XII. But here lies the difference: the one who under- stands the notation of numbers, by means thereof is able to exprefs briefly and diftin&ly all the variety and degrees of number, and to perform with eafe and difpatch feverai arithmetical operations, by the help of general rules. Of all which operations, as the ufe in human life is very evi- dent, fo it is no lefs evident, that the performing them de- pends on the aptnefs of the notation. If we fuppofe rude mankind, without the ufe of language, it may be prefumed, they would be ignorant of arithmetic: But the ufe of names, by the repetition whereof in a certain order they might exprefs endlefs degrees of number, would be the firft ftep towards that fcience. The next ftep would be, to devife proper marks of a permanent nature, and vifible to the eye, the kind and order whereof mult be chofe with judgment, and accommodated to the names. Which marking or notation would, in propor- tion as it was apt and regular, facilitate the invention and application of general rules, to aflift the mind in reafon- ing and judging, in extending, recording, and commu- nicating its knowledge about numbers: in which theory and operations, the mind is immediately occupied about the flgns or notes, by mediation of which it is directed to a£fc about things, or number in concrete (as the logicians call it) without ever confidering the fimple, abftracl:, in- tellectual, general idea of number. The figns, indeed, do in their ufe imply relations or proportions of things: but thefe relations are not abftracl general ideas, being founded in particular things, and not making of themfelves diftincl: ideas to the mind, exclufive of the particular ideas and the figns. I imagine one need not think much to be convinced, that the fcience of arithmetic, in its rife> 353 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VIL] operations, rules and theorems, is altogether converfant about the artificial ufe of figns, names, and characters. Thefe names and characters are univerfal, inafmuch as they are figns. The names are referred to things, the characters to names, and both to operation. The names being few, and proceeding by a certain analogy, the cha- racters will be more ufeful, the fimpler they are, and the more aptly they exprefs this analogy. Hence the old notation by letters was more ufeful than words writ- ten at length: And the modern notation by figures, ex- preffing the progreffion or analogy of the names by their fimple places, is much preferable to that, for eafe and ex- pedition, as the invention of algebraical fymbols is to this for extenfive and general ufe. As arithmetic and algebra are fciences of great clearnefs, certainty, and extent, which are immediately converfant about figns, upon the fkillful ufe and management whereof they intirely depend, fo a little attention to them may poflibly help us to judge of the progrefs of the mind in other fciences; which, though differing in nature, defign, and object, may yet agree in the general methods of proof and inquiry.
XIII. — If I miftake not, all fciences, fo far as they are univerfal and demonflrable by human reafon, will be found converfant about figns as their immediate object, though thefe in the application are referred to things: The reafon whereof is not difficult to conceive. For as the mind is better acquainted with fome fort of objects, which are earlier offered to it, ftrike it more fenfibly, or are more eafily comprehended than others, it feems naturally led to fubftitute thefe objects for fuch as are more fubtile, fleeting, or difficult to conceive. Nothing, I fay, is more natural, than to make the things we know, a ftep to- wards thofe we do not know: and to explain and repre- fent things lefs familiar by others which are more fo.— - [Dial. VIL] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 359 Now, it is certain we imagine before we reflect; and we perceive by fenfe before we imagine: and of all our fen- fes the fight is the mod clear, diftin£t, various, agreea- ble, and comprehensive. Hence it is natural to aflift in- tellect by imagination, imraagination by fenfe, and other fenfes by fight. Hence figures, metaphors, and types. We illuftrate fpiritual things by corporeal: we fubftitute founds for thoughts, and written letters for founds; em- blems, fymbols, and hieroglyphics for things too obfcure to itrike, and too various or too fleeting to be retained. We fubftitute things imaginable for things intelligible, fenfible things for imaginable, fmaller things for thofe that are too great to comprehend eafily, and greater things for fuch as are too fmall to be difcerned diftinc"Hy, pre- fent things for abfent, permanent for perifhing, and vifi- ble for invifible. Hence the ufe of models and diagrams. Hence lines are fubflituted for time, velocity, and other things of very different natures. Hence we fpeak of fpi- rits in a figurative ftyle, exprefling the operations of the mind by allufions and terms, borrowed from fenfible things, fuch as apprehend^ conceive^ refleff> difcourfe, and fuch like: And hence thofe allegories which illuftrate things intellectual by vifions exhibited to the fancy. Plato^ for inftance, reprefents the mind prefiding in her vehicle by the driver of a winged chariot, which fometimes moults and droops and is drawn by two horfes, the one good, and of a good race, the other of a contrary kind; fymbblically exprefling the tendency of the mind towards the divinity, as (he foars or is borne aloft by two inftincts like wings, the one in the intellect towards truth, the other in the will towards excellence, which inftin£ts moult or are weakened by fenfual inclinations: exprefling alfo her alternate elevations and depreflions, the ftruggks between reafon and appetite, like horfes that go an une- qual pace, or draw different ways, embarrafling the foul 36o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
in her progrefs to perfection. I am inclined to think the doctrine of figns a point of great importance, and gene- ral extent, which if duly confidered, would caft no fmall light upon things, and afford a juft and genuine folution of many difficulties.
XIV. Thus much, upon the whole, may be faid of all figns: That they do not always fuggeft ideas fignified to the mind: That when they fuggeft ideas, they are not general abftracl: ideas: That they have other ufes befides barely {landing for and exhibiting ideas, fuch as railing proper emotions, producing certain difpofitions or habits of mind, and directing our actions in purfuit of that happinefs, which is the ultimate end and defign, the pri- mary fpring and motive, that fets rational agents at wrork: That figns may imply or fuggeft the relations of things; which relations, habitudes, or proportions, as they can- not be by us underftood but by the help of figns, fo being thereby expreffed and confuted they, direct and enable us to acl: with regard to things: That the true end of fpeech, reafon, fcience, faith, affent, in all its different degrees, is not merely, or principally, or always the imparting or acquiring of ideas, but rather fome thing of an active, operative nature,, tending to a conceived good; which may fometimes be obtained, not only although the ideas marked are not offered to the mind, but even although there fhould be no poflibility of offering or exhibiting any fuch idea to the mind: For inftance, the algebraic mark, which denotes the root of a negative fquare, hath its ufe in logiftic operations, although it be impoffible to form an idea of any fuch quantity. And what is true of alge- braic figns, is alfo true of words or language, modern al- gebra being in fa£t a more fhort, appofite, and artificial fort of language, and it being pcfiible to exprefs by words at length, though lefs conveniently, all the fteps of an al- [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 361 gebraical procefs. And it muft be confefled, that even the mathematical fciences themfelves, which above all oth- ers are reckoned the mod clear and certain, if they are confidered, not as inftruments to direct our practice, but as fpeculations to employ our curiofity, will be found to fall fhort in many instances of thofe clear and diftin£t ideas, which, it feems, the Minute Philofophers of this age, whether knowingly or ignorantly, expect and iniift upon in the myfteries of religion.
XV. Be the fcience or fubjecl: what it will, whenfoe- ver men quit particulars for generalities, things concrete for abftrattions, when they forfake practical views, and the ufeful purpofes of knowledge for barren fpeculation, confidering means and inftruments as ultimate ends, and loboring to obtain precife ideas, which they fuppofe indif- criminately annexed to all terms, they will be fure to em- barrafs themfelves with difficulties and difputes. Such are thofe which have fprung up in geometry about the na- ture of the angle of contact, the doctrine of proportions, of indivifibles, infinitelimals, and divers other points j notwithstanding all which, that fcience is^very rightly ef- teemed an excellent and ufeful one, and is really found to be fo in many occafions of human life 5 wherein it gov- erns and directs the actions of men, fo that by the aid or influence thereof, thofe operations become juft and accu- rate, which would otherwife be faulty and uncertain. And from a parity of reafon, we mould not conclude any other doctrines which govern, influence, or direcl: the mind of man to be, any more than that, the lefs true or excellent, becaufe they afford matter of controverfy and ufelefs fpeculation to curious and licentious wits: Particularly thofe articles of our chriftian faith, which, in pro- portion as they are believed, perfuade, and, as they per- fuade, influence the lives and actions cf men. As to the X x 362 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
perplexity of contradictions and abftrafted notions, in all parts, whether of human fcience or divine faith, cavillers may equally object, and unwary perfons incur, while the judicious avoid it. There is no need to depart from the received rules of reafoning to juitify the belief of chrif- tians. And if any pious men think otherwife, it may be fuppofed an efFecl:, not of religion or of reafon, but only of human weaknefs. If this age be fingularly productive of infidels, I (hall not, therefore, conclude it to be more knowing, but only more prefuming, than former ages: And their conceit, I doubt, is not the efFecl: of consider- ation. -To me it feems, that the more thoroughly and extensively any man fhall confider and fcan the principles, objects, and methods of proceeding in arts and fciences, the more he will be convinced, there is no weight in thofe plaufible objections that are made againft the myfteries of faith, which it will be no difficult matter for him to main- tain or juftify in the received method of arguing, on the common principles of logic, and by numberlefs avowed parrallel cafes, throughout the feveral branches of human knowledge, in all which the fuppofition of abftracl ideas creates the fame difficulties.
Alc — According to this doctrine, all points may be alike maintained. There will be nothing abfurd in pope- ry, not even tranfubftantiation.
Euph. — Pardon me. This doctrine juftifies no article of faith, which is not contained in fcripture, or which is repugnant to human reafon, which implies a contradic- tion, or which leads to idolatry or wickednefs of any kind: All which is very different from our not having a diilincl or an abftracl: idea of a point.
. XVI. Alc— I will allow, Euphramr> this reafoning of yours to have all the force you meant it fhould have. I freely own there may be myfteries: That we may be- [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 363 lieve, where we do not under ft and: And that faith may be of ufe, although its object is not diftinctly apprehended. In a word, I grant there may be faith and myfteries in oth- er things, but not in religion: And that for this plain rea- fon: becaufe it is abfurd to fuppofe, there fhould be any fuch thing as religion: And if there be no religion, it fol- lows there cannot be religious faith or myfteries. Reli- gion, it is evident, implies the worfhip of a God, which worftiip, fuppofeth rewards and punifhments, which fuppofe merits and demerits, actions good and evil, and thefe fup- pofe human liberty, a thing impoffible: and confequently religion a thing built thereon, muft be an unreafonable ab- furd thing. There can be no rational fears where there is no guilt, nor any guilt where there is nothing done, but what unavoidably follows from the ftructure of the world and the laws of motion. Corporeal objects ftrike on the organs of fenfe, whence enfues a vibra- tion in the nerves, which being communicated to the foul, or animal fpirit in the brain or root of the nerves, produ- ceth therein that motion called volition: And this produ- ceth a new determination in the fpirits, caufing them to flow into fuch nerves as muft neceffarily by the laws of mechanifm produce fuch certain actions. This being the cafe, it follows, that thofe things, which vulgarly pafs for human actions, are to be efteemed mechanical, and that they are faifly afcribed to a free principle. There is, therefore, no foundation for praife or blame, fear or hope, reward or punifhment, nor confequently for religion, which, as I obferved before, is built upon and fuppofeth thofe things.
Euph. — You imagine, Alciphron, if I rightly under- ftand you, that man is a fort of organ played on by out- ward objects, which according to the different fnape and texture of the nerves, produce different motions and effects therein.
364 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
Alc. — Man may, indeed, be fitly compared to an or- gan: but a puppet is the very thing. You muft know, that certain particles iffuing forth in right lines from all fen- fible objects, compofe fo many rays, or filaments, which drive, draw, and actuate every part of the foul and bo- dy of man, juft as threads or wires do the joints of that little wooden machine vulgarly called a Puppet: With this only difference, that the latter are grofs and vifible to common eyes, whereas, the former are too fine and fubtle to be difcerned by any but a fagacious free-thinker. This admirably accounts for all thofe operations, which we have been taught to afcribe to a thinking principle within us.
Euph. — -This is an ingenious thought, and muft be of great ufe in freeing men from all anxiety about moral no- tions, as it transfers the principle of action from the hu- man foul to things outward and foreign. But I have my fcruples about it. For you fuppofe the mind, in a literal fenfe, to be moved, and its volitions to be mere motions. Now, if another mould affirm, as it is not impofiible fome or other may, that the foul is incorporeal, and that mo- tion is one thing, and volition another, I would fain know how you could make your point clear to fuch a one. It muft be owned very clear to thofe, who admit the foul to be corporeal, and all her a&s to be but fo many motions. Upon this fuppofition, indeed, the light wherein you place human nature is no lefs true, than it is fine and new. But let any one deny this fuppofition, which is eafily done, and the whole fuperftruc~ture falls to the ground. If we grant the abovementioned points, I will not deny a fatal necefti- ty muft enfue. But I fee no reafon for granting them. On the contrary, it feems plain, that motion and thought are two things, as really and as manifeftly diftincl: as a triangle, and a found. It feems, therefore, that in or- der to prove the neceffity of human actions, you fuppofe [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 365 what wants proof as much as the very point to be proved.
XVII. Alc. — But fuppofing the mind incorporeal, I {hall, neverthelefs, be able to prove my point. Not- to amufe you with far-fetched arguments, I mail only de- fire you to look into your own breaft, and obferve how things pafs there, when an object offers itfelf to the mind. Firft the underilanding confiders it: in the next place, the judgment decrees about it, as a thing to be chofen or re- jected, to be omitted or done, in this or that manner: And this decree of the judgment doth neceffarily deter- mine the will, whofe office is merely to execute what is ordained by another faculty: Confequently there is no fuch thing as freedom of the will. For that which is ne- ceffary, cannot be free. In freedom, there fhould be. an indifference to either fide of the queftion, a power to aft or not to act, without prefcription or control: and with- out this indifference and this power, it is evident, the will cannot be free. But it is no Iefs evident, that the will is not indifferent in its actions, being abfolutely determin- ed and governed by the judgment. Now whatever moves the judgment, whether the greateft prefent uneafinefs, or the greateft apparent good, or whatever elfe it be, it is all one to the point in hand. The will being ever concluded and controlled by the judgment, is in all cafes alike under neceffity. There is indeed, throughout the whole of human nature, nothing like a principle of free- dom, every faculty being determined in all its a£ts - by fomething foreign to it. The underftanding, for inftance, cannot alter its idea, but muft neceffarily fee it fuch as it prefents itfelf. The appetites, by a natural neceffity, are carried towards their refpec~tive objects. Reafcn cannot infer indifferently any thing from any thing, but is limitted by the nature and connexion of things, and the eternal rules of reafoning. And as this is confeffedly 366 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
the cafe of all other faculties, (o it equally holds with re- fpect to the will itfelf, as hath been already fhewn. And if we may credit the divine characlerizer of our times, this, above all others, muft be allowed the moll flavifh faculty. " Appetite (faith that noble writer) which is el- der brother to reafon, being the lad of ftronger growth, is fure on every conteft to take the advantage of drawing all to his own fide: and will, fo highly boafted, is but at beft a foot-ball, or top, between thofe youngfters who prove very unfortunately matched, till the youngeft, in- ftead of now and then a kick or lafh, bellowed to little pur- pofe, forfakes the ball or top itfelf, and begins to lay about his elder brother."
Cri. — This beautiful parable, for ftile and manner, might equal thofe of a known EngUJh writer, in low life, renowned for allegory, were it not a little incorrect, ma- king the weaker lad find his account in laying about the ftronger.
Alc. — This is helped by fuppofing the ftronger lad the greater coward. But, be that as it will, fo far as it re- lates to the point in hand, this is a clear ftate of the cafe. The fame point may be alfo proved from the prefcience of God. That which is certainly foreknown, will certainly be. And what is certain, is neceffary. And neceffary ac- tions cannot be the effecl: of free-will. Thus you have this fundamental point of our free-thinking philofophy demonftrated different ways.
Euph. — Tell me, Alciphron, do you think it implies a contradiction, that God mould make a creature free?
Alc— -I do not.
Euph. — It is then poffible there may be fuch a thing.
Alc. — This I do not deny.
Euph.— You can, therefore, conceive and fuppofe fuch a free agent.
Alc— Admitting that I can j what then?
[Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 36*7 Euph. — Would not fuch an one think that he acted?
Alc— He would.
Euph.— And condemn himfelf for fome actions, and approve himfelf for others?
Alc— This too I grant.
Euph.— Would he not think he deferved reward or punifhment?
Alc. — He would.
Euph. — And are not all thefe characters actually found in man?
Alc. — They are.
Euph. — Tell me now, what other character of your fuppofed free agent may not actually be found in man? For if there is none fuch, we mult conclude, that man hath all the marks of a free agent.
Alc — Let me fee! I was certainly overfeen in grant- ing it poflible, even for Almighty Power, to make fuch a thing as a free-agent. I wonder how I came to make fuch an abfurd conceflion, after what had been, as I ob- ferved before, demonftrated fo many different ways.
Euph. — Certainly whatever is poflible may be fuppof- ed: And whatever doth not imply a contradiction is pof- fible to an infinite power: Therefore if a rational agent implieth no contradiction, fuch a being may be fuppofed. Perhaps from this fuppofition I might infer man to be free: But I will not fuppofe him that free agent *, fince, it feems, you pretend to have demonftrated the contrary. O Alciphrotiy it is vulgarly obferved, that men judge of others by themfelves. But in judging of me by this rule, you may be miftaken. Many things are plain to one of your fagacity, which are not fo to me, who am often puzzled rather than enlightened by thofe very proofs, that, with you, pafs for clear and evident. And, indeed, be the inference never fo juft, yet fo long as the premifes are not clear, I cannot be thoroughly convinced.
368 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
You muft give me leave, therefore, to propofe fome ques- tions, the folution of which, may perhaps, fhew what at prefent I am not able to difcern.
Alc— I fhall leave what hath been faid with you, to coniider and ruminate upon. It is now time to fet out on our journey: there is, therefore, no room for a long firing of queflion and anfwer.
XVIII. Euph. — I fhall then only beg leave in a fumma- ry manner, to make a remark or two on what you have advanced. In the firfl place, I obferve, you take that for granted which I cannot grant, when you aflert whatever is certain, the fame to be necefTary. To me, certain and necefTary feem very different; there being nothing in the former notion that implies conftraint, nor confequently which may not confifl with a man's being accountable for his ad\ions. If it is forefeen that fuch an action fhall be done: may it not alfo be forefeen that it fhall be an effect of human choice and liberty? In the next place, I obferve, that you very nicely abflract and diflin- guifh the actions of the mind, judgment, and will: That you make ufe of fuch terms as power, faculty, a£l, deter- mination, indifference, freedom, neceflity, and the like, as if they flood for diflincl: abftracT; ideas: And that this fuppofition feems to infnare the mind into the fame per- plexities and errors, which, in all other inflances, are cb- ferved to attend the doctrine of abflraclion. It is felf-evi- dent, that there is fuch a thing as motion: And yet there have. been found, philofophers, who, by refined reafon- ing, would undertake to prove there was no fuch thing.
Walking before them was thought the proper way to con- fute thofe ingenious men. It is no lefs evident, that man is a free agent: And though by abftra£led reafonings you fhould puzzle me, and feem to prove the contrary, yet fo long as I am confcious of my own actions, this inward evidence of plain facl, will bear me up againft all your [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 369 reafonings, however fubtle and refined. The confuting plain points by obfeure ones, may perhaps convince me of the ability of your philofophers, but never of their tenets. I cannot conceive why the acute Cratylus fhould fuppofe a power of acting in the appetite and reafon, and none at all in the will. Allowing, I fay, the diftinction of three fuch beings in the mind, I do not fee how this could be true. But if I cannot abftract and diftinguifh fo many beings in the foul of man fo accurately as you do, I do not find it neceflary, Gnce it is evident to me in the grofs and concrete that I am a free agent. Nor will it avail to fay, the will is governed by the jtfdgment, or determined by the object, while, in every fudden common caufe, I cannot difcern nor abftract the decree of the judgment from the command of the will; while I know the fenfible object to be abfolutely inert: And laftly, while I am con- fcious that I am an active being, who can and do deter- mine myfelf. If I fhould fuppofe things fpiritual to be corporeal, or refine things actual and real into general abftracted notions, or by metaphyfical ikill fplit things fimple and individual into manifold parts, I do not^know what may follow: But if I take things as they are, and afk any plain untutored man, whether he acts or is free in this or that particular action, he readily affents, and I as readily believe him from what I find within. And thus, by an induction of particulars, I may conclude man to be a free agent, although I may be puzzled to define or conceive a notion of freedom in general and abftract. And if man be free, he is plainly accountable. But if you fhall define, abftract, fuppofe, and it fhall follow that according to your definitions, abftractions, and fup- pofitions, there can be no freedom in man, and you fhall thence infer that he is not accountable, I fhall make bold to depart from your metaphyfical abftracted fenfe, and ap- peal to the common fenfe of mankind.