Euph. — Take your own advice, and fhutT your eyes to affift your meditation. Upon this, Alciphron having clof- ed his eyes, and mufed a few minutes, declared he could make nothing of it. And that, replied Euphranor, which it feems neither you nor I can»frame an idea of, by your own remark of men's minds and faculties being made much alike, we may fuppofe others have no more an idea of than we.
Alc — We may.
Euph. — But, notwithftanding all this, it is certain there are many fpeculations, reafonings, and difputes, refined fubtilities, and nice difiin&ions, about this fame force. And to explain its nature, and diftinguifh the fe- veral notions or kinds of it, the terms, gravity, reaclion, vis inertia, vis inftta, vis imprejfa, vis mortua, vis viva, impetus, momentum, folicitatio, conatus, and divers other fuch like expreflions, have been ufed by learned men: [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 345 and no fmall controverfies have arifen about the notions or definitions of thefe terms. It has puzzled men to know whether force is fpiritual or corporeal, whether it remains after action, how it is transferred from one body to ano- ther. Strange paradoxes have been framed about its na- ture, properties, and proportions: For inftance, that contrary forces may at once fubfift in the fame quiefcent body: That the force of percuffion in a fmall particle is infinite: For which, and other curiofities of the fame fort, you may confult Borellus de vi perciffionis, the Lez- ioni Academiche of Torricelli, the exercitations of Hermanus% and other writers. It is well known to the learned world, what a controverfy hath been carried on, between mathe- maticians, particularly Monfieur Leibnitz and Monfieur Papin in the Leipfic Acta Eruditorum, about the propor- tion of forces: Whether they be each to other in a pro- portion compounded of the fimple proportion of the bo- dies and the celerities, or in one compounded of the fimple proportion of the bodies, and the duplicate proportions of the celerities? A point, it feems, not yet agreed: As in- deed the reality of the thing itfelf is made a queftion. Leibnitz diftinguifhed between the nifus elementaris, and the impetus, which is formed by a repetition of the nifus elementarisy and feems to think they do not exift in nature, but are made only by an abftraction of the mind. The fame author, treating of original, active force, to illuftrate his fubject hath recourfe to the fubftantial forms and En- telechtia of Ariflotle. And the ingenious Torricelli faith of force and Impetus, that they are fubtile ab (tracts and fpir- itual quintefiences: And concerning the momentum and the velocity of heavy bodies falling, he faith they are tin certo che and un non Jo che, that is plain Englifh, he knows not what to make of them. Upon the whole, therefore, may we not pronounce, that excluding body, time, fpace, motion, and all its fenfible meafures, and effects, we U u 346 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
(hall find it as difficult to form an idea of force, as of grace?
Alc.— I do not know what to think of it.
VII. Euph.— And yet, I prefume, you allow there are very evident proportions or theorems, relating to force, which contain ufeful truths: for inftance, that a body with conjunct forces, defcribes the diagonal of a paralle- logram, in the fame time that it would the fides with fep- arate. Is not this a principle of very extenfive ufe? Doth not the doctrine of the compofition and refolution of for- ces depend upon it, and in confequence thereof, number- lefs rules and theorems, directing men how to act, and explaining Phenomena, throughout the mechanics and mathematical philofophy? And if, by confidering this doctrine of force, men arrive at the knowledge of many inventions in mechanics, and are taught to frame engines, by means of which things difficult, and otherwife impof- fible may be performed; and if the fame doctrine, which is fo beneficial here below, ferveth alfo as a key to discov- er the nature of the celeltial motions; (hall we deny that it is of ufe, either in practice or fpeculation, becaufe we have no diftinct idea of force? Or that which we admit with regard to forcey upon what pretence can we deny, concerning grace? If there are queries, difputes, per- plexities, diversity of notions and opinions about the one, fo there are about the other alfo: If we can form no pre- cife diftinct idea of the one, fo neither can we of the other. Ought we not, therefore, by a parity of reafon, to conclude, there may be poflibly divers true and ufeful propofitions concerning the one, as well as the other? And that grace may, for ought you know, be an object: of our faith, and influence our life and actions, as a principle, deftructive of evil habits, and productive of good ones, although we cannot attain a diftinct idea of [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 347 it, feparate, or abftracted from God, the Author, from man, the fubject, and from virtue and piety, its effects?
VIII. Shall we not admit the fame method of arguing, the fame rules of logic, reafon, and good fenfe to obtain in things fpiritual, and things corporeal, in faith and fci- ence? And (hall we not ufe the fame candor, and make the fame allowances in examining the ravelations of God, and the inventions of men? For ought I fee, that philo- fopher cannot be free from bias, and prejudice, or be faid to weigh things in an equal balance, who mall maintain the doctrine of force, and reject that of grace, who (hall admit the abftract idea of a triangle, and at the fame time ridicule the holy trinity. But, however partial or prejudiced other Minute Philosophers might be, you have laid it down for a maxim, that the fame logic, which ob- tains in other matters, muft be admitted in religion.
Lys. — I think, Alciphron^ it would be more prudent to abide by the way of wit and humor, than thus to try re- ligion by the dry teft of reafon and logic.
Alc— Fear not: By all the rules of right reafon, it is absolutely impoflible that any myftery, and leaft of all the trinity, mould really be the object of man's faith.
Euph. — I do not wonder you thought fo, as long as you maintained that no man could affent to a propofition without perceiving or framing in his mind, diftinct ideas marked by the terms of it. But although terms are figns, yet having granted, that thofe figns may be fignificant, though they fhould not fuggeft ideas reprefented by them, provided they ferve to regulate and influence our wills, paflions, or conduct, you have confequently granted, that the mind of man may affent to propofitions containing fuch terms, when it is fo directed or affected by them, notwithftanding it mould not perceive diftinct ideas mark- ed by thofe terms. Whence it feems to follow, that a 548 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
man may believe the do&rine of the trinity, if he finds it revealed in Holy Scripture, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoft are God, and that there is but one God? Although he doth not frame in his mind, any ab- ftract, or diftinct ideas of trinity, fubftance, or perfonal- ity, provided, that this doctrine of a Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier makes proper impreffions on his mind, producing therein, love, hope, gratitude, and obedience, and thereby becomes a lively operative principle, influ- encing his life and actions, agreeably to that notion of fa- ving faith which is required in a chriftian. This, I fay, whether right or wrong, feems to follow from your own principles, and conceffions. But, for further fatisfa&ion, it may not be amifs to inquire, whether there be any thing parrallel to this chriftian faith, in the Minute Philofophy. Suppofe a fine gentleman or lady of fafhion, who are too much employed to think for themfelves, and are only free- thinkers at fecond hand, have the advantage of being be- times initiated in the principles of your feci;, by converting with men of depth and genius, who have often declared it to be their opinion, the world is governed either by fate, or by chance, it matters not which: Will you deny it poflible for fuch perfons to yield their aflent to either of thefe propositions?
Alc. — I will not.
Euph. — And may not fuch their aflent, be properly called faith } Alc. — It may.
Euph. — And yet it is pcflible, thofe difciples of the Minute Philofophy may not dive fo deep, as to be able to frame any ahftracl:, or precife, or any determinate idea whatfoever, either of fate, or of chance.
Alc. — This too, I grant.
Euph. — So that according to you, this fame gentleman or lady, may be faid to believe, or have faith, where they have not ideas.
[Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 349 Alc— They may.
Euph.— And may not this faith, or perfuafion produce real effe&s, and fhew itfelf in the conduct, and tenor of their lives, freeing them from the fears of fuperfti- tion, 'and giving them a true relifh of the world, with a noble indolence, or indifference about what comes after.
Alc— It may.
Alc— It may.
Euph.' — And may not chriftians, with equal reafon, be allowed to believe the dignity of our Saviour, or that in him, God and man, make one perfon, and be verily perfuaded thereof, fo far as for fuch faith or belief, to be- come a real principle of life and conduct? inafmuch as by virtue of fuch perfuafion, they fubmit to his govern- ment, believe his doctrine, and pra&ife his precepts, al- though they frame no abftracl: idea of the union between the divine and human nature; nor may be able to clear up the notion of perfon to the contentment of a Minute Philofopher. To me, it feems evident, that if none but thofe who had nicely examined, and could themfelves ex- plain the principle of individuation in man, or untie the knots and anfwer the objections, which may be raifed even about human perfonal identity, would require of us to ex- plain the divine myfteries, we mould not be often called upon, for a clear and diftindt. idea of perfon in relation to the trinity, nor would the difficulties on that head, be of- ten objected to our faith.
Alc. — Methinks, there is no fuch myflery in perfonal identity.
Euph. — Pray, in what do you take it to confift?
Alc— In confcioufnefs.
Euph.-— Whatever is poflible, may be fuppofed.
Alc — It may.
Euph. — We will fuppofe now (which is poflible in the nature of things, and reported to be facl) that a perfon, through fome violent accident or diftemper, mould fall ii>- 350 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
to fuch a total oblivion, as to lofe all confcioufnefs of his pad life, and former ideas. I afk, is he not ftill the fame perfon?
Alc— -He is the fame man, but not the fame perfon. Indeed, you ought not to fuppofe that a perfon lofeth its former confcioufnefs; for this is impoffible, though a man perhaps may; but then he becomes another perfon. In the fame perfon, it muft be owned, fome old ideas may be loft, and fome new ones got: But a total change is in- confiftent with identity of perfon.
Euph.— Let us then fuppofe that a perfon hath ideas, and is confcious during a certain fpace of time, which we will divide into three equal parts, whereof the later terms are marked by the letters, A, B, C. In the firfl part of time, the perfon gets a certain number of ideas, which are retained in A: during the fecond part of time, he retains one half of his old ideas, and lofeth the other half, in place of which he acquires as many new ones: So that in B, his ideas are half old and half new. And in the third part, we fuppofe him to lofe the remainder of the ideas acquired in the firft, and to get new ones in their ftead, which are retained in C, together with thofe acquired in the fecond part of time. Is this a poffible fair fuppofition?
Alc— It is.
Euph, — Upon thefe premifes, I am tempted to think, one may demenftrate, that perfonal identity doth not confift in confcioufnefs.
Alc. — As how?
Euph You mall judge; but thus it feems to me. — The perfons in A and B are the fame, being confcious of common ideas by fuppofition. The perfon in B is (for the fame reafon) one and the fame with the perfon in C. Therefore the perfon in A, is the fame with the perfon in C, by that undoubted axiom, £$ua conveniunt uni tertio con- veniunt inter fe. But the perfon in C hath no idea in [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 351 common with the perfon in A. Therefore, perfonal iden- tity doth not confift in confcioufnefs. What do you think, Alcipkrotiy is not this a plain inference?
Alc. — I tell you what I think: You will never affift my faith by puzzling my knowledge.
IX. Euph. — There is, if I miftake not, a practical faith, or afTent, which fheweth itfelf in the will and actions of a man, although his underftanding may not be furnifhed with thofe abftracl:, precife, diftinct, ideas, which, what- ever a philofopher may pretend, are acknowledged to be above the talents of common men; among whom, ne- verthelefs, may be found, even according to your own conceflion, many inftances of fuch practical faith, in other matters which do not concern religion. What fhould hinder, therefore, but that doctrines relating to heavenly myfteries, might be taught in this faving fenfe to vulgar minds, which you may well think incapable of all teaching and faith in the fenfe you fuppofe. Which miftaken fenfe, faid Crito, has given occafion to much profane and mifapplied raillery. But all this may very juftly be retorted on the Minute Philofophers themfelves, who confound fcholafticifm with chriftianity, and im- pute to other men thofe perplexities, chimeras, and in- confiftent ideas, which are often the workmanfhip of their own brains, and proceed from their own wrong way of thinking. Who doth not fee that fuch an ideal abftra<£t- ed faith is never thought of by the bulk of chriftians, huf- bandmen, for inftance, artifans, or fervants? Or what footfteps are there in the Holy Scripture to make us think, that the wiredrawing of abftracl; ideas was a talk injoined either Jews or chriftians? Is there any thing in the law or the prophets, the evangelifts or apoftles, that looks like it? Every' one, whofe underftanding is not pervert- ed by fcience, falfely fo called, may fee the faving faith 35a MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
of chriftians is quite of another kind, a vital operative principle, productive of charity and obedience.
Alc— What are we to think then of the difputes and decifions of the famous council of Nice, and fo many fub- fequent councils? What was the intention of thofe vene- rable fathers, the Homooufians and the Homoiouftans? Why did they difturb themfelves and the world with hard words and fubtle controversies?
Cri.—— Whatever their intention was, it could not be to beget nice abftra&ed ideas of myfteries in the minds of common chriftians, this being evidently impoffible: Nor doth it appear that the bulk of chriftian men did, in thofe days, think it any part of their duty, to lay a fide the words, fhut their eyes, and frame thofe abftracl: ideas; any more than men now do of force, time, number, or feveral other things, about which they neverthelefs believe, know, argue, and difpute. To me it feems, that what- ever was the fource of thofe controversies, and howfoever they were managed, wherein human infirmity muft be fuppofed to have had its (hare, the main end was not, on either fide, to convey precife pofitive ideas to the minds of men, by the ufe of thofe contefted terms, but rather a negative fenfe, tending to exclude polytheifm on the one hand, and fabellianifm on the other.* Alc. — But what fhall we fay to fo many learned and ingenious divines, who, from time to time, have obliged the- world with new explications of myfteries, who hav- ing themfelves profefledly labored to acquire accurate ideas, would recommend their difcoveries and fpeculations to others for articles of faith?
Cri. — To all fuch innovators in religion, I would fay with Jerome, (i Why, after fo many centuries, do you pretend to teach us what v/as untaught before? Why ex- plain what neither Peter nor Paul thought neceflary to be [Dial. VIL] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 353 explained? f" And it muft be owned, that the explication of myfteries in divinity, allowing the attempt as fruitlefs as the purfuit of the philosopher's Hone in chymiftry, or the perpetual motion in mechanics, is no more than they, chargeable on the profeffion itfelf, but only on the wrong- headed profeflbrs of it.
X. It feems, that whit hath been now faid, may be applied to other myfteries of our religion. Original fin, for inftance, a man may find it impofiible to form an idea of an abftract, or of the manner of its tranfmiflion, and yet the belief thereof may produce in his mind a falutary fenfe of his own unworthinefs, and the goodnefs of his Redeemer: From whence may follow good habits, and from them good actions, the genuine effects of faith: which confidered in its true light, is a thing neither repugnant nor incomprehenfible, as fome men would perfuade us, but fuit- ed even to vulgar capacities, placed in the will and affections rather than in the underftanding, and producing holy lives, rather than fubtile theories. Faith, I fay, is not an indo- lent perception, but an operative perfuafion of mind, which ever worketh fome fuitable action, difpofition, or emotion in thofe who have it: As it were eafy to prove and illuftrate by innumerable inftances taken from human affairs. And, indeed, while the chriftian religion is con- fidered as an inftitution fitted to ordinary minds, rather than' to the nicer taknt, whether improved or puzzled, of fpeculative men; and our notions about faith are ac- cordingly taken from the commerce of the world, and practice of mankind, rather than from the peculiar fyf- tems of refiners; it will, I think, be no difficult matter to conceive and juftify the meaning and ufe of our belief of myfteries, again ft the mod confident aflertions and ob- jections of the Minute Phil ofophers, who are eafily to be 354 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.j caught in thofe very fnares, which they have fpun and fpread for others. And that humor of controverfy, the mother and nurfe of herefies, would doubtlefs very much abate, if it was confidered that things are to be rated, not by the colour, fhape, or ftamp, fo truly as by the weight. If the moment of opinions had been by fome litigious di- vines made the meafure of their zeal, it might have fpar- ed much trouble both to themfelves and others. Cer- tainly one that takes his notions of faith, opinion, and afTent from common fenfe, and common ufe, and has ma- turely weighed the nature of figns and language, will not be fo apt to controvert the wording of a my fiery, or to break the peace of the church, for the fake of retaining or rejecting a term. But, to convince you, by a plain inftance, of the efficacious neceffary ufe of faith without ideas: We will fuppofe a man of the world, a Minute Philofopher, prodigal and rapacious, one of large appe- tites and narrow circumftances, who fhall have it in his power at once to feize upon a great fortune by one villan- ous act, a fingle breach of truft, which he can commit with impunity and fecrecy: Is it not natural to fuppofe him arguing in this manner? All mankind in their fenfes purfue their intereft. The interefts of this prefent life are either of mind, body, or fortune. If I commit this fact, my mind will be eafy (having nought to fear here or hereafter) my bodily pleafures will be multiplied, and my fortune enlarged. Suppofe now, one of your refined theorifls talks to him about the harmony of mind and af- fections, inward worth, truth of character, in one word, the beauty of virtue; which is the only intereft he can propofe, to turn the fcale againft all other fecular interefts and fenfual pleafures •, would it not, think you, be a vain attempt? I fay, in fuch a juncture what can the moft plaufible and refined philofophy of your feet offer, to dif- fuade fuch a man from his purpofe, more than alluring [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 355 him that the abftra£ted delight of the mind, the enjoy- ments of an interior moral fenfe, the to kalon are what conftitute his true intereft? And what efFecl: can this have on a mind callous to all thofe things, and at the fame time ftrongly afFedted with a fenfe of corporeal pleafures, and the outward intereft, ornaments, and conveniencies of life? Whereas that very man, do but produce in him a iincere belief of a future (late, although it be a myftery, although it be what eye hath not feen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive, he fhall neverthelefs, by virtue of fuch belief, be withheld from executing his wicked project: And that for reafons which all men can comprehend, though no body can the object of them. I will allow the points infilled on by your re- fined moralifts to be as lovely and excellent as you pleafe to a reafonable, reflecting, philofophical mind. But I will venture to fay, that, as the world goes, few, very few, would be influenced by them. We fee, therefore, the neceflary ufe as well as the powerful effects of faith, even where we have not ideas.
XI. Alc — It feems, Euphranor and you, would per- fuade me into an opinion, that there is nothing fo Angularly abfurd as we are apt to think, in the belief of myfteries: And that a man need not renounce his reafon to maintain his religion. But if this were true, how comes it to pafs, that, in proportion as men abound in knowledge, they dwindle in faith?
Euph. — O Alciphrorij I have learned from you, that there is nothing like going to the bottom of things, and anaiyfing them into their firft principles. I (hall there- fore make an eflay of this method, for clearing up the nature of faith: With what fuccefs I fhall leave you to determine: For I dare not pronounce myfelf on my own judgment, whether it be right or wrong: But thus k 356 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
fcems to me. The objections made to faith are by no means an effecT: of knowledge, but proceed rather from an ignorance of what knowledge is: Which ignorance may poflibly be found even in thofe who pafs for mailers of this or that particular branch of knowledge. Science and faith agree in this, that they both imply an affent of the mind: And, as the nature of the fir.ft is moft clear and evident, it fnould be firit confidercd in order to caft a light on the other. To trace things from their original, it feems that the human mind, naturally furnifhed with the ideas of things particular and concrete, and being de- figned, not for the bare intuition of ideas, but for action or operation about them, and purfuing her ov/n happinefs therein, ftands in need of certain general rules or theo- rems to direcl: her operations in this purfuit: The fupply- ing which want is the true, original, reafonable end of itudying the arts and fciences. Now thefe rules being general, it follows, that they are not to be obtained by the mere consideration of the original ideas, or particular things, but by the means of marks or figns, which, being fo far forth univerfal, become the immediate inftruments and materials of fcience. It is not, therefore, by mere contemplation of particular things, and much lefs of their abftracl: general ideas, that the mind makes her progrefs, but by an appofite choice and fkilful management of figns: For inftance, force and number, taken in concrete with their adjuncts, fubjecls, and figns, are what every one knows: And confidered in abftra£t, fo as making precife ideas of themfelves, they are what no body can compre- hend. That their abftracl: nature, therefore, is not the foundation of fcience, is plain: And that barely confid- ering their ideas in concrete, is not the method to advance in the refpe&ive fcience, is what every one that reflects may fee; nothing being more evident, than that one, who can neither write nor read; in common life, underftands [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 3^7 the meaning of numeral words, as well as the bed philo- fopher or mathematician.