The earlieft attempt in the execution of this deiign was to fet up for Minifter, a perfon, in rank, indeed refpetftable, and very ample in fortune 3 but who, to the moment of this vaft and fudden elevation, was little known or con- iidered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and implicit fubmiffion. But whether it was for want of firmnefs to bear up againff the firft oppoiition; or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the moft eligible; that idea was foon abandoned. The inflru- mental part of the project Wus a little altered, 6 to i6 THOUGHTS ONTHECAUSE OF to aecommodate it to the time, and to bring things more gradually and more furely to the one great end propofed.
The firft part of the reformed plan was t» draw a line 'which fiould Jeparatc the Court from the Minijlry. Hitherto thefc names had been looked upon as fynonymous; but for the future. Court and Adminiilration were to be confidered as things totally diftinft. By this operation, two fyl]:ems of Adminidration were to be formed; one which fliould be in the real fecret and confidence; the other merely oftenfible, to perform the official and executory duties of Government. The latter were alone to be re- fponfible; whilft the real advifers, who enjoyed all the power, were eife6lual]y removed from all the danger.
Secondly, A party under thefe leaders was to be formed in favour of the Court againjl the Minijlry: this party was to have a large Ihare in the emoluments of Government, and to hold it totally feparate from, and independent of, offen- fible Adminillration.
The third point, and that on which the fuccefs of the whole fcheme ultimately depended, was to bring Parliament to an acquicfcence in this projcci. Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the perlons, rank, influence, abilities, connexions, and cha- ra(5ler, of the Minifters of the Crown. By means of a difcipline, on which 1 iLall fay more here- after, that body was to be habituated to the mofl oppofite in terefls, and the moft difcordarit politicks.
politicks.
THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 17 politicks. All connexions and dependencies among fubjects were to be entirely diflolved. As hitherto hufinefs had gone through the hands of leadei*s of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and engage to their confidence, now the method was to be altered; and the lead was to be given to men of no fort of consideration or credit in the country* This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power. Members of Par- liament were to be hardened into an infenfi- bility to pride as well as to duty. Thofc high and haughty fentiments, which are the great fupport of independence, were to be let down gradually. Point of honour and precedence were no more to be regarded in Parliamentr.ry deco- rum, than in a Turkifh army. It was to be avowed as a conilitutional maxim, that the King might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen, for Minifter; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, ss well followed as the nrft name for rank or wifdom in the nation. Thus Parliament was to look on, as if perfedly unconcerned; while a cabal of the clofcr and back-ftairs was fubflituted in the place of a national Adminiftration.
With fuch a degree of acquiefcence, any meafure of any Court mi^ht well be deemed thoroughly fecure. The capital objecls, and by much the mofc flattering charadlerifticks of arbi- trary power, would be obtained. Every thing would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the perfonal favour and inclination of the C Prince.
i8 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF Prince. This favour would be the fole intro- dudion to power, and the only tenure by which it was to b^ held: io that no peribn looking towards another, and all looking towards the Court, it was impofilble hut that the motive which folely influenced every man's hopes muft come in time to govern every man's conducft; till at lall the fervility became univerfal, in fpite of the dead letter of any laws or inAitutions whatfoever.
How it {hould happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon fuch a projeft of Go- vernment, may at firft view appear furprizing. But the fadt is, that opportunities vary inviting to fuch an attempt have offered; and the fcheme itfelfwas not deflitiite of fome arguments not wholly unplaufible to recommend it. Thefe opportunities and thefe arguments, the ufe that has been made of botli, the plan for carrying this new fcheme of government into execution, and the effeds which it has produced, are in my opinion worthy of our ferious conlideration.
His Majefty came to the throne of thefe kingdoms with more advantages than any of his predeceffors fince the Revolution. Fourth in defcent, and third in fucceflion of his Royal family, even the zealots of hereditary right, in him, faw fomething to flatter their favourite prejudices; and tojuflify a transfer of their at- tachments, without a change in their principles. The perfon and caufe of the Pretender were be- come contemptible; his title difowned through- cut Europe, his party difbanded in England. ^ His THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 19 His Majefty came indeed to the inheritance of a mighty war; but, vid:orious in every part of the globe, peace was always in his power, not to negociate, but to didlate. No foreign habi- tudes or attachments withdrew him from the cultivation of his power at home. His revenue for the civil eftabHfhment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a large, but definite fum, was ampie> without being invidious. His influence, by ad- ditions from conqueft, by an augmentation of debt, by an increafe of military and naval efta- blifhment, much ftrengthened and extended. And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigour of youth, as from affection there was a iirong difiike, fo from dread there feemedto be a general averfenefs, from giving any thing like offence to a Monarch, againft whofe refentment oppofition could not look for a refuge in any fort of reverfionary hope.
Thefe fingular advantages infpired his Majefly only with a more ardent define to preferve un- impaired the fpirit of that national freedom, to which he owed a fituation fo full of glory. But to others it fuggefced fentiments of a very different nature. They thought they now be- held an opportunity (by a certain fort of Statef- meg never long undifcovcred or unemployed) of drawing to thenifelves, by the aggrandifement of a Court Faction, a degree of power which they could never hope to derive from natural influence or trom honourable fervice; and wiiich it was impoffible they could hold with the leafl: fccurity, vvhilil the fyftem of Adminillration C 2 reftcd 20 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF refted upon its former bottom. In order to facilitate the execution of their delign, it was neceflary to make many alterations in political arrangement, and a fignal change in the opinions, habits, and connexions of the greateft part of thofe who at that time adted in publick.
In the firlt place, they proceeded gradually, but not (lowly, to deftroy every thing of ftrength which did not derive it:^ principal nourifliment from the immediate pleafure of the Court. The greatell weight of popular opinion and party connexion were then with the Dukeof Newcaftle and Mr. Pitt, Neither of thefc held their im- portance by the neiu tenure of the Court; they ivere not therefore thought to be fo proper as others for the fervices which were required by that tenure. It happened very favourably for the new fyftem, that under a forced coalition there rankled an incurable alienation and difguft between the parties which compofed the Admi- niftration. Mr. Pitt was firrt attacked. Not fatisfied with removing him from power, they endeavoured by various artifices to ruin his cha- rader. The other party feemed rather pleafed to get rid of fo oppreffive a liipportj not per- ceiving, that their own fall was prepared by his, and involved in it. Many other reafons pre- vented them from daring to look their true fituation in the face. To the great Whig families it was extremely difagreeable, and feemed almoll unnatural, to oppofe the Adminiftration of a Prince of the Houfe of Brunt'wick. Day alter day they hefitated, and doubted, and lingered, cxpeding THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 21 expelling that other counfels would take place; and were flow to be perfuaded, that all which had been done by the Cabal, was the effed: not of humour, but of fyftem. It was more llrongly and evidently the interCi^ of the new Court Fadion, to get rid of the great Whig conncxioiis, than to dcflroy Mr. Pitt. The power of that gentleman was vaft indeed and merited; but it was in a great degree perfonal, and therefore tranficnt. Theirs was rooted in the country. For, with a good deal lefs of popularity, they polTefied a far more natural and fixed influence. Long polTeflion ot Government; vafl: property; obligations of favours given and received; con- nexion of office; ties of blood, of alliance, of friendfhip (things at that time fuppofcd of fome force); the name of Whig, dear to the majority of the people; the zeal early b.gun and fteadily continued to the Royal Family: all thefe to- gether formed a body of power in the nation, which, was criminal and devoted. The great ruling principle of the Cabal, and that which animated and harmonized all their proceedings, how various foever they may have been, was to lignify to the world, that the Court would proceed upon its own proper forces only; and that the pretence of bringing any other into its fervicc was an alfront to it, and not a fupnort. Therefore, when the chiefs were removed, in order to go to the root, the whole party v/as put undtr aprofcription, fo general and fevere as to take their hard-earned bread from the lowelt piiicersj in a manner which had never been ^ 3 known -t THOUGHTS ON THK CAUSE OF known before, even in general revolutions/ But it was thought neceflary effcdlually to deftroy all clependencies hut one; and to iLew an exnniple of the firmnefs and rigour with which the new fyftein was to be hipported.
Thus for the time were pulled down, in the perfons of the Whig leaders and of Mr. Pitt (in fpite of the fervices of the one at the ac- ceihon of the Royal Family, and the recent fervices of the other in the war), the tixo only Jlcurities for the importance of the people; power arijing from popularity j a7jd power arifng from connexion. Here and there indeed a few individuals were left ftanding, who gave fecu- rity for their total ellrangement from the odious principles of party connexion and perfonal at- tachment; and it muft be confefled that moft of them have religioully kept their faith. Such a change could not however be made without a inighty fliock to Government.
To reconcile the minds of the people to all thefe movements, principles correfpondent to tliem had been preached up with great zeal. Every one muii remember that the Cabal fer out with the moil: aftonifhing prudery, both moral and political. Thofc who in a fev/ months after fouled over head and ears into the deepcll and dirtied: pits cf corruption, cried out violently agalnfl the indlredl: pradices in the electing and managing of Pailiaments, which had formerlv prevailed. This marvellous abhorrence which the Court had fuddenly taken to all influence, was not orJv circulated in converfation through the THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 23 the kingdom, but pompoufly announced to the publick, with many other extraordinary things, in a pamphlf-t * which had all the appearance of a manifefto preparatory to fome conddcrable enterprize. Hiroughout, it was a latire, though in terms managed and decent enough, on the politicks of the fornier Reign. It was indeed written with no fm.ill art and addrefs.
In this piece appeared the firft dawning of the new fyftem; there firrt: appeared the idea (then only in fpecnlation) o^feparating the Court from the Adminijlraticn; of carrying every thing ironi national connexion to perfonnl regards; and of forming a regular party for that purpofe, under the name of King's men.
To recommend this fyftem to the people, a perfpe(5live view of the Court gorgeoufly painted, and finely illuminated from within, was ex- hibited to the gaping multitude. Party was to be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to be caft down from Court, as Ate was from Heaven. Power was thencefor- ward to be the chofen refidence of public fpiritj and no one was to be fuppofed under any Unifier influence, except thofe who had the mif- fortune to be in difgrace at Court, which was to Aand in lieu of all vices and all corruptions. A fcheme of perfedion to be realized in a Mo- narchy far beyond the vifionary Republick of Plato. The whole fcenery was exactly difpofed to captivate thofe good fouls, whofe credulous morality is fo invaluable a treafure to crafty '''• Sentiments of an honefl Man.
C 4 politicians.
24 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF politicians. Indeed there was wherewithal! to charm every body, except thoic few who are not much plenfed with profefllons of fupernatural virtue, who know of what fluiTfuch profclTions are made, for what purpofcs they aredefigned, and in what they are fure conflantly to end. IVIany innocent gentlemen, who had been talk- ing prcfe all their lives without knowing any tiling of the matter, began at 1 all: to open their eyes upon their own m.erits, and to attribute their not having been Lords of the Treafury and Lords of Trade many years before, merely to the prevalence of p:H-ty, and to the Miniderial power, whichhad fruflrated the good intentions of the Court in favour of their abilities. Now was the tim-e to unlock the fealed fountain of Poyal bounty, which had been infamoufly mo- nopolized and huckftered, and to let it flow at large upon the whole people. The time was come, to leflore Royalty to its original fplendour. Mctire le Roy bors de page, became a fort of watch-word. And it u-as conllantly in the mouths of all the runners of the Court, that nothing could preferve the balance of the con- ftitution from being overturned by the rabble, or by a faction of the nobility, but to free the Sovereign effeilually from that Minifterial tyranny under which the Royal dignity had been oppreiTed in the perfon of his M.ijelly's grai^.d- faiher.
I'hefe were fome of the many artifices ufed to reconcile the people to the great change \vhich was made in the pcrfons who compofcd the THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 55 the Minidry, and the ftill greater which was made and avowed in its conftitution. As to individuals, other methods were employed with them J in order fo thoroughly to difunite every party, and even every family, that no cojicert^ order, cr cffeB, might appear in any future opp'^jition. And in 'this manner an Adminldra- tion without connexion with the people, or with one another, was firlt put in poffeflion of Govern- ment. What good confequences followed from if, we have all iecn j whetlier with regard to virtue, public or privates to the eafe and happinefs of the Sovereign 3 or to the real ftrength of Govern- ment. But as fo much ftrefs was then laid on the necelTity of this new projed, it will not be amJfs to take a view of the effefts of this Royal fervitude and vile durance, which was fo de- plored in the reign of the late Monarch, and was io carefully to be avoided in the reign of hi? Succellbr. The effects were thefe.
In times full of doubt and danger to his per- fon and family, George the Second maintained the dignity of his Crown conneifced with the liberty of his people, not only unimpaired, but improved, for the Ipace of thirty three years. He overcame a dangerous rebellion, abetted by foreign force, and raging in the heart of his kingdoms j and thereby deftroyed the feeds of all future rebellion that could arife upon the lame principle. He carried the glory, the power, the commerce of England, to an height unknown even to this renowned nation in the times of its greateft profperity; and he left his fucccffion 26 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF fucceffion relling on the true and only true founddiions of all national and all regal greatnefs; affection at home, reputation abroad, trud in allies, terror in rival nations. The moll; ardent lover of his country cannot vvi{h for Great Britain an happier fate than to continue as {he was then left. A people emulous as we are in affec- tion to our prefent Sovereign, know not how to form a prayer to Heaven for a greater bleffing upon his virtues, or an higher flatc of fe- licity and glory, than that he flicuid live, and fliould reign, and, when Providence ordains it, fhould die, exactly like his illullrious Prede- celfor.
A great Prince may be obliged (though fuch a thing cannot happen very often) to facrifice his private inclination to his public intereil. A wife Prince will not think that fuch a reftraint implies a condition of fervility; and truly, if fuch was the condition of the laft reign, and the effects were alfo fuch as we have del'cribed, we ought, no lefs for the fake of the Sovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear arguments convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that reign, or fly in the face of this c^ieat bodv of ftrong and recent ex- perience.
One of the principal topicks \^hich was then, and has been fmce, much employed by that political * fchool, is an affcded terror of the growth of an ariltocratic power, prejudicial to * See the Political Writings oi" the lute Dr. Erov.n, and v.\:.r.w others.
the THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 27 the rights of the Crown, and the balance of the conilitution. Any new powers exercifed in the Houfc of Lords, or in the Moufe of Commons, or by the Crown, ought CLTlainly to excite the vigilant and anxious jealoufy of a free people. Even a new and unprecedented courfe of ad:ioa in the whole Legillature, without great and evident reafon, may be a fubjed: of juft: un- ealinefs. I will not affirm, that there may not have lately appeared in the Floufe of Lords a difpofition to fome attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the fubjedt. If any fuch have really appeared, they have arifen, not from a power properly ariftocratic, but from the;fame influence which is charged with having excited attempts of a fimilar nature in the Houfe of Commons; which Houfe, if itfliould have been betrayed into an unfortunate quarrel with its conliituents, and involved in a charge of the very fame nature, could have neither power nor inclination to repell fuch attempts in others. Thofe attempts in the Houfe of Lords can no more be called ariflocratic proceedings, than the proceedings with regard to the county of Mid- dlefex in the Houfe of Commons can with any fenfe be called democratical.
It is true, that the Peers have a great influence in the kingdom, and in every part of the public concerns. While they are men of property, it is impoiiible to prevent it, except by fuch means as mull pi^event all property from its natural operation; an event not eafily to be compalfed, \\hile property is power; nor by any means to be wiilied.
2S THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF wlilied, while the Icaft notion exifts of the method by which the fpirit of liberty ads, and of the means by which it is prefervcd. If any particular Peers, by their uniform, upright, conftitutional conduvli, by their pubhc and their private virtues, have acquired an intiuence in the country; the people, on whofe favour that influence depends, and from whom itarofe, will never be duped into an opinion, that fuch greet- nefs in a Peer is the defpotifm of an arirtocracy, when they know and feel it to be the eiFcdt and pledge of their own importance.
I am no friend to arifiocracy, in the fenfe at leall in which that word is ufually underftood. If it were not a bad habit to moot cafes on the fuppofed ruin of the conftitution, I fliould be free to declare, that if it mull peri(h, I would rather by far fee it refolved into any other form, than loH: in that auftere and infolent domination. But, whatever my diflikes may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The queflion, on the intluence of a Court, and of a Peerage, is not, which of the two dangers is the moil eligible, but which is the mofl imminent. He is but a poor obferver, who has not feen, that the generality of Peers, far from fupporti ng them- ielves in a (late 'of independent greatnefs, are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong into an abiecTi fervitude. Would to God it were true, that the fault of cur Peers were too much fpirit! It is worthy of Ibme obfervation, that thefe gentlemen, fo jealous of arillocracy, make no complaints complaints THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 29 complaints of the power of thofe Peers (neither few nor inconfiderable) who are always in the train of a Court, and whofe whole weight muft be confidered as a portion of the fettled influ- ence of the Crown. This Is all fafe and right: but if fome Peers (I am very forry they are not as many as they ought to be) fet themfelves, in the great concern of Peers and Commons, againfl: a back-flairs influence and clandefl:ine government, then the alarm begins; then the confl:itution is in danger of being forced into an arifl:ocracy.
I refl: a little the longer on this Court topick, becaufe it was much infifled upon at the time of the great change, and has been flnce frequently revived by many of the agents of that party: for, whilfl: they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob-government, they are by other managers attempting (though hitherto with little fuccefs) to alarm the people with aphantom of tyranny in the Nobles. All this is done upon their favourite principle of difunion, of fov^ing jealoulies amongft the different orders of the State, and of disjointing the natural fl:rength of the kingdom; that it may be rendered incapable of refifting the finifl:er defigns of wicked men, who have engrcfled the Royal power.
Thus much of the topicks chofen by the Courtiers to recommend their fvftem: it will be neceflary to open a little more at large the nature of that party which was formed for its fupport. Withtut this, the whob v.ould have 5 teen 30 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF been no better tban a vifionary amufement, like the fcheme of Harrington's political club, and not a builnefs in which the nation had a real concern. As a powerful party, and a party conftrudled on a new principle, it is a very invit- ing objedl of curiofitv.
It mufl be remembered, that fince the Revo- lution, until the period we are fpeaking of, the influence of the Crown had been always em- ployed in fupporting the Minifters of State, and in carrying on the public bufinefs according to their opinions. But the party now in queftion is formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favour, prote£lion and confldence of the Crown in the paffage to its Minill:ers j it is to come between them and their importance in Parliament; it is to feparate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies; it is intended as the controul, not the fupport, of Adminiflration. The machinery of this fyftem is perplexed in its movements, and falfe in its principle. It is formed on a fuppofition that the King is fomething external to his govern- ment; and that he may be honoured and aggrandized, even by its debility and difgrace. Tlie plan proceeds exprefbly on the idea of enfeebling the regular executory power. It proceeds on the idea of weakening the State in order to strengthen the Court. The fcheme depending intirely on diftruft, on difconnexion, on mutability by principle, on fyllematic weak- nefs in every particular member; it is impoflible that THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 31 that the total refult fhould be fubftantial ftrength of any kind.
As a foundation of their fchcme, the Cab.il have eftablifhed a fort of Rota \n the Court. All forts of parties, by this means, have been brought into Adminiftration, from whence few- have had the good fortune to efcape without difgrace; none at all without confiderable lofTcs. In the beginning of each arrangement no pro- fefiions of confidence and fupport are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage. But while the Minifters of the day appear in all the pomp and pride of power, while they have all their canvas fpread out to the wind, and everv fail filled with the fair and profperous gale of Royal favour, in a fliort time they find, they know not how, a current, which f^ts diredly agriinft them; which prevents all progrefs; and even drives them backwards. They grow afhamed and mortified in a fituation, which, by its vicinity to power, only ferves to remind them the more ftrongly of their infignificance. They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or to fee themfelves oppofed by the natural inftruments of their office. With the lofs of their dignity, they lofe their temper. In their turn they grow troublefome to that Cabal, which, whether it fupports or oppofes, equally difgraces and equally betrays them. It is foon found necefiary to get rid of the heads of Ad- Biiniftration; but it is of the heads only. As there always are many rotten members belong- ing to the beft connexions, it is not hard to pcrfujde 32 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF fuade feveral to continue in office without their leaders. By this means the party goes out much thinner than it came in; and is only reduced in flrength bv its temporary poflefiion of power. Befides, if by accident, or in courfe of changes, that power fliould be recovered, the Junto have thrown up a retrenchment of thefe carcafes, which may ferve to cover themfelves in a day of danger. They conclude, not unwifely, that fuch rotten members will become the firfl objeds of difgufb and ref^ntment to their antient connex- ions.
They contrive to form in the outward Admi- niflration two parties at the leal}; which, whilfl they are tearing one another to pieces, are both competitors for the favour and pro- tection of the Cabal; and, by their emulation, contribute to throw every thing more and more into the hands of the interior managers.
A Minifter of State will fometimes keephim- felf totally eftranged from all his coUegues; will differ from them in their councils, will privately traverie, and publicly oppofe, their mcafures. He will, however, continue in his employment. Inllead offuffering any mark of difpleafure, he will be diftinguiilied by an unbounded profufion of Court rewards and carelfes; becaufe he does what is expected, and all that is expeded, from men in ofiice. He helps to keep Ibme form of Adminirtration in being, and keeps it at the fame time as weak and divided as poflible.
However, we mull take care not to be miltckcn,- or to imagine that fuch perfons have any THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 33 any weight in their oppofition. When, by them, Adminiftration is convinced of its infignihcancy, they are loon to be convinced of their own. They never are fufFered to fucceed in their oppoiition. They and the world are to be fatisfied, that, neither office, nor authority, nor property, nor abihty, eloquence, council, fkill, or union, are of the leall importance; but that the mere influence of the Court, naked of all fupport, and defUtute of all management, is abundantly fufficient for all its own purpofes.