Y y 3)o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
XIX. If we confider the notions that obtain in the world, of guilt and merit, praife and blame, accountable and unaccountable, we (hall find the common queftion in order to applaud or cenfure, acquit or condemn a man, is, whether he did fuch an action? and whether he was him- felf when he did it? Which comes to the fame thing. It mould feem, therefore, that in the ordinary commerce of mankind, any perfon is efteemed accountable fimply as he is an agent. And though you mould tell me that man is inactive, and that the fenfible objects a£fc upon him, yet my own experience afTures me of the contrary. I know I a£t, and what I a£t, I am accountable for. And if this be true, the foundation of religion and morality remains unfhaken. Religion, I fay, is concerned no farther than that man mould be accountable: And this he is according to my fenfe, and the common fenfe of the world, if he acts: And that he doth a£t is felf-evident. The grounds, therefore, and ends of religion are fecured: whether your philofophic notion of liberty agrees with man's ac- tions or no; And whether his actions are certain or con- tingent; the queftion being not whether he did it with a free will, or what determined his will; not whether it was certain or foreknown that he would do it, but only whether he did it wilfully: As what muft intitle him to the guilt or merit of it.
Alc. — But ftill the queftion recurs, whether man be free?
Euph.— To determine this queftion, ought we not firft to determine what is meant by the word free?
Alc — We ought.
Euph. — In my opinion, a man is faid to be free, fo far forth as he can do what he will. Is this fo, or is it not?
Alc. — It feems fo.
Euph. — Man, therefore, acting according to his will, is to be accounted free.
[Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 371 Alc. — This I admit to be true, in the vulgar fenfe. But a philofopher goes higher, and inquires whether man be free to will?
Euph. — That is, whether he can will as he wills? I know not how philofophical it may be to afk this queftion, but it feems very idle. The notions of guilt, and merit, juftice, and reward, are in the minds of men, antecedent to all metaphyfical difquifitions: And according to thofe received natural notions, it is not doubted that man is ac- countable, that he acts, and is felt-determined.
XX. But a Minute Philofopher (hall, in virtue of wrong fuppofitions, confound things moft evidently diftincl:; bo- dy, for inftance, with fpirit, motion with volition, cer- tainty with necefiity; and an abftra&er, or refiner, fhall fo analyfe the moft fimple inftantaneous act: of the mind, as to diftinguifh therein divers faculties and tendencies, prin- ciples and operations, caufes and effects; and having ab- ftracted, fuppofed, and reafoned upon principles gratui- tous and obfcure, he will conclude it is no act at all, and man no agent, but a puppet, or an organ, played on by outward objects, and his will a top or a foot-ball. And this paffeth for philofophy and free-thinking. Perhaps this may be what it paffeth for, but it by no means feems a natural or juft way of thinking. To me it feems, that if we begin from things particular and concrete, and thence proceed to general notions and conclufions, there will be no difficulty in this matter. But if we begin with gen- eralities, and lay our foundation in abftracl: ideas, we mall find ourfelves intangled and loft in a labyrinth of our own making. I need not obferve, what every one muft fee, the ridicule of proving man no agent, and yet pleading for free thought and action, of fetting up at once for advocates of liberty and necefiity. I have haftily thrown to- gether thefe hints or remarks, on what you call a funda- 372 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.j mental article of the Minute Philofopby, and your meth^ od of proving it, which feems to furntui an admirable fpe- cimen of the fophiftry of abftract ideas. If in this fum- mary way, I have been more dogmatical than became me, you mufl excufe what you occafioned, by declining a joint and leifurely examination of the truth.
Alc — I think we have examined matters fufficiently.
Cri. — To all you have faid againft human liberty, it is a fufneient anfwer to obferve, that your arguments proceed upon an erroneous fuppofition either of the foul's being corporeal, or of abflracl: ideas: not to mention other grofs miftakes and gratuitous principles. You might as well fuppofe, that the foul is red or blue, as that it is folid. You might as well make the will any thing eUa as motion. And whatever you infer from fuch premifes, which (to fpeak in the fofteft manner) are neither proved nor probable, 1 make no difficulty to reject. You difcinguifh in all hu- man actions between the lail decree of the judgment and the acl: of the will. You confound certainty with neceffi- ty. You inquire, and your inquiry amounts to an abfurd queftion: Whether man can will as he wills? As evident- ly true as is this identical proposition, fo evidently falfe mud that way of thinking be, which led you to make a queftion of it. You fay, the appetites have by neceffity- of nature a tendency towards their refpe&ive objects. This we grant, and withal that appetite, if you pleafe, is not free. But you go farther, and tell us the underftand- ing cannot alter its idea, nor infer indifferently any thing from any thing. m What then! Can we not acl; at all if we cannot alter the nature of objects, and mayx we not be free in other things if we are not at liberty to make ab- furd inferences? You take for granted, that the mind is Inactive, but that its ideas acl upon it: As if the contra- ry were not evident to every man of common fenfe, who cannot but know, that it is the mind which confiders its [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 375 ideas, choofes, rejects, examines, deliberates, decrees, in one word, acts about them, and not they about it. Upon the whole, your premifes being obfcure and falfe, the fun- damental point, which you pretend to demonftrate fo many different ways, proves neither fenfe nor truth in any. And, on the other hand, there is not need of much inquiry to be convinced of two points, than which none are more evi- dent, more obvious, and more univerfally admitted by men of all forts, learned or unlearned, in all times and places, to wit, that man acts and is accountable for his actions. Whatever abftracters, refiners, or men prejudiced to a falfe hypothecs may pretend, it is, if I miftake not, evi- dent to every thinking man of common fenfe, that human minds are fo far from being engines, or foot-balls, acted up- on and bandied about by corporeal objects, without any in- ward principle of freedom or action, that the only origi- nal true notions that we have of freedom, agent* or action, are obtained by reflecting on ourfelves, and the operations of our own minds. The finguiarity and credulity of Mi- nute Philofophers, who fuller themfelves to be abufed by the paralogifms of three or four eminent patriarchs of in- fidelity in the laft age, is, I think, not to be matched; there being no inftance of bigotted fuperftition, the ring- leaders whereof have been able to fcduce their followers, more openly and more widely from the plain dictates of nature and common fenfe.
XXI. Alc. — It has been always an objection againft the difcoverers of truth, that they depart from received opinions. The character of finguiarity is a tax on {i\zc,~ king: And as fuch we mod willingly bear it, and glo- ry in it. A genuine philofopher.is never modefc in a falfe fenfe, to the preferring authority before reafon, or an old and common opinion before a true one. Which falfe mod- ?:ty>.ourages men from treading in untroden paths.
374 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
or ftriking out new light, is above all other qualities the greateft enemy to free-thinking.
Cri. — Authority in difputable points will have its weight with a judicious mind, which yet will follow evidence wherever it leads. Without preferring, we may allow it a good fecond to reafon. Your gentlemen, therefore, of the Minute Philofophy, may fpare a world of common place upon reafon, and light, and difcoveries. We are not attached to authority againft reafon, nor afraid of untroden paths that lead to truth, and are ready to follow a nem light, when we are fure it is no ignis fatuus. Reafon may oblige a man to believe againft his inclinations: But why fhould a man quit falutary notions, for others not lefs un- reafonable than pernicious? Your fchemes, and princi- ples, and boafted demonftrations have been at large pro- pofed and examined. You have fhifted your notions, fucceffively retreated from one fcheme to another, and in the end renounced them all. Your objections have been treated in the fame manner, and with the fame event. If we except all that relates to the errors and faults of par- ticular perfons, and difficulties which, from the nature of things, we are not obliged to explain; it is furprifing to fee, after fuch magnificent threats, how little remains, that can amount to a pertinent objection againft the chriftian religion. What you have produced has been tried by the fair tefl of reafon: AncJ though you mould hope to prevail by ridicule when you cannot by reafon, yet in the upfhot I apprehend you will find it impracticable to de- ftroy all fenfe of religion. Make your countrymen ever fo vicious, ignorant, and profane, men will ftill be difpo- fed to look up to a Supreme Being. Religion, right or wrong, will fubfift in fome fhape or other, and fome worfhip there will furely be, either of God or the creature. As for your ridicule, can any thing be more ridiculous, than to fee the moft unmeaning men of the [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 375 age fct up for free-thinkers, men fo ftrong in aflertion, and yet fo weak in argument, advocates for freedom intro- ducing a fatality, patriots trampling on the laws of their country, and pretenders to virtue deftroying the motives of it? Let any impartial man but caft an eye on the opin- ions of the Minute Philofophers, and then fay if any thing can be more ridiculous, than to believe fuch things, and at the fame time laugh at credulity.
XXII. Lys. — Say what you will, we have the laughers on our fide: And as for your reafoning, I take it to be an- other name for fophiftry.
Cri.— And I fuppofe, by the fame rule, you take your own fophifms for arguments. To fpeak plainly, I know no fort of fophifm that is not employed by Minute Philo- fophers againft religion. They are guilty of a Petit 10 Prin- ciple in taking for granted that we believe contradictions; of non Caufa pr& Caufa, in affirming that uncharitable feuds and difcords are the effects of chriftianity; of Ignoratio elenchi) in expecting demonftration where we pretend on- ly to faith. If I was not afraid to offend the delicacy of polite ears, nothing were eafier than to aflign inftances of every kind of fophifm, which would fhew how fkilful your own philofophers are in the practice of that fophiftry you impute to others.
Euph. — For my own part, if fophiftry be the art or faculty of deceiving other men, I muft acquit thefe gen- tlemen of it. They feem to have led me a progrefs through atheifm, libertinifm, enthufiafm, fatalifm, not to convince me of the truth of any of them, fo much as to confirm me in my own way of thinking. They have expofed their fairy ware not to cheat but divert us. As I know them to be profefTed mailers of ridicule, fo in a ferious fenfe I know not what to make of them.
376 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.3 Alc-— You do not know what to make of us! I mould be fony you did. He mutt be a fuperficial philofopher that is foon fathomed.
XXIII. Cri. — The ambiguous character is, it feems, the fure way to fame and efteem in the learned world, as it {lands conftituted at prefent. When the ingenious read- er is at a lofs to determine whether his author be atheift or deift, or polytheift, ftoic or epicurean, fceptic or dogma- tift, infidel or enthufiaft, in jeft or in earned, he concludes him, without hefitation, to be enigmatical and profound. In fad!:, it is true of the moft admired writers of the age* that no man alive can tell what to make of them, or what they would be at.
Alc. — We have among us, moles that dig deep under ground, and eagles that foar out of fight. We can a£fc all parts, and become all opinions, putting them on or off with great freedom cf wit and humor.
Euph.- — It feems then, you are a pair of infcru table, un- fathomable, falhionable philofophers.
Alc— It cannot be denied.
Euph. — But, I remember, you fet out with an open dogmatical air, and talked cf plain principles, and evident reafoning, promifed to make things as clear as noon-day, to extirpate wrong notions, and plant right in their ftead. Soon after, you began to recede from your firft notions and adopt others ■: you advanced one while, and retreated another, yielded and retracted, faid and unfaid: And after having followed you through fo many untroden paths and intricate mazes, I find myfelf never the nearer.
Alc— Did we not tell you, the gentlemen of our feci; are great proficients in raillery?
Euph. — But, methinks, it is a vain attempt, for a plain man of any fettled belief or principles to engage with fuch flippery, fugitive, changeable philofophers. It feems as if [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 377 a man fhould (land ftill in the fame place, while his adver- fary choofes and changes his fituation, lias full range and liberty to traverfe the field, and attack him on all fides, and in all fhapes, from a nearer or farther diftance, on horfeback or on foot, in light or heavy armour, in clofe fight or with miffive weapons.
Alc. — It muft be owned, a gentlemen hath great ad- vantage over a ftrait-laced pedant, or bigot.
Euph. — But after all, what am I the better for the con- verfation of two fuch knowing gentlemen? I hoped to have unlearned my errors, and to have learned truths from you, but, to my great difappointment, I do not find that I am either untaught or taught.
Alc.—- To unteach men their prejudices, is a difficult talk: And this muft firft be done, before we can pretend to teach them the truth. Befides, we have at prefent no time to prove and argue.
Euph. — But fuppofe my mind white paper, and with- out being at any pains to extirpate my opinions, or prove your own, only fay what you would write thereon, or what you would teach me in cafe I were teachable. Be for once in earned, and let me know fome one conclufion of yours before we part: Or I (hall intreat Crito to violate the laws of hofpitality, towards thofe, who have violated the laws of philofophy, by hanging out falfe lights to one benighted in ignorance and error. I appeal to you (faid he, turning to Crito) whether thefe philosophical knight-errants fhould not be confined in this caftle of yours, till they make reparation. Euphranor has reafon, faid Critoy and my fentence is that you remain here in durance, till you have done fomething towards fatisfying the engagement I am under, having promifed, he fhould know your opin» ions from yourfelves, which you alfo agreed to.
Z z 378 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
XXIV. Alc. — Since it mud be fo, I will now reveal what I take to be the fum and fubftance, the grand arcan- um and ultimate conclufion of our feci;, and that in two words, PANTA UPOLEEPSIS.
Cri.— You are then a downright fceptic. But, fceptic as you are, you own it probable there is a God, certain that the chriftian religion is ufeful, poflible it may be true, certain that if it be, the Minute Philofophers are in a bad way. This being the cafe, how can it be queilioned what courfe a wife man mould take? "Whether the principles of chriftians or infidels are trued, may be made a queftion, but which are fafeft can be none. Certainly if you doubt of all opinions, you mud doubt of your own: And then for ought' you know, the chriftian may be true. The more doubt, the more room there is for faith, a fceptic, of all men, having the leaft right to demand evidence. But, whatever uncertainty there may be in other points, thus much is certain: Either there is, or is not a God: There is, or is not a revelation: Man either is, or is not an agent: The foul is, or is not immortal. If the negatives are not fure, the affirmatives are poflible. If the negatives are improbable, the affirmatives are probable. In propor- tion, as any of your ingenious men, finds himfelf unable to prove any one of thefe negatives, he hath grounds to fufpecl: he may be miftaken. A Minute Philofopher, therefore, that would acl: a confident part, mould have the diffidence, the modefty, and the timidity, as well as the doubts, of a fceptic; not pretend to an ocean of light, and then lead us to an abyfs of darknefs. If I have any notion of ridicule, this is mod ridiculous. But your ridi- culing what, for ought you know, may be true, I can <nake no fenfe of. It is neither acting as a wife man, with regard to your own intereft, nor as a good man, with regard to that of your country.
[Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 379 XXV. Tully faith fome where, aut undique religtonem tolle aut ufquequaque conferva: Either let us have no religion at all, or let it be refpe£ted. If any fingle inftance can be (hewn of a people, that ever profpered without fome re- ligion, or if there be any religion, better than the chriftian, propofe it in the grand aflembly of the nation to change our conftitution, and either live without relgioin, or in- troduce that new religion. A fceptic, as well as other men, is member of a community, and can diftinguifh between good and evil, natural or political. Be this then his guide as a patriot, though he be no chriftian. Or, if he doth not pretend even to this difcernment, let him not pretend to correct or alter, what he knows nothing of: Neither let him that only doubts, behave as if he could de- monftrate. Timagoras is wont to fay, I find my country in pofleffion of certain tenets: They appear to have an ufeful tendency, and, as fuch, are encouraged by the legif- lature: They make a main part of our conftitution: I do not find thefe innovators can difprove them, or fubftitute things more ufeful and certain in their ftead: Out of re- gard, therefore, to the good of mankind, and the laws of my country, I (hall acquiefce in them. I do not fay Timagoras is a chriftian, but I reckon him a patriot. Not to inquire in a point of fo great concern, is folly, but it is ftill a higher degree of folly, to condemn without inquir- ing. Lyficles feemed heartily tired of this converfation. It is now late, faid he to Alciphron, and all things are ready for our departure. Every one hath his own way of think- ing: And it is as impoflible for me to adopt another man's, as to make his complexion and features mine. Alciphron pleaded that, having complied with Euphratior's conditions, they were now at liberty: And Euphranor anfwered that, all lie defired, having been to know their tenets, he had nothing further to pretend.
38o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.} XXVI. The philosophers being gone, I obferved to Crito how unaccountable it was, that men fo eafy to con- fute flioulcl yet be fo difficult to convince. This> faid Crito, is accounted for by Arifiotle, who tells us that arguments have not an effetl: on all men, but only on them whofe minds are prepared by education and cuftom, as land is for Seed.# Make a point never fo clear, it is great odds, that a man, whofe habits and the bent of whofe mind lie a contrary way, (hall be unable to comprehend it. So weak a thing is reafon in competition with inclination. I replied, this anfwer might hold with refpect to other per- fons and other times: But when the queftion was of inquifitive men, in an age, wherein reafon was fo much cultivated, and thinking fo much in vogue, it did not feem fatisfa&ory. I have known it remarked, faid Crito, by a man of muchobfervation, that in the prefent age, thinking is more talked of, but lefs pra&ifed, than in ancient times: And that fince the revival of learning, men have read much and wrote much, but thought little: Infomuch that with us to 'think clofely and juftly, is the leaft part of a learned man, and none at all of a polite man. The free-thinkers, it muft be owned, make great pretentions to thinking, and yet they (hew but little exa&nefs in it. A lively man, and what the world calls a man of fenfe, are often deftitute of this talent j which is not a mere gift of nature, but muft be improved and perfected, by much attention and exercife on very different fubjecls: A thing of more pains and time, than the hafty men of parts in our age care to take. Such were the fentiments of a judicious friend: And, if you are not already fufficiently convinced of thefe truths, you need only caft an eye on the dark and confut- ed, but neverthelefs admired writers of this famous feci:: And then you will be able to judge, whether thofe