SigPhi · Cicero

On Divination and On the Laws (Yonge Treatises of Cicero)

Page 32 of 38

Quintus.—There cannot be a better proposal, my brother. And now you are employing the terms of civil justice and laws, on which topics I am waiting for a lecture from you, for the subject is particularly important, as I have often heard you say. And certainly we have sufficiently established the principle we have been discussing, and proved that to live according to nature, is the highest good; that is, to lead a life regulated by conscience, and conformed to virtue and tem- perance. And to follow nature, and to live according to her law, that is to say, as far as ‘depends on the person himself, to omit nothing to secure nature in the attainment of. those things which she requires, this surely is the most lawful and. virtuous mode of living. As to the discussions of philoso- phers, I know not whether we shall ever arrive at a decision, but we certainly shall not do so in our present conference, at least, if we prosecute our original design, and come to the practical investigation of the civil law, as established in our country.

XXII. Atticus.—I, however, turned aside to this digression. very willingly.

Quintus.—We shall have an meper eas of set this A424 ON THE LAWS.

subject on some future occasion; let us at present keep to what we began with, as especially since this discussion re- specting the chief good and evil has no reference to our present subject.

Marcus.—What you say, my Quintus, is most wise and excellent, for what has hitherto been said by me’ is derived from the very heart of philosophy. But you perhaps wish to have the laws of some particular state discussed.

Quintus. —I am not anxious to hear of the laws of Lycurgus, or of Solon, or of Charondas, or Zaleucus, nor of our Roman Twelve Tables, nor of popular decrees; but I expect you to describe in this day’s conversation, not only the laws fitted for all nations, but also the rules and maxims of conduct that may apply to individuals.

Marcus.—And indeed what you expect, my Quintus, har- monizes very well with the subjects of our present discussion. And I wish that it were within my abilities to do justice to it. But the real state of the case is, that since law ought to be both a correctress of vice and a recommender of virtue, the principles on which we direct our conduct ought to be drawn from her. And, thus it comes to pass wisdom is the mother of all the virtuous arts, from the love of which the Greeks have composed the word Philosophy; and which is beyond all contradiction the richest, the brightest, and the most excellent of the gifts which the Gods have bestowed on the life of mankind. For wisdom alone has taught us, among other things, the most difficult of all lessons, namely, to know ourselves, a precept so forcible and so comprehensive, that it has been attributed not to a man, but to the God of Delphi himself.

For he who knows himself must in the first place be con- scious that he is inspired by a divine principle. And he will look upon his rational part as a resemblance to some divinity consecrated within him, and will always be careful that his sentiments as well as his external behaviour be worthy of so inestimable a gift of God. And after he has thoroughly examined himself and tested himself in every way, he will become aware what signal advantages he has received from’ nature at his entrance into life, and with what infinite means _1 Jn the original the text breaks off here. The remainder of the sentence has been restored in its present form by Lamberius.

ON THE LAWS. 495 and appliances he is furnished for the attainment and acqui- sition of wisdom; since, in the very beginning of all things, he has, as it were, the intelligible principles of things de- lineated, as it were, on his mind and soul, by the enlighten- ing assistance of which, and the guidance of wisdom, he sees that he shall become a good and consequently a happy man.

XXIII. For what can be described or conceived more truly happy than the state of that man, whose mind having attained. to an exact knowledge and perception of virtue, has entirely discarded all obedience to and indulgence of the body, and has trampled on yoluptuousness as a thing unbecoming the dignity of his nature; and has raised himself above all fear of death or pain; who maintains a benevolent intercourse with his friends, and has learnt to look upon all who are united to him by nature as his kindred; who has learnt to preserve piety and reverence towards the Gods and pure religion; and who has sharpened and improved the perceptions of his mind, as well as of his eyesight, to choose the good and reject the evil, which virtue from its foreseeing things is called Prudence?

When this man shall have surveyed the heavens, the earth, and the seas, and studied the nature of all things, and informed himself from whence they have been generated, to what state they will return, and of the time and manner of their dissolution, and has learnt to distinguish what parts of them are mortal and perishable, and what divine and eternal—when he shall have almost attained to a know- ledge of that Being who superintends and governs these things, and shall look on himself as not confined within the walls of one city, or as the member of any particular com- munity, but as a citizen of the whole universe, considered as a single Commonwealth: amid such a grand magnificence of things as this, and such a prospect and knowledge of nature, what a knowledge of himself, O ye immortal Gods, will a man arrive at! That is the warning of the Pythian Apollo, And how insignificant will he then esteem, how thoroughly will he contemn and despise, those things which by vulgar minds are held in the highest admiration!

XXIV. And all these acquirements he will secure and guard as by a sort of fence, by the knowledge how to dis- 1 From providendo; prudentia being a contracted form of providentia.

426 ON THE LAWS, tinguish truth from falsehood, and by a certain science and art of reasoning which teaches him to know what. conse- quences follow from premises, and what proposition is con- trary to another. And when such a person feels that nature has designed him for civil society, he will not rest contented with these subtle disquisitions alone, but will put in prac- tice that more comprehensive and continuous eloquence by which he may be able to govern nations, to establish laws, to. punish malefactors, to defend the honest part of mankind, and publish the praises of great men: by which also he may fitly put forth precepts of safety, and panegyrics of virtue, in a way suited to persuade his countrymen: by which also he may be able to rouse them to the practice of virtue, and turn them from wickedness, to comfort the afflicted, and, in fine, to immortalize the wise consultations and noble actions of the brave and wise, and to punish the shame and infamy of wicked men by handing them down in undying records. And of all these important things which are perceived to be in man by those who wish to attain a know- ledge of themselves, the parent and nurse is wisdom.

Atticus ——You have given us a very dignified and just eulogium on her. But on what do you mean your remarks to bear?

Marcus.—Iin the first place, my Atticus, I mean them to bear on those jurisprudential topies which we shall hereafter discuss, which are well nigh as important as the preceding. For these moral principles we have already developed, would not be so grand and so interesting, if the sources from which they arise were not also full of sublimity and beauty. And for the rest, I prosecute this inquiry with pleasure, and I — trust with justice; for I cannot with any conscience pass over in silence that study to which I am devoted, and which has made me all that I am.

Atticus—You speak truly, and as that study deserves; ° and it was, as you say, proper to do so in this discussion.

ON THE LAWS. | 427.

BOOK IL.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND BOOK.

In this Second Book Cicero treats of hierarchical and ecclesiastical laws, and lays down a number of ecclesiastical canons or maxims, which he subsequently expounds at large.

I. Atticus.—Do you feel inclined, since we have had walking enough for the present, and since you must now take up a fresh part of the subject for discussion, to vary our situation; if you do, let us pass over to the island which is surrounded by the Fibrenus,—for such, I believe, is the name of the other river,—and sit down, while we prosecute the remainder of our discourse?

Marcus —1 like your proposal; for that is the very spot which I generally select when I want a place for undisturbed meditation, or uninterrupted reading or writing.

Aiticus.—In truth, now Iam come to this delicious retreat, I cannot see too much of it. Would you believe, that the pleasure I find here makes me almost despise magnificent villas, marble pavements, and sculptured palaces? Who would not smile at the artificial canals which our great folks call their Niles and Euripi, after he had seen these beautiful streams? Therefore, as you just now, in our conversation on Justice and Law, referred all things to Nature, so you seek to preserve her domination even in those things which are con- ‘structed to recreate and amuse the mind. I therefore used to wonder before, as I expected nothing better in this neigh- bourhood than hills and rocks (and, indeed, I had been led to form these ideas by your own speeches and verses)—I used to wonder, I say, that you were so exceedingly delighted with this place. But my present wonder, on the contrary, is, how, when you retire from Rome, you condescend to rusticate in -any other spot.

- ‘Marcus.—But when I can escape bon a few days, especially at this season of the year, I usually do come here, on account of the beauty of the scenery and the salubrity of the air; but ASS: ON THE LAWS.

it is but seldom that I have it in my power to do so. There is one reason, however, why I am so fond of this Arpinum, whicn does not apply to you.

A tticus,—What reason is that?

Marcus.—Because, to confess the truth, it is the native place of myself and my brother here; for here indeed, descended from a very ancient race, we ‘first saw the day. Here is our altar, here are our ancestors, and here still remain many vestiges of our family. Besides, this villa which you behold in its present form, was originally constructed, at considerable expense, under my father’s superintendence; for having very infirm health, he spent the later years of his life here, engaged in literary pursuits. And on this very place, too, while my grandfather was alive, and while the villa, according to the olden custom, was but a little one, like that one of Curius in the Sabine district, I myself was born. There is, therefore, an indescribable feeling insensibly per- vading my soul and sense which causes me, perhaps, to find a more than usual pleasure in this place. And even the wisest of men, Ulysses, is related to have renounced imap Or Many that he might once more revisit his beloved Ithaca.

IT. Attecus.—I indeed think what you have mentioned a very sufficient reason for your feelings, and for your coming hither with pleasure, and being attached to this place. More- over, I myself, to say the truth, feel that my love for this house and all this neighbourhood increases, when I remember that you were born and bred up here; for, somehow or other, we certainly cannot behold without emotion the spots in which we find traces of those who possess our esteem or admiration. And for my own part, even in the case of Athens itself, which I love so greatly, it is not so much the magni- ficent works, and exquisite specimens of art of the ancients, which delight me, as the remembrance of her great men, and the thought where each of them used to live, and sit down and discourse. Even their very tombs do I contemplate with deep attention. And with the same feelings, I shall for the future love the place the more where you were born.

Marcus.—That being the case, I am very glad that I have brought you here, and shown you what I may almost call my cradle.

Atticus.—And T am greatly pleased at having seen it. But ON THE LAWS. 429 what were you going to say just now, when you called this Arpinum the true country of yourself and your brother Quintus? Have you more than one country, or any other than that Roman commonwealth in which we have a similar interest? Unless, indeed, you mean to say, that the true country of the philosophic Cato was not Rome, but Tus- culum.

Marcus.—I indeed should say that Cato, and all municipal citizens like him, have two countries,—the one, that of their birth, and the other, that of their citizenship. As in the case of Cato, who, having been born at Tusculum, was elected a citizen of Rome; so that, as he was a Tusculan by extraction, and a Roman by citizenship, he had one country as his native place, and another as his country in law. So among your Athenians, before Theseus urged them to quit their rural territories, and assembled them at Athens, those that were natives of Sunium, were reckoned as Sunians and Athenians at the same time; and, in the same way, we justly consider as our country, both the place from where we originated and that in which we have been received. It is necessary, how- ever, that we should attach ourselves by a preference of affection to the latter, which, under the name of the Com- monwealth, is the common country of us all. For this country it is that we ought to sacrifice our lives; it is to her that we ought to devote ourselves without reserve; and it is for her that we ought to risk all our riches and consecrate all our hopes. But still that land which produced us is not much less dear to us than that which has received us. Therefore I will never disown Arpinum as my country, at the same time acknowledging that Rome is the greater of the two, and that the other is contained in her.

III. Atticus.—It was not, then, without reason that Pom- pey said in my hearing, when he pleaded conjointly with you the cause of Ambius, that our commonwealth owed great gratitude to this municipality for having given it two of its preservers. For my part, I quite agree with you, that your native place may be called your country, no less correctly than the commonwealth of Rome. But here we are arrived in your favourite island. How beautiful it appears! How bravely it stems the waves of the Fibrenus, whose divided waters lave its verdant sides, and soon rejoin their rapid cur-.

430 ON THE LAWS.’

rents! The river just embraces space enough for a moderate walk; and having discharged this office, and secured us an arena for disputation, it immediately precipitates itself into the Liris; and then, like those who ally themselves to patri- cian families, it loses it8 more obscure name, and gives the waters of the Liris a greater degree of coolness. For I have never found water much colder than this, although I have seen a great number of rivers; and I can hardly bear my foot in it, when I wish to do what Socrates did in Plato’s Phedrus.

Marcus.—You are quite right; but my brother Quintus often tells me that your river Thyamis in Epirus is nothing inferior to even this delightful spot in beauty.

Quintus.—And that is the truth, too; and I would have you believe that nothing on earth can surpass the beauties of our friend Atticus’s Amaltheum, and its plane-trees. But if you have no objection, let us repose here in the shade, and return to that part of our subject from which we have digressed.

Marcus.x—You are very persevering in your demands, my Quintus! I thought that we had done with the question; but you are not a man to allow any one to remain in your debt.

Quintus.—Pray begin, then; for all this day is devoted to hearing you.

Marcus.—‘ With Jupiter the Muses shall toed as I said in my translation of Aratus.

Atticus. — Wherefore this exordium?

Marcus.—Because on this occasion we cannot do better than commence by invoking him and the other immortal ods. Quintus.—There can be no objection to this: it is but decent and proper.

IV. Marcus. -—- Let us, then, ones more examine, béfore we come to the consideration of particular laws, what is. the power and nature of law in general; lest, when we come to refer everything to it, we occasionally make mistakes from the employment of incorrect language, and show ourselves ignorant of the force of those terms which we ought to em- ploy in the definition of laws. © Quintus. —This is a very necessary caution, and the proper method of seeking truth, ON THE LAWS. A3L ~ Marcus:—This, then, as it appears to me, has been the decision of the wisest philosophers,—that law was neither a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor established by any decree of the people, but a certain eternal principle, which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong. Therefore they called that aboriginal and supreme law. the mind of God, enjoining or forbidding each separate thing in accordance with reason. On which account it is, that this law, which the Gods have bestowed on the human race, is so justly applauded. For it is the reason and mind of a wise Being equally able to urge us to good and to deter us from evil.

Quintus. —You have, on more than one occasion, already touched on this topic. But before you come to treat of the laws of nations, I wish you would endeavour to explain the force and power of this divine and celestial law, lest the torrent of custom should overwhelm our understanding, and betray us into the vulgar method of expression.

Marcus.—From our childhood we have learned, my Quin- tus, to call such phrases as this, “that a man appeals to justice, and goes to law,” and many similar expressions, law; but, nevertheless, we should understand that these, and other similar commandments and prohibitions, have sufficient power to lead us on to virtuous actions and to call us away from vicious ones. Which power is not only far more ancient than any existence of states and peoples, but is coeval with God himself, who beholds and governs both heaven and earth. For it is impossible that the divine mind can exist in a state devoid of reason; and divine reason must necessarily be pos- sessed of a power to determine what is virtuous and what is vicious. Nor, because it was nowhere written, that one man should maintain the pass of a bridge against the enemy's whole army, and that he should order the bridge behind him to be cut down, are we therefore to imagine that the valiant Cocles did not perform this great exploit agreeably to the laws of nature and the dictates of true bravery. Again, though in the reign of Tarquin there was no written law con- cerning adultery, it does not therefore follow that Sextus Tarquinius did not offend against the eternal law when he committed a rape on Lucretia, daughter of Tricipitinus. For, even then he had the light of reason deduced from the nature 432 ON THE LAWS.

432 ON THE LAWS.

of things, that incites to good actions and dissuades from évil ones; and which does not begin for the first time to be a law when it is drawn up in writing, but from the first moment that it exists. And this existence of moral obligation is co- eternal with that of the divine mind. Therefore, the true and supreme law, whose commands and prohibitions are equally _ authoritative, is the right reason of the Sovereign Jupiter.

V. Quintus.—I grant you, my brother, that whatever is just is also at all times the true law; nor can this true law either be originated or abrogated by the written forms in which decrees are drawn up.

Marcus.—Therefore, as that Divine Mind, or reason, is the supreme law, so it exists in the mind of the sage, so far as it can be perfected in man. But with respect to civil laws, which are drawn up in various forms, and framed to meet the occasional requirements of the people, the name of law belongs to them not so much by right as by the favour of the people. For men prove by some such arguments as the following, that every law which deserves the name of a law, ought to be morally good and laudable. It is clear, say they, that laws were originally made for the security of the people, for the preservation of states, for the peace and happiness of society; and that they who first framed enactments of that kind, per- suaded the people that they would write and publish such laws only as should conduce to the general morality and hap- piness, if they would receive and obey them. And then such regulations, being thus settled and sanctioned, they justly entitled Laws. From which we may reasonably conclude, that those who made unjustifiable and pernicious enactments for the people, acted in a manner contrary to their own promises and professions, and established anything rather than laws, properly so called, since it is evident that the very signification of the word law, comprehends the whole essence and energy of justice and equity.

I would, therefore, interrogate you on this point, my Quintus, as those philosophers are in the habit of doing. If a state wants something for the want of which it is reckoned no state at all, must not that something be something good?

Quintus.—A very great good.

Marcus.—And if a state has no law, is it not for that reason to be reckoned no state at all? - ON THE LAWS. 433 Quintus.—We must needs say so.

Marcus.—We must therefore reckon law among the very best things.

Quintus.—I entirely agree with you.

Marcus.—lf, then, in the majority of nations, many per- nicious and mischievous enactments are made, which have no more right to the name of law than the mutual engagements of robbers, are we bound to call them laws? For as we cannot call the recipes of ignorant and unskilful empirics, who give poisons instead of medicines, the prescriptions of a physician, so likewise we cannot call that the true law of a people, of whatever kind it may be, if it enjoins what is in- jurious, let the people receive it as they will. For law is the just distinction between right and wrong, made conformable to that most, ancient nature of all, the original and principal regulator of all things, by which the laws of men should be measured, whether they acer the guilty or protect and preserve the innocent.

VI. Quintus.—I quite colonial you, and think that no law but that of justice should either be proclaimed as one or enforced as one.

Marcus.—Then you regard as null and void the laws of Titius and Apuleius, because they are unjust.

Quintus.—Yes; and I would say sie same of the laws of Livius.

Marcus.—You are right, and so sali the more, since a single vote of the senate would be sufficient to abrogate them in an instant. But that law of justice, the power of which I have explained, can never be discarded or abrogated.

Quintus.—And, therefore, you will require such laws as can never be abrogated.

Marcus.—Certainly, if I could get you both to agree with me. But Plato, that wisest of all men, that most dignified of all philosophers, who was the first man who ever com- posed a treatise on a Commonwealth, and afterwards a separate one on Laws, induces me to follow his illustrious example, and to proclaim the praises of law, before I begin to recite its regulations. Such, likewise, was the practice of Zaleucus and Charondas, who wrote the laws which they gave their cities, not for the sake of study or amusement, but for the benefit of their country and their fellow-citizens, DE NAT. ETC, FE 434 ON THE LAWS.

And imitating them, Plato considered that it was the pro- perty of law, to persuade in some instances, and not to compel everything by threats and violence.

Quinitus.—What, do you. venture to cite Zaleucus, when Timeeus denies that he ever existed? | Marcus.—But Theophrastus, an author, In my opinion, quite as respectable, and as many think much more so, cor- roborates my statement. His fellow-citizens too, my clients, the Locrians, commemorate him; but whether he was a real man or not, is of no great consequence to our argument: we are only speaking according to tradition.

VII. Let this, therefore, be a fundamental principle in all societies, that the Gods are the supreme lords and governors. of all things,—that all events are directed by their influence, and wisdom, and Divine power; that they deserve very well of the race of mankind; and that they likewise know what sort. of person every one really is; that they observe his actions, whether good or bad; that they take notice with what feelings and with what piety he attends to his religious duties, and that they are sure to make a difference between the good and the wicked.

- For when once our minds are confirmed in these views, it will not be difficult to inspire them with true and useful sentiments. For what can be more true than that no man should be so madly persumptuous as to believe that he has. either reason or intelligence, while he does not believe that the heaven and the world possess them likewise, or to think that those things which he can scarcely comprehend by the greatest possible exertion of his intellect, are put in motion without the agency of reason?

In truth, we can scarcely reckon him a man, whom neither the regular courses of the stars, nor the alternations of day and night, nor the temperature of the seasons, nor the pro- ductions that nature displays for his use and enjoyment, urge to gratitude towards heaven.

And as those beings which are furnished with reason are incomparably superior to those which want it, and as we cannot say, without impiety, that anything is superior to the universal Nature, we must therefore confess that divine reason is contained within her. And who will dispute the utility of these sentiments, when he reflects how many cases ON THE LAWS. 435 ON THE LAWS. 435 of the greatest importance are decided by oaths; how much the sacred rites performed in making treaties tend to assure peace and tranquillity; and what numbers of people the fear of divine punishment has reclaimed from a vicious course of life; and how sacred the social rights must be in a society where a firm persuasion obtains the immediate intervention of the immortal gods, both as witnesses and judges of our actions? Such is the “preamble of the law,” to use the expression of Plato.

Quintus.—I understand you, my brother; and I am greatly pleased to find that you take a different view of the subject, and dwell upon other points of it, than those which he selects, for nothing can less resemble his opinions, than what you have just now asserted, even in this preamble. The only matter in which you seem to me to imitate him, is his style and language.

Marcus.—I wish, indeed, I did, but who is, or who ever will be able to imitate that? As to his sentiments, it is easy enough to translate them, and, indeed, that is what I should do if | did not wish to be altogether original. For what diffi- culty is there in stating the same doctrines as he does, trans- lated from him almost word for word?: Quintus.—I entirely agree with you; for as you have just remarked, your arguments ought to be entirely your own. Begin, then, if you will do us the favour, and Pn. nen the laws of religion.

Marcus. nel will explain them as well as I can; and since both the topic and the conversation is a familiar « one, I shall begin by describing the laws of laws.

Quentus.— What laws do you mean?

Marcus,—There are certain terms in law, my Quintus, not. so ancient as those in the primitive sacred laws, but still, in order to carry with them greater authority, being of a some- what greater antiquity than the common parlance of the people. These legal terms, I shall mention with as much brevity as possible; and I shall endeavour to expound the: laws, not. indeed in their whole extent, for this would be a boundless subject, but those which involve the principles, and contain the sum and substance of the rest.

Quintus.—This appears a most desirable method: lot us therefore hear the terms of the law.

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VIII. Marcus.—Such are the following:—Let men ap- proach the gods with purity—let men appear before them in the spirit of devotion—let then remove riches from their temples; whoever doth otherwise shall suffer the vengeance of heaven—let no one have private gods—neither new gods nor strange gods, unless publicly acknowledged, are to be worshipped privately—let the temples which our fathers have constructed in the cities; be upheld—let the people maintain the groves in the country, and the abodes of the Lares—let. men preserve the customs of their fathers and of their family —let the gods who have always been accounted celestial be worshipped, and those likewise who have merited celestial honours by their illustrious actions, such as Hercules, Bac- chus, A’sculapius, Castor, Pollux, and Quirinus. Let due | honour be likewise paid to those virtues, by which man is exalted to heaven,—as Intelligence, Valour, Piety, Fidelity; and let temples be consecrated to their honour—with regard to the vices, let no sacred sacrifices be paid to them.

Let men put aside all contentions of every kind on the sacred festivals, and let servants enjoy them, their toils being remitted, for therefore they were appointed at certain seasons. —Let the priests duly render the public thank-offerings to heaven, with herbs and fruits, on the sacrificial days. Also, on the appointed holidays, let them offer up the cream of milk, and the sucklings; and lest the priests should commit any mistakes in these sacrifices, or the reason of these sacrifices, let. them carefully observe the calendar, and the revolutions of the stars—Let them provide those particular victims which are most appropriate and agreeable to each particular | deity.—Let the different gods have different orders of priests (sacerdotes).—Let them all have pontiffs in common; and let each separate god have his Flamen.

Let the Vestal Virgins in the city carefully keep the eter- nal fire of the public altar always burning; and, that this may be done both publicly and privately with all due form and ceremony, let those who are not instructed in the order of the ceremonials learn it from the public priests. Let there be two classes of these priests, one to preside over ceremonials and sacrifices, and the other to interpret the obscure predic~ tions of the prophets and diviners, whenever the senate and the people require it. Let the public Augurs, who are the ON THE LAWS.; 437 ON THE LAWS.; 437 anterpreters of the all-good and all-great Jupiter, likewise ex- amine the presages and the auspices, according to the disci- pline of their art. Let the priests who are conversant in auguries implore prosperity for the vineyards and gardens, and pray for the general welfare of the people. Let those who give counsel in military or civic affairs attend to the auspices, and be guided by them. Let them guard against the anger of heaven, and appease it; and observe from what parts of heaven the lightnings burst forth. Let them declare what lands, cities, and temples, are to be held free and consecrated. Whatever things the augur declares to be unjust, ill-omened, vicious, and accursed, let them be forsaken as prohibited and disastrous, and whoever will not obey these divine indications, let him suffer capital punishment.

IX. As to alliances, peace, war, truces, and the rights of am- bassadors, let the two Feciales be the appropriate judges, and let them determine all questions relating to military affairs. Let them report all prodigies and portents to the Etruscans and soothsayers, if the senate orders it; and let the chiefs of Etruria explain their system. Then will they learn what deities it behoves them to propitiate, and deprecate the fury of the thunderbolt against the object of its vengeance.

Let there be no nocturnal sacrifices performed by women, except those which they offer according to custom on behalf of the people; and let none be initiated in the mysteries except by the usual forms consecrated to Ceres, according to the Grecian ceremonials, A crime which has been committed and cannot be expiated has been an act of impiety; as to the faults which can be ex- piated, let the public priests expiate them.

Let men temper the public hilarity with song, and harp, and flute at the public games, as far as can be done without the games of the race-course and the wrestling-matches, and let them unite these amusements with the honours of the gods. Let them retain whatever is best and purest in the ancient form of worship. Except the devotees of Cybele, to whom this privilege is allowed on certain days, let no one pre- sume to levy rates for private emolument. Whoever purloins or robs any temple, or steals any property deposited in a. temple, shall be accounted a parricide. The divine punish- ment of perjury is destruction,—the human penalty is infamy, 438 ON THE LAWS.

With regard to incest, let the chief priests sentence it to the extremest penalty of the law.

Let not the impious man attempt to appease the gods by gifts and offerings. Let vows be carefully performed. Where- ever law is violated let its punishments be executed. Let no private person presume to consecrate his land; and let his consecration of gold, silver,.and ivory, be made within the limits of moderation. Let the sacred actions of private per- sons be preserved inviolate for ever. Let the rights of the Deities of the dead be considered sacred. Let those who have passed into the world of souls be considered as deified; but let men diminish the unnecessary expense and sorrow which is lavished on them.

X. Atticus.—You have managed to include a great deal of law in a very small compass 5 but it seems to me, that this class of religious maxims does not much differ from the laws of Numa and our national regulations.

Marcus.—-Do you suppose, then, that when, i my Treatise on the Commonwealth, Scipio appears to be arguing that our ancient Roman Commonwealth was the best of all republics, it was not indispensable that I should give laws of boreeRpene ing exeellence to that best of all republics, “Atticus. —Undoubtedly I think you should.

Marecus.—Well, then, you may expect such laws as may embrace that most perfect kind of republic. And if any others should haply be demanded of me this day, which are not ‘to be found, and never have existed, in our Roman Com- monwealth, yet even these formed a portion of the customs of our ancestors, which at that time were maintained as reli- giously as the laws themselves. | :~ Attieus.—Proceed, then, if you please, to propose these laws, that I may have the pleasure of ratifying them by my vote.

Marcus.—Are you sure, my Atticus, that when you hear them, you will not say something very different?

Attieus.—I do not think so! I believe I shall entirely agree with you respecting the greater laws. And as for the minor ones, I shall concede them to you, and pass sentence accordingly.

Marcus.—And that is my opinion, too. However, take care that it does not turn out a long business. ee on wert LAWS, 439 Atticus.—I wish it might. For what could we find to do which could be more delightful!

Marcus.—One of the legal maxims I heve mentioned, states, that we should approach the gods with purity,—that is to say, with purity of mind, for this is everything. Not that the Jaw dispenses with purity of body; but this must. be understood, inasmuch as the mind is far superior to the body; and it may be observed, that if we are to be attentive to the purity of our persons, we ought to be still more so to the purity of our souls. For the pollutions of the body may indeed be removed by a few ablutions of water, or in a few days; but the stains of the conscience cannot be obliterated by any lapse of time, and all the rivers in the world cannot wash them out.

The next legal maxim commands us to cultivate piety, and to banish costliness from our temples; which signifies that piety is grateful to God, and that all extravagance is displeas- ing to him. For if in our social relations we desire that dis- tinctions of wealth and poverty should not induce us to forget the fraternal equality of men, why should we throw a stumb- ling-block in the approaches of mortals to their Maker, by requiring costly sacrifices and offerings. Especially since nothing could be less agreeable to the Deity than to see that the way to propitiate and worship him was not open to all men.