Euph. — We do, indeed, perceive or apprehend thofe things by the faculty of fight. But will it follow from thence, that they are the proper and immediate objects of fight, any more than that all thofe things are the proper and immediate objects of hearing, which are fignified by the help of words, or founds?
Alc — You would have us think then, that light, {hades, and colours, varioufly combined, anfwer to the feveral articulations of found in language; and that, by means thereof, all forts of objects are fuggefted to the mind through the eye, in the fame manner as they are fuggefted, by words or founds, through the ear: that is, [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 167 neither from neceflary deduction to the judgment, nor from fimilitude to the fancy, but purely and folely from experience, cuftom, and habit.
Euph. — I would not have you think any thing, more than the nature of things obligeth you to think, nor fub- mit in the leaft to my judgment, but only to the force of truth -, which is an impofition that I fuppofe the freeft thinkers will not pretend to be exempt from.
Alc. — You have led me, it feems, ftep by ftep, till I am got I know not where. But I fhall try to get out again, if not by the way I came, yet by fome other of my own finding. Here Alciphrcn> having made a (hort paufe, proceeded as follows: XI. Anfwer me, Euphranor, mould it not follow, from thefe principles, that a man, born blind, and made to fee, would at firft fight not only not perceive their dif- tance, but alfo not fo much as know the very things themfelves which he faw, for inftance, men or trees? which furely to fupport mult be abfurd.
Euph. — I grant, in confequence of thofe principles, which both you and I have admitted, that fuch a one would never think of men, trees, or any other objects that he had been accuftomed to perceive by touch, upon having his mind filled with new fenfations of light and colours, whofe various combinations he doth not yet un- derftand, or know the meaning of; no more than a Chi- Hefet upon firft hearing the words man and tree, would think of the things fignified by them. In both cafes, there mull be time and experience, by repeated a£ts, to acquire a habit of knowing the connexion between the figns and things fignified j that is to fay, of underftanding the lan- ge, whether of the eyes or of the ears. And I con- ceive no abfurdity in this.
Alc. — I fee, therefore, in ftri£t philofophical truth, that rock only in the fame fenfe that I may be faid to hear it, when the word reck is pronounced.
1 63 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
Eu?H. — In the very fame.
Alc. — How comes it to pafs then, that every one (hall fay he fees, for inftance, a rock, or a houfe, when thofe things are before his eyes; but no body will fay, he hears a rock, or a houfe, but only the words or founds them- felves, by which thofe things are faid to be fignified or fuggefted, but not heard? Befides, if yifion be only a language, fpeaking to the eyes, it may be afked, When did men learn this language? To acquire the knowledge of fo many figns, as go to the making up a language, is a work of fome difficulty. But will any man fay, he hath fpent time, or been at pains, to learn this language of vifion?
Euph. — No wonder, we cannot affign a time beyond our remoteft memory. If we have been all pra&ifing this language, ever fince our firft entrance into the world; if the Author of nature conftantly fpeaks to the eyes of all mankind, even in their earlieft infancy, whenever the eyes are open in the light, whether alone or in company; It doth not feem to me at all ftrange, that men mould not be aware they had ever learned a language, begun fo ear- ly, and pra£Ufed fo conftantly, as this of vifion. And, if we alfo confider, that it is the fame throughout the whole world, and not, like other languages, differing in different places j it will not feem unaccountable, that men fhould miftake the connexion between the proper objects of fight, and the things fignified by them, to be founded in neceffary relation, or likenefs: Or, that they mould even take them for the fame things. Hence it feems eafy to conceive, why men, who do not think, fhould con- found, in this language of vifion, the figns with the things fignified, othsrwife than they are wont to do, in the vari- ous particular lauguages, formed by the feveral nations of men.
XII. It may be alfo worth while to obferve, that figns being little confidered in themfelves, or for their own fake, [Dial. IVJ MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i69 but only in their relative capacity, and for the fake of thofe things whereof they are figns, it comes topafs, that the mind often overlooks them, fo as to carry its attention immediately on to the things fignified. Thus, for exam- ple, in reading, we run over the characters with the flight- eft regard, and pafs on to the meaning. Hence it is fre- quent for men to fay, they fee words, and notions, and things, in reading a book: whereas, in ftrictnefs, they fee only the characters, which fuggeft words, notions, and things. And, by parity of reafon, may we not fuppofe, that men, not refting in, but overlooking the immediate and proper objects of fight, as in their own nature of fmali moment, carry their attention onward to the very thing fignified, and talk as if they faw the fecondary objects? which, in truth and ftri£tnefs, are not feen, but only fug- gefted and apprehended by means of the proper objects of fight, which alone are feen.
Alc. — To fpeak my mind freely, this differtation grows tedious, and runs into points too dry and minute for a gentleman's attention.
I thought, faid Crito, we had been told, the Minute Philofophers loved to confider things clofely and minutely.
Alc— That is true, but in fo polite an age, who would be a mere philofopher? There is a certain fcholaftic accu- racy, which ill fuits the freedom and eafe of a well-bred man. But, to cut fhort this chicane, I propound it fairly to your own confidence, whether you really think that God himfelf fpeaks every day, and in every place, to the eyes of all men?
Euph. — That is really, and in truth, my opinion: and it mould be yours too, if you are confident with yourfelf, and abide by your own definition of language. Since you cannot deny, that the great mover and author of nature conftantly explaineth himfelf to the eyes of men, by the fenfible intervention of arbitrary figns, which have no fimil- itude, or connexion, with the things fignified; fo as by X i7o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
compounding and difpofing them, to fuggeft and exhibit an endlefs variety of obje&s, differing in nature, time, and place, thereby informing and directing men how to act with refpecl: to things diftant and future, as well as near and prefent. In confequence, I fay, of your own fenti- ments and conceflions, you have as much reafon to think, the Univerfal Agent, or God, fpeaks to your eyes, as you can have for thinking any particular perfon fpeaks to your ears.
Alc. — I cannot help thinking, that fome fallacy runs throughout this whole ratiocination, though perhaps I may not readily point it out. It feems to me, that every other fenfe may as well be deemed a language as that of vilion. Smells and tafte, for inftance, are figns that inform us of other qualities, to which they have neither likenefs nor neceffary connexion.
Euph. — That they are figns is certain, as alfo that lan- guage, and all other figns, agree in the general nature of fign, or fo far forth as figns. But it is as certain that all figns are not language; not even all fignificant founds, fuch as the natural cries of animals, or the inarticulate founds and interjections of men. It is the articulation, combination, variety, copioufnefs, extenfive and general ufe, and eafy application of figns (all which are commonly found in vifion) that conftitute the true nature of language. Other fenfes mayindeed furnifh figns; and yet thofe figns have no more right than inarticulate founds to be thought a language.
Alc- — Hold! let me fee! In language, the figns are arbitrary, are they not?* Eupk* — They are.
Alc — And confequently, they do not always fuggeft real matters of fa 61. Whereas, this natural language, as you call it, or thefe vifible figns, do always fuggeft things in the fame uniform way, and have the fame conftant reg- ular connexion with matters of fact: whence it mould [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 171 feern, the connexion was neceflary, and therefore, accord- ing to the definition premifed, it can be no language. How do you folve this objection?
Euph. — You may folve it yourfelf, by the help of a picture, or looking-glafs.
Alc. — You are in the right. I fee there is nothing in it. I know not what elfe to fay to this opinion more, than that it is fo odd and contrary to my way of thinking, that I (hall never affent to it.
XIII. Euph. — Be pleafed to recollecl: your own lec- tures upon prejudice, and apply them in the prefent cafe. Perhaps they may help you to follow where reafon leads, and to fufpe£t notions which are ftrongly riveted, without having been ever examined.
Alc. — I difdain the fufpicion of prejudice. And I do not fpeak only for myfelf. I know a club of mod ingen- ious men, the freed from prejudice of any men alive, who abhor the notion of a God, and I doubt not, would be very able to untie this knot. Upon which words of Alciphron, I, who had a£ted the part of an indifferent ftan- der-by, obferved to him, that it miibecame his character, and repeated profeflions, to own an attachment to the judgment, or build upon the prefumed abilities of other men, how ingenious foever: and that this proceeding might encourage his adverfaries to have recourfe to author- ity, in which, perhaps, they would find their account more than he.
Oh! faid CritOy I have often obferved the conduct of Minute Philofophers. "When one of them has got a ring of difciples round him, his method is to exclaim againft prejudice, and recommend thinking and reafoning, giving to underffcand that himfelf is a man of deep refearches and clofe argument, one who examines impartially, and corv cludes warily. The fame man, in other company, if he chance • 172 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
to' be pre fled with reafon, fhall laugh at logic, and afiume the lazy fupine airs of a fine gentleman, a wit, a railleur, to avoid the drincfs of a regular and exa£t inquiry. This double face of the Minute Philofopher is of no fmall ufe to propagate and maintain his notions. Though to me it feems a plain cafe, that if a fine gentleman will fhake off authority, and appeal from religion to reafon, unto reafon he mud go: And if he cannot go without leading-firings, furely he had better be led by the authority of the public, than by that of any knot of Minute Philosophers.
Alc. — Gentlemen, this difcourfe is very irkfome and needlefs. For my part, I am a friend to enquiry. I am willing reafon mould have its full and free fcope. I build on no man's authority. I have no intereft in denying a God. Any man may believe, or not believe, a God, as he pleafes, for me. But after all, Euphranor mult allow me to flare a little at his conclufions.
Euph. — The conclufions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own conceflions.
XIV. — You, it feems, flare to find, that God is not far from every one of us; and that in him we live and move and have our being. You, who, in the beginning of this morning's conference, thought it ftrange, that God fhould leave himfelf without a witnefs, do now think it ftrange the witnefs fhould be fo full and clear?
Alc- — I muft own I do. I was aware, indeed, of a certain metaphyficai hypothefis, of our feeing all things in God, by the union of the human foul with intelligible fub- llance of the Deity, which neither I, nor any one elfe could make fenfe of. But I never imagined it could be pretend- ed, that we faw God with our flefhly eyes, as plain as we fee any human perfon whatfoever, and that he daily fpeaks to our fenfes in a manifeft and clear diaJeel:.
Cri. — As for that metaphyficai hypothefis, I can make no more of it than you. But I think it plain, this optic [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 173 language hath a neceffary connexion with knowledge, wif- dom, and goodnefs. It is equivalent to a conftant creation, betokening an immediate act of power and providence. It cannot be accounted for by mechanical principles, by at- oms, attractions, or effluvia. The inftantaneous produc- tion and reproduction of fo many figns combined, diflblved, tranfpofed, diverfified, and adapted to fuch an endlefs va- riety of purpofes, ever fhiftvng with the occafions, and fuit- ed to them, being utterly inexplicable and unaccountable by the laws of motion, by chance, by fate, or the like blind principles, doth fet forth and teftify the immediate opera- tion of a Spirit or thinking Being: and not merely of - a Spirit, which every motion or gravitation may pofEbly in- fer, but of one wife, good, and provident Spirit, who di- rects, and rules, and governs the world. Some philofo- phers, being convinced of the wifdom and power of the Creator, from the make and contrivance of organized bo- dies, and orderly fyftem of the world, did neverthelefs im- agine, that he left this fyftem, with all its parts and con- tents, well adjufted and put in motion, as an artift leaves a clock, to go thenceforward, of itfelf, for a certain period. But this vifual language proves, not a Creator merely, but a provident Governor, actually and intimately prefent, and attentive to all our interefts and motions, who watches over our conduct, and takes care of our minuteft actions and defigns, throughout the whole courfe of our lives, in- forming, admonifhing, and directing inceflantly, in a mod evident and fenfible manner. This is truly wonderful.
Euph. — And is it not fo, that men mould be encompaf- fed by fuch a wonder, without reflecting on it?
XV. Something there is of divine and admirable in this language, addrefied to our eyes, that may well awa- ken the mind, and deferves its utmoft attention: it is learned with fo little pains; it expretleth the differences i74 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
of things fo clearly and aptly; it inftru&s with fuch fa- cility and difpatch, by one glance of the eye conveying a greater variety of advices, and a more diftin£t knowledge of things, than could be got by a difcourfe of feveral hours. And, while it informs, it amufes and entertains the mind, with fuch fingular pleafure and delight. It is of fuch ex- cellent ufe, in giving a liability and permanency to hu- man difcourfe, in recording founds, and bellowing life on dead languages, enabling us to converfe with men of remote ages and countries. And it anfwers fo appofite to the ufes and neceffities of mankind, informing us more diftinctly of thofe objects, whofe riearnefs and magni- tude qualify them to be of greateft detriment or benefit to our bodies, and lefs exactly, in proportion as their littlenefs, or diflance, make them of lefs concern to us.
Alc. — And yet thefe ftrange things affect men but little.
Euph. — But they are not ftrange, they are familiar, and that makes them to be overlooked. Things which rarely happen flrike j whereas frequency leffens the ad- miration of things, though in themfelves ever fo admira- ble. Hence a common man, who is not ufed to think and make reflexions, would probably be more convinced of the being of a God, by one fingle fentence heard once in his life from the fky, than by all the experience he has had of. this vifual language, contrived with fuch exqui- fite (kill, fo conftantly addreffed to his eyes, and fo plain- ly declaring the neamefs, wifdom, and providence of Him with whom we have to do.
Alc. — After all, I cannot fatisfy myfelf, how men fliould be fo little furprifed, or amazed, about this vifive faculty, if it was really of a nature fo furprifing and ama- zing.
Euph. — But let us fuppofe a nation of men blind from their infancy, among whom a ftranger arrives, the only [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 175 man who can fee in all the country: Let us fuppofe this ftranger travelling with fome of the natives, and that one while he foretells to them, that, in cafe they walk ftrait forward, in half an hour they fhall meet men, or cattle, or come to a houfe; that, if they turn to the right, and proceed, they fhall, in a few minutes, be in danger of falling down a precipice *, that, fhaping their courfe to the left, they 'will, in fuch a time, arrive at a river, a wood, or a mountain. What think you? Muft they not be infinitely furprifed, that one, who had never been in their country before, fhould know it fo much better than themfelves? And would not thofe predictions feem to them as unaccountable and incredible, as prophefy to a Minute Philofopher?
A lc. — I cannot deny it.
Euph. — But it feems to require intenfe thought, to be able to unravel a prejudice that has been fo long forming, to get over the vulgar error of ideas common to both fenfes, and fo to diftinguifh between the objects of fight and touch, which have grown (if I may fo fay) blended together in our fancy, as to be able to fuppofe ourfelves exactly in the flate, that one of thofe men would be in, if he were made to fee. And yet this I believe is poffi- ble, and might feem worth the pains of a little thinking, efpecially to thofe men whofe proper employment and profefiion it is to think, and unravel prejudices, and con- fute miftakes. I frankly own I cannot find my way out of this maze, and fhould gladly be fet right by thofe who fee better than myfelf.
Cri. — The purfuing this fubjecT: in their own thoughts would poflibly open a new fcene to thofe fpeculative gen- tlemen of the Minute Philofophy. It puts me in mind of a pafiage in the Pfalmift, where he reprefents God to be covered with light, as with a garment, and would, me- thinks, be no ill comment on that ancient notion of fome iy6 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IVj eaftern fages, That God had light for his body, and truth for his foul.
This converfation lafted till a fervant came to tell us the tea was ready: upon which we walked in, and found Lyficles at the tea-table.
XVI. As foon as we fat down, I am glad, faid Alci- phrotiy that I have here found my fecond, a frefh man, to maintain our common caufe, which, I doubt, Lyficles will think hath fuffered by his abfence.
Lys.-~ Why fo?
Alc. — I have been drawn into fome concefiions you won't like, Lys. — Let me know what they are.
Alc. — Why, that there is fuch a thing as a God, and that his exiftence is very certain.
Lys. — Blefs me! How came you to entertain fo wild a notion?
Alc — You know we profefs to follow reafon wherev- er it leads. And, in ihort, I have been reafoned into it.
Lys. — Reafoned! You mould fay, amufed with words, bewildered with fophiftry.
Euph. — Have you a mind to hear the fame reafoning that led Alciphron and me, ftep by ftep, that we may ex- amine whether it be fophiflry or no?
Lys — As to that, I am very eafy. I guefs all that can be faid on that head. It fhall be my bufinefs to help my friend out, whatever arguments drew him in.
Euph. — Will you admit the premifes, and deny the conclufions?
Lys. What if I admit the conclufion?
Euph.— -How! will you grant there is a God?
Lys. — Perhaps I may.
Euph. — Then we are agreed.
Lys. — Perhaps not.
{put. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 177 Euph. — O Lyftcles! you are a fubtle adverfary. I know not what you would be at.
Lys. — You muft know then, that, at bottom, the be- ing of God is a point, in itfelf, of fmall confequence, and a man may make this conceflion without yielding much. The great point is, what fenfe the word God is to be ta- ken in. The very Epicureans allowed the being of gods, but then they were indolent gods, unconcerned with hu- man affairs. Hobbes allowed a corporeal god; and Spino* fa held the univerfe to be god. And yet nobody doubts they were ftanch free-thinkers. I could wifh, indeed, the word god were quite omitted, becaufe, in molt minds, it is coupled with a fort of fuperftitious awe, the very root of all religion. I (hall not, neverthelefs, be much difturbed, though the name be retained, and the being of God allowed in any fenfe, but in that of a Mind, which knows all things, and beholds human actions, like fome judge, or magiftrate, with infinite obfervation and intelli- gence. The belief of a God, in this fenfe, fills a man's mind with fcruples, lays him under conftraints, and im- bitters his very being: But, in another fenfe, it may be attended with no great ill confequence. This, I know, was the opinion of our great Diagoras, who told me he would never have been at the pains to find out a demon- stration that there was no God, if the received notion of God had been the fame with that of fome fathers and fchoolmen.
Euph. — Pray what was that?
XVII. Lys. — You muft know, Diagoras, a man of much reading and inquiry, had difcovered, that once upon a time the mod profound and fpeculative divines, finding it impoflible to reconcile the attributes of God, taken in the common fenfe, or in any known fenfe, with human reafon, and the appearances of things, taught, that the Y i78 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
words knowledge, wifdom, goodnefs, and fuch like, when fpoken of the Deity, muft be under flood in a quite differ- ent fenfe from what they fignify in the vulgar acceptation, or from any thing that we can form a notion of, or con- ceive. Hence, whatever objections might be made againfl the attributes of God, they eafily folved, by denying thofe attributes belonged to God, in this or that, or any known particular fenfe or notion; which was the fame thing as to deny they belonged to him at all. And thus denying the attributes of God, they, in effe£t., denied his being, though perhaps they were not aware of it. Suppofe, for inftance, a man fhould object that future contingencies were inconfiftent with the fore-knowledge of God, becaufe it is repugnant, that certain knowledge mould be of an un- certain thing: it was a ready and eafy anfwer to fay, that this may be true, with refpeft to knowledge, taken in the common fenfe, or in any fenfe that we can pofhbly form any notion of: but that there would not appear the fame inconfiftency, between the contingent nature of things, and divine fore knowledge, taken to fignify fomewhat that we know nothing of, which, in God, fupplies the place of what we underftand by knowledge; from which it differs not in quantity or degree of perfection, but altogether, and in kind, as light doth from found; and even more, fmce thefe agree in that they are both fenfations: whereas knowledge in God hath no fort of refemblance, or agree- ment, with any notion that man can frame of knowledge. The like may be faid of all the other attributes, which in- deed may, by this means, be equally reconciled with every thing, or with nothing. But all men, who think, muft needs fee, this is cutting knots, and not untying them. For how are things reconciled with the divine attributes, when thefe attributes themfelves are, in every intelligible fenfe, denied } and confequently the very notion of God taken away, and nothing left but the name, without any [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 179 meaning annexed to it? In fhort, the belief that there is an unknown fubje£fc of attributes, abfolutely unknown, is a very innocent doctrine: which the acute Diagoras well faw, and was, therefore, wonderfully delighted with this fyftem.
•XVIII. For, faid he, if this could once make its way, and obtain in the world, there would be au end of ail nat- ural or rational religion, which is the bafis both of the Jew- ifh and the chriftian: for he who comes to God, or enters himfeif in the church of God, mull firft believe that there is a God, in fome intelligible fenfe: and not only that there is fomething in general without any proper notion, though never fo inadequate, of any of its qualities or attri- butes: for this may be fate, or chaos, or piaftic nature, cr any thing elfe, as well as God. Nor will it avail to fay, there is fomething in this unknown Being analogous to knowledge and goodnefs: that is to fay, which produceth thofe effe&s, which we could not conceive to be produced by men in any degree, without knowledge and goodnefs. For this is, in fa£fc, to give up the point in difpute between theifts and atheifts, the queftion having always been, not whether there was a principle (which point was allowed by all philofophers, as well before as fince Anaxagoras) but whether this principle was a nous, a thinking, intelligent Being: that is to fay, whether that order, and beauty, and ufe, vifible in natural effects, could be produced by any thing but a mind or intelligence, in the proper fenfe of the word? and whether there mud not be true, real, and proper knowledge in the firft caufe? we will therefore ac- knowledge, that all thofe natural effects, which are vulgarly afcribed to knowledge and wifdom, proceed from a Being, in which there is, properly fpeaking, no knowledge, or wifdom at all, but only fomething elfe, which, in reality, U the caufe of thofe things which men, for want of know-