If, for example, any one had, many years before, predicted that Marcus Marcellus, who was thrice consul, was to perish by a shipwreck, he would, doubtless, have been a true diviner, because such a fact could not have been foreseen by any other means than that of divination. Divination, there- fore, is a foreknowledge of events which depend on fortune.
_ VI. But can there be a just presentiment of those things which do not admit of any rational conjecture to explain why they will happen? For what do we mean when we say a thing happens by chance, or fortune, or hazard, or accident, but that something has happened or taken place wnich might 206 ON DIVINATION.
never have happened or taken place at all, or which might have happened or taken place in a different manner? Now how can that be fairly foreseen or predicted which thus takes place by chance, and the mere caprice of fortune 4 It is by reason that the physician foresees that a malady will increase, a pilot that a tempest will descend, and a general that the enemy will make certain diversions. And yet these men, who have generally good reasons on which — their opinions respecting relative probabilities are founded, are themselves often deceived. As when the husbandman sees his olive-trees in blossom, he ventures to expect that they will also bear fruit; nevertheless, he is sometimes mistaken. ' Now, if those who never assert anything but from some probable conjecture founded on reason, are often mistaken, what are we to think of the conjectures of those men who derive their presages of futurity from the entrails of victims, or birds, or prodigies, or oracles, or dreams. I have not as yet come to show how utterly null and vain such signs are, as the cleft of a liver, the note of a crow, the flight of an eagle, the shooting of a star, the voices of people in frenzy, lots and dreams, of each of which I shall speak in its turn; at present I dwell only on the general argument. How can it be fore- seen that anything will happen which has neither any as- signable cause, or mark, to show why it will happen?¢ The eclipses of the sun and moon are predicted for a series of many years before they happen, by those who make regular calculations of the courses and motions of the stars. They only foretell that which the invariable order of nature will necessarily bring about. For they perceive that in the un- deviating course of the moon’s motions, she will arrive at a _ given period at a point opposite the sun, and become so exactly under the shadow of the earth, which is the boundary of night, that she must be eclipsed. They likewise know, that when the same moon comes between the earth and the sun, the latter must appear eclipsed to the eyes of men. They know in what sign each of the wandering stars will be at a future period, and when each sign will rise and set on any specific day. So that you know on what principles those — men proceed who predict these things. VIL But what. rational rule can guide those men whe ON DIVINATION, 207 ON DIVINATION, 207 ‘predict the discovery of a treasure, or the accession to an estate? And by what series of cause and effect are the approach of events of this kind indicated? If these events, and others of the same kind, happen by any kind of neces- ‘sity, then what is there that we can suppose to be brought about by chance or fortune? For nothing is so opposite to regularity and reason as this same fortune; so that it seems to me that God himself cannot foreknow absolutely those things which are to happen by chance and fortune. For if he knows it, then it will certainly happen; and if it will certainly happen, there is no chance in the matter. But there is chance; therefore there is no such thing as a pre- sentiment of the future.
If, however, you maintain that there is no such thing as fortune, and that all things which happen, and which are about to happen, are determined by fate from all eternity, then you must change your definition of divination, which you have termed the presentiment of things fortuitous. For if nothing can happen, or come to pass, or take place, unless it has been determined from all eternity that it shall happen at a certain time what, chance can there be in anything? And if there is no such thing as chance, what becomes of your definition of divination, which you have called “a pre- sentiment of fortuitous events?” although you said that everything which happened, or which was about to happen, depended on fate. Nevertheless, a great deal is said on this subject of fate by the Stoics. But of this elsewhere.
_ To return to the question at issue. If all things happen by fate, what is the use of divination?
VIII. For that which he who divines predicts, will truly come to pass; so that I do not know what character to affix to that circumstance of an eagle making our friend King Deiotaris renounce his journey; when, if he had not turned _ back, he would have slept in a chamber which fell down in the ensuing night, and have been crushed to death in the ruins. For if his death had been decreed by fate, he could not have avoided it by divination; and if it was not decreed by fate, he could not have experienced it. | What, then, is the use of divination, or what reason is there why I should be moved by lots, or entrails, or any kind of prediction? For if in the first Punic war it had been 208 ON DIVINATION.
settled by fate, that one of the Roman fleets, commanded by the consuls Lucius Junius and Publius Clodius, should perish by a tempest, and that the other should be defeated by the Carthaginians, then even if the chickens had eaten ever so greedily, still the fleets must have been lost. But if the fleets would not have perished, if the auspices had been obeyed, then they were not destroyed by fate. But you say that everything is owing to fate; therefore there is no such thing as divination. } If fate had determined, that in the second Punic war the army of the Romans should be defeated near the lake Thra- simenus, then could this event have been avoided, even if Flaminius the consul had been obedient to those signs and those auspices which forbade him to engage in battle? Cer- tainly it might. Either, then, the army did not perish by fate—for the fates cannot be changed,—or if it did perish by fate (as you are bound to assert), then, even if Flaminius had obeyed the auspices, he must still have been defeated.
Where, then, is the divination of the Stoics? which is of no use to us whatever to warn us to be more prudent, if all things happen by destiny. For do what we will, that which is fated to happen, must happen. On the other hand, what- ever event may be averted is not fated. There is, there- fore, no divination, since this appertains to things which are certain to happen; and nothing is certain to happen, which may by any means be frustrated.
IX. Moreover, I do not even think that the knowledge of futurity would be useful to us. How miserable would have been the life of King Priam if from his youth he could have foreseen the calamities which awaited his old age! Let us, however, leave alone fables, and come to facts that are more near to us. I have recounted, in my essay entitled “Conso-, lation,” the misfortunes which have happened to the greatest men of our commonwealth. Omitting, therefore, the ancients, do you think that it would have been any advantage to Marcus Crassus, when he was flourishing with the amplest riches and gifts of fortune, to have foreknown that he should behold his son Publius slain, his forces defeated, and lose his own life beyond the Euphrates with ignominy and disgrace? Or do you think that Pompey would have experienced much satisfaction in being thrice made consul, and having received ON DIVINATION, 209 ON DIVINATION, 209 three triumphs, and having attained the summit of glory by his heroic actions, if he could have foreseen that he should be assassinated in the deserts of Egypt after the defeat of his _ army, and. that after his death those disasters should happen which we cannot mention without tears?
What do we think of Cesar? Would it have been any pleasure to Ceesar to have anticipated by divination, that one day, in the midst of the throng of senators whom he himself had elected, in the temple of Victory built by Pompey, and before that general’s statue, and before the eyes of so many of his own centurions, he should be slain by the noblest citizens, some of whom were indebted to him for their digni- ties,—aye, slain under such circumstances that not one of his friends, or even of his servants, would venture to approach him? Could he have foreseen all this, in what wretchedness would he have passed his life?
It is, therefore, certainly more advantageous for man to be ignorant of future evils than to know them, For it cannot be said, at least not by the Stoics, that Pompey would not have taken up arms, nor Crassus passed the Euphrates, nor Ceesar engaged in the civil war, if they had foreseen the future; therefore the end which they met with was not in- evitably ordained by fate. For you insist upon it that all things happen by fate, therefore divination would have availed them nothing. It would even have deprived them of all enjoy- _ ment in the earlier part of their lives; for what gratification could they have enjoyed if they had been always thinking of their end?
Therefore, to whatever argument the Stoics resort in defence of divination, their ingenuity is always baffled. For if that which is to happen may happen in different modes, then, indeed, fortune may have great power; but that which is fortuitous cannot be certain. If, on the other hand, every event is absolutely determined by fate, and the time and cir- cumstance in connexion with which it is to take place, what Service can diviners render us by informing us that very sad events are portended for us?: X. They add, moreover, that when we are duly attentive to religious ceremonies, all things will fall more lightly on us. But if everything happens by fate, no religious ceremonies can lighten the event, Homer acknowledges this, when he DE NAT. ETO, 9106 ON DIVINATION.
introduces Jupiter uttering complaints that he cannot save the life of his son Sarpedon against the order of fate; and ‘the same sentiment is expressed in the Greek verse— Great Destiny o’ermaster’s Jove himself. It appears to me that such a fate as this is justly ridiculed by the Atellane plays; but on such a serious subject we must not allow ourselves to be facetious.
I therefore conclude with this observation. If we cannot foresee anything which happens by chance, since that thing is necessarily uncertain, therefore there is no divination; and if, on the contrary, things that are to happen can be foreseen because they happen by an infallible fatality, there is no divination, because you say divination only relates to for- tuitous events.: But what I have hitherto said respecting divination may be looked upon as a mere slight skirmishing of oratory. I must now enter on the contest in good earnest, and prepare to encounter the most formidable arguments of your cause.
XT. For you say that there exist two kinds of divination, —one artificial, the other natural. The artificial consists partly in conjecture, partly in continued observation.
The natural, on the other hand, is what the mind lays hold of or receives externally from the divinity, from which we all derive the origin, and fashioning, and preservation of our minds. Under the artificial divination you enumerate several varieties of divination connected with the inspection of -entrails, the observation of thunderstorms and prodigies, and the auguries, of those who deal in signs and omens. And under this artificial class you include all kinds of conjectural divination.
As to the natural species of divination, it appears to be sent forth and to issue either from a certain ecstasy of the spirit, or to be conceived by the mind when disengaged from the senses and from cares by sleep. But you suppose that all divination is derived from three things—God, Fate, and Nature. But as you could give no sound explanation, you laboured to confirm it by a wonderful multitude of imaginary examples, concerning which you must permit me to say, that a philosopher ought not to use evidences which may be true through accident, or false and fictitious through malice, It behoves you to show, by reason and argument, why each circum ON DIVINATION. 912 stance happens as it does, rather than by the events, especially when they are such as I am quite unable to give credit to.
XII. To begin then with the Soothsayers, whose science I believe that the interest of Religion and the State requires to be upheld. But as we are alone, it behoves us, and myself more especially, to examine the truth without partiality, since I am in doubt on many points.
Let us proceed, if you please, first to consider the inspec- tion of the entrails of victims. Can you then persuade any man in his senses, that those events which are said to be signified by the entrails, are known by the augurs in con- - sequence of a long series of observations? How long, I wonder! For what period of time can such observations have been continued? What conferences must the augurs hold among themselves to determine which part of the victim's entrails represents the enemy, and which the people; what sort of cleft in the liver denoted danger, and what sort presaged advantage? Have the augurs of the Etrurians, the Eleans, the Egyptians, and the Carthaginians arranged these matters with one another? But that, besides that it is quite impossi- ble, cannot be imagined. For we see that some interpret the auspices in one way, and some in another, and no ‘common rule of discipline is acknowledged among the professors of the art; and certainly if some secret virtue existed in the victim’s entrails which clearly declared the future, it must either belong to the universal nature of things, or be connected in some way or other with the Deity himself. But what com- munication can there exist between so great and so divine a nature of things, one so beautiful, and so admirably diffused throughout every part and motion, and (I will not say) the gall of the cock, (though that, indeed, is said by many to be the most significant of all signs,) but the liver, or heart, or lungs of a fat bullock? Can such things possibly teach us the hidden mysteries of futurity? | XIII. Democritus, speaking as a natural philosopher, than which no class of men are more arrogant, on this subject, — trifles ingeniously enough. | Man, who knows not the common facts of earth, Must waste his time in star-gazing. a He remarks, that the colour and condition of the vietim’s entrails may indicate the nature of the pasturage, and the 212 ON DIVINATION, abundance or scarcity of those things which the earth brings forth, He even supposes they may guide our opinions respecting the wholesomeness or pestilential state of the atmosphere, O happy man! such a person can certainly never want amusement. The idea of any one being so enchanted with such trifling, as not to see that this theory might be plausible, if, indeed, the entrails of all animals assumed the same appearance and colour at one and the same time! But if we discover that the liver of one animal is sound and healthy, and that of another withered and ' diseased at the same moment, what indication can we draw from the state and colour of the entrails?
Does this at all resemble the indications from which that Pherecydes, in a case which you have cited, predicted the approach of an earthquake from the drying up of a spring? It required a little confidence, I think, after the earthquake had taken place, to-presume to say what power had produced it; [but] could they even foresee that it would take place at all from the appearance of a running spring? Many such stories are recounted in the schools, but we are not obliged to believe the whole of them. But even supposing that what Democritus says is true, when do we seek to know the general phenomena of nature by an examination of entrails; or when did soothsayers ever tell us anything of the sort from such an inspection? They warn us of danger from fire or water. Sometimes they predict that inheritances will be added to our fortunes, and sometimes that we shall lose what we already possess. ‘They regard the cleft in the lungs as a matter of’ vital importance to our property and our very life; they in- vestigate the top of the liver on all sides with the most scrupulous exactness, and if by any chance they cannot dis- cover it, they affirm that nothing more disastrous could have happened.
XIV. It is impossible, as I have before observed, that such a system of observation can have any certainty about it; such divination as this flourished not among the ancients; it is the invention of mere art, if, indeed, there can be any art, properly so called, of things unknown. But what connexion has it with the nature of things? And even if it were united and joined therewith, so as to form one harmonious whole, which I see is the opinion of the natural philosophers, ON DIVINATION. ee and especially of those who say that all things that exist are. but one whole; still what correspondence can there be between the order of the universe and the discovery of a treasure? For if an increase of my wealth is indicated by the entrails of a victim, and this fact is a necessary link in the chain of nature, then it follows, in the first place, that we must suppose that the entrails themselves form other links; and secondly, that my private gain is connected with the nature of things. Are not the natural philosophers ashamed to say such things as these? For, although theré may be some connexion in the nature of things, which I admit to be possible,—(for the Stoics have collected many cases which they think confirm the notion, as when they assert that the little livers of little mice increase in winter, and that dry pennyroyal flourishes in the coldest weather, and that the distended vesicles, in which the seeds of its berries are contained, then burst asunder; that the chords of a stringed instrument at times give notes different from their usual ones; that oysters and other shell-fish increase and decrease with the growth and waning of the moon; and that trees lose their vitality as the moon declines, just as they dry up in winter, and that this is the time to cut them, Why need I speak of the seas, and the tides of the ocean, the flow and ebb of which are said to be governed by the moon? and many other examples might be related to prove that some natural connexion subsists between objects appa- rently remote and incongruous.
XV. Let us grant this, for it does not in the least make against our argument;)—granting, I say, that there is a cleft of some kind in a liver, does that indicate gain to any one? By what natural affinity, by what harmony, by what secret accord of nature, or, to use the Greek term, by what sympathy can you discern a necessary relation between a cleft liver and my gain, or between my gain and heaven and earth, and the universal nature of things?
I may even grant you this, though I shall be greatly damaging my argument if I allow that there is any connexion between nature and entrails.
But suppose I make this concession, how does it happen that he who would obtain some benefit from the Gods can discover, just when he wishes, a victim exactly adapted to his ‘ 214 ON DIVINATION, purpose? I had thought this objection was unanswerable, but see how cleverly you get over it. I do not blame you for this, I rather commend your memory. But I am ashamed of Antipater, Chrysippus, and Posidonius, who all assert the same proposition—namely, that the divine and sentient energy which extends through the universe, directs us even in the choice of the victim by whose entrails we are to frame our divinations. And to improve upon this theory, you agree with them in asserting that at the very instant that the sacrifice is offered, a certain appropriate change takes place in.
the victim’s entrails, so that we can therein discover some significant addition or deficiency, since all things are obedient to.
the will of the Gods.
Believe me, there is not an old woman in the world so. superstitious as gravely to believe these things. Can you. imagine that the same bullock, if chosen by one man, will.
have the head of the liver, and if chcsen by another will not, have it? Can this. same head come and go at the instant just to accommodate the individual who offers the sacrifice? Do you not perceive that there must be considerable chance in the choice of the victim? and in fact the thing speaks for itself, that this must be the case. For when one ill-omened.
victim is discovered to have had no head to its liver, it often happens that the one which is offered immediately afterwards.
has the most perfect entrails imaginable. What then becomes of the menaces of the first victim’s entrails, or how have the Gods been so suddenly appeased?
XVI. But you will say, that in the entrails of the fat bull which Ceesar offered, there was no heart, and sinée it was not. possible that this animal could have lived without a heart, we must suppose that the heart was annihilated at the instant of immolation. How is it that you think it impossi- ble that an animal can live without a heart, and yet do not think it impossible that, its heart could vanish so suddenly, nobody knows whither? For myself, I know not how much vigour in a heart is necessary to carry on the vital function, and suspect that if afflicted by any disease, the heart of a victim may be found so withered, and wasted, and small, as to be quite unlike a heart. But on what argument can you build an opinion that the heart of this same fat bullock, if it existed in him before, disappeared at the instant of immola-, ON DIVINATION, 215 tion? Did the bullock behold Czesar in a heartless condition even while arrayed in the purple, and thom lose its own heart by mere force of sympathy?
Believe me, you are betraying the ode of philosophy while defending its castles. In trying to prove the truth of the auguries, you are overturnin ng the whole system of physics. A victim has a heart, and head of the liver: the moment that you sprinkle him with meal and wine they depart, some God carries them off, some power destroys or consumes them. It is not nature alone, therefore, which causes the decay and destruction of everything; and there are some things which arise out of nothing, and some which suddenly perish and become nothing. What natural philosopher ever said such a thing as this? The soothsayers affirm it. Do you then think that you are to believe them rather than the natural philosopher st XVII. Again, when you sacrifice to several Gods at the same time, how is it that the sacrifice is favourably received by some, and is rejected by others? And what inconsistency must there be among the Gods, if they threaten by the first entrails, and promise good fortune by the second! Or is there such strong dissension among the Deities, even when they are nearly related to each other, that certain entrails bode good when offered to Apollo, and evil when offered to his sister Diana? It is clear that since the victims are brought by chance, the entrails must in the case of each sacrificer depend upon what victim falls to his share, and that very thing requires some divination to know what victim falls to each person’s share, as, in the case of lots, what is drawn by each person, ' Then you will speak of lots, though you are not strengthen- ing the authority of sacrifices by comparing them to lots, but weakening that of lots by comparing them to sacrifices.
Do you think, when we send a messenger to Alquime- lium to bring us a lamb to sacrifice, and the lamb which is brought to me possesses entrails peculiarly accommodated to the circumstances of the case, that the messenger has been guided to him not by chance, but by divine direction? For if you wish to signify that in this case chance interferes, as being some lot connected with the will of the Gods, I am sorry that your friends the Stoics should give the Epicureans 216 ON DIVINATION, 216 ON DIVINATION, such occasion to ridicule them, for you know well how they deride all such ideas, And, indeed, it is no hard matter to be facetious on such an idea. Epicurus, in order to show his wit on the subject, introduced transparent airy deities, residing, as it were, be- tween the two worlds as between two groves, that they may avoid destruction from the fall of either. These deities, it seems, possess bodies like ourselves, though I cannot find that they make any use of them.
Epicurus therefore, who, by a roundabout argument of this kind, takes away the Gods, naturally feels no hesitation in taking away divination also. But though he is consistent with himself, the Stoics are not; for as the God of Epicurus never troubles himself with any business, either regarding himself or others; he, therefore, cannot grant divination to men. On the other hand, the God of the Stoics, even though he does not grant divination, must still regulate the affairs of the universe and take care of mankind.
Why, then, do you involve yourself in these dilemmas ‘which you can never disentangle? For this is the way in which, when they are in a hurry, they usually sum up the matter—*“ If there are Gods, there must be divination; but there are gods, therefore there is divination.” It would be much more plausible to say—‘“ There is no divination, there- fore there are no Gods.” Observe how imprudently the Stoics make this assertion, that if there is no divination, there are no Gods; for divination is plainly discarded, and yet we must retain a belief in Gods.
XVIII. After having thus destroyed divination by the in- spection of entrails, all the rest of the science of the sooth- sayers is at an end; for prodigies and lightning follow in the same category. With respect to the latter, their predictions are founded on a long series of observations, while the interpretation of prodigies proceeds chiefly on inference and conjecture.
What observations, then, have been made about lightning? The Etrurians, forsooth, have divided heaven into sixteen parts; for it was not very difficult to double the four quarters, which we recognise, into eight, and then to repeat the process, so as by that means to say from what direc- tion the lightning had come. But in the first place, what ON DIVINATION. | 217 difference does it make? Secondly, what does such a thing intimate?
Is it not plain from the astonishment which was at first excited in men’s minds, because they feared the thunder and the hurling of the thunderbolt, that they believed that they were the immediate manifestations brought about by the all-powerful ruler of all things, Jupiter? This is the reason of the enactment in the public registers, that the comitia of the people shall not be held when Jupiter thunders and lightens. It was enacted, perhaps with a view to the interest of the state, for our ancestors wished to have pretexts for not holding the comitia. Therefore, in the case of the comitia, lightning is the only vitiating irregularity. But in all other matters it is a most favourable auspice if it comes on the left hand. But we will speak of the auspices hereafter; at present we will confine ourselves to lightning.
XIX. What can be less proper for natural philosophers to say, than that anything certain is indicated by things which are uncertain? I cannot believe that you are one of those who imagine that there were Cyclopes in mount Aitna who forged Jove’s thunderbolt, for it would be wonderful indeed if Jupiter should so often throw it away when he had but one. Nor would he warn men by his thunderbolts what they should do or what they should avoid.
For the opinion of the Stoics on this point is, that the exhalations of the earth which are cold, when they begin to flow abroad, become winds; and when they form themselves into clouds, and begin to divide and break up their fine particles by repeated and vehement gusts, then thunder and lightning ensue; and that when by the conflict of the clouds the heat is Squeezed out so as to emit itself, then there is lightning. Can we, then, look for any intimation of futurity in a thing which we see brought about by the mere force of nature, without any regularity or any determined periods?
If Jupiter wished that we should form divinations by lightnings, would he throw away so many flashes in vain? for what good does he do when he throws a thunderbolt into the middle of the sea, or upon lofty mountains, which is very common, or upon deserts, or in the countries of those nations among which no meteorological observations are made? Oh! but a head was discovered in the Tyber. As if I 218 ON DIVINATION.
affirmed that those soothsayers had no skill! What I deny is only their divination. For the distribution of the firma- ment, which we have just mentioned, and their various observations, enable them to note the direction from which the lightning has proceeded, and where it falls. But no reason can inform us of its signification. XX. You will, however, urge against me my own verses— The father of the Gods who reigns supreme - On high Olympus, smote his proper fane, And harl'd his lightnings through the heart of Rome. At the same time the statue of Natta and the images of the Gods, and Romulus and Remus, with that of the beast who was nursing them, were struck by the thunderbolt and thrown down; and the answers of the soothsayers, with reference to these prodigies, were found perfectly correct. That also was a surprising thing, that the statue of Jupiter was placed in the Capitol, two years later than it had been contracted for, at the very time that information of the conspiracy was being laid before the senate, Will you, then, (for this is the way you are used to argue with me,) bring yourself to uphold that side of the question in opposition to your own actions and writings? | | You are my brother, and all you say is entitled to my respect. Yet what is there here that offends you? Is it the thing itself, which is of such and such a character, or I myself, who only wish to get at the truth? I therefore say nothing upon it for the sake of contradiction, and only seek from you yourself information respecting all the prin- ciples of the art of soothsaying. - But you have involved yourself in an inextricable dilemma; for foreseeing that you would be hard pressed, when I should urge you to explain the cause of every divination, you made many excuses to show why, when you were sure of the fact, you did not inquire into its principles and causes,—that the question was, what was done, and not why it was done; as if I granted that it was done at all, or as if it were not the duty of a philosopher to inquire into the reason why every- thing takes place. At the same time you quoted my prog- nostics, and spoke-of the scammony, the aristoloch, and other herbs, whose virtues were evident to you from their effects, though the law of their operation was unknown to you.
ON DIVINATION, 219: XXT. All this is, however, beside the main question. For the Stoic Boethus, whose name you have cited, and even our friend Posidonius have investigated the causes of prognostics,, and though it is not easy to discover the cause of such occult mysteries, yet the facts themselves may be observed and animadverted upon.