The fatuousness of that style of eloquence seems, too, in a quasi-unconscious manner to have got the length of being an acknowledged certainty for the cultivated minds of our time, since all interest in the whole mass of those rhetorical spread-eagle phrases has disappeared — a loss of interest which is betrayed in the sheer weari- someness they produce.
The result, then, arising from this opposition, con- sists in the fact that consciousness lets the idea of an inherent good, which yet has no actual reahty, slip from it like a mere cloak. Consciousness has learned in the course of its struggle that the world's process is not so bad as it looked; for the reality of the world's process is that of the universal. With the discovery of this it is seen that there is no way of producing the good through the sacrifice of individuality, the means for doing so Virtue and the Course of the World 379 have gone; for individuality is precisely the explicit actualisation of what is implicitly and inherently real (i.e. the universal); and the perversion ceases to be looked at as a perversion of goodness, for it is just the transmuting of the good, qua bare purpose, into actual reality. The moving process of individuality is the realising of the universal.
In point of fact, however, what as world-process stood opposed to the consciousness of the inherently and impHcitly real, has hkewise been vanquished and has disappeared with the attainment of the above result. The self-existence of individuahty was there in opposition to the inner essential nature, the uni- versal, and made its appearance as a reahty cut off from the inherent imphcit nature. Since, however, it has come out that reahty is in undivided 'unity with the universal, the self-existence of the world's process proves to have no longer a being, just as the inherent nature [Ansich) of virtue is merely an aspect too {An- sicht). The individuahty of the world's process may doubtless think it acts merely for itself or selfishly; it is better than it thinks; its action is at the same time one that is imiversal and with an inherent being of its own. If it acts selfishly, it does not know what it is doing; and if it insists that aU men act selfishly, it merely asserts that all men are unaware as to what action is. If it acts for itself, this is just the explicit bringing into reality of what is at first imphcit and inherent. The purpose of its self-existence, of its " being for itself," which it fancies opposed to the inherent nature — its futile ingenuity and cunning, as also its fine-spun explanations which so knowingly demon- strate the existence of selfishness everywhere — all these 380 Phenomenology of Mind have as much vanished as the purpose of the inherent element and its rhetorical eloquence.
Thus, then, the effort, the struggle, the activity of individuahty is inherently an end in itself; the use of powers, the play of their outward manifestations — that is what gives them life: otherwise they would be hfeless, potential, and merely imphcit {Ansich). The inherent imphcit nature is not an abstract universal without exist- ence and never carried into effect; it is itself immediately this actual present and this hving actuality of the pro- cess of individuality.
0 Individuality, which takes Itself to be Eeal IN AND FOR Itself [The following section gives a general description of individuality which seeks to realise itself, not in the one-sided ways analysed in the three preceding sections, but as a complete concrete whole. Here in- dividuality does not regard itself abstractlj', and hence does not treat the sphere of its realisation as in any way alien to itself. It is completely one with the objective world where it carries out its ends, and finds both itself adequate to its own realisation, and the world sufficient and all-sufficient for the embodiment of its ends. In this sphere we have, as it were, the very antithesis of the preceding state of mind. There the good was opposed to the course of the " world," the latter being dependent for its goodness on individual effort. Here it is as if the " world " were made up of the activity of individuals and were wholly adequate to satisfy and embody all their ends. Naturally therefore individuals take themselves here to be " real just as they are," and have merely to express or develop their own content in order to objectify their ends. The objective world is their activity realised, is themselves " externalised."
This condition of individuality is the immediate preparation for the social order of the life of a free spiritual community, and is the antici- pation of that community — a community where the individual is uni- versalised through union with the whole, and the whole particularised in the individual.]
381 Individuality, which takes Itself to be Real IN AND FOR Itself Self-consciousness lias now grasped its own principle, which at first sight was only our notion of it, viz. the notion that, when consciously certain of itself, it is all reaUty. Its purpose and nature henceforward consist in the interpenetration of the universal elements (its " gifts " and " capacities") and individual existence. The particular moments of this process of complete concrete permeation preceding the unity in which they now com- bine in a single fused whole, were found in the purposes hitherto considered. These have now ceased to be the ab- stractions and chimeras, belonging to those earlier empty modes of the self-consciousness of mind, modes whose true nature hes simply in the would-be hfe of " the heart," fancy and mere rhetoric, and not in reason, which is now sure of its own reality as it stands {an und fur sich), and no longer seeks to take up the position of being only a purpose in opposition to immediately existent (sensible) reality, but, on the contrary, has the category as such as the object of its consciousness. ., This means that the character of being for itself on its own account {fur sich), or of negative self-conscious- ness, with which reason started, is cancelled. This self-consciousness at that stage fell in with a reality which would be its own negative, and by cancelling which it would consciously reahse its purpose. Now that purpose and inherent nature {Ansicliseyn) have Concrete Individuality 383 proved to be the same as objective existence for another and the given reality, [objective] truth is no longer divided from [subjective]' certainty. The purpose set up may now be taken for certainty of self, and the reahsation of that purpose for truth; or, again, pur- pose may be taken for the truth, and reahty for cer- tainty. The essential nature and purpose as it stands {an und fur sich) constitute the certainty of immediate reahty itself, the interpenetration of the inherent im- phcit nature (ansich), and the exphcit distinctive nature {fur sich), of the universal and individuahty. Action is fer se its truth and reahty, and the manifestation or expression of individuahty is its purpose taken just as: it stands.
With the attainment of such a conception, therefore, self-consciousness has returned into itself and passed from those opposite characteristics which the category presented, and which its relation to the category had, when it was " observing " and when it was " active." Its object is now the category pure and simple; in other words, it is itself the category become conscious of itself. Its account with its previous forms is now closed; they lie behind it in the past; they do not come forward as a world found ready to hand, but are developed solely within itself as transparent moments. Yet they still fall apart at this stage as a movement of distinct moments, which has not yet got combined into its own substantial unity. But throughout all these moments self- consciousness holds firmly to that simple unity of self with objective existence which is its constitutive nature or generic attribute.
Consciousness has in this way cast free from all oppo- sition and from every condition limiting its activity.
384 Phenomenology of Mind It starts anew from itself, and is occupied not with something external, but with itself. Since individuahty is in itself actuahty, the material of operation and the purpose of action He in the action itself. Action con- sequently has the appearance of a circular process, which moves freely in vacuo within itself, which, un- impeded, now enlarges and then contracts, and is quite content to play simply within itself and with itself. When individuahty manifests and displays its form and shape, this means that it simply assumes and receives this form; that is its element: it is just the hght of day, to which consciousness wants to show itself here. Action alters nothing, opposes nothing; it is the mere form of transition from a condition of being invisible to one of being visible, and the content, brought thus to daylight, and laid bare, is nothing else than what this action already is imphcitly {an sich). It is implicit — that is its form as unity in thought: and it is actual — that is its form as imity in existence: while it is itself content merely in virtue of its maintaining this character of simpHcity in spite of the aspect of change process and transition.
Society as a Hekd of Individuals: Deceit: " Actual Fact " [This section seems at first sight a strained interpretation of the life of society. There seems at first glance nothing in a society corresponding to the view here put forward. But a little reflection will show that the conception of society here analysed is a necessary and universal element in every society. In order to form a free spiritual community, individuals must be each complete in himself, be real "just as they are" as concrete individuals. So conceived the component individuals of a society are separate cells of the organism of a society, all self -complete, all implicitly universal and capable of being universalised, but jun. individuals all distinct. Together they form the elements out of which the compact structure of a society is made: and without their being so together as they are thus constituted, that structure would be impossible. Their "togetherness" as individual units each self-contained is not merely the basis of complete social life, but the primd facie aspect of social life, and the original primitive condition of social individuality. Here each seeks to realise his own ends quite naturally and spontaneously, and is hardly aware and is almost indiflferent to the universal result which his implicitly universal nature must bring about. Each acts in his own interest, little knowing that his interest must lead to the universal good. His attitude is not strictly selfishness; it is self-interest, and such an interest all his ends mist have, because they are the ends of his self. The reality he brings about has to be expressed. He never questions its right to be, just because he is self-complete: the reality is indeed a genuine reality, a reality with a universal character. It is so much "actual fact" for him, which he takes or makes, and accepts just because it has a universal significance. All the individuals are in the same position; each is in touch with and is only concerned about " actual fact." Each is thus equally "honest" with himself in seeking his own interest, in being concerned with his own "actual fact"; and each is equally "honourable" as regards others in so doing. But still each is throughout focussing the meaning of the whole exclusively in himself, and is not consciously going beyond himself, for in a sense he does not need or wish to do so. AU VOL. I.— 2 C 3S5 386 Phenomenology of Mind the same this very " fact " he deals with has a universal significance and holds for others, and can only be a " fact " if it does. Hence in so keep- ing up this individual interest in " actual fact " each is really " deceiving " himself as to its true meaning, and deceiving others at the same time. The situation is one of unconscious self-sophistication and unconscious deceiving of others as to their true inner spiritual affinity. This social attitude is thus bound to prove inadeqnate and give way to the fuller social consciousness of a concrete community.
Social life as here analysed may be said to be society as it is conceived by the abstract Political Economist. The economic order of society is a necessary moment in the life of society; but the " economic man " is little better than an anthropotherion. The section may be regarded as a satirical analysis of such an abstract entity; it is also an indirect criticism of the futility of opposing " egoism " and " altruism.''
The position in which individuals are, when acting in the manner above described, corresponds precisely to that of a herd of animals. Hence the title of the present section.]
Society as a Heed op Individuals: Deceit: " Actual Fact " The above substantial individuality, to begin with, is again particular and determinate. Absolute reality, which it knows itself to be, is thus, in the way it is consciously aware of that reality, abstract and universal, without filling and content, merely the empty thought of this category. We have to see how this conception of sub- stantial individuality is made expHcit in its various moments, and how it gets to be conscious of its true nature.
The conception of this individuahty, as it takes itself as such to be all reahty, is in the first instance a mere result: its own movement and reality are not yet set forth; it is here in its immediacy as some- thing purely and simply implicit. Negativity, however, which is the same as what appears as movement and process, is inherent in this implicit nature as a specific quality; and being, the simple implicit nature, comes to be a definite compass or range of being. Individuahty confronts us, therefore, as an original determinate nature: original, in virtue of its being imphcit: originally determinate, in virtue of the negative moment lying in that implicitness, which negative element is thereby a quality. This limitation cannot, however, limit the action of consciousness, for this consists at the present stage in thorough and com- plete self-reference: relation to what is other than 387 388 Phenomenology of Mind itself, which would be a limitation, is now overcome. The character inherent originally by nature is thus merely an undefined (simple) principle, a transparent universal element in which individuahty finds itself free and at one with itself, as well as unfolds its diversity without restraint, and in reahsing itself is simply in reciprocal relation with itself. We have here something similar to what we find in the case of indeterminate animal hfe: this breathes the breath of hfe, let us say, in water as its element, or air or earth, and within these again in still more determinate conditions: every aspect of its life is affected by the specific element, and yet animal life still keeps these aspects within its power and itself a unity in spite of the limitations of the element, and remains qua the given particular organi- sation animal life throughout, the same general fact of animal life.
This determinate original nature of conscious- ness, in which it finds itself freely and wholly, appears as the immediate and only proper content of the piu-pose of the individual. That content is indeed a definite content, but is only content so far as we take the imphcit nature in isolation. In truth, however, it is reahty {Realitdt) permeated by individuahty: actuahty (Wirklichkeit) in the way consciousness qua individual contains this within itself, and is to begin with taken as existing, but not yet as acting. So far as action is concerned, however, that determinateness is, in one respect, not a hmitation it wants to overcome; for, looked at as an existent quality, that determinateness is simply the colour of the element where it moves: in another respect, however, the negativity is deter- minateness merely in the case of what " exists." But Society as a Herd of Individuals 389 acting is nothing else than this negativity. Hence when individuality acts, its specific determinateness is dissipated into the general process of negation, into the sum and substance of all determinateness.
The simple " original nature " now breaks up, in action and the consciousness of action, into the dis- tinction which action implies. To begin with, action is here an object, an object, too, still belonging to con- sciousness; it is present as a purpose, and thus opposed to a given reality. The other moment is the process of this statically presented purpose, the process of actualisation of the purpose, bringing the purpose to bear on the entirely formal reality, and hence is the idea of the transition itself. In other words, this second moment is the " means." The third moment is, finally, the object, no longer as immediately and subjectively presented purpose, but as brought to light and estab- lished as something other than and external to the acting subject.
These various aspects must be viewed in the light of the general principle of this sphere of consciousness. The content throughout remains the same, without any difference, whether between individuahty and existence in general, or between purpose as against individuahty in the sense of an " original nature," or between purpose and the given reahty: or between the means and that reality as absolute purpose: or finally between the reahty moulded by the agent as against the purpose, the " original nature," or the means.
At the outset, then, the nature of individuahty in its original determinate form, its immediate essence, is not yet affirmed as active; and in this shape is called special 390 Phenomenology of Mind capacity, talent, character, and so on. This peculiar colouring of mind must be looked at as the only content of its purpose, and as the sole and only reality. If we thought of consciousness as going beyond that, as seeking to bring into reality another content, then we should think of it as a nothing working away towards nothing. This original nature is, moreover, not merely the substance of its purpose, but imphcitly the reality as well, which otherwise assumes the appearance of being a given material on which to act, of being found ready at hand for action to work up into some determinate form. That is to say, acting is simply transferring from a state not yet explicitly expressed to one fully ex- pressed; the inherent being of that reality opposed to consciousness has sunk to the level of a mere empty appearance, a mere seeming. This mode of conscious- ness, by determining itself to act, thereby refuses to be led astray by the semblance of reality on the part of what is presented to it; and has likewise to abandon its dealings with idle thoughts and pur- poses, and keep its hold on the original content of its own nature. No doubt this content first exists as a fact for consciousness, when it has made that content actual; but the distinction between something which while for consciousness is only inside itself, and a reality outside consciousness existing in itself, has broken down. Consciousness must act only that what it inherently and implicity is, may be for it explicitly; or, acting is just the process of mind coming to be qua conscious- ness. What it is imphcity, therefore, it knows from its actual reality. Hence it is that an individual cannot know what he is till he has made himself real by action.
Society as a Herd of Individuals 391 Consciousness, however, seems on this view to be tmable to determine the purpose of its action before action has taken place; but before action occurs it must, in virtue of being consciousness, have the act in front of itself as entirely its own, i.e. as a purpose. The individual, therefore, who is going to act seems to find himself in a circle, where each moment already presupposes the others, and hence seems unable to find a beginning, because it only gets to know its own original nature, the nature which is to be its purpose, by first acting, while in order to act it must have that purpose beforehand. But just for that reason it has to start straight away and, whatever the circumstances are, without troubling further about begmning, means, or end, proceed to action at once. For its essential and impHcit {ansicliseynde) nature is beginning, means, and end all in one. As beginning, it is found in the circum- stances of the action; and the interest which the in- dividual finds in something is just the answer to the question, "whether he should act and what is to be done in a given case. " For what seems to be a reahty confront- ing him is implicitly his own original fundamental nature, which has merely the appearance of an objective being — an appearance which hes in the notion of action, involving as this does self-diremption, but which expressly shows itself to be his own original nature by the interest the individual finds therein. Similarly the how, the means, is determined as it stands {an und fiir sich). Talent is likewise nothing but indi- viduality with a definite original constitution, looked at as the subjective internal means, or transition of purpose into actuality. The actual means, however, and the real transition are the miity of talent with the 392 Phenomenology of Mind nature of the fact as present in the interest felt. The former [talent] expresses that aspect of the means which concerns action, the latter [the fact found of interest] that which concerns content: both are individuahty itself, as a fused whole of acting and existing. "What we find, then, is first circumstances given ready to hand, which are impUcitly the original nature of the individual; next the interest which afnrms them as its own or as its purpose; and -finally the connection and sublation of these opposite elements in the means. This connexion itself still falls within consciousness, and the whole just considered is one side of an opposition. This appearance of opposi- tion which still remains is removed by the transition, i.e. by the means. For the means is a unity of inner and outer, the antithesis of the determinate character it has qua inner means (viz. talent): it therefore abohshes this character, and makes itself — this unity of action and existence — equally an outer, viz.: the actually realised individuality, i.e. individuahty which is established for individuahty itself as the objectively existent. The entire act in this way does not go beyond itself, either as circumstances, or as purpose, or means, or as work performed.
In this notion of work, however, the distinction which lay within the original nature seems to enter. The work done is something determinate, hke the original nature it expresses, because being cut loose by the process of acting and become an existing reality, the negation impHed in this process remains in it as a quality. Consciousness, however, as against the work, is specifically that in which this quality as a general process of negation, as acting, is to be found. It is Society as a Herd of Individuals 393 thus the universal as opposed to the specific deter- minateness of the work performed; it can therefore compare one kind of work with another, and thence apprehend individuahties themselves as different. An individual who is of wider compass in his work has either stronger energy of will or a richer nature, i.e. a nature whose original constitution {Bestimmtheit) is less limited; while another has a weaker and a poorer nature.
*In contrast with this purely quantitative difference, which is not an essential difference, "good" and " bad" would express an absolute difference; but this is not in place here. Whether taken in one way or another, action is equally carried on; there is a process of dis- playing and expressing an individuahty, and for that reason it is all good: it would, properly speaking, be impossible to say what "bad" is to be here. What would be called a bad work is the individual life of a certain specific nature, which is therein realised. It would only be degraded into a bad work by a reflective comparison, which, however, is quite empty and futile, since this goes beyond the essential meaning and nature of work (which is a self-expression of individuality), and then seeks to find and demand from it heaven knows what else. The comparison could have to do only with the distinction above mentioned. But this, being a distinction of quantity, is in itself not an essential one, and is only made here because of differences in works and individualities which might be compared with one another. But these do not affect one another; each is concerned simply with itself.
The original nature is alone the essential fact, or * The following paragraph is somewhat parenthetical.
394 Phenomenology of Mind what could be "used as an ultimate standard of judg- ment regarding the work; and conversely. Both, however, correspond to each other: there is nothing for individuahty which is not obtained through it: or there is no reality which is not its nature and its action, and no action nor inherent substance of in- dividuahty which is not real. And only these moments are to be compared.