When any adverfe connexion is to be deflroy- ed, the Cabal feldom appear in the work them- felves. They find out fome perfon of whom the party entertains an high opinion. Such a perfon they endeavour to delude with various pretences. They teach him firft to diftruft, and then to quarrel with his friends; among whom, by the fame arts, they excite a limilar diffidence of him 3 fo that, in this mutual fear and diftruO:,; he may fuffer himfelf to be employed as the inftrument in the change which is brought about. Afterwards they are fure to deflroy him in his turn; by letting up in his place fome per- son in whom he had himfelf repofed the greateft confidence, and who ferves to carry off a con- fiderable part of his adherents.
When fuch a perfon has broke in this manner with his connexions, he is foon compelled to commit fome flagrant adl of iniquitous perfonal hoftility agaiiift fome of them (fuch as an attempt to ftrip a particular friend of his fa- mily eftate), by which the Cabal hope tcf D render 34 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF render the parties utterly irreconcilable. In truth, they have To contrived matters, that people have a greater hatred to the fubordi- nate inftruments than to the principal movers.
As in deftroying their enemies they make ufe of inftruments not immediately belonging to their corps, fo, in advancing their own friends, they purfue exa(5lly the fame method. To promote any of them to confiderable rank or emolument, they commonly take care that the recommendation (hall pafs through the hands of the oftenfible Miniftry: fuch a recommendation might however appear to the world, as fome proof of the credit of Minifters, and fome means of increafing their ftrength. To prevent this, the perfons fo advanced are direfted, in all companies, induftrioufly to declare, that they are under no obligations whatfoever to Admi- niftration; that they have received their office from another quarter; that they are totally free and independent.
When the Fa6lion has any job of lucre to obtain, or of vengeance to perpetrate, their way is, to feleft, for the execution, thofe very perfons to whofe habits, friendfhips, principles, and declarations, fuch proceedings are publicly known to be the moft adverfe; at once to render the inftruments the more odious, and there- fore the more dependent, and to prevent the people from ever repofing a confidence in any appearance of private friendlhip, or public principle.
If If THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 35 If the Adminiflration feem now and then, from remiirncfs, or from fear of making them- felves difagreeable, to fuffer any popular ex- cefles to go unpunirticd, the Cabal immediately fets up fome creature of theirs to raife a cla- mour againft the Minifters, as having fhametully betrayed the dignity of Government. Then they compel the Miniftry to become adtive in conferring rewards and honours on the perfons who have been the inrtruments of their difgrace; and, after having firfl: vilified them with the higher orders for fuffering the laws to fleep over the licentioufnefs of the populace, they drive them (in order to make amends for their former inactivity) to fome adt of atrocious vi- olence, which renders them completely ab- horred by the people. They who remember the riots which attended the Middlefex Eledion; the opening of the prefent Parliament j and the tranfadions relative to Saint George's Fields, will not be at a lofs for an application of thefe remarks.
That this body may be enabled to compafs all the ends of its inftitution, its members are icarcely ever to aim at the high and reiponfible offices of the State. They are diitributed with art and judgement through all the fecondary, but efficient, departments of office, and through the houfeholds of all the branches of the Royal Family: fo as on one hand to occupy all th^ avenues to the Throne; and on the other to forward or truftrate the execution of any mea- fure, according to their own interelts. For D 2 with D 2 with 36 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF with the credit and fupport which they are known to have, though for the greater part in places which are only a genteel excnfe for falary, they poflcfs all the influence of the higheft ports; and they dictate publicly in ahnofl: every thing, even with a p;irade of fuperiority. When- ever they diflent (as it often happens) from their nominal leaders, the trained part of the Senate, inftindlivcly in the fccret, is fare to follow them; provided the leaders, fenfible of their fituation, do not of themfelves recede in time from their mod declared opinions. This latter is generally the cafe. It will not he conceivable to any one who has not feen it, what pleafure is taken by the Cabal in rendering thefe heads of office throughly contemptible and ridiculous. And when they are become fo, they have then the befl: chance for being well fupported.
The members of the Court Facflion are fuHy indemnified for not holding places on the flippery heights of the kingdr^m, not only by the lead in all affairs, but alfo by the perfect fecurity in which they enjoy lefs confpicuous, but very advantageous fituations. Their places are, in exprefs legal tenure, or in etfecl:, all of them for life. Whilil: the firfl: and moft refpedlable perfons in the kingdom are tolled about like tennis balls, the fport of a blind and infolent caprice, no Vlinifter dares even to call: an oblique glance at the loweft of their body. If an attempt be made upon one of this corps, immediately he flies to fajK^lnary, and pretends to the moft in- violable of all prcmiks. No conveniency of public THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 37 public arrangement is available to remove any one of them from the fpecific lituation he holds; and the flightell: attempt upon one of them, by the moll powerful Minifter, is a certain pre- liminary to his own deftrud:ion.
Confcious of their independence, they bear themfelves with a lofty air to the exterior Tvlinirters. Like Janiilaries, they derive a kind of freedom from the very condition of their fervitude. They may a(fl juft as they pleafe; provided they are true to the great ruling prin- ciple of their inftitution. It is, therefore, not at all wonderful, that people (hould be fo defi- rous of adding themfelves to that body, in which they may polTefs and reconcile fatisfadtions the moft alluring, and feemingly the moft contra- dictory; enjoying at once all the fpirited pleafure of independence, and all the grofs lucre and fat emoluments of fervitude.
Here is a fketch, though a flight one, of the conftitution, laws, and policy, of this new Court corporation. The name by which they chufe to difl'inguifh themfelves, is that of Kings fnen, or the King s friendsy by an invidious exclufion of the reft of his Majelly's moft loyal and affec- tionate fubje(5ls. The whole fyftem, compre- hending the exterior and interior Adminillra- tions, is commonly called, in the technical lan- guage of the Court, Double Cabinet -, in French or Englifh, as you choofe to pronounce it.
Whether all this be a vifion of a diftradied brain, or the invention of a malicious heart, or a real Fadion in the country, muft be judged D3 by 3S THOUGHTS ON THE C A tJ S E CF by the appearances which things have worn for eight years part. Thus far I am certain, that there is not a fingle public man, in or out of office, who has not, at lome time or other, born teftimony to the truth of what I have now related. In particular, no perfons have been more flrong in their afiertions, and louder and more indecent in their complaints, than thofe who compofe all the exterior part of the prefent Admin iflration; in whofe time that Faction has arrived at fuch an height of power, and of boldnefs in the ufe of it, as may, in the end, perhaps bring about its total deftruftion.
It is true, that about four years ago, during the adminiftration of the Marquis of Rocking- ham, an attempt was made to carry on Govern- ment without their concurrence. However, this was only a tranfient cloudy they were hid but for a moment; and their conftellation blazed out with greater brightneu-, and a far more vi- gorous influence, fome time after it was blown over. An attempt was at that time made (but without any idea of profcription) to break their corps, to difcountenance their dodlrines, to re- vive connexions of a different kind, to rcfiore the principles and policy of the Whigs, to re- animate the caufe of Liberty by Minifterial countenance j and then for the fir ft time were men fecn attached in office to every principle tliey had maintained in oppoiition. No one will doubt, that fuch men were abhorred and violently oppofed by the Court Faction, and that fuch a iyftcm could have but a fhort duration.
It THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 39 It may appear fomewhat affeded, that in fo much difcourfe upon this extraordinary Party, I Should fay fo little of the Earl of Bute, who is the fuppofed head of it. But this was neither owing to affedation nor* inadvertence. I have carefully avoided the introducflion of perfonal reflexions of any kind. Much the greater part of the topicks which have been ufed to blacken this Nobleman, are either unjuft or frivolous.. At!^eft, they have a tendency to give the re- fentment of this bitter calamity a wrong di- rediion, and to turn a public grievance into ^ mean perfonal, or a dangerous national, quarrel. Where there is a regular fcheme of operations carried on, it is the fyftem, and not any individual perfon who a6ts in it, that is truly dangerous. This fyftem has not rifen folely from the ambition of Lord Bute, but from the circumftances which favoured it, and from an indifference to the conftitution which had been for fome time growing among our gentry. We (hould have been tried with it, if the Earl of Bute had never exifted; and it will want neither a contriving head nor adlive members, when the Earl of Bute exifts no longer. It is not, therefore, to rail at Lord Bute, but firmly to embody againft this Court Party and its practices, which can afford us any profped: of relief in our prefent condition.
Another motive induces me to put the per- fonal conlideration of Lord Bute wholly out of the queftion. He communicates very little in a dire£t manner with the greater part of our men 40 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF of bufinefs. This has never been his cuftom. It encugh for him that he furrounds the m with his creatures. Several imagine, therefore, that they have a very good excufe for doing all the work of this Faction, when they have no per- fonal connexion with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a party to an Admiuillmt'on, compofed of infiilated individuals, without faith pli[fhted, tie, or common principle; an Adminiftration conftitutionally impotent, becaufe fupported by no party in the nation; he who contributes to deftroy the connexions of men and their iruft in one another, or in any fort to throw the de- pendence of public counfels upon private will and favour, poflibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular perfon. But let him be who or what he will, he abets a Faction that is driving hard to the ruin of his country. He is f?pping the founda- tion of its liberty, diflurbing the fources of its domeflic tranquillity, weakening its govern- ment over its dependencies, degrading it from all its importance in the fyilem of Europe.
It is this unnatural infulion of a Jyfiem of Favouritifm into a Government which in a great part of its conftitution is popular, that has raifed the prefent ferment in the nation. The people, without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effeds, in much violence, in a great fpirit of innovation, and a general diforder in all the fundions of CjQvernmeiU. I keep my eye folely on this THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 41 fyftem; if I fpeak of thofe meafures which have arifen from it, it will bs fo far only as they illuftrate the general fcheme. This is the fountain of all thofe hitter waters of which, through an hundred different conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burft. The dif- cretionary power of the Crown in the forma- tion of Miniiiry, abufed by bad or weak men, » has given rife to a fyftem, which, without diredly violating the letter of any law, ope- rates againft the fpirit of the whole conftitution. A plan of Favouritifm for our executory Government is effentially at variance with the plan of our Legiflature. One great end un- doubtedly of a mixed Government like ours, compofed of Monarchy, and of controls, oa the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the Prince ihall not be able to violate the laws. This is ufeful indeed and funda- mental. But this, even at firfl: view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defenfive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in importance, that the difcretionary powers which are necejfarily \:ejied in the Monarchy whether for the execution of the laws, or for the nomination to magijiracy and ojice, or for con - dueling the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, fiould all be exercifed upon public principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a Court. This, I laid, is equal in importance to the fecuring a Government ac- cording to law. The laws reach but a very little 42 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF little way. Conftitute Government how you pleafe, infinitely the greater part of it muft depend upon the exercife of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightnefs of Minifters of State. Even all the ufe and potency of the laws depends upon them. Without them, your Commonwealth is no better than a fcheme upon paper; and not a living, afting, effedtiv^e conftitution. It is poffi- ble, that through negligence, or ignorance, or defign artfully conduced, Minifters may fuffer one part of Government to languifh, another to be perverted from its purpofes, and every va- luable interefl: of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without poffibility of fixing any fingle act on which a criminal profecution can be juftly grounded. The due arrangement of men in the active, part of the State, far from being foreign to the purpofes of a wife Go- vernment, ought to be among its very firft and deareft objeds. When, therefore, the abettors of the new fyftem tell us, that between them and their oppofers there is nothing but a llruggle for power, and that therefore we are no-wavs concerned in it; we muft tell thofe who have the impudence to infult us in this manner, that of all things we ought to be the moft concerned, who and what fort of men they are, that hold the truft of every thing that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation, but what muft either render us totally defperate, or foothe us into the fccurity of idiots. We muft foften into THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 43 into a credulity below the milkinefs of infancy, to think all men virtuous. VVe mufi: be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical, to believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in public life as in private, fome good, fome evil. The elevation of the one, and the depreffion of the other, are the iirft objefts of all true policy. But that form of Government, which, neither in its direct infti- tutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the moft truft- worthy hands, but has left its whole executory fyftem to be difpofed of agreeably to the un- controuled pleafure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective not only in that member, but confequentially errOi'ieous in every part of it.
In arbitrary Governments, the conftitution of the Miniftry follows the conftitution of the Legiflature. Both the Law and the Magifirate are the creatures of Will. It muft be fo. Nothing, indeed, will appear more certain, on any tolerable confideration of this matter, than that every fort of Government ought to have its Adminijiration correfpondent to its Legijlature, If it fliould be otherwife, things muft fall into an hideous diforder. The people of a free Commonwealth, who have taken fuch care that their laws ftiould be the refult of general con- fent, cannot be fo fenfelefs as to fuffer their executory fyftem to be compofed of perfons on whom they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the public love and confidence have recommended 6 44 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF recommended to thole powers, upon the ufe of which the very being of the State depends.
The popular eledion of magiftrates, and popular difpofition of revviirds and honours, is one of the firft pd vantages of a free State. Without it. or fomething equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot iciig enjoy the fub- flance of freedom; certainly none of the vivify- ing energy of good Government. The frame of our Commonwealth did not admit of fuch an adual election: but it provided as well, and (while the fpirit of the conflitution is preferved) better for all the effeds of it than by the method of fuffrage in any democratic State whatfoever. It had always, until of late, been held the firft duty of Parliament, to rcfufc to fupport Govern- ment ^ until poii-er was in the hands cf perfons who were acceptable to the people y or while JaSfions fredcmiuated in the Court in which the nation had no confidence. Thus all the good effects of po- pular election were fuppofcd to be fecured to us, wnthout tlie mifchiefs attending on perpetual intrigue, and a diftinct canvafs for every parti- cular office throughout tlic body of the people. This was the moft noble and refined part of our conflitution. The people, by their reprefent- atives and grandees, were intruded with a de- liberative power in making lav.'s j the King with the control of his negative. The King was in- trufted with the deliberative choice and the eltftion to ofiice; the people had the negative in a Parliamentary refufal to fupport. Formerly this power of controul was what kept Minifters in awe THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS. 45 awe of Parliaments, and Parliaments in reve- rence with the people. If the ufe of this power of controul on the fyftem and perfons of Admi- niftration is gone, every thing is loft, Parliament and all. We may aiTure ourfelves, that if Par- liament will tamely fee evil men take pofleffion of all the ftrong-holds of their country, and allow them time and means to fortify them- felves, under a pretence of giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of difcovering, whether they will not be reformed by power, and whe- ther their meafures will not be better than their morals; fuch a Parliament will give countenance to their meafures alfo, whatever that Parlia- ment may pretend, and whatever thofe mea- fures may be.
Every good political inftitution muft have a preventive operation as well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from Government, and not to trufi: for the fafety of the State to fubfequent punifhment alone: puniftiment, which has ever been tardy and uncertain; and which, when power is fuffered in bad hands, may chance to fall ra- ther on the injured than the criminal.
Before men are put forward into the great trufts of the State, they ought by their condu(5l to have obtained fuch a degree of eftimation in their country, as may be fome fort of pledge and fecurity to the publick, that they will not abufe thofe trufts. It is no mean fecurity for a proper ufe of power, that a man has ilievvn by the general tenor of his adions, that the affedion, the 46 THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF the good opinion, the confidence, of his fellow citizens have been among the principal objects of his life; and that he has owed none of the gradations of his power or fortune to a fettled contempt, or occafional forfeiture of their efteeni.
That man who before he comes into power has no friends, or who coming Into power is obliged to defert his friends, or who lofing it has no friends to f3aTipathize with him; he who has no fway among any part of the landed or commercial intereft, but whofe whole importance has begun with his office, and is fure to end with it; is a perfon who ought never to be fuffered by a controuling Parliament to continue in any of thofe fituations which confer the lead and direction of all our public affairs; becaufe fuch a man has no comiexion with the intereji of the people.
Thofe knots or cabals of men who have got together, avowedly without any public principle, in order to fell their conjunct iniquity at the higher rate, and are therefore univerfally odious, ought never to be fuffered to domineer in the State; becaufe they have 7io connexion with the fentiments and opinions of the people, Thefe are confiderations which in my opinion enforce the neceffity of having fome better rea- fon, in a free country, and a free Parliament, for fupporting the Minifters of the Crown, than that (hort one, That the King has thought proper to appoint them. There is fomething very courtly in this. But it is a principle pregnant with all forts forts THE PRESENT D IS C O NTENTS. 47 forts of mifchlef, in a conftitution like ours, to turn the views of adive men from the country to the Court. Whatever be the road to power, that is the road which will be trod. If the opinion of the country be of no ufe as a means of power or confideration, the qualities which ufually procure that opinion will be no longer cultivated. And whether it will be right, in a State fo popular in its conftitution as ours, to leave ambition without popular motives, and to truft all to the operation of pure virtue in the minds of Kings and Minifters, and public men, muft be fubmitted to the judgement and good fenfe of the people of England.
Cunning men are here apt to break in, and, without direftly controverting the principle, to raife objedions from the difficulty under which the Sovereign labours, to diftinguifh the genuine voice and fentiments of his people, from the clamour of a faftion, by which it is fo eafily counterfeited. The nation, they fay, is generally divided into parties, with views and paffions utterly irreconcileable. If the King fhould put his affairs into the hands of any one of them, he is fure to difguft the reft; if he feled particular men from among them all, it is an hazard that he difgufts them all. Thofe who are left out, however divided before, will foon run into a body of oppofition; which, being a coUedlion of many difcontents into one focus, will without doubt be hot and violent enough. Fadion will make its cries refound through the nation, as if the whole were in an uproar, when