A 410 ON THE LAWS.
IX. With respect to man, this same bountiful nature hath: not merely allotted him a subtle and active spirit, but also. physical senses, liké so many servants and messengers. And’she has laid bare before’him the obscure but necessary » explanation of many things, which are, as it were, the foun-, dation of practical knowledge; and in all respects she has given him a convenient figure of body, suited to the bent of. the human character. For while she has kept down the countenances of other animals, and fixed their eyes on their. food, she has bestowed on man alone an erect stature,' and prompted him to the contemplation of heaven, the ancient. home of his kindred immortals. So exquisitely, too, has she fashioned the features of the human face, as to make them indicate the most recondite thoughts and sentiments. For our eloquent eyes speak forth every impulse and passion of owr souls; and that which we call expression, which cannot exist in any other animal but man, betrays all our feelings, the power of which was well known to the Greeks, though they have no name for it.
I will not enlarge on the wonderful faculties and qualities of the rest of. the body, the modulation of the voice, and the. power of oratory, which is the greatest instrument of in- fluence upon human society. For these matters do not all belong to the present occasion or the present subject, and_ I think that Scipio has already sufficiently explained them in. those books of mine which you have read.
_ Since, then, the Deity has been pleased to create and adorn: man to be the chief and president of all terrestrial creatures, so it is evident, without further argument, that human nature: has also made very great advances by its own intrinsic energy; that nature, which without any other instruction than her own, has developed the first rude principles of the 1 Oyid has versified this idea: Pronaque cum spectent animalia csetera terram, Os homini sublime dedit; ecelumque tueri -Jussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus, —Met. i. 86.
Which may be translated— And while all other creatures from their birth With downeast eyes gaze on their kindred earth; -. He bids man walk erect, and scan the heaven ‘ From whence his soul has sprung, to which his hopes are given. - ON THE LAWS. 41} understanding, and strengthened and perfected reason to all the appliances of science and art.
X. Atiicus.—Oh ye immortal Gods! to what a distance back are you tracing the principles of justice! However, you are discoursing in such a style that I will not show any im- patience to hear what I expect you to say on the Civil Law. But I will listen patiently, even if you spend the whole day in this kind of discourse; for assuredly these, which perhaps you are embracing in your argument for the sake of others, are grander topies than even the subject itself for which they prepare the way.
Marcus.—You may well describe these topics as grand, which we are now briefly discussing. But.of all the questions which are ever the subject of discussion among learned men, there is none which it is more important thoroughly to understand than this, that. man is born for justice, and that law and equity have not been established by opinion, but by nature. ‘This truth will become still more apparent if we investigate the nature of human association and society.
For there is no one thing so like or so equal. to an- other, as in every instance man is to man. And if the cor- ruption of customs, and the variation of opinions, did not - induce an imbecility of minds, and turn them aside from the course of nature, no one would more nearly resemble himself than all men would resemble all men. Therefore, whatever definition we give of man, will be applicable to the whole human race. And this is a good argument that there is no dissimilarity of kind among men; because if this were the case, one definition could not inblintte all men.
In fact, reason, which alone gives us so many advantages over beasts, by means of which we conjecture, argue, refute, discourse, and accomplish and conclude our designs, is as- suredly common to all.men; for the faculty of acquiring knowledge is similar in all human minds, though the know- ledge itself may be endlessly diversified. By the same senses we all perceive the same objects, and those things which move the senses at all, do move in the same way the senses of all men. And those first rude elements of intelligence which, as I before observed, are the earliest developments of thought, are similarly impressed upon all men; and that faculty of 412 ON THE LAWS.
412 ON THE LAWS.
speech which is the interpreter of the mind, agrees in the ideas which it conveys, though it may differ in the words by which it expresses them. And therefore there exists not a man in any nation, who, if he adopts nature for his guide, may not arrive at virtue.
XI. Nor is this resemblance which all men bear to each other remarkable in those things only which are in accord- ance with right reason, but also in errors. For all men alike are captivated by pleasure, which, although it is a temptation to what is disgraceful, nevertheless bears some resemblance to natural good; for, as by its delicacy and.sweetness it is delightful, it is through a mistake of the intellect adopted as something salutary. . And by an error scarcely less universal, we shun death as if it were a dissolution of nature, and cling to life because it keeps us in that existence in which we were born. Thus, likewise, we consider pain as one of the greatest evils, not only on account of its present asperity, but also because it seems the precursor of mortality. Again, on account of the apparent resemblance between renown with honour, those men appear to us happy who are honoured, and miserable who happen to be inglorious. In like manner our minds are all similarly susceptible of inquietudes, joys, desires, and fears; nor if different men have different opinions, does it follow that those who deify dogs and cats, do not labour under superstition equally with other nations, though they may differ from them in the forms of its manifestation.
Again, what nation is there which has not a regard for kindness, benignity, gratitude, and mindfulness of benefits? What nation is there in which arrogance, malice, cruelty, and unthankfulness, are not reprobated and detested? And while this uniformity of opinions proves that the whole race of man- kind is united together, the last point is that a system of living properly makes men better. If what I have said meets your approbation, I will proceed; or if any doubts occur to you, we had better clear them up first.
Atticus.—There is nothing which strikes us, if I may reply for both of us.
_ XII. Marcus.—It follows, then, that nature made us just that we might share our goods with each other, and supply each other’s wants, You observe in this discussion, whenever ON THE LAWS. 413 I speak of nature, I mean nature in its genuine purity, but that there is, in fact, such corruption engendered by evil customs, that the sparks, as it were, of virtue which have been given by nature are extinguished, and that antagonist vices arise around it and become strengthened.
But if, as nature prompts them to, men would with deli- berate judgment, in the words of the poet, “being men, think nothing that concerns mankind indifferent to them,” then would justice be cultivated equally by all. For to those to whom nature has given reason, she has also given right reason, and therefore also law, which is nothing else than right reason enjoining what is good, and forbidding what is evil. And if nature has given us law, she hath also given us right. But she has bestowed reason on all, therefore right has been bestowed on all. And therefore did Socrates de- servedly execrate the man who first drew a distinction between utility and nature, for he used to complain that this error was the source of all human vices, to which this sentence of Pythagoras refers—“ The things belonging to friends are common”—and that other, “Friendly equality.” From whence it appears, that when a wise man has displayed this benevo- lence which is so extensively and widely diffused towards one who is endowed with equal virtue, then that phenonemon takes place which is altogether incredible to some people, but which is a necessary consequence, that he loves himself not more dearly than he loves his friend. For how can a dif- ference of interests arise where all interests are similar? If there could be ever so minute a difference of interests, then there would be an end of even the nature of friendship, the real meaning of which is such, that there is no friendship at all the moment that a person ‘prefers anything happening to himself rather than to his friend.
Now, these preliminary remarks have been put forward as a preparation for the rest of our discourse and argument, in order that you may more easily understand that nature her- self is the foundation of justice. And when I have explained this a little more at large, then I will proceed to the con- sideration of that civil law from which all these arguments of mine are derived.
XIII. Quintus.—Then you have not much to add, my ‘brother, for the. arguments you have already used have suf- ‘A414 ON THE LAWS.
ficiently proved to Atticus, or at all events to me, that nature is the fountain of justice.
Atticus ——How could I maintain any other opinion, since -you have now established these points —first, that we have been provided as we are and adorned by the gifts of the Gods; -secondly, that all mankind have but one similar and common principle of living together; and, lastly, that all men are bound together by a certain natural indulgence and affection, as well as social rights? And as we have, rightly as I think, admitted the truth of these principles, how can we, with any consistency, separate from nature that law and justice which are her moral developments?
Marcus.—You are quite right, and that is the proper view of the case. But in conformity with the method of philoso- ‘phers, (1 do not mean the older sages of philosophy, but those modern ones, who have erected a magazine, as it were, of wisdom,) those questions which were formerly discussed loosely and unconstrainedly, are now examined with strict- ness and distinctness. Nor will these men allow that we have done justice to the subject which we have now before us, unless we demonstrate in a distinct discussion that right is ‘a part of nature.
Atticus.—You seem to have renowned your liberty in debate, my Cicero; or are you become a man who, in dis- ‘cussion, rather follows the authority of others, than develops his individual sentiments?
Marcus.—N ot always, Atticus. But you see what the line of this present conversation is, and how the main object of this whole discussion is to strengthen the foundation of com- ‘monwealths, to establish their forces, and to benefit their ‘population. I am, therefore, particularly anxious to avoid arguments which have not been thoroughly examined and carefully considered. Not that I expect to demonstrate my doctrine to the satisfaction of all men, for that is impossible; -but I hope to do so to that of those who think that all just and honourable things deserve to be cultivated even for their own sake, and that nothing whatever can be properly called a good which is not. intrinsically praiseworthy, or at least that there can exist no great good whatever which is truly laudable on its own account.
All the philosophers who flourished in the. old academy ON THE LAWS, ALD ‘with Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, or those that followed Aristotle and Theophrastus, agréeing with them in doctrine, though they might differ in their method of ex- plaining it—whether, like Zeno, they preserved the same principles, while they changed the terms of exposition,—or whether, like Ariston, they supported that difficult and ‘arduous sect now generally scattered and confuted, which supposed that, with the exception of virtue and vice, all other things were completely equal and indifferent: all these have ‘adopted the principles which I have been explaining.
But those who indulge their appetites and pamper their ‘passions, and who estimate all the objects of their pursuit or avoidance in life by pleasure and pain, even if they speak truth, (for there is no need of raising the question here,) we may ‘still desire to be content with talking in their own gardens, and entreat them to retire for a while from all connexion with the state, of which they know nothing, and have never wished to know anything. <As to that new academy, of which Arcesilas and Carneades are the leaders, rand who. attack all sects and parties, we will implore them not to interrupt us in our present discussion; for if they enter upon these subjects, which to us appear to be settled and arranged with sufficient accuracy and learning, they will do great mischief. But I would rather pacify them, and dp not dare to order them off.’
XIV. For in questions of this nature, we uns po ex- piation without such fumigations as theirs.
But there is no expiation for the crimes and icapiotieg of men. The guilty therefore must pay the penalty, and bear the punishment; not so much those punishments inflicted by courts of justice, which were not always in being, do not exist at present in many places, and even where established are frequently biassed and partial, but those of conscience; while the furies pursue and torment them, not with burning torches, as the poets feign, but with remorse of COnRAASIADR, and the tortures arising from guilt.
But were it the fear of punishment, and not the nature of the thing itself, that ought to restrain mankind from wicked- ness, what, I would ask, could give villains the least uneasi- ness, abstracting from all fears of this kind? And yet none 1 There is a hiatus here. bie?
of them was ever so audaciously impudent, but what he either denied that the action in question had been committed by him, or pretended some cause or other for his just indig- nation, or sought a defence of his deed in some right of nature. And if the wicked dare to appeal to this principle, with what respect ought not good men to treat them?
But if either direct punishment, or the fear of it, be what ‘deters men from a vicious and criminal course of life, and not the turpitude of the thing itself, then none can be guilty of injustice, and the greatest offenders ought rather to be called imprudent than wicked.
On the other hand, those among us who are determined to the practice of goodness, not by its own intrinsic excellence, but for the sake of some private advantage, are cunning rather than good men. For what will not that man do in the dark who fears nothing but a witness and a judge? Should he meet a solitary individual in a desert place, whom he can rob of a large sum of money, and altogether unable to defend himself from being robbed, how will he behave? In such a case our man, who is just and honourable from principle and the nature of the thing itself, will converse with the stranger, assist him, and show him the way. But he who does nothing for the sake of another, and measures everything by the advantage it brings to itself, it is obvious, I suppose, how such a one will act; and should he deny that he would kill the man, or rob him of his treasure, his reason for.this cannot be that he apprehends there is any moral turpitude in such actions, but only because he is afraid of a discovery, that is to say, that bad consequences will thence ensue—a sentiment this at which not only learned men but even clowns must blush. — XY. It is therefore an absurd extravagance in some philo- sophers to assert, that all things are necessarily just which are established by the civil laws and the institutions of nations. Are then the laws of tyrants just, simply because they are laws? Suppose the thirty tyrants of Athens had imposed certain laws on the Athenians? or, suppose again that these Athenians were delighted with these tyrannical Jaws, would these laws on that account have been considered just? For my own part, I do not think such laws deserve any greater estimation than that passed during our own inter- ON THE LAWS. 417 regnum, which ordained that the dictator should be em- powered to put to death with impunity whatever citizens he pleased, without hearing them in their own defence.
For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.
But if justice consists in submission to written laws and national customs, and if, as the same school affirms, every- thing must be measured by utility alone, he who thinks that such conduct will be advantageous to him will neglect the laws, and break them if it is in his power. And the conse- quence is, that real justice has really no existence if it have not one by nature, and if that which is established as such on account of utility is overturned by some other utility.
But if nature does not ratify law, then all the virtues may — lose their sway. For what becomes of generosity, patriotism, or friendship? Where will the desire of benefitting our neigh- bours, or the gratitude that acknowledges kindness, be able to exist at all? For all these virtues proceed from our natural inclination to love mankind. ‘And this is the true basis of justice, and without this not only the mutual charities of men, but the religious services of the Gods, would be at an end; for these are preserved, as I imagine, rather by the natural sympathy which subsists between divine and human beings, than by mere fear and timidity.
XVI. But if the will of the people, the decrees of the senate, the adjudications of magistrates, were sufficient to establish rights, then it might become right to rob, right to commit adultery, right to substitute forged wills, if such con- duct were sanctioned by the votes or decrees of the multi- tude. But if the opinions and suffrages of foolish men had sufficient weight to outbalance the nature of things, then why should they not determine among them, that what is essentially bad and pernicious should henceforth pass for good and beneficial? Or why, since law can make right out of injustice, should it not also be able to change evil into good?
_ But we have no other rule by which we may be capable of distinguishing between a good or a bad law than that of DE NAT. ETC. EE ) 418 ON THE LAWS.
nature. Nor is it only right and wrong which are discriminated by nature, but generally all that is honourable is by this means distinguished from all that is shameful; for common sense has ‘impressed i in our minds the first principles of things, and has given us a general acquaintance with them, by which we connect with virtue every honourable quality, and with vice all.that is disgraceful.; 3 But to think that these differences exist only i in opinion,’ and not in nature, is the part of an idiot. For even the virtue of a tree or a horse, in which expression there is an’ abuse of terms, does not exist in our opinion only, but in nature; and if that is the case, then what is honourable and disgraceful, must also be discriminated by nature.
For if opinion could determine respecting the character of universal virtue, it might also decide respecting particular or _ partial virtues. But who will dare to determine that a man: is prudent and cautious, not from his general conduct, but from some external appearances? For virtue. evidently con- sists in perfect reason, and this certainly resides in nature. Therefore so does all honour and honesty in the same way.
XVIT. For as what is true and false, creditable and dis. creditable, is judged of rather by their essential qualities than their external relations; so the consistent and perpetual. course of life, which is virtue, and the inconsistency of life, which is vice, are judged of according to their own nature, —and that inconstancy must necessarily be vicious.
We form an estimate of the opinions of youths, but not by their opinions. Those virtues and vices which reside in their moral ‘natures must not be measured by opinions. And so of all moral qualities, we must discriminate between honourable and. dishonowrable by reference to the essential nature of the things themselves.
The good we commend, must needs contain in itself some- thing commendable; for as I before stated, goodness is not ‘a mode of opinion, but of nature. For if it were otherwise, ‘opinion alone might constitute virtue and happiness, which is the most absurd of suppositions. And since we judge of good and evil by their nature, and since good and evil are the first principles of nature, certainly we should judge in the same manner of all honourable and all shameful things, referring them all to the law of nature, De: ON TEE LAWS.’ 419.
ON TEE LAWS.’ 419.
- But we are often too much disturbed by the dissensions of men and the variation of opinions: And because the same thing does not happen with reference to our senses, we look upon them as certain by nature. Those objects, indeed, which sometimes present to us one appearance, sometimes another, and which do not always appear to the same people in the same way, we term fictions of the senses; but it is far otherwise. For neither parent, nor nurse, nor master, nor poet, nor drama, deceive our senses; nor do popular preju- dices seduce them from the truth. But all kinds of snares are laid for the mind, either by those errors which I have just enumerated, which, taking possession of the young and. uneducated, imbue them deeply, and bend them any way they please; or by that pleasure which is the imitator of good- ness, being thoroughly and closely implicated with all our senses—the prolific mother of all evils. For she so corrupts us by her blandishments, that we no longer perceive some things which are essentially excellent, because they have none of this deliciousness and pruriency.
XVIII. It follows that I may now sum up the whole of this argument by asserting, as is plain to every one from these positions which have been already laid down, that all right and all that is honourable is to be sought for its own sake. In truth, all virtuous men love justice and equity for what they are in themselves; nor is it like a good man to make a mistake, and love that which does not deserve their affection. Right, therefore, is desirable and deserving to be cul- tivated for its own sake; and if this be true of right, it must be true also of justice. What then shall we say of liberality? Ts it exercised gratuitously, or does it covet some reward and recompense? If a man does good without expecting any recompense for his kindness, then it is gratuitous: if he does expect compensation, it is a mere matter of traffic. Nor is there any doubt that he who truly deserves the repu- tation of a generous and kind-hearted man, is thinking of his duty, not of his interest. In the same way the virtue of justice demands neither emolument nor salary, and therefore we desire it for its own sake. And the case of all the moral virtues is the same, and so is the opinion formed of them.
Besides this, if we weigh virtue by the mere utility and profit that attend it, and not by its own merit, the one virtue EE2 420 ON THE LAWS, which results from such an estimate will be in fact a species of vice. For the more a man refers all his actions especially to his own advantage, the further he recedes from probity; so that they who measure virtue by profit, acknowledge no other virtue than this, which is a kind of vice. For who can be called benevolent, if no one ever acts kindly for the sake of another? And where are we to find a grateful person, if those who are disposed to be so can find no bene- factor to whom they can show gratitude? What will become of sacred friendship, if we are-not to love our friend for his own sake with all our heart and soul, as people say? if we are even to desert and discard him, as soon as we despair of deriving any further assistance or advantage from him. What can be imagined more inhuman than this conduct? But if friendship ought rather to be cultivated on its own account, so also for the same reason are society, equality, and justice, desirable for their own sakes. If this be not so, then there can be no such thing as justice at all; for the most unjust thing of all is to seek a reward for one’s just conduct.
XIX. What then shall we say of temperance, sobriety, continence, modesty, bashfulness, and chastity? Is it the fear of infamy, or the dread of judgments and penalties, which prevent men from being intemperate and dissolute? Do men then live in innocence and moderation, only to be well spoken of, and to acquire a certain fair reputation? Modest men blush even to speak of indelicacy. And I am ereatly ashamed of those philosophers, who assert that there are no vices to be avoided but those which the laws have branded with infamy. For what shall I say? Can we call those persons truly chaste, who abstain from adultery merely for the fear of public exposure, and that disgrace which is only one of its many evil consequences? For what can be either praised or blamed with reason, if you depart from that great law and rule of nature, which makes the difference between right and wrong? Shall corporal defects, if they are remarkable, shock our sensibilities, and shall those of the soul make no impression on us?!—of the soul, I say, whose turpitude is so evidently proved by its vices. For what is there more hideous than avarice, more brutal than lust, more contemptible than cowardice, more base than stupidity and ON THE LAWS, 491 ON THE LAWS, 491 folly? Well, then, are we to call those persons unhappy, who are conspicuous for one or more of these, on account of some injuries, or disgraces, or sufferings to which they are exposed, or on account of the moral baseness of their sins? And we may apply the same test in the opposite way to those who are distinguished for their virtue.
Lastly, if virtue be sought for on account of some other things, it necessarily follows that there is something better than virtue. Is it money, then? is it fame, or beauty, or health? all of which appear of little value to us when we possess them; nor can it be by any possibility certainly known how long they will last. Or is it (what it is shame- ful even to utter) that basest of all, pleasure? Surely not; for it is in the contempt and disdain of pleasure that virtue is most conspicuous.
Do not you see what a long series of facts and arguments IT have brought forward, and how perfect is the connexion between one and another? I should have proceeded further still, if I had not kept myself in check.
XX. Quintus.—To what point do your arguments tend, my brother!—for I would willingly go hand in hand with you through this discussion.
Marcus.—The point they bear on is the moral end of our actions, to which all things are to be referred, and for the sake of which all things are to be undertaken. This subject is, however, one of great controversy, and full of question among the learned, yet one that must some day or other be decided.
Aiticus.— How can that be done, since Gellius is no longer alive?
Quintus.— What is that to the purpose?
Atticus.—Because when I was at Athens, I recollect hear- ing from my friend Pheedrus that your friend Gellius, when he came as Pro-Consul into Greece, after his preetorship, assembled all the philosophers who were at that time at Athens in one spot, and very earnestly pressed upon them his advice that they should endeavour to come to some unanimous agree~ ment in their controversies; urging that if they were so dis- posed as to be unwilling to spend their whole lives in discord, an agreement might be made; and, at the same time, he pro- mised them his best assistance, if this scheme of mutual con- ciliation and concession met their views.
499 ON THE LAWS, Marcus.—Y our story is amusing enough, my Atticus, and it has often excited much merriment; but, indeed, I should very gladly be appointed mediator between the ancient Academy and the Stoics., Atticus.—How can you think of such a thing?
Marcus.—Because they differ on one point only, and agree to admiration in all the rest. | oe! dothey contend about one point of debate ‘only ¢ 3 Mareus.—Yes. I think they have only a single issue, so far as concerns this question of morals; inasmuch as the ancient Academicians are unanimously agreed that the true good is that which is in accordance with nature, and is such that we may be assisted in life by it. The Stoics, on the other hand, allow of no good but what is honourable.
Atticus —This is indeed a very insignificant controversy, and not such as to account for their general opposition.
Marcus.—You are quite right if it were the thing itself on which they differed, rather than the terms. iy XXI. Atticws:—You then rather agree with my friend Antiochus, with whom I was living, for I will not venture to call him my master. It was he who at one time almost ‘persuaded me to desert my Epicurean gardens, and led me by gentle steps to the Academy. 7 Marcus.— This Antiochus was a wise and clever man, and highly accomplished in his way. He was, as you know, a gfeat friend of mine; and | shall presently examine whether I agree with him in all respects or not. This I am sure of, that the whole of that controversy might easily be settled.
Atticus.—Why do you prosecute this inquiry?
Marcus.—Because if, as Ariston of Chios pretended, he were to say that there is no other good than the honourable, and no other evil than the dishonourable; that all other things are altogether indifferent, and that. their presence or absence are of no kind of consequence; then Zeno would be departing very far from Xenocrates, Aristotle, and all the school of Plato, and there would be an entire difference be- tween them respecting a principle of the greatest importance, and about the whole course of life. But now, when he — affirms that to be the only good which the ancients asserted to be the chief good, namely honour, and its opposite dis- ON THE LAWS. 423.
grace, which they cailed the chief evil—the only evil; and when he calls riches, health, and beauty, only advantages, not goods,—and poverty, grief, and pain, only inconveniences, not. evils; he in fact agrees in opinion with Xenoerates and Aristotle, though he expresses himself in different terms. From this difference, not respecting things, but words, the controversy concerning moral ends arose; in relation to which, inasmuch as our Roman Law of the Twelve Tables has granted a neutral space of five feet wide between the territories of different landlords, we will not allow the vene- rable estate of the Academy to be trespassed on by this erafty Stoic; and though the Mamilian law appointed but one surveyor to determine the rights of these neutral spaces, in this ethical question all three of us will undertake to arbi- trate respecting the moral ends of philosophy.
Vuintus. — What, then, shall be the decision which we pronounce?
Marcus.—I think we should seek the boundaries which Socrates has laid down in relation to this question, and abide by them. |