Without then opposing piinciplcs. The abstiact good is pthereahzed into something wholly devoid of power, some- thing into which I can mti oduce any content at all And the suhiectivity of spiiit is cquallj’' -without content, since it has no ohiectiic signifatance Hence there may arise a longing aftci objectivity Man would debase himself to the complete deiiendcnce of a seif, m oidei to escape the torment of sheer inanity and negativity Many Piotestants lecently passed over to the Catholic church, bim]-)ly because they foimd no substance m then own innci life They were willing to accept any fixed and tangible authoiity, even though it had not the security which comes from thought The social order is the unitv and aecoiding to the conceiition the leconciliation also of the subiective good with the objective absolute good Moiahty is the general foim of the will as subjective, but the ethical order is not simply the subjective foira and the self-deter- mination of the will, but contains then coneejition, namely, freedom Neither right nor moiality can exists indepen- dently, but must have the ethical as its pillar and supjioi t In right IS wantmg the element of subjectivity, and in morality is wanting the objective, so that neither by itself has any actuahty.
Only the infinite, the idea is actual Sight exists onlj as a branch of a whole, or as a vine twining itself about a firmly rooted tree THIRD PART.
THE ETHICAL SYSTEM.
142 The etliical system is the idea of freedom It is the living good, which has in self-conscionsness its knowing and willing, and through the action of self-consciousness its actuality Sclf-oousciousne&s, on the other hand, finds in the ethical system its absolute basis and motive The ethical system is thus the conception of freedom developed into a piesent world, and also into the natuie of self-con- sciousness 143 The conception of the will, when united with the loahsiatiou of the will, oi the paiticular will, is knowing Hence arises the consciousness of the distinction between these two phases of the idea But the consciousness is now piesent in such a way that each phase is separately the totality of the idea, and has the idea as its content and foundation 144 The obiective ethical jumciple which takes the place of the abstract good is m its substance concrete through the presence m it of subjectivity as its infinite form Hence it makes differences which are withm itself, and therefore are due to the conception. By means of these differences, it obtains a sure content, which is inde- pendent and necessary, and reaches a standing ground raised above subjective opinion and liking This content IS the self-onginated and self-iefemng laws and regu- lations.
THE nilLOSOPHY OF RIGIII.
Addition — In the ethical pi maple as a whole occui hoili the ob]ecti\e and the subjective elements, but of this piinciple each is only a foim Here the prood is substance, 01 the filling of the objective ■with subjectivity If vro con- template the social oidei fioin the objective standpoint, ii c can say that man, as ethical, is unconscious of himself In this sense Antigone proclaims tliat no one kiioiis whenLC the laws come, they aie eveilasting, that is, they exist absolutely, and flow fioiii the natuie of things None the less has this substantive existence a consciousness also, which, howevei, is only one element of the whole 145 The ethical material is rational, because it is tlie sjstem of these phases of the idea Thus fieedom, the absolute will, the objective, and the ciicle of necessitv, aie all one prmcijile, whose elements aie the ethical foices They lule the lives of individuals, and m individuals as then modes have their shape, manifestation, and actuality Addition — Since the phases of the ethical sj stem ai e the conception of fieedom, they aie the substance oi univcisal essence of individuals In lelatiou to it, individuals aie meiely accidental 'Whethci the individual exists oi not IS a mattei of indifteiencc to the objective ethical oidei, which alone is steadfast It is the powei by which the life of mdiiiduals is ruled It has been lepiesentod by nations as eternal justice, oi as deities who aie absolute, in contrast with whom the stiivmg of individuals is an empty game, like the tossing ot the sea 146 (0) This ethical leality in its actual self-conscious- ness knows itself, and is therefore an object of knowledge It, with its laws and forces, has for the subject a real exis- tence, and 18 in the fullest sense independent. It has an absolute authority or force, mfinitely more sure than that of natural objects Note — The sun, moon, mountains, rivers, and all objects of nature doubtless exist They not only have for con- sciousness the authority of existence m general, but have iiiii: jjniiCAL sysii:m also a paiticular iiatuie Tliis iiatuic consciousness le- garcls as valid, and in its v.uied i elation and commerce with ob]ects and their use coinpoits itself accordinijly But the authoiity of the social laws is infanitely higher, because natural things lepiesent leason only in a quite ex- ternal and particiilai way, and hide it under the guise of contingenc}' 147 On the otliei hand, the i.uious social foices are not something foicign to the subject His spiiit bears witness to them as to his own being In them he feels that he is himself, and in them, too, he hves as in an element indis- tinguishable fioni himself This lelation is moie direct and intuitive than even taith oi tiiist Note — Faith and tiust belong to the beginning of re- flection, piesuppobiug pictuie thought and such discein- meiit as that to believe lu a heathen rehgion is different fioin being a heathen The lelation, oi lathei identity Y itliout lelation, in which the ethical pimciple is the actual life ot self-cousciousuess, can indued be tiansfoinied into a lelation of faith and conviction By turthei leflection, also, it may pass into an insight based on leasons, which oiigi- nate in some paiticulai end, inteiest, or legaid, in feai or hope, or in histoiical piesuppositions. But the adequate Icnowledge of those belongs to the conception ai lived at thiough thought 148 The indmdual may distinguish himself from these substantive ethical factois, logaidiug himself as subjective, as of himself undetermined, oi as detei mined to some paiticulai course of action He stands to them as to his substantive reality, and they are duties bmdmg upon his will Note — The ethical theory of duties in their objective character is not comprised undei the empty piinciple of moral subjectivity, m winch, indeed, nothing is determined (§ 134), but IS lightly taken ujj in the thud part of our work, in which is found a systematic development of the 'llli: PHILOSOPHY OK BIGlIl.
sphere of etluLal necessity In this piesent method of tieatment, as distinguished fiom a theory of duties, the ethical factors aie deduced as necessary relations It is, then, needless to add, ivith legaid to each of them, the remark that it is thus foi men a duty A theoiy of duties, so far as it is not a philosophic SLience, simply takes its niateiial out of the lelations at hand, and shows liow it is connected with peisonal ideas, with uidelv pieialeiit piin- ciples, and thoughts, with ends, impulses, and expciieiices It may also adduce as leasous the consequeuLes, which aiise when each duty is icfeiied to othei ethical iclations, as well as to general well-being and common opinion But a theoiy of duties, which keeps to the logical settlement ot Its own inheient mateiial, must be the development of the relations, which aie made necessary tluough the idea ot freedom, and are hence m then eutiie context actual This IS found only in the state 149, A duty or obligation appears as a limitation nieiely of undetermined subjectivity and abstiact fieedoni, oi ot the impulse of the natuial will, oi of the moial will which fixes upon its undetei mined good ca^iriciouslv But iii point of fact the individual finds in duty liboi atiou He is fieocl from subjection to meie natuial impulse, he is freed fiom the dependence which he as subjective and particular felt towards moral permission and command, he IS fieecl, also, fiom that mdcfiiuto subjectivity, ivhich does not issue m the objective lealiiation implied m action, but icmains wrapped nj) m its own unreality. In duty the individual freely enteis upon a liberty that is substantive Addition — Duty limits only the caprice of subjectivity, and comes into collision only with abstract good, with which subjectivity is so firmly aUied When men say we will to be free, they have in mind simply that abstract libeity, of which every definite organization m the state is legal ded as a liimtation. But duty is not a Umitation of THE ETHICAL SYSTEM fieedom, but only of tlie abstraction of freedom, that is to say, of seivitiide In duty -we leach the leal essence, and fjain positive freedom 150 The ethical, in so fai as it is leflected simply m the niituial chaiacter of the individual, is virtue When it contains nothing more than confoimity to the duties of the sphere to ivliieh the individual belongs, it is mtegrity Note — What a man ought to do, or what duties he should fulfil in ordei to be viituous, is in an ethical tom- inuiiity not haid to say He has to do nothing except what IS jneseuted, exjnessed and lecognized in his estab- lished relations Integrity is the universal trait, which should be found in his charactei, partly on legal, partly on ethical grounds But fioni the standpoint of moials a man often looks npon iiitegiity both for himself and others as secondaiy and unessential The longing to be unique and pccuhai is not satisfied with what is absolute and uiiiveisal, but only with some situation that is ex- < optional The name “ viituo ” may quite as well be applied to the difleient aspects of integrity, because they, too, although they contain nothing belonging exclusively to the individual in contrast with others, are yet his ^lossession. But discourse about the viitucs easily passes into mere declamation, since its subject matter is abstiact and indefinite, and its reasons and declarations aie diiected to the individual’s caprice and subjective inclination In any piesent ethical ciicum- stance, whose relations aie fuUy developed and actualized, virtue in the strict sense has place and reality only when these relations come into collision But genuine colhsions are lare, although moial reflection can, on the shghtest provocation, create them It can also provide itself with the consciousness that, in order to fulfil its special mission, it must make sacrifices Hence, in undeveloped conditions of social life viitue as suchoccuis more frequently, because ethical principles and the realization of them are more riii: PuiLOsopiiY of righi a matter of ]nivato liking, lielonging indeed to the nature of peculiarly gifted individuals Thus, the ancients have attnhuted viituo in a special way to Hercules So, too, in the ancient states, where ethical principles had not ex- panded into a system of fiee self- deiien dent development and ohjectivitv, ethical defects had to he compensated foi by the genius of the 2 Jrivafo mdmdiial Tims the tlipoi v of the virtues, so far as it difteis from a nieie theoii of duties, embiaces the special features of character due to iiatuial endowments, and thus becomes a s^niitual histoiy of the natural m man Since the i irtues are the ethical leality apiilied to the fiai - ticular, and aie on this subiective side indotiiiite, theie arises, ui oidei to make them definite, a quantitative distinc- tion of moio and leas Hence the consideration of the virtues calls up the opposing vices as defects Thus Aiistotle defines a paiticiilar iiitne, when lightly iindei- stood, as the mean between too much and too little The content, winch receives the form of duties and also of vntiies, is the same as that ninth has tlie foim of appetites (§ 19, note) Besides, tliej all have the s.ime con- tent as then basis But because the content of the aiqie- tites still belongs to unformed will anduatiiial pcice 2 )tion, and IS not develoijed to an ethical oidei, the onlv obiect which they have in common nith the content of duties and virtues IS abstract Since it in itself is mdcteiminatc, it does not contain foi the ayipetites the limits of good and ovil Thus aiipelites, if we consider then jiositive side, aie good, if their negative side evil (§ 18) Addition If a man realizes this or that social project, he IS not at once virtuous, though such, indeed, he is, when this way of behaving is a fixed element of his charactei Virtue IS not wholly objective, it is rather ethical vii- tuosity To-day we do not speak of vntue as foimeily, for the reason that ethical piinciples aie not now so much a featuie of a particular individual. The French speak most Tin: EiiriCAL sy&iem of virtue, because amongst tbeui the indiviflual is moie Ins own peculiai proiierty, and acts according to the dictates of natuio The Geiinans, on the othei hand, aie inoic reflec- tive, and amongst them the same content attains the form of univcisalii}'’ 151 The ethical, when simply identical with the reality of individuals, appeals as a gcneially adopted mode of action, oi an ohscivance This is the custom, which as a second nature has been substituted for the oiiginal and iiieiely natiual will, and has become the veiy soul, meaning, and loality of one’s dailj' life It is the hving spint actualized as a world; by this actualization does the sub- stance of S 2 )iiit exist as spiiit Additian — As uatuie has its laws, as the animals, trees, the sun, fulfil then law, so observance belongs to the spirit of fioodom What light and moiality aie not as yet, the ethical piiiiciplo is, namely, sjniit The paiticulanty m- volvud is not yet that ot the couceiition, but only of the natuial will So, too, fioni the standpoint of moiality, self-cousciousnobs IS not }ct sinntual consciousness It is occujncd simply with the value of the subject in himself, the subject, who fiamcs lumself accoiding to the good and against evil, has yet the foim of capiice But, heie at the ethical point of view, will is tlic will of spiiit, and has a coiiespondingly substantive content Pedagogy is the ai t of nialiiug men ethical It looks upon man as natural, and jioints out the way in which he is to be bom agam. His first nature must be couveited into a second spiritual natuie, in such a mannei that the spiiitual becomes lu him a habit In the spiritual disposition the opposition of the natuial and subjective will disappears, and the struggle of the subject ceases To this extent habit belongs to ethics It belongs also to philosophic thought, which demands that the mind should be armed against sallies of caprice, rout and oveicome them, in oidci that lational thought may have free com'se It is true, on the other hand, that mere iin: j'liiLosopiiY OF Rioin.
habit causes death, -which eusueswlion one fjets tlioiou<{hU used to life, and has hceoine ph3'sically and mentally dulled Then the oiiposition due to subjective consciousness and spuitual activity has disappeaied Man is active only in so far as he has not attained something which he desiies to effect. When this is fully accouiphshed, activitv.ind vitality vanish, and the lack of iiiteiest, which then pei- vades him, is mental or physical death 152. Substantive ethical lealitv attains its right, and tins right receives its due, when the individual in Ins pin ate will and conscience drops his self-assertion and antagonism to the ethical His character, moulded by ethical principles, takes as its motive the unmoved universal, which is open on all its sides to actual rationality He recognizes that his worth and the stability of his private ends are grounded upon the univeisal, and derive then reality fiom it Sub- jectivity is the absolute form and the existing actuality of the substance The difference between the subject and substance, as the object, end, and power of the subject, forthwith vanishes, like the difference between foim and matter Note — Subjectivity, -svhich is the foundation for the leal existence of the concejition of fieedoni (§ 106), is at the moral standpoint still distinguished from the con- ception In ethics it is adequate to the conception, whose existence it is 153. In that individuals belong to the ethical and social fabric they have a right to deteimine themselves sub- jectively and freely. Assurance of their freedom has its truth in the objectivity of ethical observance, in which they reahze their o-wn pecuLar being and inner universality Note — To a father seeking the best way to brmg up his son, a Pythagorean, or some other thmker, rephed, “ Make him a citizen of a state which has good laws ” Addition — The attempts of speculative educators to withdiaw people fiom then piespnt social life and bnng them up 111 the country, a pioposal made by Bousseau in “ Emile,” have been vain, because no one can succeed m alienating man fi om the laws of the woilcL Although the education of young men must take place in solitude, we cannot believe that the odoui of the world of spirits does not in the end penetrate then seclusion, or that the power of the spiiit of the woild is too feeble to take possession of even the leinotest corner Only when the individual is a citizen of a good state, does he receive bis right.
154 The light of individuals to their particularity is contained in the conciete ethical older, because it is in particularity that the social jninciple finds a visible outer manifestation 155 Eight and duty coincide in the identity of the uni\ eisal and the particular wills By virtue of the ethical iabric man has lights, so fai as he has duties, and duties so tar as lie has rights In abstract light, on the contiary, I have the right and another person the corresponding duty; and 111 moials I lesolve to consider as an objective duty only the light of my own knowledge and will and of my oivn well-being Addition — The slave can have no duties, but only the tree man If all lights weie on one side and all duties on the other, the whole would be broken up Identity is the only principle to which we must now adhere 156 The ethical substance, as the union of self-conscious- iiess with its conception, is the actual spirit of a family and a nation Addition — The ethical framewoik is not abstract bke the good, but in a special sense real Spirit has actuality, and the accidents oi modes of this actuality are individuals. Hence as to the ethical theie are only two possible views. Either we start from the substantive social system, or we proceed atomically and work up from a basis of indi- viduabty. This latter method, because it leads to mere 'llli: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGIIl ITixtaposition, is void of spirit, since mind oi spnit is not Bomcthiufj individual, but the unity of individual and universal 157. The conception of this idea exists only as spiiit, as active self-knowledge and leality, since it objectifies itself by passing thiough the foini of its elements Hence it is, A The direct or natuial ethical spnit, the faiiiilj^ This reahty, losing its unity, passes ovoi into disnicmbei- inent, and assumes the natuie of the lelative It thus becomes B The civic community, an association of meiiibeis oi independent individuals in a formal universality Such an association is occasioned by needs, and is piesoived by the law, which secuies one's person and projieity, and by an ex- ternal system for private and common mteiests C This external state goes back to, and finds its central jinnciple m, the end and actuality of the substantive universal, and of the public life dedicated to the main- tenance of the umveisal This is the state-constitution FIEST SECTION The Family 158 The family is the duect substantive reality of spina The unity of the family is one of feeling, the feel- ing of love The true disposition hcie is that which esteems the unity as absolutely essential, and ivithin it places the consciousness of oneself as an individuality Hence, m the family we are not mdependent persons but members Addition — ^Love is in general the consciousness of the unity of myself with anothei. I am not sejiaiate and isolated, but win my self-consciousness only by i enouncing my independent existence, and by knowmg myself as unitj’ THE FAMILY of mvsolf -with anothei and of another T\itli me But love IS feeling, that is to say, the ethical in the form of the iiatuial It has no longer a place in the state, where one knows the unity as law, where, too, the content must he latioiial, and I must know it The first element m love is that I ivill to he no longei an independent self-suflB.cing person, and that, if I weie such a person, I should feel iiijsclf lacking and incomiilete The second element is that I gam myself m anothei peisoii, m whom I am i ecog- uized, as he again is in me Hence love is the most tiemcndous contiadiction, incapable of being solved by the undci standing Nothing is more obstinate than this sciupiilosity of sclf-consciousness, which, though negated, I I et insist upon as something positive Love is both the source and solution of this contradiction As a solution it IS an ethical union 159 A light, which comes to the individual by leason of the family and constitutes his life in it, does not appear in the foiin of a light, that is, the abstiact element of a definite individuality, until the family is dissolved Then those, who should he iiiombeis, become m feeling and leality self-dependent peihons What was theirs by right of then position in the family, they now leceive in separa- tion in an external way, in the form of money, mam- tenance, or education Addition — The family has this special right, that its substantive natuie should have a sjihere in actuality. This light IS a right against external infiuences and against abandonment of the unity But, on the other hand, love is subjective feehng, which, if it oppose the unity of the family, destroys it If in such a case a unity is insisted on, it can comprehend only things that are external and independent of feehng 160 The family when completed has the three following phases (a) The form of its direct conception, marriage.
IHE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.
(6) External reality, the family property and goods and the care of them (c) Education of children and dissolution of the family.
A Mai riage 161 Marriage, as the elementary social relation, con- tains firstly the factor of natural life As marriage is also a substantive fact, natural life must be viewed in its totality as the realization of the species, and the proces-. which the realization involves But, secondly, the moieh inner, potential and, when actuahzed, external unity ol the sexes is transformed in self-constiousness into the spiritual unity of self-conscious love Addition — Mariiage is essentially an ethical iclation Formerly, in the maioiity of what aio called rights ot nature, mariiage was interpreted on its physical or natuial side It has thus been loolred upon simply as a scMial relation, and as excluding all the other features of mariiage But such a view is no more ciudc than to tonceivc oi marriage merely as civil contiact, a view found in Kant In accordance with this view, individuals form a compact through mere capiice, and marriage is degraded to a bargain for mutual use A thud doctrine, equally lejire- liensible, bases maiiiage on love only Love, which is feeling, admits the accidental on every side, as the ethical cannot do Hence, marriage is to be defined moie exactli as legal ethical love Out of mairiage has disaiipoarcd the love, which is merely subjective 162 Asa subjective starting-point for marriage either the special inclination of two persons for each other may be the more observable, or else the provision and geneiul ariangements ot the parents The objective point of departure, however, is the free consent of the two to become one jierson They give up their natural and private jiersonahty to enter a unity, which may be regarded TIIL FAMILY. 167 as a limitation, but, since in it they attain to a substantive self-consciousness, is really their liberation Note — That an individual may be ob-jective, and so fulfil Ins ethical duty, he should marri The circumstances attending the external starting-point are naturally a matter of chance, depending largely upon the state of reflective cultiiie In this theie may be either of two extremes Eitlici well-meaning parents arrange beforehand for the marriage of two persons, who, when they have made each other’s acquaintance as prospective husband and wife, are then expected to love each other Or, on the other hand, inclination is supposed fiist to a23pear in the two jiersons, left absolutely to their private selves The extreme, in which inariiage is resolved on juior to inclination, and both resolution and inclmatiou aio then present in the actual marriage, is the more ethical In the other extreme, it IS the individual’s private and unformed nature, which inalces good its jiretensions This extreme is in close alliance with the subjective principle of the modern world Modem dramas and other works of art produce an atmosplioie of the chilliest mdifterence, by the way m which they represent the motive of sexual love This feeling ot indifference is due to the association in the drama of ardent passion with the most utter contingency, the whole interest being made to depend simply upon merely piivate persons The event is, doubtless, of the very last importance to these persons, but not in itself Addition — Amongst nations where women are held in slight esteem, parents arrange the marriage of their children, without ever consulting them. The children submit, because the particularity of feelmg as yet makes no claim at all. The maiden is simply to have a husband, the man a wife In other circumstances regard may be had to means, connections, political hopes To make marriage the means for other ends may cause great hard- THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT sliip. But in modem times the suh-icctive point of depai- ture, ^ e, liciug in love, is thought to he the only thing of consequence In this it is taken foi gi anted that each one must ivait till his hour has stiuck, and that ho can hestow his love upon one and only one indiMdual 163 The ethical side of mariiage consists in the con- sciousness that the union is a substantive end Maiiiage thus rests upon love, confidence, and the socializing of the ivhole individual existence In this social disposition and leality natuial impulse is leduced to the mode of a meicly natural element, which is extinguished in the moment of its satisfaction On the other hand, the spiiitnal bond of union, when its right as a substantive fact is iccognizcd, is laised above the chances of passion and of tempoiaiy par- ticulai inclination, and is of itself indissoluble Note — It has already been lemniked that tbcie is no contract m connection with the essential cliaiactei of marriage (§75) Marnage leaves behind and tiaiisccuds the standpoint of contiact, occupied by the peison i\ho is sufficient foi himself Substance is such lus to be in C'sscn- tial lelation to its accidents ‘ The union of pei sonalitics, whereby the family becomes one person, and its members its accidents, is the ethical spiiit The ethical spiiit, stiipped of the many external phases nhicli it has in jiai- ticulai indiiiduals and tiansitory inteiests, has been by pictuie-tliought given independent foim, and leveieuced as the Penates, etc In this attitude of mind is found that religious side of maiiiage and the familj’, which is called piety It is a further abstraction, when the divine and substantive reality is separated from its physical em- bodiment The result of this pioceduie is that feehng and the consciousness of spiritual unity become what is falsely called Platonic love This separation is in keeping with the monastic doctrine, in which natural vitality is regaided * See “ Enc} clopicdia of the Fliilosophical Sciences.
THE FAMILY Simply as negative, and is given by this very separation an infinite iinpoitance Addition — Maiiiage is distinguished from concubinage, since in concubinage the chief factor is the satisfaction of natuial impulse, while in maniage this satisfaction is sub- oidinate Hence, in niairiage one speaks without blushing of occuirencos, which apart from the marriage relation cause a sense of shame Therefore, also, is marriage to be esteemed as in itself indissoluble. The end of maniage is ethical, and thoiefore occu 2 ucs so high a place that every- thing opiiosing it seems seeondaiy and powei less Mai riage shall not be liable to dissolution through passion, since passion 18 subject to it. But, after all, it is only in itself indissoluble, for, as Chiist says, divorce is permitted, but only because ot haidness of heart Marriage, since it con- tains feeling, is not absolute, but ojien to fluctuations, and has in it the iiossibihty of dissolution Yet the laws must make the p)ossibility as difBcult as can be, and must retain intact the i ight of the ethical against inclination 164 Just as 111 the case of contract it is the exi>hcit stipulation, nliicli constitutes the tiue transference of pro- jierty (§ 79), so m the case of the ethical bond of marriage the ])u1j1ic celebiatioii of consent, and the coi responding recognition and acceptance of it by the family and the community', constitute its consummation and reality. The function of the church is a sejtaiate feature, which is not to bo considered here Thus the union is established and comjileted ethically, only when preceded by social ceremony, the symbol of language being the most spiritual embodi- ment of the spiritual (§ 78) The sensual element pertain- ing to the natural life has place in the ethical relation only as an after result and accident belongmg to the external reahty of the ethical union The union can be expressed fully only in mutual love and assistance Note — When the question as to the chief end of marriage IB asked with a view to enact or recast laws, it means: THE niitosoPiiy of rigu'i "Wliich pa.rticu]ai side of the icality of manitigc must be accepted as the most essential P But no one sejjaiatc phase of mariiage compiises the whole langc of its absolute ethical content, and one oi othci phase of its existence may be wanting without mjuiy to its essence — In the celebration of marriage the essence of the union is clearlj understood to be an ethical principle, fieedfiom theaccidents of feeling andpiivatc inclination If the solemnization be taken foi an external formality, or a so-called mei(‘ ciiil lequisitioii, the act loses all puipose except that of edifica- tion, or of an attestation to the cimc legnlatioii Indeed, there ma}’ peihaps leniam onh the positive aibitiaiincss of a civil or ecclesiastical command Now, not only is a command of this kind indiffeient to the natuie of mainage, but in so fai as the two peisons have because of it aseiibed value to the formality, and counted it as a condition pie- cedent to complete abandonment to each otliei, it is an alien thing, bunging discoid into the disposition of loie, and thwaiting the inner natuie of the uuiou The opiuion that the mainage ceiemony is a meie civic mandate professes to contaiu the loftiest conception ot the freedom, intensitv, and completeness of Ioac, hnt in point of fact it denies the ethical side of it, which implies a limitation and repression of the mere natuial tendenev Rcsoive is alieadv found natuially m a sense of shame, and is by the inoie articulate spiritual consciousness raised to the higher form of modesty and chastity In a woicl, the view of maniage ■just criticised rejects the ethical side, by virtue of which consciousness gathers itself out of its native and subjective condition, and attams to the thought of the substantive In- stead of always holding before itself the accidental character of sensual inclination, it casts off the fetters of this state and engages itself to what is substantive and binding, namely, the Penates The sensual [element is reduced and con- ditioned by tbe recognition of maniage as an ethical bond Insolent IS the view of the mere understanding, which is