* Pascal <iuote' aKo m the s,aiiie [il.icc* tin* pi.icci of (’hiist on the cioss toi his eneiines, ‘ F.atliei, loiiriic' thciii, foi Ihev hno« not icliat the\ do ’ He calls it.i supetlluous loiniest, if tlie cii cninstance tliai thee iceic not conscious ot -ccliat the\ h.ul done cleprned tlie act of its taint of eiil, since in th.it case it vonhl not need to he formic eii In the same -n.ix he tjiiolcs the mcm of Aiistotle (“ Xicoiii.ich ’ Kth III 2), uho dr.ius a distinction between the a^ciit «ho is oei, tiTiir and one who is uyi-UMi In tlie (list case the aecnt acts luculuiit.uils, the lack ot knowledge liaiing to do uitli external circnmslanees (§ 117), and is thus not lesponsilile for the act Butnitli icgaid ci> the other case, Aiistotle sacs, “Xo bad man re.illv knows what sIiouM be done and left undone, and it is tins lock (dpapna) wliicli makes liim uiqust and e\ il Ignorance of the choice between good and ei il dues not make an act involuntary or the agent niesponsible, but only makes the act bad Aristotle has indeed a deejiei insight into the connec tion of knowing and willing than is in logne in the sn])erlicial plnhisoplic, whicli tcMchcs th<it igiini.incc, teclmg, and inspiiatioii are the tiueat pnnciples of ethical conduct Till: GOOD AND COXSflE.NCJ aie not to bo repieseutcd as sepaiable, ludiffeient to each other, and i elated only casually And yet this is just the view which lay at the basis ot the old-time question about saving giaco ' Evil on its foiinal side is that which is most peculiarly the individual’s own, since it is his sub- jectivity setting itself up as wholly and purely its own Foi it ho IS, tbeiefoio, lesjionsiblc (§ 139 and note) On the objective side, man m his i oucei>tioii as spiiit is rational, and has solely' in himself a univci sahty, which is aware of itself Hence we fail to tieat him in aceoidance with the dignity of his conccjition, when we separate fiom him eithei the goodness of a good act oi the evil of an evil act, and lefuse to impute it to him as good or evil How definite may be the consi lonsness of these two distinguish- able sides in man, with what degioe of dearness oi obscurity this consciousness mav become knoii ledge, oi how fai in an evil act conscience mav bo foimal,.lie questions with which wo aio not much concoined Thev belong to the empincal side of the subject-mattei (h) But evil and to act with evil conscience aie not yet hypociisy We must add the foiiual jihase of uiitiuth, in which evil IS maintained to be good and good foi otheis The agent icpiesents as good, conscientious, and pious an act, which IS ineiely an aitifice foi the betiayal of otheis But by means of what is othei wise good and pious, namely, bv good leasons geneialh.an evil man may find a justifica- tion of Ills evil, tiaiisfoiming evil into something good for himself The possibility of such a transformation is found in the abstract and negative subjectivity, which is conscious that all jihases must submit to and sjning from it (c) Allied to the foiegomg is what is known as prob- abibty Its piniciple is that if consciousness can trump up one good reason, be it only the authoiity of a single theo- logian, whose judgment, it may be, is disappioved by ' Wirksame Gnade 'llli: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.
others, the act is peimissihlc, and conscience nni} he at ease Such a leason oi authoiity, it is acknoiiledgcct, gives at best only piobability, but that is supptised to be enough to coufiiiii the conscience It is adimtte.l also that a good leason does not exxlude otheis, ivhich niav be quite as good Furthci, in this foiin of subjeetiMty thcie IS a touch of the obiective m the concession lhal conduct should be based on a "lound oi leasoii But to the many good leasoiis and authorities, which might be adduced in favour of a ceitam line of action, niav be opposed pist as many good leasons foi an opposite course Hence the decision is intiusted not to the ob]oetiMt\ of tlie thing, but to subjccticity, liking and capiico aie made the diseerneis between good and evil, and ethical obseivanee and religion aio uiideiiniued But since it is given out that some icasou. and not pm ate sub]ectivity, is the basis of decision, probability is so far a form of hipocrisv (cl) The nc.\t liighei stage is tlie asscitioii that the good will shall consist lu willing the good, the willing of the ahstiact good shall be the sole icipiisite foi a good act Since the act, as a definite volition, has.1 loiiteiit, while the abstr.act good deteiiiiines nothing, it del olios upon the private indiiidual to give the good filling and definiteness In piobahiliti theie must he obtained fioiii some If' u'lend Frre autlioiitj to bung a definite content uudei the general categoiy of the good But lieie even subject, simply as he stands, is invested with the dignitv of giving a content to the abstiact good, or, what is the same thing, of bringing a content under the univeisal But tins con- tent is only one of several sides of a concrete act, which inai% on another of its sides, he bad oi cnimnal And yet my subjective estimate of the good is the good as known by me in the act, it is my good intention (§ 111) Thus aiises an opposition between diffeient phases, in accoidance with one of which the act is good, but in a< coi dance with auothci, cnmmaL Here, too, would seem to come up the 'llli: GOOD AND COXSCIENCN question, if, m tlie a.ctua.1 act, the intention is leally good But at this btancljioiiit, at winch ahstiact good is the deter- mining motive, the good not only may but must be the leal intention And however bad and ciiininal they may be 111 other diicctions, the lesults of an act, which com- jiletcs a good intention, aic also good We seem forced to ask which of these sides is essential But this objective question cannot lieio be put, or lather the only objective IS the decision of the subjectne couscioiisncss itself Besides, at this staudjiomt the teims essential and good have the same meaning Both aie abstractions Good is that wliitli ill logaid to the Mill is essential, and the ebsential in legaid to the will is that an act shall be for me good But hoie one may place any pleasurable content he likes nuclei the ahstiact good, because this good, having no content of its own, is lediiced to mean merely a baie positive something, that is, -nbich may have value from some 2''<Jiiit of i low, and also in its diiect phase may be made to count as an essential end Such a positive action might be, c g,to do good to the jioor, oi to piovide foi my- self, my life, oi my family' Fintber, as the good is abstract, the bad also iiinst be without content, and must icceive defiiiitcnoss fioiu ray subjectivity Hence arises the moial cud to hate and loot out the liad Theft, cowaiclice, iiiiiidcr, as acts of a subjective will, imply at the veiy outset the satisfaction of this will, and are theicfoie something positive New, that the act may he good, I simjily' need to know this positive side of it as my' intention Hence the act is at once decided to be good, because to know it as good is involved m my inten- tion Theft for the benefit of the j>oor, theft or flight from battle, m cider to fulfil the duty of caring foi one’s life 01 one’s family', which may be jioor, murder through hate and revenge, i e, to satisfy a sense of right, or of my light, 01 of the wiekediiess of another, oi to satisfy a sense of the wrong done by him to me or others, or the world, or lUi: I’llILOSOPlIY OF KIGIir people geuoially. In o\tupaling liim as thoiouglily anil thus coutiibuting somelhiug to the cxteimiuation ot evil, — all these aits aie on then ixisitiie side good in in- tention and so good m act Theie is needed a supeilatnely small eftoit ot the iniderstaiiding to discovei, as did the learned dnines afoiesaid, foi o\eiv act a positive side, and a good 3 eason oi intention — Hence it has been said that theie aie no evil men becaii'e no one wills cnil for omI’s sake, an act which noiild be jniielv negatiio He alwajs ■wills soinethiiig 2'“'’dive, and tlieiefoie, fioiii this iioint of vision, good 111 tins abstiact irood the distinction between good and evil, and all leal duties also, liaie disaiijieaiod Accordmglv, meiely to will tbe gooil, mcielv to have a good intention n hen we act, is ei il bei aiise the n died good IS an abstidctiou, and the astei tauimeiit of what is good is left to the laiJiKO ot the snbiect To this 2ilace belongs the famous sentence, "The end ]ustifies the means ” This expiession, as it stands, is tiivial, because one could as lagiieh lejih that a ^nst cud lustifies the means, but an iiiijiist end does not The ex- inession n ould them be tautologn al, since the moans, if they are leal means, aie nothing ot themsehes but aie only for the sake of something else, fioin nhich tliev deiive then woith — But this sac mg is not lueaiit in a moielj toiinal and indefinite sense It pistifies the use lui a good end of some- thing not stiicth a means at all It ■justifies and inculcates as a dutv even < nine and the iiolatiou of what is of itself ]ust, as means foi ettei ting a good end In this sa} mg theie floats a geneial consciousness of the dialectic of the jiositive element, alluded to above, as it hears ujion right and ethics, and upon such indefinite propositions as “ Thou shalt not kill,” “ Thou shalt care for thy own well-being and that of tin family " In law and war, to kill is not only a light but a duty; but in these cases there is an accurate descriji- tioii of the circumstances under which, and also of the kind ot men whom it is permitted or enjoined to kill. In IIIJ. (JOOD and f'ONSCID.VCi; tbe same Tvav mj' well -1 leins' and the 'well-heing of my family must yield to liighei ends, and he ledueed to means But a (rime is not an iiidistnitt geiieiality, winch has to iindeigo a piocess of dialectic, but something defaiiitelj and objectively limited Yet the end 11-111011 is to oppose this (lime and depiive it of its natuie, the holy and ]ust end, is only the subjective opinion of what is good or better Thus, heie again the will Iiolds to the abstiact good, and eveiy absolutely valid maik of the good and bad, of light and wiong, is siijiei sedod by and handed over to the feel- ing, opinion, and liking of the individual (f) Subjective ojmiiou is opeiilv jnoiiounced to be the lule of light and duty, when the conviction that a thing IS light is declaied to bo the ciileiiou of the ethical cha- iac‘t(‘r of ail act As the good, uhich is here willed, is still without (outeiit, the piinciplc* ol conviction implies that it IS simjily foi the subject to decide whethei the act is good 01 not Thus hoie also all semblance of ethical objectivity has vanished Such a theoiy has diiect affinity with the so-called jchilosojihv, alioadi lejicatedly alluded to, which denies the possibility of knowing tho ti uth, and, in so doing demies also the moial laws, iihieh aie the truth and leasoii of sjniit as mil Such jihilosophizing, as it jiro- claiiiis a knowledge of the tiuth to bo vanity, and the eiiele of knowledge to be meic ajijicaiance, must obviously make apjieaiaiico the piinciple of action also Thus ethical piineiples aie decided by the individual’s peculiar view of life aud his piivate conviction This degradation of philosophy appeals, indeed, to outsiders as of supremely small imjjortance, and to be confined merely to the idle talk of the school But the view necessarily makes its way into ethics, which is an essential pait of philosojihy. The real woild sees the meaning of these views only when they have become a reality- By the sjuead of the view that subjective conviction alone decides the ethical value of an act, it has come to llli: IMIILO&OPHY Ob IlI&IIl pass that Inpociis^, foiineily mudi discussed, is now liaidly spoken of at all To niaik hipociisv as cmI is to believe that eeitain ai ts aio binoiid all question tiespasses, vices, and ciiiiies, that also, he who ( oinmits them must know what they aie, knowini' and lecooni/inq, as he does the pnncqiles and outnaid acts of laety and iiolit, eicii in the false guise under which he misuses Iheni Oi, per- haps, with legaid to eiil, it was assumed that i1 is a duti to know the good and to distinguish il lioin eiil In am case it was uncoiiditioiialh claimeil that men should do nothing viLious or cimiiiial and that if they did, they must, just so far as they aie men, not cattle be held responsible But wbeii the good heait, good mtcmtions, and subjectiye eomiction aie said to deudo tlie \alue of action, theio is no longci any hipociisv, oi, foi that matter, eyil at all Since whateicn an indiyidiuil does he can convert into good by the icllectiic luteiveiitioii of good intentions and motives, and by vntue of liis comiction his act is good ‘ There is no longei anj absolute vice oi Clime Instead of fiauk and fiee, baideiied and nn- tioubled tiausgiessiou appeals the coiisiiousiicss of com- plete justification tliiongh luteiitioii and couiiction, iiiv good intention and my conviction tliat the act is good make it good To pass sentence upon an act is nioiely to judge of the intention, conviction, oi faith of the agent ‘ “That he focK fiilli cimMiiccil I ihi not in llic lisist doiiht Yet many coniniit the ssen-t oiitianc". fioni pist siwh a loiiMe tioii IVsides, if that reason could asail eierysiheie as an excuse, there would no longer he any rational judgment upon good and evil, honourable and mean conduct Lunacy would have the same lights as reason, or latlier reason would no longci have any light oi esteem Its voice would he n thing of naught AV'lio does not donht i> m the truth ' I tienilile at the icsiilts of siirli a tolera- tion, w'liioli would he exclusively to the advantage of iinieason " Fi H Jacohi to Count Holiiier Eiitiii oth Aug, ISOO, Coiicein mg Count Stolberg s Com orsioii (IJieiimis, Ileiliii, Aug, 1SU2) - Alluded to by rascal above 'IIIE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE Faith IS not used hero in the sense in ■which Christ demands faith in objective tiutli In that sense, if a man has a bad faith, i e, a con'viction which is in its content evil, he must accordingly be condemned But faith here means simply fidelity to conviction When we ask if a man has leniaiiied tiue to his conviction, we refer to the merely foiimil subjective faith, winch is supposed of itself to contain his duty Because the piinciple of conviction is subjective, there IS foiced ujioii us the thousrht of the possibility of erior, and in this thought is the imjilieation of an absolute law But a law does not act, it is only a leal human being who acts If we arc to estimate the worth of his acts accord- ing to this subjective piineiple, we can ask merely how far li(‘ has embodied the law in his conviction Thus, if the acts aie not to be judged and measiiied according to the law, it is not easy to peiceive what purpose the law sub- seives It IS degraded to a meie external letter or empty woid, and inevitably, since it is made a binding law and obligation only by mv conviction Such a law may have the authority of Grod, of the state, and of ceutuiies, in winch it united men and gave sub- stance to their acts and destiny It may thns include the convictions of an untold number of individuals. And yet to it I oppose the authoiity of my private conviction — a conviction which has no other footing than authority Tins, to all apjjcaianco, stupendous picsumption is ignoied by the piinciple which makes subjective conviction to he the rule.
Although reason and conscience, never wholly driven away by shallow science and sophistry, with bad logic but a higliei insight concede the possibility of error, they yet 1 educe ciime and evil to a minimum by calling them errors To err is human Who has not often erred with legal d to one thing and anothei, whether yesterday at dinner he had fresh or pickled cabbage, and in numberless n TIIK PHILOSOPHY OF BIGH’l.
other things of gieatei or less impoi tance Ami yet the distinction betiveeu inipoitant and unimportant lauishes, if we cling obstinately to mere siib]ective conviction But the natural, though illogical, admission of the possibility of error, when it allows that a bad coiiviclion is only an error, is turned into another defeit of logic, that, namely, of dishonest}' At one time it is said that upon siibjectiie conviction rests the ethic.il stun tine and the highest worth of man, and tins conviction is declared to be most high and holy At another time we aie dealing with a mere error, and mv conviction has become tiivial, contin- gent, and accidental. In point of fact my conviction is of trifling moment if I cannot know the tiuth In such a case it IS also a mattei of indifl:erence how I think, and there remains for my thought meiely that empty good, which IS an abstraction of the undei standing.
The piinciple of justification on the ground of convic- tion beais also upon otheis in their ticatmeiit of my action They aie quite light to hold my acts to ho crimes, if this is in accoidance with their belief and con- viction. Thus I not only cannot anticipate any favoiuablc treatment, but, on the contraiy, am reduced fiom a posi- tion of ficedoin and lionoui to one of dishonoui and slavery And tins happens thiough that veiy justice which I have adopted as my own, by the exeicise of which I experience oiilv an alien subjective coniictioii, and the working of a mciely external foice.
(/) Finally, the highest form in which this subjectivity fully grasps and expresses itself, is that which we, bor- rowing the name from Plato, have called irony But it is only the name which is taken from Plato, who, like Socrates, used it in personal conversation against the opinions of the ordinal y and of the sophistic conscious- ness, in order to bring out the idea of truth and justice, but in treating the superficial consciousness in this way he expressly excepts the idea Irony is employed by him 'IIIE ROOD AXD COX&CIEIiXE in conveisation, only against persons, otherwise the essential movement of his thought is dialectic. So fai was Plato from suiiposing the conveisational process to be comjilete in itself, or irony to be the idea or nltimate form of thought, that he, on the contrary, terminated the backwaid and foiward motion of thought, which pievails in subjective opinion, by sinking it in the substantive idea ' ’ jM> tleceascil colleague, Piofcssoi Solger, adopted the mtei- pictatioii of iioiij M Inch Filed v Schlegel had at an early period of Ins litei.aiy caieei uoikcd up till it hecame m liis hands that -.ubjectivity, which is conscious of itself.as the highest But iiulgei’s supeiioi judgment and more philosophic insight seized and retained of this Mew only the phase of dialectic proper, the moling pulse of the spccnlatiie inethoil Peifectly clear, how- c\ei, he cannot he said to he, nor c-tn I agiee with the conceptions which he dei eloped in his lecent thonghtful and detailed ciiticism of iSchlegel a lectures * “Tiue iiouy,” sais Solgei (p 92), “piocoeds from the view that man, so long as he Ii\es in this picsont world, can do his highest appointed task only in thibiiurhl To believe ourselves to he tr.ansccnding finite ends is a laiii imagination also “ tlie liiglicst exists foi (lur conduct only in limited, finite form ” This IS, iiglitly understood, Platonic,.uid veiy tiulv spoken against the striMng to att.ain the abstract iiiliiiite But to say that the highest piesents itself in a limited and iinite form, as in ethics, .ind that the ethical is essentially leality and action, is very iliftcicnt fioin saying that the ethical is only a Unite end The hnite foim depiives the ethical inattei of none of its leal sub- stance and infinitude He goes ou “ And just for this reason the highest is for ns as empty as the Ion est, and necessarily col- lapses along nith us and our vam understanding For truly the highest exists only in God, and leveals itself as divine in our collapse In the divine we Iiaie no sliaie, unless its immediate jiiesence be reve.aled m the disappearance of oui reality. The dis- position, to which this principle of life is cleaily present, is tragic iiony ” The name iiony may he arbitianly used to describe any state of mind, but it is fai fiom cleai how the highest goes down * “ Kiitik uhei die Vorlesungen des Heiin August Wilhelm \ Sehlegel iiber drainatische Kunst and Literatur ” (Wiener Johrb Bd vu S 90 ff).
THi: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT The summit of the subjectivity, which apprehoiuls itself as ultimate, consists in a consciousuess of itselt as judge of truth, right, and duty It is aware, indeed, oi the objective ethical principle, but does not foiget oi leiioiince itself, or make anv earnest effort to sink itself in this principle and act from it Although it is in i elation to this pimciple, it holds itself fice fioiii it, and is conscious of itself as willing and deciding in a ccitain n aj', and as being able quite as well to vill and decide otlieinise — You, let us suppose, honestly take a law to be something absolute, but, as foi me, I too have a sbaic in it, but a until our notliingiies-., or hov tlic ilniiic i-, lecealcil (iiib in the fhsappearanoe of our lealitv Tln>. )io'inon i-, aKo m.iiiit.iineil in a paosage on!> 01 vine limn- ‘ AVc* -ee lieioe- m enoi in hotli thought and feeling, Acith icgaid not onh to the ellec I- of tlie ino-t nohle and the most heantiful, 1ml al-o to their -oim e and ^ aliio j e-, IV e aie esalted in the dc-tinctiou of the he-t it-elt The iighteou- destruction of lariting villains and iiimin.ils, of whom the Iieio in a modem ti.igedv, “f)io Silmld, is,in e\.ampl(, li.is indeed.m interest foi criminal law, Imt none foi true ait ihit the liagit destruction of liighh inoial iieisonagcs m.iv iiiteie-t, e\all, and reconcile iis to it-olf, when thej contract guilt hv htMommg opposing chaiupnm- Ilf oiiuallv ju-t ethical foi ee-, winch h\ some misfortune come into colh-ioii Out of tin- •iiitagoni-m pioeeccl the nglit and wiong of each jiaitv Tlieie ajipeai- al-o the tme ethical idea, puiihod and tiiiimpliaiit ovoi onc-idediie—, and therefore reconciled wiili and in oui-clvu- Hence il i- not the highest in u- winch is ovei whelmed, noi is il when the hc-t i- suhmeiged that we aie es.ilted, hut, on the coiitraiv, when the truth tiiuiiipli- Tills, as I have c^pUincd, in the I’lianoine- nologie des Gei9tes,”is the true and puie ethical intere-t of the ancient tragedy, although in the luiiiantic drama this function of tragedy suffers a furthei mollification Hut, apait altogctlici from the misfortune of tragic collision, and the destiuction of the indi- viduals cauglit in tins misfoitune, the ethical idea has a leal and present existence in the ethical woild, and the ethical icality, namely, the state, has as its puipose and result that this highest sliall not pieseiit itself in the ic.il woild as somctliing valueless Tins aim oi oliject of the state the ethical con-ciou-ne-s pos-c-sc- intmtively, and the thinking consciousness conceives.
'JIIE GOOD AND CONSCIE^'CE much graiidei one than you, for I have gone thiough and beyond it, and can turn it as 1 please It is not the subjcct-inattei which is excellent, but I am the excellent thing, and am master of la%v and fact I toy with them at my pleasure, and can enjov myselt only when I ironi- cally hnow and peimit the highest to he submerged This foim, indeed, makes vain the whole ethical content of light, dut}', and law, being an evil and in itself a wholly univeisal evil Yet to it we must add the subjective vanity of knowing itself as empty of all content, and yet ot knowing this empty self as the absolute This absolute self- complacency may in some cases pass bej’oiid a solitary worship of itself, and frame some kmd of community, the bond and essence of which would be the mutual asseveration of conscientiousness, good inten- tions, and rccipiocal delight in purity The members of this union would disport themselves in the luxury of self- knowledge and self-utterance, and would cherish them- selves to their heart’s content In those persons, who have been called beautiful souls, we find even a more sublime subjectivity, inakmg void all that is objective and shining by the light of its own unreality These and other phases, wdiich are in some measuie connected with the foregoing forms of subjectivity, I have treated in the “ Phaiiomenologie des Geistes ” In that work the whole section on Conscience, especially the paiagraphs dealing under a different heading writh the tiansition into a higher stage, may be compared with the present discussion Addition — Imagination may go further and convert the evil will into the pretence of the good Though it cannot alter the substance of evil, it can lend to it the outer form and semblance of good Every act contams something positive, and the demonstration that a thing is good, as opposed to evil, is effected by eliminating all but this positive Thus I can maintain an act to be good in respect of my intention. Moreover, not only in conscious- THE PHILOSOPHY OF EIGHT ness, but also on the positive piactical side of action, evil IS connected Tritli good If self-consciousness gives out that the act is good only foi otheis, it assumes the foiin of hypocrisy But if it ventures to maintain that the act IS good foi itself, it uses to the still higher summit of a subjectivity, which is conscious of itself as absolute Foi it good and evil, as they are in and of themselves, have wholly disappeared, and it can, therefore, give itself out for what it pleases Tins is the standpoint ot absolute sojihiatry, which itself assumes the style of lawgiver, aud refers the distinction between good and evil to capiice Most pronounced in hypocrisy aio the religious dis- semblers, the Tartuffes, who peifoim all kinds of ceie- monies, and are in their own eyes pious, although doing what they please To-day we seldom speak of hypociites, paitly because the accusation seems too stiong, but also because hypociisy in its diiect form has disappeaied Direct falsehood and complete cloaking of the good have become too tiansparent Noi is the total soveiance of good and evil anv longer so simple and available, since then bmits have been made uncertain by gi owing culture The moie subtle fonn ot hypociisy now is that of pio- babihtv, by which one seeks to repiesent a tiansgiession as something good for his own conscience This occuis only wheie morals and the good die fixed by authority, so that the reasons for maintaining the evil to he the good are as numerous as the authoiities Casuistic theologians, especially Jesuits, have woiked up these cases of con- science, and multiplied them ad infinitum. Owing to this over-subtlety, good and evil come into collision, and are subject to such fluctuatious that they seem to the indi- vidual to run into each other The chief desideratum is only what is probable, an approximate good, for which a single reason or authority can be secuied Another pecu- liarity of this standpoint is that it contains only what is abstract, while the concrete fillmg is represented as un- THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCK essential, or ratliei is left to meic opinion Thus anyone may have committed a ciime and yet willed the good When, foi instance, a wiiked person is muidcred, the positiie side of the act may be asseited to be a desire to oppose and diminish evil The next stage of probability is reached when the sub]ect depends not upon the authority and assertion of another, but upon liimself He relies upon his own con- viction, and his belief that only tliiough his conviction can a thing be good Tlic defect of this attitude is the deter- mination to refer to nothing but the conviction itself, involving a lejection of the substance of absolute right, and a retention of the mere form It is, of course, not a matter of indifterence whether I do something throngh use and wont, or through the foico of its truth Yet ob-|octive truth is different fiom my conviction Conviction holds no distinction at all between good and evil, for it IS always only conviction, the bad would be only that of which I am not convinced This highest stand- point, in extinguishing good and evil, is admittedly exposed to oiroi, and is cast down from its high estate to mere contingency and disregard This is irony, the conscious- ness that the highest criterion, the pnnciple of conviction, IS ruled by caprice, and is, therefore, ineffective For this view the philosophy of Fichte is chiefly responsible, as it daiins that the I is absolute At least it maintains that absolnte certitude marks the general condition of the I, which by a further development passes into objectivity Of Fichte, however, it cannot properly be said that m the practical realm he has made the capnee of the subject a principle But after him the particular, interpreted as the condition of the individual subject, and apphed by Fnednch v Schlegel to the good and beautiful, has been set up as God Hence the obiective good is only an image formed by my conviction, receiving its substance only through me, and appearing and vamshmg at the THE PHILOSOPHY OF niGHl' pleasure of me, its lord and master The oliicctiTe, to which I am lelated, is biought to naught, and thus T hover over a dim and monstrous space calling up phantoms and dispersing them at will This last extiemo of sub- jectivity aiises only at a time of high ciiltuic, wheie serious faith has ciumbled away, and all things haie become vanity Ihansii ion from Moralih/ to Ethical SijHtem 141 In behalf of conscience, or the nieie abstract principle of deteimination, it is demanded that its phases shall be univeisal and objective In the same nay in behalf of the good which, though it is the essential uni- versal of freedom, is still abstinet, aie also lequiied clefinile phases, and for these phases is fuithei demanded a piiu- ciple which must, liowevei, be identical uitli the good The good and conscience, when each is laised into a sepaiate totality, aie void of all dctmiteness, and jet claim to be made definite. Still, the eonstiuctioii of these two relative totalities into an absolute identity is alieady ac- complished 111 gcim, since even the subji'ctivity oi pure self-certitude, which vanishes bydegiees in its own vacuity, 13 identical with the abstiact universality of the good But the concrete identity of the good and the subjective will, the truth of these two, is completed only in the ethical system Note — A moic detailed account of the transition of the conception is to be found in the “Logic” Here it is enough to say that the hmited and finite by its very nature contams the opposite in itself. Such a finite thing is either the abstiact good, which is as yet uureahzed, or the ab- stract subjectivity, which is good only m intention Abstract good implicitly contains its opposite, ie, its realization, and abstiact subjectivity, or the element in which the ethit al IS realized, implicitly contains its opposite, ».&, the TIIU GOOD AND COXSCICNCD good Thus, -when either of these two is talceu in a one- sided way, it has not jet jiositivelv leali/ed all that it is capable of being The good, apait fioin all subieetivity and definite chaiacter, and the determining subjectivity, apait fioni anything that it may become, arrive at a higher actuality bv a negative piocess Each chngs at fiist to its one-sided foim, and icsolves not to accept what it jiossesses potentially, thus constituting itself an absti act whole Then it annuls itself in that capacity, and theieby leduccs itself to the level of one element in a whole Each of them becomes one element of the conception The con- ception, in till 11, 13 inaiiifcsted as their unity, and, having lecciied lealitv tliroiigh the establishment of its elements, now exists as idea. The idea is the conception, when it has fashioned its elements mto leality, and at the same tune exists in then identity' as then dynamic essence The simplest leahzation of fieedom is light, "When self-consiiousucss is tinned back upon itself, fieedom is realized as the good The thud stage, which is heie in its tiausitioii exhibited as the tiuth of the good and of sub- jectivity, is likewise quite as much the truth of right The ethical IS subjective disjiosition, and yet contains light iin- phcitlj' But that this idea is the tiuth of the concejition of fieedom must not be an assumption deiived from such a souice as feeling, but must in philosophy be demou- stiated This demonstiation is made only when light and the moial self-consciousness aie pioiedto exhibit of them- selves the tendency to run back into this idea as then' re- sult Those who believe that proof and demonstration can be dispensed with in philosophy, show that they are stall a long distance from the first thought of what philosophy is They mav speak of othei things indeed, but they have no right to discuss philosophy, if they have not understood the conception Addition — The two princijiles which we have so far con- sidered, both the abstract good and conscience, aie as yet THE PHILOSOPHY OF Rlfill 1'