S64 Phenomenology of Mind fact, this same reality, is estranged from it, it is — qua self-consciousness, qua absolute reality — aware of its unreality. In other words, both aspects are held in their contradiction to be directly its essence, which is thus in its inmost being distracted.
The heart-throb for the welfare of mankind passes therefore into the rage of frantic self-conceit, into the fuiy of consciousness to preserve itself from destruction; and to do so by casting out of its hfe the perversion which it really is, and by straining to regard and to express that perversion as something else. The universal ordinance and law it, therefore, now speaks of as an utter distortion of the law of its heart and of its happi- ness, a perversion invented by fanatical priests, by riotous, revelling despots and their minions, who seek to indemnify themselves for their own degradation by degrading and oppressing in their turn — a distortion practised to the nameless misery of deluded man- kind.
Consciousness in this its frenzy proclaims individuality to be deranging, mad, and perverted, but this is an alien and accidental individuality. It is the heart, however, or the particular consciousness immediately seeking to be universal, that is thus raving and perverted, and the outcome of its action is merely that this contradiction comes to its consciousness. For the truth in its view is the law of its heart, something merely intended, which has not outlasted as the per- manent ordinance has done, but rather collapses when it comes face to face with this latter. This its law ought to have reahty: herein the law has for it the sense of reahty, is a valid ordinance, purpose and essential nature; but that reahty, that very law as vahd or- The Frenzy of Self-conceit 365" dinance, is at once and at the same time for it nothing- ness and void.
Similarly its own reahty proper, itself as particular consciousness, is in its view the essential truth. Its purpose, however, is to establish that particularity as existent. It thus prima facie and in the first instance takes its self qua not individual to be the truly real, or purpose in the sense of law, and hence precisely a universahty, which it is to be objectively as a conscious fact. This its notion comes by its own act to be its object. Its (individual) self is thus discovered to be unreal, and unreahty it finds out to be its reahty. It is thus not an accidental and alien individuahty, but just this particular " heart," in every respect inherently per- verted and perverting.
Since, however, the directly universal individuahty is that condition of perversion, this universal ordinance, being the law of all hearts, and so of the perverted con- sciousness, is no less itself in its very nature the per- verted element, as indeed raging frenzy declared. On the one hand this ordinance proves itself to be a law for all hearts, by the resistance which the law of one heart meets with from other individuals. The accepted and estabhshed laws are defended against the law of a single individual because they are not empty necessity, unconscious and dead, but have spiritual substance and universality, in which those in whom this spiritual substance is reahsed five as individuals, and are conscious of their own selves. Hence, even when they complain of this ordinance, as if it went contrary to their own inmost law, and maintain in opposition to it the claims of the " heart," in point of fact they inwardly cUng to it as being their essential nature; 366 Phenomenology of Mind and if they are deprived of this ordinance, or put them- selves outside the range of its influence, they lose every- thing. Since, then, it is precisely in this that the reality and power of pubHc ordinance consist, the latter appears as the essence, self-identical and everywhere alive, and individuality appears as its form.
On the other hand, however, this ordinance is the sphere of perversion. For in that this ordinance is the law of all hearts, in that all individuals are immediately this universal, it is a reality which is only that of self-existing individuahty, i.e. of the heart. When consciousness therefore sets up the law of its heart, it finds itself re- sisted by others, and the latter in opposing it are doing nothing else but setting up in their turn and making valid their own law. The universal which comes out, therefore, is only a universal resistance and struggle of all against one another, in which each makes good his own individuahty, but at the same time does not come off successfully, because each individuahty meets with the same opposition, and each is reciprocally dissi- pated by the others. What appears as public ordinance is thus this state of war of each against all, in which every one for himself wrests what he can, executes even- handed justice upon the individual hves of others, and estabhshes his own individual existence, which in its turn vanishes at the hands of others. We have here the Course of tJie World, the mere semblance of a constant regular trend, which is only a pretence of universahty, and whose content is rather the meaningless insubstantial sport of setting up individual beings as fixed and stable, and then dissipating them.
If we put both sides of the universal ordinance over against one another and consider them, we see that The Universal Ordinance 367 this later universaKty has for its content restless indi- viduahty, which regards opinion or the merely par- ticular as law, the real as unreal, and the unreal as real. That universahty is, however, at the same time the side of reahsation of the ordinance, for to it belongs the independent self-existence {Fursichseyn) of individuahty. The other side is the universal in the sense of stable passive essence; but, for that very reason, the universal is only something inner, which is not indeed absolutely non-existent, but still not an actual reality, and can itself only become actual by cancelKng the individuahty, that has presumed to claim actuahty. This type of con- sciousness, which becomes aware of itself in the law — in what is inherently true and good — not as particular, or individual, but only as essentially real, yet knows individuahty to be what is perverted and perverting, and hence feels bound to surrender and sacrifice parti- cularity of consciousness — this type of consciousness is Virtue.
Virtue and the Course of the World [The mood of moral sentimentalism is reduced to coDfusion and contra- diction: but the subjective individualism in which it is rooted is not yet eradicated. Individualism now takes refuge in another attitude which claims to do greater justice to the inherent universality of rational self-realisation, but yet clings to its particular individuality as an inalien- able possession. It now tries to make the realisation of universal pur- poses in the shape of the Good depend solely on its own activity, the objective sphere in which the good is to be carried out being regarded as at once external to its ends, opposing its activity, and yet requiring these ends to be carried out in order to have any moral significance. In- dividualism looks on the good as its private perquisite, and makes a personal merit and glory out of its action in carrying out the good. This external realm is the " Course of the "World " which in itself is thought to contain no goodness, and which only gets a value if the good is realised in it. The world's course is thus to owe its goodness to the efforts of the individual A struggle ensues, for the situation is contra- dictory; and the issue of the struggle goes to prove that the individual is not the fans et origo boni, that goodness does not await his efforts, and that in fact the course of the world is at heart good, the soul of the world is righteous.
The attitude analysed here is that of abstract moral idealism, the mood of moral strenuousness, the mood that constantly seeks the improvement and perfectibility of mankind. It is found in many forms, but par- ticularly wherever there is any strong enmity between the "ideal" life and the "life of the world."]
368 Virtue and the Course oe the World In the first mode of active reason, self-consciousness felt it was pure individuality; and over agaiast this stood empty -universality. In the second the two factors in the antithesis had each both the moments within them, both law and individuahty; the one factor, the " heart," was their immediate unity, the other their opposition. Here, in the relation of virtue and the course of the world, both members are each severally unity and antithesis of the moments, are each a process, but in an opposite direction, of law and indi- viduahty inter se. For the virtuous consciousness law is the essential element, and individuality the one to be superseded and cancelled both in the case of its own conscious hfe, as well as in that of the course of the world. In the former case the private individuality claimed by any one has to be brought under the disci- pline and control of the universal, the inherently good and true. It remains there, however, still a personal con- sciousness. True cultivation and discipline consist solely in the surrender of the entire personahty, as a way of making sure that in point of fact iudividual pecuharities are no longer asserted and insisted on. In this in- dividual surrender, individuahty, as it is found in the world's process, is at the same time annihilated; for individuahty is also a simple moment couamon to both.
In the world's process individuality adopts a position VOL. I, — 2 B 369 370 Plienmnenology of Mind the reverse of what it is in the case of the virtuous consciousness, viz. that of making itself the essential factor, and subordinating to its own ends the inherently- good and true. Further, the course of the world, too, does not, as regards virtue, mean merely a universal thus overturned and perverted through individuahty; absolute law and order form likewise a common mo- ment consciously found to be in the world's process, not, however, in the sense of an existing actual fact, but as the inmost essence of the process. That regu- lative order, therefore, has not, properly speaking, to be first produced by virtue, for the production of it means qua action, a consciousness of individuahty, and consists rather in superseding the latter. By thus cancelling indi\"iduahty, however, the inherent nature of the world's process merely gets room, as it were, to enter real existence independently on its own account {an und fur sich selhst).
The general content of the actual course of the world has already made itself known. Looked at more closely, it is again nothing else than the two preceding movements of self-consciousness. From them has come virtue's shape and mould, for since they originate it, virtue has them before it; its aim, however, is to supersede its source and origin, and realise itself, or be "for itself," become objectively expHcit. The way of the world is thus, from one point of view, particular individuahty seeking its pleasure and enjoyment, finding itself overthrown in doing so, and as a result satisfying the demands of the universal. But this satisfaction, hke the rest of the moments of this relationship, is a perverted state and process of the universal. The real fact is merely the particular pleasure and enjoyment, while the universal Virtue and the Course of the World 371 is opposed to it — a necessity whicli is only the empty shape of iiniversality, a merely negative reaction, the form of an act without any content.
The other moment of the world's process is individu- ality, which wants to be a law independently and on its own account, and under the influence of this conceit upsets the estabhshed regular order. The uni- versal law no doubt manages to hold its own against this sort of conceit, and no longer appears in the form of an empty opposite over against consciousness, does not play the role of a lifeless necessity, but is a necessity operating within the conscious life itself. But in the sense in which it is a reality existing in a conscious state of absolute contradiction, it is madness; while in the sense in which it is an objective reality it is simply utter perversion. The universal, then, in both aspects proves to be the might that moves them; but the existential form this force assumes is merely that of general perversion.
It is from virtue that the universal is now to re- ceive its true reahty, by cancelling individuahty, the principle of perversion. Virtue's purpose is by this', means to transmute again the perverted world's process, ■ and bring out its true inner nature. This true being is, in the world-process merely in the form of its imphcit inherent nature; it is not yet actual; and hence virtue merely believes it. Virtue proceeds to raise this faith to sight, without, however, enjoying the fruit of its labour and sacrifice. For so far as it is individuahty, it is the active carrying-on of the contest which it wages with the world's process. Its purpose and true nature, however, he in conquering the reahty of the world's process; and the existence of the good thereby effec- 372 Phenomenology of Mind tuated carries with it the cessation of its action, i.e. of the consciousness of individuaUty.
How this struggle itself will come off, what virtue finds out in the course of it, whether, by the sacrifice which virtue takes upon itself to undergo, the world's pro- cess succumbs while virtue triumphs — all this must be decided from the nature of the hving weapons the combatants carry. For the weapons are nothing else than the essential being of the combatants themselves, a being which only makes its appearance for them both reciprocally. What their weapons are is in this way aheady evident from what is inherently impHed in this struggle.
The universal is an authentic element for the virtuous consciousness as a matter of belief; it is "impKcitly" or " inherently " true; not yet an actual, but an abstract universahty. It plays the part of purpose in the case of this consciousness, and of inner principle in that of the world's process. Precisely by having this character the universal also manifests itself in the relation of virtue to the world's process; for virtue first " wills " to carry out the good, and does not in the first instance claim reahty for it. This characteristic can also be looked at in this way: the good, in that it comes on the scene in the struggle with the world's process, thereby manifests itself in the form of what is for another, as something which is not self-contained {an und fur sich selbst), for otherwise it would not want to get at its own truth by vanquishing its opposite. By having its being only when it is for another, is meant the same as was shown in the opposite way of looking at it, viz: that it is to begin with an abstraction which only attains reahty in a relation, and has no reality of itself as it stands.
Virtue and the Course of the World 373 The good or universal, as it appears here, is, then, what is called Gifts, Capacities, Powers. It is a mode or form of spiritual hfe, where it is presented as a universal, which requires the principle of individuahty to give it hfe and movement, and in individuahty finds its reahsa- tion. This universal is afplied well by the principle of individuahty so far as this principle dwells in the consciousness of virtue, and misused by it so far as it is in the world's process — a passive instrument, which can be regulated and directed by the hand of free in- dividuahty quite irrespective of the use it is put to, and can be misused for the production of a reahty which means its ruin: a lifeless material deprived of its own independence — a material that can be formed in this way or that, or even to its own destruction.
Since this universal is at the beck and call equally of the virtuous consciousness as well as of the course of the world, it is not apparent whether with this equipment virtue wUl get the better of vice. The weapons are the same— these capacities and powers. Virtue has, it is true, carefully ensconced its belief in the original unity of its purpose and the essential nature of the world's process, and the reserve thus placed in ambush is intended to fall on the rear of the enemy during the fight, and per se accomplish its own purpose: so that thereby the knight of virtue finds as a matter of fact that his part in waging this warfare is, properly speaking, a mere sham-fight, which he cannot take seriously because he puts all his strength and confidence in the good being self-sufficient and real per se, i.e. in the good bringing about its own fulfilment — a sham-fight which he dare not even allow to become serious. For what he turns against the enemy, and finds turned against himself, and what.
374 Phenomenology of Mind both, in his own case and as regards his enemy as well, he runs the risk of getting wasted and damaged in the struggle, is not the good itself; he fights to keep and carry that out: what is exposed to the hazard of the contest is merely gifts and capacities that are indifferent to the issue. But these, in point of fact, are nothing else than just that universal from which individuahty has been eliminated, and which is to be conserved and actualised by the struggle.
This universal, however, is at the same time directly realised and if so facto made actual by the very notion of the contest; it is the inherent essential nature, the "universal," and its actualisation means merely that it is at the same time for an other. The two aspects mentioned above, in each of which it became an abstraction, are no longer separated; it is in and through the struggle that the good is primarily affirmed and established in both forms.
The virtuous consciousness, however, enters into con- flict with the way of the world as if this were a factor opposed to the good. What the conflict brings to light is the universal, not merely as an abstract universal, but as one animated by individuality, and existing for an other, in other words the universal in the sense of»the actually real good. Wherever virtue comes to grips with the world's process, it always hits upon places where goodness is found to exist; the good, as the in- herent nature of the world's process, is inseparably inter- woven with all the manifestations of it, with all the ways in which the world's process makes its appearance, and where it is real the good has its own existence too. Virtue thus finds the world's process invulnerable. All the moments which virtue was to jeopardise in itself Virtue and the Course of the World 375 when dealing with the world's process, all the moments which it was to sacrifice — these are just so many ways in which goodness exists, and consequently are inviolable relations. The conflict can, therefore, only be an oscillation between conserving and sacrificing; or rather there can be no place for either sacrificing one's own or doing harm to what comes from elsewhere. Virtue is not merely hke the combatant whose sole concern in the fight is to keep his sword weU-burnished; but it has even started the fight simply to preserve its weapons. And not merely is it unable to use its own weapons, but it must also preserve intact those of its enemy, and protect them against its own attack, seeing they are aU noble parts of the good, on behalf of which it enters the field of battle.
This enemy, on the other hand, has as its essen- tial element not the inherent universal, but indi- viduahty. Its force is thus the negative principle before which nothing stands, nothing is absolutely sacred, but which can risk and endure the loss of everything and anything. In so doing it feels victory to be assured, as much from its very nature as by the contradiction in which its opponent gets entangled. What is to virtue imphcit and inherent is taken merely as an ex- phcit objective fact in the case of the world's process. The latter is detached from every moment which virtue finds fixed and to which it is fast secured. The world- process has such a moment under its power and has consequently in its control the tethered knight of virtue bound thereto, by the fact that this moment is held to be merely one which the world's process can as readily cancel as let be. This knight of valour cannot work himself loose from it as he might from a cloak thrown 376 Phenomenology of Mind round him, and get free by leaving it behind; for it is to him the essential element which there is no getting rid of.
Finally, as to the ambush out of which the inherent good is cunningly and craftily to fall on the rear of the world's process, this hope is vain and foohsh from its very nature. The world's process is the mind sure of itself and ever on the alert, that can never be got at from behind, but fronts breast- forward every quarter; for it consists in this that everything is an objective element for it, everything stands before it. But when the iaherent goodness is for its enemy, then it finds itself in the struggle we have seen; so far, however, as it is not for its enemy, but subsists in itself, it is the passive instru- ment of gifts and capacities, material without reality. If represented as object, it would be a dormant con- sciousness, remaining in the background, no one knows where.
Virtue will thus be overpowered by the world's process, because the abstract unreal essence is in fact virtue's own purpose, and because its action as regards reahty rests on distinctions that are solely a matter of words. Virtue wanted to consist in the fact of bringing about the reahsation of goodness through sacrificing individuahty; but the aspect of reality is itself nothing else than the aspect of individuality. The good was meant to be what is implicit and inherent, and opposed to what is; but the imphcit and inherent, taken in its real truth, is simply heing itself. The implicitly inherent element is primarily the abstraction of essence as against actual reahty: but the abstraction is just what is not true, but a distinction merely for consciousness; this means, however, it is itself what is called actual, for the actual Virtue and the Course of the World 377 is wtat essentially is for an other — or it is being. But the consciousness of virtue rests on this distinction of implicitness and exphcit being, a distraction with- out any true vahdity.
The world's process was to be the perversion of the good, because it took individuality for its principle. But this latter is the principle of actual reality, for it is just that mode of consciousness by which what is impKcit and inherent is for an other as well. The world's process transmutes and perverts the imchangeable, but does so in fact by transmuting it out of the nothingness of abstraction into the being of reahty.
The way of the world is, then, victorious over what, in opposition to it, constitutes virtue; it is victorious over that whose nature is an unreal abstraction. But it is not victorious over something real, but over the produc- tion of distiactions that are no distinctions, over this pompous talk about the best for mankind and the op- pression of humanity, about sacrifice for goodness' sake and the misuse of gifts. Imaginaryidealities and purposes of that sort faU on the ear as idle phrases, which exalt the heart and leave the reason a blank, which edify but build up nothing that endures: declamations whose only definite announcement is that the individual who professes to act for such high ends and indulges in such fijie phrases holds himself for a fine creature: a swollen enlargement which gives itself and others a mighty size of a head, but big from inflation with empti- ness.
Virtue in the olden time had its secure and determin- ate significance, for it found the fullness of its content and its soHd basis in the substantial life of the nation, and had for its purpose and end a concrete good that 378 Phenomenology of Mind existed and lay at its hand: it was also for that reason not directed against actual reality as a general perver- sity, and not turned against a world-process. The virtue above considered, however, is removed from that substantial life, and is outside it, a virtue with no essential being, a virtue merely in idea and in words, and one that is deprived of all that content.
The vacuousness of this rhetorical eloquence in con- flict with the world's process would be at once discovered if it could be stated what all its eloquent phrases amount to. They are therefore assumed to be familiar and well- understood. The request to say what, then, this " well- known " is would be either met by a new swell of phrases, or in reply there would be an appeal to the " heart " which " inwardly " tells what they mean — which is tantamount to an admission of inability to say what the meaning is.