“This subject,” says Williams, “has been treated with much dignity by a writer who is admired by all mankind for his eloquence, but who is, if possible, still more admired by all competent judges for his philosophy. I allude to Burke, of whom I may justly say that he was ‘gravissimus et dicendi et imtelligendi auctor et magister;’ and I cannot refuse myself the gratification of quoting his words:-—‘ The science of jurisprudence,’ says he, ‘is the pride of the human intel- lect; for, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, it is the col- lected reason of ages, combining the principles. of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns.’ Dr. Johnsou’s reply to a person who was foolishly abusing the profession of the law, was, ‘ Do you presume, sir, to find fault with that study which is the last effort. of human intelligence acting upon human experience?’ ” * Law,” says Sir W. Blackstone, * is a science which distinguishes the criterions of right and wrong; which teaches us to establish the one, and prevent, punish, and redress the other; which employs in its theory the noblest faculties of the soul, and exerts in its practice the cardinal virtues of the heart. A science which is universal in its use and extent, accommodated to each individual, yet comprehending the whole community.” ¢; Sir), EE LS a 396 A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF ** The science of jurisprudence,” says Sir James Mackintosh, in his discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations, “is cer- tainly the most honourable occupation of the understanding, because it is most immediately subservient to the general safety and com- fort. There is not, in my opinion, in the whole compass of human affairs, so noble a spectacle as that which is displayed in the progress of jurisprudence; where we contemplate the cautious and unwearied exertions of a succession of wise men through a long course of ages, withdrawing every case as it arises from the dangerous power of discretion, and subjecting it to inflexible rules; extending the dominion — of justice and reason, and gradually contracting, within the narrowest possible limits, the domain of brutal force and arbitrary will.” Granting the justice of these remarks, we cannot help lamenting that the science of jurisprudence or universal law, properly so called, should be so little studied in our British state at present. When we look into the history of literature, we find the times have been, in which men of the most consummate genius devoted that genius with the most ardent perseverance and the most mathematical precision, to the study of jurisprudence in its very loftiest and widest bearings. They hesitated not, through many years of incessant labour, like Grotius abroad and Selden at home, to study the vast system of moral obligations. In order to make themselves jurisconsults worthy of the name, they studied the divine laws handed down in Scripture, and developed in the ecclesiastical policy, ancient and modern. They studied the law of nature and nations, as explained by its oriental - and classical commentators. They studied the civil laws of all states and commonwealths, and, by a kind of comparative analysis, elicited the spirit of laws among all peoples, and confirmed just regulations by examples derived from the catholic experience of men in all ages and countries, and defeated the blunders of legislation, by showing their pernicious consequences under every variety of circumstance. Such men still appear occasionally in Kurope and America. A few such may still grace the colleges, and the inns of court, or the open walks of literature; but their number has certainly become deplorably limited. We scarcely ever can find the man, now-a-days, who has studied jurisprudence in its loftier and broader relations,—a man who, like Grotius, Selden, Montesquieu, or Sir W. Jones, can esta- blish the doctrines of a sage and philosophical legislation by an over- whelming accumulation of testimonies and facts calculated to inspire confidence and ensure success. In consequence, we meet with few who rise to those syncretic and universal maxims of equity and law, which throw a moral radiance through the long current of decisions, simplify the legal economy in its most important branches, and dis- perse the technical abuses that profane the sanctuary of Themis. Such men are valuable in proportion to their rarity. be deserve the best patronage and promotion that the state can give them; for they are the true prophets and oracles of jurisprudence,—and they Pavia ii |: Pavia ii |: . CICERO’S TREATISE ON THE LAWS. 397 can speak with the force and precision of science, while others are eeerecing through the perilous by-paths of, quackery, pretence, and ap-hazard.
But such men are not encouraged, and consequently their number is insignificant. Legal philosophy is slighted and unrewarded; while legal practice, however erroneous, is profusely paid for. The conse- quence is so plain and palpable that it has struck most of the Italian, German, and French writers on the subject. They say, “ Britain has no jurists, but she has lawyers in abundance.” (See Filangieri, Sa- vigny, Pastoret, Constant, Guizot, Sismondi, Chateaubriand, &c.)
This dangerous tendency of the age to sacrifice the higher doctrines of political and legal philosophy,—such as most tend to develop the national mind and national resources,—to a merely secular practice, which will take any form and impression for the sake of interest and emolument, is too much noted. ‘‘ These lower studies,” says the author of the Natural History of Enthusiasm, “fall in marvellously well with the frigid timidity of the times, and the love of practical utility. But that kind of discretion which can sacrifice truth for the sake of lucre, is always short-sighted and fraught with peril.” ' We do sincerely believe that a sound knowledge of jurisprudence is quite as necessary as a familiarity with the practice of our courts, for all those who would truly deserve the name of legal reformers. And we more strenuously insist on this indispensable combination of theory and practice in relation to legal reforms, because it affords us the only hope of those ameliorations which have become of the utmost importance to the welfare of the British empire. 5 ON THE LAWS.
BOOK I.
INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST BOOK.
Marcus Triurvs Cicero has composed this treatise in the form of a dialogue, in which himself, his brother Quintus, and Atticus, are the interlocutors. Cicero supposes this dialogue to take place near his villa at Arpinum, on the banks of the river Liris, and beneath the Shade of a grove, in the midst of which grew an ancient oak. The - sight of this tree reminds Atticus of the oak which Cicero had described in a poem which he once composed in honour of Marius. From this circumstance he takes occasion to compliment Cicero on his poetry. The conversation then turns upon history; and Quintus observes, that he knew no one better able than his brother to write the history of his country,and presses him to undertake it. This Cicero declines, and turns the discourse to the subject of universal justice, and the law of nature and nations.
I. Atticus.—I recognise this as the very grove, and this oak, too, as the oak of Arpinum, the description of which I have often read in your poem on Marius. If that oak still exists, this must certainly be it: and, indeed, it appears extremely old.
Quintus Cicero.—Yes, my Atticus, it does exist, and always will exist, for it is a nursling of genius. No such long-lived stock can be planted by the care of the agriculturist as may be sown by the verse of the poet.
Atticus.—How can that happen, my Quintus? And what sort of seed is that which poets can sow? For you seem to me, in eulogizing your brother, to be putting in a word for yourself, Quintus.—You may say that if you please, but as long as the Latin language is spoken, an oak which will be called Marius’s oak will never be wanting in this place; and as Sceevola said of my brother’s poem on Marius, it will Extend its hoary age through countless years. Unless, indeed, you believe that your Athenians have been able really to preserve the olive in their citadel free from ON THE LAWS) * 399 death, or that tall and slender palm-tree which the people of Delos show to this day, is the same which Homer’s Ulysses says that he had beheld at Delos; and there are many other things, in many places, the memorial of which endures beyond the term of any possible natural existence: this eeprsnionessis, 3 oak, then, out of which there once did fly Jove’s golden eagle, dazzling as the sun, is at present the genuine tree. But when storms and the lapse of ages shall have wasted it, there will still be found an oak on this sacred spot, which will be called the Oak - Marius.
_ Aitticus.—I do not doubt it; but there is one qiieation which I would ask, not of you, but of the poet Marcus him- self; whether the tree is indebted for its celebrity to his verses alone, or whether the circumstance which they record really happened in the history of Marius?
Marcus Cicero.—I will answer you frankly; but not till you have first informed me what you think of the tradition which asserts, that not far from your house at Rome, Proculus Julius beheld our first king Romulus walking after his decease, and that Romulus told him that he had become a god, and that his name was Quirinus; and he ordered a temple to be dedicated to him on that spot. Tell me also what you think of the tradition of the Athenians, who maintain that not far from your Athenian villa, Boreas made a stolen match with Orithya, for so runs the story.
Atticus.—For what purpose do you ask me such gs “18 as these?
Marcus.—For no purpose at all, unless it be to convince you that we had better not inquire too critically into those remarkable accounts which have been thus handed down by tradition.
Atticus —But there are many statements in your Marius which are the subjects of inquiry as to whether they are true or false; and some people expect the strictest accuracy from you, because the events of which you speak are fresh in men’s memory, and because you are speaking of one who, like your- self, was a native of Arpinum.
Mareus.—I myself, also, should be unwilling to gain the reputation of a liar, But ‘yet some of these inquisitors, my 400 * ON THE LAWS.
Atticus, show great ignorance of the subject, who expect an exact statement of matters of fact in a work of this nature, as | if the author were not a poet, but a witness. And yet, I doubt not that these critics really believe that Numa did converse with Egeria, and that the Eagle did really replace his cap on the head of the first Tarquin.
Quintus.—I understand you, my brother; you think that the laws which ought to bind a historian are quite different from those which require to be observed in a poem.
Marcus.—Certainly; inasmuch as the main object of the former is truth in all its relations, while that of the latter is amusement; although in Herodotus,’ the father of Greek history, and in Theopompus, we find fables in great numbers.
Il, Atticus.—I have now found the opportunity which I wanted, and I shall not let it slip.
, Marcus.—What opportunity, Atticus?
_ Atticus—Men have long ago asked, or rather implored ‘you, to write a history; for they conceive that if you under- took this literary enterprise, the result would be that, even in the historical department, we should be nowise inferior to Greece, And if you will listen to my opinion, it seems to me that you owe this gift, not only to the affection of those who are delighted with literature, but to your country too, in order that, since you have saved her, you should endeavour likewise to adorn her. For a good history is a desideratum in our national literature, as I know by my own experience, and.as I have often heard you declare. Now, there is no man more likely than yourself to give general satisfaction in a work of this kind, since by your own avowal, it is of all the 1 There is nothing more unjust and false, than the charges made by the Romans against the truthfulness of Herodotus and the Greek historians in general. As for Herodotus, in particular, there is no historian in any language more scrupulous to relate nothing which he does not believe to be true. He also considered it not inconsistent with the province of a historian, to record such reports as were communicated to him by the priests and other natives of the countries of which he was speaking. But he not only gives his authorities, so as to enable us to judge for ourselves how much trust may be reposed in them, but he often even states expressly that he does not believe the story which has been told him. In fact, the Greck historians were as a body very scrupulous lovers of truth, And the first author who ever undertook to write a history utterly regardless of the truth of his statements, and too careless to make the slightest inquiry, was Livy.: Se eee eee eh ON THE LAWS. 401 forms of composition that which most demands the eloquence of the orator.
Wherefore, I entreat you, undertake this work, and devote your time to this employment, which has been hitherto un- known to our fellow-citizens, or at least neglected by them. For after the annals of the chief Pontiffs, than which nothing can be more interesting,’ we come to the ‘book of Fabius, or of Cato, whom you are always eulogizing, or to the treatises of Piso, Fannius, and Venonius; though perhaps one of them may be more vigorous than another, still are they not all ex- tremely defective? The contemporary of Fannius, Ccelius Antipater, adopted a bolder style of expression. He had, indeed, some energy, was rude and rough, without much polish or skill, but he served as a sort of warning to his suc- cessors, to write with more accuracy and eloquence.. But unfortunately he had for his successors a Gellius, a Claudius, an Asellio, who, far from improving on him, relapsed into the dulness and insipidity of earlier writers.
I scarcely need to mention Attius. His garrulity is not without neatness, though he has derived it not so much from the learned Grecian authors, as from the petty Latin scrib-— blers. In his style he is prolix, and full of conceits, which he indulges in the most shameless manner. His friend Sisenna far surpasses all our historical writers, unless there be any whose compositions have not yet been published, and of whom we cannot judge. He, however, has never gained a name as an orator among those of your rank; and in his history he betrays a sort of puerility. He seems to have read no Greek author but Clitarchus, and he is content to * imitate him; but even if he were to succeed in his imitation, he would still be far enough from the best style. Therefore the task of historian of right belongs to you, and we shall expect you to accomplish it, unless Quintus can bring forward any reasonable objections.
IIL. Quintus.—I have nothing to say against it. Indeed we have often talked over the subject together, and I have made the same request as yourself; but there is a slight dis- agreement between us on the subject.
1 The reading of MSS. is jwcundius. But many critics propose to read jujunius, more scanty; which would certainly make better sense.
DE NAT. ETC. DD ali.
402 ON THE LAWS, A tticus.—How so!
Quintus.—Why, respecting the a from whence he should eommence his history. For, in my opinion, he ought to go back to the most distant ages, since the accounts that have hitherto been published respecting those times are so written as never to be read. But he himself, on the other hand, wishes to confine himself to the events that have hap- ‘pened within the recollection of his own age, so as only to describe those public affairs in which he himself bore a part. Atticus.—In this respect I rather agree with him. For the grandest events in Roman history are probably those that have taken place within our own recollection. And then, too, he will be able to illustrate the praises of our noble friend Pompey, and describe the memorable year of his own consul- ship, which I would much rather have related by him than anything about Romulus and Remus, as the saying is.
Marcus.—\1 know, my Atticus, that you and other friends have long urged me to this undertaking, nor should I be at all unwilling to attempt it, if I could find any free and leisure time. But. it is vain to enter on so extensive a work while my mind is harassed with cares, and my hands are full of business. Such an undertaking requires a perfect freedom from care and political business.
Atticus,—What can you mean? What leisure time did you ever find for those other works of which you have. written more than any other of our Roman authors?
. Marcus. —Why, certain spare times occur to every man, and these I make a rule not to lose. For instance, if I spend a few days in rusticating at my country seat, I employ them in composing a part of those essays which I may have deter- mined to write. But an historical work cannot be begun at all unless one has leisure time prepared beforehand, nor can it be completed in a short time. And my mind is thrown into a miserable state of suspense when, after having fairly com- ‘macneéd some work, I am drawn away in some other direction; nor do I find it as easy to recover the train of ideas in works .80 interrupted, as to bring works when begun at once 10 a conclusion.
Attiews.—Your argument, then, would. show that you re- _ quire an appointment as ambassador, or some similar free and unoccupied holiday, for -_ Pee) ON THE LAWS. 403 Marcus.—\ would rather trust to the holiday to which I am entitled by my age, especially asI do not refuse, after the method of our ancestors, to continue the custom of giving magisterial advice to my clients, and thus to discharge the offices of old age gracefully and honourably. And in such a situation, I should be able to give as much time as I might choose, not only to the work which you require, but to others still more extensive and important.. ti IV. Attiews—I fear that few will accept such an apology for your retirement, and that you will be obliged to speak in public as long as you live. And I regret this the more, as you have already changed your manner of delivery, and have instituted another style of eloquence. So that as your friend Roscius the actor, in his old age, was forced to give up his most brilliant modulations, and to adapt the instrumental accom- paniments to a slower measure; so you also, my Cicero, find | it necessary daily to relax from those lofty conflicts of oratory | to which you have been accustomed, so that your eloquence ‘is already not much removed from the gentle conversation of — philosophers...Aud since the extremest old age is still capable of undergoing that amount of exertion, I see that your retire- ment will never be allowed to excuse you from pleading causes. | Quintus.—But I indeed think that the citizens of Rome might be induced to sanction your retirement from public life, if you still consented to plead in legal matters..So, whenever you please, I think you ought to try.
Marcus.—Your advice, my Quintus, would be excellent if there were no danger in taking stich a step. But I fear that in thus. seeking to diminish my labours, I should rather in- crease them; and that I might find that I had united to the toil of public causes and prosecutions (which I never attempt to plead without full preparation and meditation) the addi- tion of this professional interpretation of the laws, which would not distress me so much by its labour, as by its ten- dency to deprive me of that time for deliberation as to what I should speak, without which I never ventured to enter on any considerable: pleadings. jee te . Atticus.—Why should you not then, in this spare time, as you callit, at present, explain these very points to us, and write usa treatise on the civil law with more accuracy than others have DD2 404 ON THE LAWS.
hitherto employed. For even from your earliest youth, I remember that you used to study the laws, when I used to go, like yourself, to hear the lectures of Sczvola; nor did I ever find you so addicted to oratorical pursuits as to neglect your legal studies.
Marcus.—You seek to engage me in a long discussion, my Atticus. However, I will not hesitate to undertake it, unless Quintus prefers some other subject.. If not, I will tell you all I know about it, since at present we seem to be at leisure.
Quintus.—I shall listen to you with the greatest pleasure, for what better subject can be discussed, or how can the day be spent more profitably?
Marcus.—Let us go, then, to our accustomed promenade, and to the benches, where, after we have had walking enough, we may lie down. Nor shall we want for entertainment while asking different questions of one another.: Atticus.—Let us go, then, and enter on our investigations, as we walk along the bank of the river under the shadow of its foliage. And now begin, I beg of you, to explain to us your opinion respecting the nature of Civil Law.
Marcus.—My opinion? Why, that we have had many great men in Rome, who have made it their profession to expound it to the people, and explain its doctrines and practice. But though they professed to be acquainted with its great princi- ples, they were in reality familiar rather with its minuter technicalities. For what can be grander or nobler than the jurisprudence of a state? or what can be so insignificant ag the office of those men who are consulted as advocates, neces- sary as it is for the people? Not that 1 think that those who adopt this profession have been altogether ignorant of the principles of universal legislation, but they have united their _ practice of this civil law, as they call it, to just so much as | gives them a hold on the interests of the people. But the great principles of jurisprudence are unknown, and less neces- sary in practice. What, then, is it that you invite me to? or what.are you exhorting me to? to write treatises on the rights of common sewers and partition walls? or to compose formulas of stipulations and judgments? These have been already most diligently prepared by many persons, and are _ lower than the topics which, I suppose, you expect me to — discuss,: a ON THE LAWS. 405 ON THE LAWS. 405 V. Alticus.—But, if you ask what I expect, I should reply, that after having given us a treatise on the Common- wealth, it appears a natural consequence that you should also write one on the Laws. Yor this is what I see was done by your illustrious favourite Plato, the philosopher whom you admire and prefer to all others, and love with an especial affection, Marcus.—Do you wish, then, that, as he conversed at Crete with Clinias, and Megillus of Lacedzemon, on that sum- mer’s day, as he describes it, in the cypress groves and sylvan avenues of Cnossus, often objecting to, and at times approving of, the established laws and customs of commonwealths, and discussed what were the best laws; so we also, walking beneath these lofty poplars, along these green and umbrageous banks, and sometimes sitting down, should investigate the same sub- jects somewhat more copiously than is required by the prac- tice of the courts of law?; Atticus.—I should like to hear sucha discussion.
Marcus.—But what says Quintus?
- Quintus.—There is no subject which I would rather hear argued..., Marcus.—And you are quite right. For, take my word for it, in no kind of discussion can it be more advantageously displayed how much has been bestowed upon man by nature, and how great a capacity for the noblest enterprises is im- planted in the mind of man, for the sake of cultivating and perfecting which we were born and sent into the world, and what beautiful association, what natural fellowship, binds men together by reciprocal charities: and when we have explained these grand and universal principles of morals, then the true fountain of laws and rights can be discovered.
Atticus.—In your opinion, then, it is not in the edict of: the magistrate, as the majority of our modern lawyers pretend, nor in the Twelve Tables, as the ancients maintained, but in the sublimest doctrines of philosophy, that we must seek for the true source and obligation of jurisprudence, | Marcus.—For in this discussion of ours, my Atticus, we are not inquiring how we may take proper caution in law, or what we are to answer in each consultation,—that may indeed be an important affair, as in truth it is; and at one time it was supported by many great men, and is at present ex+ 406 ON THE LAWS: pounded by one most eminent lawyer with admirable ability and skill.
But the whole subject of universal law at jurispr udence must be comprehended in’ this discussion, in order that this which we call civil law, may be confined in some one small and narrow space of nature. For we shall have to explain the true nature of moral justice, which must be traced back from the nature of man. And laws will have to be considered by which all political states should be governed. And last of all, shall we have to speak of those laws and customs of_ nations, which are framed for the use and convenience of par= ticular countries, (in which even our own people will not be omitted,) which are known by the title of civil laws.
VI. Quintus.—You take a noble view of the subject, my brother, and go to the fountain-head, in order to throw light: on the subject of our consideration; and those who treat. civil law in any other manner, are not so much pointing out the paths of justice as those of litigation.
Marcus.—That is not quite the case, my Quintus. It is not.so much the science of law that. produces litigation, as the ignorance of it. But more of this by-and-by. At pre= sent: let us examine the first principles of Right. _ Now, many learned men have maintained that it springs from law. I hardly know if their opinion be not correct, at least according to their own definition; for “ law,” say they,: “is the highest reason implanted in nature, which prescribes those things which ought to be done, and forbids the con- trary.” And when this same reason is confirmed and estax blished in men’s minds, it is then law.
They therefore conceive that prudence is a law, hens | operation is to urge us to good actions, and restrain us from: evil ones. And they think, too, that the Greek name for law (vdj0s), which is derived from: véno, to distribute, implies the very nature of the thing, that is, to give every man his due. The Latin name, lex, conveys the idea of selection, a legendo. According to the Greeks, therefore, the name: of law implies an’ equitable distribution: according to the Romans, an — equitable selection. And, indeed, both characteristics mene 4 pearly to law..
_And if this be a correct statement, which it seems to me for the most part to be, then the origin of right is to be — ON THE LAWS. 407.
sought in the law. For this is the true energy of nature,—~ this is the very soul and reason of a wise man, and the test. of virtue and vice. But since all this discussion of ours re- lates to a subject, the terms of which are of frequent occur-) rence in the popular language of the citizens, we shall be sometimes obliged to use the same terms as the vulgar, and to call that law, which in its written enactments sanctions what it thinks fit by special commands or prohibitions.
- Let us begin, then, to establish the principles of justice on that supreme law, which has existed from all ages before any legislative enactments were drawn up in ba li or any political governments constituted.
Quintus.—That will be more convenient, and more sensible with reference to the subject of the discussion which we have. determined on.
Marcus.—Shall we, then, seek for the origin of justice at: its fountain-head? when we have discovered. which, we shall be in no doubt to what these questions which we are examin-~ ing ought to be referred.
Quintus. —Such is the course I would advise.
Atticus,—I also subscribe to your brother’s opinion.
Marcus.— Since, then, we wish to maintain and preserve the constitution of that republic which Scipio, in those six books which I have written under that title, has proved to be: the best, and since all our laws are to be accommodated to the kind of political government there described, we must also treat of the general principles of morals and manners, and not limit ourselves on all occasions to written laws; but I purpose to trace back the origin of right from nature itself, who will be our best guide in conducting the whole discussion.
Atticus.—You will do right, and when she is our guide it is absolutely impossible for us to err. — VII. Marcus.—Do you then grant, my Atticus, (for I know my brother’s opinion already,) that the entire universe is regu~ lated by the power of the immortal Gods, that by their nature; reason, energy, mind, divinity, or some other word of clearer. signification, if there be such, all things are governed and directed’? for if you will not grant me this, that is what L ot begin by establishing., : Atticus—I grant you all you can desire. But owing te 408 ON THE LAWS.
this singing of birds and babbling of waters, I fear my fellow- learners can scarcely hear me. | Marcus.—You are quite right to be on your guard; for even the best men occasionally fall into a passion, and they will be very indignant if they hear you denying the first article of that notable book, entitled “The Chief Doctrines of Epicurus,” in which he says “that God takes care of nothing, — neither of himself nor of any other being!” | Atticus.—Pray proceed, for I am waiting to know what advantage you mean to take of the concession I have made ou.
Marcus.—I will not detain you long. This is the bearing which they have on our subject. This animal—prescient, sagacious, complex, acute, full of memory, reason, and counsel, which we call man—has been generated by the supreme God in a most transcendent condition. for he is the only creature among all the races and descriptions of animated beings who is endued with superior reason and thought, in which the rest are deficient. And what is there, I do not say in man alone, but in all heaven and earth, more divine than reason, which, when it becomes right and perfect, is justly termed wisdom?
There exists, therefore, since nothing is better than reason, and since this is the common property of God and man, a eertain aboriginal rational intercourse between divine and human natures. But where reason is common, there right reason must also be common to the same parties; and since this right reason is what we call law, God and men must be considered as associated by law. Again, there must also be a communion of right where there is a communion of law. And those who have law and right thus in common, must be considered members of the same commonwealth.
And if they are obedient to the same rule and the same authority, they are even much more so to this one celestial regency, this divine mind and omnipotent deity. So that the entire universe may be looked upon as forming one vast commonwealth of gods and men. And, as in earthly states certain ranks are distinguished with reference to the relation- ships of families, according to a certain principle which will be discussed in its proper place, that principle, in the nature ef things, is far more magnificent and splendid by which men ON THE LAWS. 409° are connected with the Gods, as belonging to their kindred and nation.
VIII. For when we are reasoning on “universal nature, we are accustomed to argue (and indeed the truth is just as it is stated in that argument) that in the long course of ages, and the uninterrupted succession of celestial revolutions, there arrived a certain ripe time for the sowing of the human race; and when it was sown and scattered over the earth, it was animated by the divine gift of souls. And as men retained from their terrestrial origin those other particulars by which they cohere together, which are frail and perishable, their immortal spirits were ingenerated by the Deity. From which circumstance it may be truly said, that we possess a certain consanguinity, and kindred, and fellowship with the heavenly powers, And among all the varieties of animals, there is not one except man which retains any idea of the Divinity. And among men themselves, there is no nation so savage and ferocious as not to admit the necessity of believ- ing in a God, however ignorant they may be what sort of God they ought to believe in. From whence we conclude that every man must recognise a Deity, who has any recollec- tion and knowledge of his own origin.
Now, the law of virtue is the same in God and man, and in no other disposition besides them. This virtue is nothing else than a nature perfect in itself, and wrought up to the _~™most consummate excellence. There exists, therefore, a. similitude between God and man. And as this is the case, what connexion can there be which concerns us more nearly, and is more certain?- | _ Therefore, nature has supplied such an abundance of sup- plies suited to the convenience and use of men, that the things which are thus produced appear to be designedly - bestowed on us, and not fortuitous productions. Nor does this observation apply only to the fruits and vegetables which gush from the bosom of the earth, but likewise to cattle and the beasts of the field, some of which, it is clear, were in- tended for the use of mankind, others for propagation, and. others for the food of man, Innumerable arts have likewise been discovered by the teaching of nature, whom reason has imitated, and thus skilfully discovered all things necessary to the happiness of life, ok” A 410 ON THE LAWS.