It is plain that we have two great classes of these senti- ments: the subjective, attaching to judgment of our own action, and the objective, attaching to judgment of the action of others. Among the subjective may be counted shame and pride, humiliation and vanity, guilt and inno- cence, freedom and restraint, etc. Among the objective are trust and distrust, gratitude and ingratitude, envy and compassion, jealousy and magnanimity, emulation and self-effacement, indebtedness and patronage, forgiveness and revenge, etc. It is plain, too, that some of these sen- timents occur in a more subjective and a more objective form: thus praise and blame are the objective correlates of pride and shame, justice and injustice the objective correlates of innocence and guilt, security and insecurity the subjective correlates of trust and distrust, honour the subjective correlate of duty. But it is impossible to make out a complete list, or to set up a satisfactory classification, of the ethical sentiments. The situation judged is, as a rule, so important to us, so absorbing, that the sentiment 3 1 8 Sentiment 3 1 8 Sentiment passes over into an emotion; guilt and innocence become hope and fear, envy and compassion are lost in hate and affection ('' pity's akin to love"), humiliation changes to chagrin, etc.
Although they spring from a different root, and al- though the judgments to which they attach are intrinsi- cally different, the religious sentiments are, in the civilised society of to-day, most intimately connected with the ethi- cal. Many of the experiences mentioned in the previous paragraph may be grouped round the religious judgment. Further to mention are the sentiments of awe and rever- ence, humility and unworthiness, faith and resignation, exaltation and remorse, etc. All of these sentiments readily pass into emotions.
Method. — The ethical and religious sentiments could be inves- tigated, perhaps, by help of the questionnaire. The questionnaire is a series of questions, submitted to a large number of persons for introspective answer; it is a device to secure the advantages of comparative introspection (§ 9; cf. § 35).
In the present case, a number of typical instances of conduct would need to be collected. The list would be headed by the direction: ' Read these cases, one by one, and describe intro- spectively the feelings which they arouse in you.' If the persons appealed to were well versed in the employment of psychological method, their replies might go far to bring order into the existing chaos.
The expression of the sentiments, so far as it has been investi- gated, does not differ in kind from that of the emotions. Thus if the subject, placed as described in § 33 (2), be shown a prettily painted decorative pattern, pulse and breathing are heightened, and volume and muscular strength increased.
CHAPTER XIV The Synthesis of Action. The Reaction Experiment § 92. The Synthesis of Action. — In Chapter X we ana- lysed and classified the various forms of action, but did not attempt an experimental reconstruction of the action- consciousness. We have now to make good this omis- sion; to put together the processes which we found to be involved in action, and to show by synthesis that our analysis was correct.
The method which enables us to effect the synthesis of action, to put together, for experimental purposes, the constituents of which the action-consciousness is com- posed, is known as the reaction juetJiod. A reaction is an artificial action. It is agreed between two persons, the * experimenter ' and the 'reactor,' that on the occur- rence of a certain sensory stimulus (given by the experi- menter) a certain movement shall be made (by the reactor). The sensation set up by the stimulus corre- sponds to the object-idea in impulsive, etc., action; the simple movement made in response to it corresponds to the complicated movements of crouching down, clinching the fist, etc. We may make the reaction impulsive, voli- tional, etc., as we please, by prearranging the conditions under which the experiment is performed.
The reaction experiment consists, on its objective side, in the accurate measurement of the time elapsing between 320 Synthesis of Action. Reaction Experiment the occurrence of the sensory stimulus and the execution of the movement in response to it; on its subjective side, in the introspective examination of the conscious processes which run their course during this time, and for some 2 sec. before it. The responsive movement may follow at once upon the sensing of the stimulus, or may be restrained until certain connections have been formed in consciousness. In the former case we speak of a simple^ in the latter of a compound reaction.
Fig. io.
Method. — Figure lo shows one of the sets of apparatus most commonly employed in the reaction experiment. A and B are different rooms: the reactor sits in the reacting room, B, the experimenter, who notes the time taken by the reaction, in the registration room, A. Reactor and experimenter are separated in order that the reactor's introspection may be undisturbed by noise, etc.
« is a telegraph key. The reaction movement employed with this set of instruments consists in the lifting of the first or second finger of the right hand from the button of the key. b is a steel hammer (§ 29), the head of which can be lowered so as to § 92. The Synthesis of Action 321 strike upon a steel block placed beneath it. The sound made by the fall of the hammer is the stimulus to which the subject in the present experiments is to react. <r is a screen, which pre- vents the reactor from seeing the hammer fall, and consequently moving his finger too soon (reacting to sight, instead of to sound).
Hammer and key are connected with an electric clock, or chronoscope, e. The clock has two dials. A complete revolu- tion of the hand of the lower dial occupies 10 sec, a complete re- volution of that of the upper dial, yL sec. The circumference of each dial is divided into 100 parts; so that the unit of measure- ment on the lower dial is ^^ sec, that on the upper, yo^o"o" ^^^• To read the time from the clock, therefore, we have only to add the figures of the upper to those of the lower dial; if the lower hand points to 76, and the upper to 25, the time is 7.625 sec. The chronoscope goes only when the electric current is passed through a magnet, which is attached to the clockwork.
The wires which connect together hammer, key and chrono- scope run to the battery/, by way of a commutating key, d. The function of this key is to change the direction of the current sent through the chronoscope in successive experiments. In one ex- periment, the current takes the direction +~jn HT""; in the next, the direction ^TXT • This reversal is necessary, since a current which travelled always in the same direction would permanently magnetise the chronoscope magnet, and so alter the times recorded by the dials.
Below the shaft of the hammer b is placed an electromagnet, g^ wires from which run to the battery/', by way of the commutator d\ Closure of the commutator sends a current through the mag- net, and the head of the hammer is thus pulled down upon the steel block.
We will suppose now that an experiment is to be made. The experimenter, seated before the chronoscope in the registration room, closes the commutator d. Having done this, he signals to the reactor (by means of an ordinary electric bell, not represented in the Figure) to prepare for the reaction movement. The reactor 322 Sy7ithesis of Action. Reaction Experiment lays his right arm on the table which carries the reacting key, a, and rests the first or second finger of the right hand upon the but- ton, thus closing the key. We have {\) a closed, d closed, and b open. Two seconds after his signal (§ 41), the experimenter closes the commutator d^; the hammer falls. The sound stimulus is thus given, while we have {2) a closed, ^/closed, and b closed: the chronoscope hands begin to move. The reactor, hearing the hammer fall, raises his finger from the button of <^, — i.e., 'reacts.' We have (3) <^ open, b closed, and d closed: the chronoscope stops with the breaking of the circuit at a. If the hands pointed to 7.625 at (2), and the dials now read 7.819 at (3), we know that the whole time, from the dropping of the hammer to the moving of the finger, was.194 sec. This interval is called the 'reaction time '; and its unit, the thousandth of i sec, is called a 'sigma' (Greek o-).
While the experimenter is reading the reaction time from the dials of the chronoscope, the reactor writes out an introspective account of his reaction-consciousness, beginning from the sound- ing of the signal bell, 2 sec. before the hammer fell, and ending with the snapping of the finger from the button of the reacting key. Presently the signal is again sounded by the experimenter, and a new experiment begins. It is customary to limit a series of experiments to 15 or 20, since the strain of attention necessary for reacting and for the subsequent introspection is very great, and the reactor soon becomes fatigued (§ 10).
The psychological laboratories contain many forms of the re- acting key, many kinds of instruments whose function it is to give the stimulus which starts the reaction experiment, and many appa- ratus for time registration. The responsive movement need not be made with the finger; it may be performed by lips, eyelid, vocal organs, tongue, foot, etc. And the stimulus need not be auditory; it may be visual, tactual, etc. Moreover, the movement may be movement not of a single finger, but of different fingers in dif- ferent experiments: in such cases a five-finger key is employed. And the impression may not be known beforehand to the reactor; it may be one of a number of colours, sounds, etc.: in such caser the apparatus which gives the stimulus becomes very complex.
The reaction time in the instance given above is the time elapsing between the fall of the hammer and the movement of the finger from the key. Within this time, the external stimulation has made its way through the ear, and the excitation set up in the hair-cells of the basilar membrane has travelled to the brain. Moreover, the outgoing excitation has run down the right arm, to the finger-tip. No one of these physiological processes is accom- panied by a conscious process. Plainly, then, the reaction time is the duration of more than a simple action-consciousness: it is the duration of this, plus the duration of certain physiological pro- cesses. It is, unfortunately, impossible to measure the physiologi- cal processes by themselves, and subtract the time which they require from the total reaction time; so that every recorded re- action time is somewhat too long. This fact, while it does away with the absolute value of the figures read from the chronoscope, does not lessen their relative value. If a reaction time which in- cludes, say, the formation of an association of ideas is longer than a reaction time which does not, the difference may be referred, other conditions being equal, to the association.
§ 93. The Simple Reaction. — In the simple reaction experiment, the movement follows at once upon the sens- ing of the stimulus. In other words, the simple reaction is an artificial impulsive action. But the impulsive action of real life passes over into reflex action; and in like manner the simple reaction, by a fitting preadjustment of its conditions, may be brought very near to the reflex type. We thus have two forms of simple reaction: the true or impulsive form, or, as it is usually termed, the * sensorial ' reaction; and the curtailed or reflex-like form, usually termed the ' muscular ' reaction.
(i) The Sensorial Reaction. — In the sensorial reaction experiment, the reactor is directed to hold his attention from the outset upon the sensory stimulus, and to withhold the reaction movement until he has sensed that stimulus.
324 Synthesis of Action. Reaction Experiment At the beginning of the experiment, therefore, conscious- ness is dominated by an idea of end, and by a centrally aroused sensation (or verbal idea) which corresponds to the expected stimulus. When the stimulus is given, this centrally aroused object-idea is replaced by the periphe- rally aroused sensation, which brings with it the recogni- tive or cognitive mood. We now have two of the three factors in the impulse: the ideas of object and of end. These are immediately supplemented by the idea of move- ment, and the motor response to the stimulus is made.
The stages in the formation of the reaction-consciousness (sen- sorial reaction) may, therefore, be tabulated as follows: ( i) idea of end plus anticipation of object; (2) idea of ^xvA plus idea of object, with mood of * at home ' or ' of course '; (3) idea of end plus idea of object ///^j- idea of movement; (4) sensations set up by movement.
The idea of end soon ceases to play any considerable part in the reaction-consciousness. At first it may be vividly present, as the idea of gaining control over the attention, getting practice in introspection, adding to the sum of psychological facts, doing a piece of prescribed work well, etc. But with frequent repeti- tion of the experiments, it loses its original definiteness, until, in course of time, all that is left of it is the cognitive mood set up by the sight of the reaction table, screen, etc.
The duration of the simple sensorial reaction differs according to the sense department from which the object- idea is taken, i.e., to which the stimulus appeals. This time difference is, in all probability, due to the physiologi- cal conditions of stimulation of the different sense-organs, and accordingly has no psychological significance.
The sensorial reaction time has been determined in the spheres of sight, sound, pressure, taste, smell and temperature. But the conditions of stimulation in the three last cases are so variable and so little understood that the time measurements are of small psychological value. For purposes of introspective analysis and comparison, therefore, we must confine ourselves to reactions in the domain of sight, sound and pressure. The average durations are as follows: (i) Sensorial reaction to light: 2700-; (2) Sensorial reaction to sound: 2250-; (3) Sensorial reaction to pressure: 2100-.
(2) Tke Musaclar Reaction. —In the muscular reaction experiment, the reactor is directed to hold his attention from the outset upon the movement which is to be made in response to the stimulus. At the beginning of the experiment, therefore, consciousness is dominated by the ideas of end and of movement. When the stimulus is given, and the object-idea added to these two ideas, the impulse is complete: motor response to the stimulus is immediately made.
The sensorial reaction can never pass over into a reflex action, since, by the conditions of the experiment, move- ment cannot take place until the ideas of end and of object have been supplemented by the idea of move- ment. The muscular reaction, on the other hand, may, in course of practice, come very near to the reflex type. In the first place, the idea of end tends to disappear, as the reactor grows accustomed to the experiment. In the second place, the concentration of attention upon the movement to be made paves the way for the actual move- ment; the attention does for this movement what biologi- cal conditions have done for other movements which are of the true reflex order; there exists, for the time being, a sort of 'reflex arc' (§ 66) between the sense-organ to 326 Synthesis of Action. Reaction Experiment which the stimulus appeals and the muscles concerned in the reaction movement, — just as there exists a permanent reflex arc between, e.g., the pressure organs in the cornea of the eye and the muscles concerned in winking. Hence it is intelligible that the muscular reaction should be quick and spasmodic, and that it should oftentimes seem, when introspectively examined, to have taken place automati- cally, reflexly, without the intervention of any object-idea at all.
When the reactor is new to the reaction experiment, the stages in the formation of the reaction-consciousness (muscular reaction) may be tabulated as follows: (i) idea of end plus idea of movement; (2) idea of tndplus idea of movement plus idea of object; (3) sensations set up by movement.
But in its most reflex-like form, as performed by a highly practised subject, the reaction is accompanied only by the follow- ing processes: (i) idea of movement; (2) sensations set up by movement.
The idea of end lapses altogether, and the object-idea comes to consciousness later, after the movement has been made. The average durations of the muscular reaction are as follows: (i) Muscular reaction to light: 1800-; (2) Muscular reaction to sound: 1200-; (3) Muscular reaction to pressure: iioo*.
These times are too long to be pure reflex times: the winking reflex occupies only about 500-. But they are reflex-like. This is borne out not only by the verdict of introspection, but also by the fact that the muscular reaction is not infrequently made too soon, or made in response to the wrong stimulus. If the attention has done its work thoroughly, and the ' reflex arc ' is well con- nected in all its parts, there is a constant tendency for the movement to ' go off '; any slight provocation, such as the creaking of a chair in the reacting room, is enough to bring about the jerk of the finger from the key.
The difference between the average sensorial and the average muscular reaction time amounts, as the tables show, to about looo- or yL sec. The difference is so constant that the experi- menter, as he reads the figures from the chronoscope, can tell whether the subject is reacting in the one way or the other. This objective control is most valuable, since it enables us to educate the reactor in introspection, to aid him in gaining sub- jective control of his action by acquiring a mastery over the attention (§ 97).
The Mean Variation. — If we are to estimate the introspective power of the reactor, we must know not only the average duration of his sensorial and muscular reactions, but the regularity or irreg- ularity with which he reacts. Thus suppose that in three succes- sive sensorial reactions to sound the chronoscope read iiocr, 3200- and 2450-. The average of these three times is a good average: 225 o-. But the irregularity is so great that the reactor could not be credited with any considerable degree of control over his attention.
Hence it is usual to record not only the average reaction time of each reactor, but the mean variation of that time. By the * mean variation ' we mean the average difference between the average reaction time and the single reaction times gained in the course of an experimental series. Thus iioo- differs from the average time (225 o-) by 1150-; 3200- differs from it by 95 o-; and 245 o- differs from it by 200-. The mean variation in this case is (115 -I-95 H- 20) -r- 3 (the number of experiments in the series); The mean variation of a practised reactor is lOo- for muscular reactions, and about 250- for sensorial.
The simple reaction experiment can be varied in many ways. Thus we can investigate the influence of the intensity of stimulus, of variation of the time allowed for preparation of the attention.
328 Synthesis of Action. Reaction Experi^jtent of the omission of the signal, of the occurrence of distracting stimuli, etc. The results of such experiments are all valuable as throwing light upon the working of the attention.
§ 94. The Discrimination Reaction and the Cognition Re- action. — In its sensorial form, the simple reaction is an artificial impulsive action. In the experience of everyday life, we have conflicts of impulses with one another, the result of which may be inaction or selective action, and conflicts of impulses with other groups of associated ideas, the result of which may be inaction or volitional action. Now if we can introduce these conflicts into the course of the reaction experiment, we shall be able objectively to measure and subjectively to examine the two most compli- cated forms of the action-consciousness.
It is possible, by the help of the reaction method, to put together an artificial selective or volitional action. But the end cannot be reached by a single step. We must advance to * choice reactions,' as they are termed, by way of the * discrimination reaction' and the 'cognition reaction.'
( 1 ) The Discrimination Reaction. — The discrimination reaction differs only in one respect from the simple senso- rial reaction. In the latter, the subject reacts to a single known stimulus; in the former, to one of two or more known stimuli. The reactor is told, e.g.^ that he will be shown either black or white, and that he is to react when he has cognised the black as black or the white as white; but he does not know which of the two brightness qualities to expect in each particular experiment. He has to ' discriminate ' the stimulus which is actually employed.
(2) TJie Cognition Reaction. — The cognition reaction differs in two respects from the simple sensorial reaction.
In the first place, the subject is required to react only when he has cognised some one of two or more possible stimuli; the cognition reaction is a discrimination reaction. In the second place, the reactor does not know, except in a quite general way, what stimulus he is to expect. Thus he may be told that he will be shown a light stimulus, and that he is to react when he has cognised this stimulus as a particular brightness or a particular colour; but nothing more explicit is said.
If we wish briefly to characterise these three forms of reaction, we may say that (i) the simple sensorial reaction involves cogni- tion of one known stimulus, (2) the discrimination reaction in- volves cognition of some one of a number of known stimuli, and (3) the cognition reaction involves cognition of some one of a number of unknown stimuli, — 'unknown,' that is, so far as igno- rance is permitted by the conditions of the method at large.
For an analysis of the ' cognition ' which is involved in each case, cf.% 72. The reader must remember that the titles ' discrim- ination reaction ' and ' cognition reaction ' are employed in narrow and special senses. The * discrimination reaction ' implies a cog- nition; and the * cognition reaction ' implies a more elaborate dis- crimination than does the ' discrimination reaction ' technically so called.
Both the discrimination reaction and the cognition reaction are longer than the simple sensorial reaction. The time differences between the latter and certain forms of the cognition reaction are given in the following table: The ' cognition ' of a colour requires 300-; The 'cognition' of a printed letter requires 500-; The 'cognition' of a short word requires 50 o-.
With simple stimuli, of this kind, there is hardly any diflerence between the durations of the discrimination and cognition reaction. The rule seems to be, however, that discrimination requires a sHghtly shorter time than cognition.
330 Synthesis of Action. Reaction Experiment § 95. The Choice Reaction. — The choice reaction is an artificial selective or volitional action.
(i) The Choice Reaction as Selective Action. — This re- action, in its simplest form, is a direct development from the discrimination reaction. The reactor is told, e.o^., that he will be shown either black or white, and that he is to react only when he has cognised the black as black or the white as white. So far, the directions are the same as those for the discrimination reaction. But further, he is to react to black by a movement of the right hand, and to white by a movement of the left hand. This additional direction introduces a conflict of impulses into the course of the experiment.
(2) TJie Choice Reaction as Volitional Action. — This reaction also is built up, in the first place, from the dis- crimination reaction. The reactor is instructed as before, except that he is told to react to black by a movement of the right hand, and not to react to white at all. There is thus introduced into the experiment a conflict between an impulse and another group of ideas.
Both forms of the choice reaction, however, may be based upon the cognition reaction, instead of the simpler discrim- ination reaction. Thus the reactor may be told that he will be shown a colour or a letter, and that he is to react by naming the impression, i.e., by a movement of the vocal organs. He is here left in entire ignorance as to what colours or what letters will be exposed. The reaction will, in this case, be an artificial selective action. Or he may be told that he will be shown either a colour or a letter, and that he is to react to the former by naming the given impression, but not to react to letters at all. In this case, the reaction would be an artificial volitional action.
(i) It is plain that the time occupied by the conflict of im- pulses in the first form of the choice reaction will depend very largely upon the reactor's practice, and upon the number of impressions used. If no more than two stimuli are employed, — say, black and white, — the connection of black with right-hand movement and of white with left-hand movement may become so stable, in course of practice, that there is really no conflict of impulses in the case. The reaction may come to be as much a matter of course as the taking of a knife in one's right hand and a fork in one's left (§ 96). On the other hand, if ten col- ours are used, and the reactor instructed to reply to each colour by the movement of a particular finger, there will nearly always be some conflict of impulses, hovever great the amount of practice.
The following may be taken as instances of the duration of the choice reaction^ (selective action), {a) Nine persons were re- quired to react to two intensities of sound by movements of the two hands. The average time of the choice reaction was 3160-. When we remember that the simple sensorial reaction to sound occupies 2250-, and that the remaining 910- represents not only the ' choice,' i.e., the conflict of impulses, but also the ' discrimina- tion,' i.e., the cognition of the loud as ' the loud ' and the weak as * the weak ' sound, we see that the conflict of impulses in the experiments was not very serious. 'Choice' could not have occupied more than 60 cr.
{b) In another investigation, ten persons reacted to ten impres- sions (the figures i, 2, 3, 4, 5, I, II, III, IV and V) by movements of the fingers of the two hands. The average time of reaction was 6iocr. If we subtract from this total 2700- for the simple sensorial reaction time, we have a remainder of 340 cr. Allowing ^ The figures given here and later in the chapter must be regarded as quite rough averages. The duration of a compound reaction varies so greatly with variation of the experimental conditions, and conditions have varied so greatly in the investigations as yet carried out, tliat it is very difficult to make any general statement as to the time occupied by the processes of ' choice ' and association.
332 Synthesis of Action. Reaction Experiment 30-500- for Miscrimination,' we have 290-3100- as the time occupied by the conflict of impulses.
(^r) We now come to the consideration of choice reactions which presuppose not the ^ discrimination ' reaction but the ' cog- nition ' reaction. Two persons reacted to colours, letters and short words: the reaction movement consisted in the articulation of the name of the given impression. The average times were: for colours, 550 o-; for letters, 4100-; for short words, 3900. From the first we must subtract 270 + 300-: the time occupied by the conflict of impulses was, therefore, 2500-. From the second and third we must take 2704-500^: the times occupied by the conflict of impulses were 90 and 700-.
(2) It seems that volitional action is, on the whole, somewhat shorter than selective. The nine persons who gave an average selective reaction of 3 1 6 o- in the experiments with two intensities of sound, described above, gave an average reaction of 310.50- when required to react with the right hand to the weaker sound, and not to react to the stronger at all. This time difference is so small as to be for all practical purposes no difl'erence. Other experiments, however, seem to show that the rule is as stated.
§ 96. The Automatic Reaction. — Impulsive action be- comes reflex: we have not only the sensorial but also the muscular form of the simple reaction. In the same way, selective and voluntary action, if constantly repeated, become automatic: we have automatic reactions in addi- tion to choice reactions.
The automatic reaction is psychologically valuable as a supplement to the muscular simple reaction. This latter, it will be remembered, is from the outset an artificial reflex; we prearrange the conditions of the experiment with the intention of getting a reaction which shall be as near a reflex action as possible. The muscular reac- tion is not a degenerated sensorial reaction. On the other hand, the automatic reaction is a degenerated choice reac-