which we deal. Weight, mobility, inertia, cohesion, are uni- versally recognised — are virtually, if not scientifically, under- stood to be essential attributes of matter; and none but the most hopeless of simpletons disregard them. In morals and legislation, however, we behave as though the things dealt with had no fixed properties, no attributes. We do not inquire re- specting this human nature what are the laws under which its varied phenomena may be generalized, and accommodate our acts to them. We do not ask what constitutes life, or wherein happiness properly consists, and choose our measures accord- ingly. Yet, is it not unquestionable that of man, of life, of happiness, certain primordial truths are predicable which ne- cessarily underUe all right conduct? Is not gratification uni- formly due to the fulfilment of their functions by the respective faculties? Does not each faculty grow by exercise, and dwindle from disuse? And must not the issue of every scheme of legis- lation or culture, primarily depend upon the regard paid to these facts? Surely it is but reasonable, before devising measures for the benefit of society, to ascertain what society is made of. Is human nature constant, or is it not? If so, why? If not, why not? Is it in essence always the same? then what are its permanent characteristics? Is it changing? then what is the nature of the change it is undergoing? what is it be- coming, and why? Manifestly the settlement of these ques- tions ought to precede the adoption of " practical measures." The result of such measures cannot be matter of chance. The success or failure of them must be determined by their accordance or discordance with certain fixed principles of things. What foUy is it, then, to ignore these fixed principles! Call you that "practical" to begin your twcKth book before learning the axioms?
But if we are not as yet capable of entirely fulfiUing the perfect law, and if our inability renders needful certain supple- CONCIUSION. 4G7 mentary regulations, then, are not these supplementary regula- tions, in virtue of their beneficial effects, ethically justifiable? and if the abolition of them, on the ground that they conflict ■with abstract morality, would be disadvantageous, then, are they not of higher authority, for the time being, than the moral law itself? — must not the relatively right take precedence of the positively right?
The confident air with which this question seems to claim an affirmative answer is somewhat rashly assumed. It is not true that the arrangement best adapted to the time, possesses, in vir- tue of its adaptation, any independent authority. Its authority is not original, but derived. Whatsoever respect is due to it, is due to it ordy as a partial embodiment of the moral law. The whole benefit conferred by it is attributable to the ful- filment of that portion of the moral law which it enforces. For consider the essential nature of all advantages obtained by any such arrangement. The use of every institution is to aid men in the achievement of happiness. Happiness consists in the due exercise of faculties. Hence an institution suited to the time, must be one which in some way or other ensures to men more facUity for the exercise of faculties — that is, greater freedom for such exercise — than they would enjoy without it. Thus, if it be asserted of a given people that a despotism is at present the best form of government for them, it is meant that the exercise of faculties is less hmited under a despotism, than it would be hmited under the anarchical state entailed by any other form of government; and that, therefore, despotism gives to such a people an amount of liberty to exercise the faculties greater than they would possess in its absence. Similarly, all apologies that can be made for a narrow suffrage, for censor- ship of the press, for restraint by passports; and the like, resolve themselves into assertions that the preservation of pubUc order necessitates these restrictions — that social dissolution would ensue on their abolition — that there would arise a state of uni- versal aggression by men on each other — or, in other words, that the law of equal freedom is less violated by the mainte- 468 CONCLUSION.
nance of these restrictions, than it would be violated were they repealed.
If, then, the only excuse to be made for measures of tem- porary expediency is, that they get the commands of the moral law fulfilled better than any other measures can, their authority may no more be compared with that of the moral law itself, than the authority of a servant with that of a master. Whilst a conductor of force is inferior to a generator of it — whilst an instrument is inferior to the will which guides it, so long must an institution be inferior to the law whose ends it subserves, and so long must such institution bend to that law as the agent to his principal.
And here let it be remarked, that we shall avoid much confu- sion by ceasing to use the word right in any but its legitimate sense; that, namely, in which it describes conduct purely moral. Rightness expresses of actions, what straightness does of hnes; and there can no more be two kinds of right action than there can be two kinds of straight Une. If we would keep our con- clusions free from ambiguity, we must reserve the term we em- ploy to signify absolute rectitude, solely for this purpose. And when it is needfiil to express the claims of imperfect, though be- neficial, institutions, we must speak of them, not as "relatively right," or " right for the time being," but as the least wrong institutions now possible.
The admission that social arrangements can be conformed to the nioral law only in as far as the people are themselves moral, will probably be thought a sufiicient plea for claiming liberty to judge how far the moral law may safely be acted upon. For if congruity between poUtical organization and popular character is necessary; and if, by consequence, a political organization in advance of the age will need modification to make it fit the age; and if this process of modification must be accompanied by great inconvenience, -^Jld even suffering; then it would seem CONCLUSION. 469 to follow that for the avoidance of these evils our endeavour should be to at first adapt such organization to the age. That is to say, men's amhition to realize an ideal excellence must be checked by prudential considerations.
" Progress, and at the same time resistance," — that celebrated saying of M. G-uizot, with which the foregoing position is in substance identical — no doubt expresses a truth; but not at all the order of truth usually supposed. To look at society from afar off, and to perceive that such and such axe the principles of its development, is one thing: to adopt these as rules for our daily government, will turn out on examination to be quite a different thing. Just as we saw that it is very possible for the attainment of greatest happiness to be from one point of view the recognised end of morahty, and yet to be of no value for immediate guidance (Chap. III.), so, it is very possible for " progress, and at the same time resistance," to be a law of social life, without being a law by which individual citizens may regulate their actions.
That the aspiration after things as they should be, needs restraining by an attachment to things as they are, is fully admitted. The two feeUngs answer to the two sides of our present mixed nature — the side on which we continue adapted to old conditions of existence, and the side on which we are becoming adapted to new ones. Conservatism defends those coercive arrangements which a still-Ungering savageness makes requisite. Radicalism endeavours to realize a state more in harmony with the character of the ideal man. The strengths of these sentiments are proportionate to the necessity for the institutions they respond to. And the social organization proper for a given people at a given time, wil] be one bearing the impress of these sentiment! in the ratio of their prevalence amongst that people at that time. Hence the necessity for a vigorous and constant manifestation of both of them. Whilst, on the one hand, love of what is abstractedly just, indignation against every species of aggression, and enthusiasm on behalf of reform, are to be rejoiced over; we must, on the other hand, 470 CONCLUSION.
470 CONCLUSION.
tolerate, as indispensable, these displays of an antagonistic ten- dency; be they seen in the detailed opposition to every im- provement, or in the puerile sentimentalisms of Young England, or even in some frantic effort to bring back the age of hero- worship. Of all these nature has need, so long as they repre- sent sincere beliefs. From time to time the struggle eventuates in change; and by composition of forces there is produced a resultant, embodying the right amount of movement in the right direction. Thus understood, then, the theory of " pro- gress, and at the same time resistance," is correct.
Mark now, however, that for this resistance to be beneficial, it must come from those who think the institutions they defend really the best, and the innovations proposed absolutely wrong. It must not come from those who secretly approve of change, but think a certain opposition to it expedient. For if the true end of this conflict of opinion is to keep social arrangements in harmony with the average character of the people; and if (rejecting that temporary kind of opinion generated by revo- lutionary passion) the honest opinion held by each man of any given state of things is not an intellectual accident, but indi- cates a preponderating fitness or unfitness of that state of things to his moral condition (pp. 240, 427); then it follows that only by a universal manifestation of honest opinions can harmony between social arrangements and the average popular- character be preserved. If, conceaUng their real sympathies, some of the movement party join the stationary party, merely with the view of preventing too rapid an advance, they must inevitably dis- turb the adaptation between the community and its institutions. So long as the natural conservatism ever present in society is left to restrain the progressive tendency, things will go right; but add to this natural conservatism an artificial conservatism a conservatism not founded on love of the old, but on a theory that conservatism is needful— and the proper ratio between the two forces is destroyed; the resultant is no longer in the right direction; and the effect produced by it is more or less vitiated. Whilst, therefore, there is truth in the belief that "progress, CONCLUSION. 471 and at the same time resistance," is the law of social change, there is a fatal error in the inference that resistance should be factitiously created. It is a mistake to suppose this the Mnd of resistance called for; and, as M. Guizot's own experience testifies, it is a further mistake to suppose that any one can say how far resistance should he carried.
But, indeed, without entering upon a criticism like this, the man of moral insight sees clearly enough that no such self- contradicting behaviour can answer. Successful methods are always genuine, sincere. The affairs of the imiverse are not carried on after a system of benign double-dealing. In nature's doings all things show their true qualities — exert whatsoever of influence is reaUy in them. It is manifest that a globe bmlt up partly of semblances instead of facts, would not be long on tliis side chaos. And it is certain that a community composed of men whose acts are not in harmony with their innermost beliefs, will be equally unstable. To know in our hearts that some proposed measure is essentially right, and yet to say by our deeds that it is not right, will never prove really beneficial. Society cannot prosper by lies.
And yet it will still be thought unreasonable to deny discre- tionary power in this matter. Neglecting prudential considera- tions in the endeavour to put society on a purely equitable basis, will probably be demurred to, as implying an entire abandonment of private judgment. It must be confessed that it does so. But whoso urges this objection, may properly ask himself how much his private judgment, as applied to such a subject, is worth?
What is the question he proposes to solve? Whether it is, or is not, the time for some desired change to be made? — whether the people are, or are not, fit for some higher social foim than they have hitherto lived under? Where now are his 472 CONCLUSION.
qualifications for answering this question? Has he ever seen the millions for whom he would prescribe? Some tenth part of them perhaps. How many of these does he recognise? Probably of one or two thousand he can tell you the names and occupations. But with how many of these is he ac- quainted? Several hundi-eds, it may be. And of what fraction of them does he personally know the characters? They are numbered by tens. Then it must be by what he reads in books and newspapers, witnesses at meetings, and hears in conversation that he judges? Partly so: from the salient points of character thus brought under his notice, he infers the rest. Does he then find his inferences trustworthy? On the contrary, when he goes amongst men he has read of, or heard described, it usually turns out that he has got quite a wrong impression of them. Does this evidence from which he judges lead all persons to like conclusions? No: with the same sources of information open to them, others form opinions of the people widely different from those he holds. Are his own convictions constant? Not at all: he continually meets with facts which prove that he had generalized on insufficient data; and which compel a revision of his estimate. Nevertheless, may it not be that by averaging the characters of those whom he personally knows, he can form a tolerably correct opinion of those whom he does not know? Hardly: seeing that of those whom he personally knows, his judgments are generally incorrect. Very intimate friends occasionally astound him by quite unexpected behaviour; even his nearest relatives — bro- thers, sisters, and children do so: nay, indeed, he has but a limited acquaintance with himself; for though from time to time he imagines very clearly how he shall act under certain new circumstances, it commonly happens that when placed in these circumstances his conduct is quite difierent from that which he expected.
Now of what value is the judgment of so circumscribed an intelligence upon the question — Is the nation ready for such CONCLUSION. 473 and such measures of reform, or is it not? Here is one who professes to say of some thirty millions of people, how they will behave under arrangements a little freer than existing ones. Yet nine-tenths of these people he has not even seen; can identify only a few thousands of them; personally knows but an injBnitesimal fraction; and knows these so imperfectly that on some point or other he finds himself mistaken respecting nearly all of them. Here is one who cannot say even of him- self how certain untried conditions will affect him, and yet who thinks he can say of a whole nation how certain untried con- ditions will affect it! Surely there is in this, a most absurd incongruity between pretension and capability.
When the contrast between present institutions and projected ones is very great — when, for example, it is proposed to change at once from pure despotism to perfect freedom — we may, in- deed, prophesy with certainty that the result will not fulfil expectation. For whilst the success of institutions depends on their fitness to popular character, and whilst it is impossible for popular character to undergo a great change all at once, it must follow that to suddenly substitute for existing institutions others of a quite opposite nature, will necessitate unfitness, and, therefore, failure. But it is not in cases like this that the power of judging is contended for. As elsewhere shown (p. 4:32), one of these extreme changes is never consequent upon that peaceful expression of opiaion presupposed by the hypothesis that the citizen should be cautious in advocating reform; on the contrary, it is always a result of some revolu- tionary passion which no considerations of pohcy can control. Only when an amelioration is being peaceably discussed and agitated for — that is, only when the circumstances prove its advent at hand — can the proposed discretion be exercised: and then does the right use of tbia discretion imply an acquaintance with the people accurate enough to say of them, " Now they are not fit;" and, again, "Now they are fit" — an acquaintance which it is preposterous to assume — an acquaintance which nothing short of omniscience can possess.
474 CONCLUSION.
Who, then, is to find out when the time for any given change has arrived? No one: it will find itself out. For us to perplex ourselves with such questions, is hoth needless and absurd. The due apportionment of the truth to the time is already provided for. That same modification of man's nature which produces fitness for higher social forms, itself generates the beUef that those forms are right (p. 427), and by doing this brings them into existence. And as opinion, being the product of character (pp. 25, 159), must necessarily be in harmony with character, institutions which are in harmony with opinion, must be in harmony with character also.
The candid reader may now see his way out of the dilemma in which he feels placed, between a conviction, on the one hand, that the perfect law is the only safe guide, and a con- sciousness, on the other, that the perfect law caonot be fulfilled by imperfect men. Let him but duly realize the fact that opinion is the agency through which character adapts external arrangements to itself — that his opinion rightly forms part of this agency — is a unit of force, constitutrng, with other such units, the general power which works out social changes— and he will then perceive that he may properly give full utterance to his innermost conviction; leaving it to produce what eflfect it may. It is not for nothing that he has in him these sympa- thies with some principles, and repugnance to others. He, with aU his capacities, and desires, and behefs, is not an accident, but a product of the time. Influences that have acted upon precediug generations; influences that have been brought to bear upon him; the education that disciplined his chUdhood; together with the circumstances in which he has since lived; have conspired to make him what he is. And the result thus wrought out in him has a purpose. He must remember that whilst he is a child of the past, he is a parent of the future.
The moral sentiment developed in him, was intended to. be CONCLUSION. 475 instrumental in producing further progress; and to gag it, or to conceal the thoughts it generates, is to balk creative design. He, like every other man, may properly consider himself as an agent through whom nature works; and when nature gives birth in him to a certain belief, she thereby authorizes him to profess and to act out that belief. For — " nature is made better by no mean, But nature makes that mean: over that art Which you say adds to nature, is an art That nature makes."
Not as adventitious, therefore, will the wise man regard the faith that is in him — not as something which may be shghted, and made subordinate to calculations of policy; but as tlie supreme authority to which all his actions should bend. The highest truth conceivable by him he will fearlessly utter; and will endeavour to get embodied in fact liis purest idealisms: knowing that, let what may come of it, he is thus playing Ids appointed part in the world — knowing that, if he can get done the thing he aims at — well: if not — well also; though not so welL And thus, in teaching a uniform imquesdoning obedience, does an entirely abstract philosophy become one with all true rehgion. Fidelity to conscience — this is the essential precept inculcated by both. No hesitation, no paltering about probable results, but an implicit submission to what is beUeved to be the law laid down for us. We are not to pay Hp homage to prin- ciples which our conduct wilfully transgresses. We are not to follow the example of those who, taking " Dotnine dirige nos" for their motto, yet disregard the directions given, and prefer to direct themselves. We are not to be guilty of that practical atheism, which, seeing no guidance for human affairs but its own limited foresight, endeavours itself to play the god, and CONCLDSION.
decide what will be good for mankind, and what bad. But, on the contrary, we are to searcli out with a genuine humility the rules ordained for us — are to do unfalteringly, without specu- lating as to consequences, whatsoever these require; and we are to do this in the belief that then, when there is perfect sincerity — when each man is true to himself — when every one strives to realize what he thinks the highest rectitude — then must all things prosper.
THE END.
G. WoodfaUmd Soa, Printer., Angel Court. SViuner Street. London.