limitation and want of strong cohesion which characterize these feelings, there goes a comparative indistinctness of the clusters. Though the nervous acts of which muscular motions are results, combine into groups with much pre- cision., yet the combination of them,, at first feeble, becomes strong only by repetition. And as the repetition which makes the combination strong, makes it to the same extent automatic, the concomitant feelings become less and less distinct,, and fade from consciousness as fast as they unite. How,, in muscular acts,, complete clustering and unconscious- ness go together,, is seen in the fact that consciousness im- pedes clustered muscular acts. After having many times gone through the series of compound movements required, it is possible to walk across the room in the dark and lay hold of the handle of the door — so long, that is, as the movements are gone through unthinkingly. If they are consciously made, failure is almost certain. Of the farther class of feelings initiated within the body, including appetites, pains, &c., it is scarcely needful to say that there is among them no formation!, of coherent groups. Their great indefmiteness of limitation and accompanying * want of cohesion, forbid unions of theiin, either simultaneous or successive. \ Obviously the emotions are characterized by a like want of combining power. A confused aiid changing chaos is produced by any of them which co-taist. In fact, the ab- sence among them of capacity for uniting, is as marked as its presence among those visual feelings with which we set out.!
{ § 71. We come now to more complex manifestations of these general contrasts. In tracts pf consciousness where the relational element predominates, and where the clus- tering of feelings is consequently decided, the clusters themselves enter into relations one 'With another. Grouped feelings, together with the relations uniting them, are 178 THE INDUCTIONS OP PSYCHOLOGY.
fused into wholes which, comporting themselves as single feelings do, combine with other such consolidated groups in definite relations; and even groups of groups, similarly fused; become in like manner limited by, and coherent with, other groups of groups. Conversely, in tracts of conscious- ness where the relations are few and vague, nothing of the kind takes place.
It is among the visual feelings, above all others multi- tudinous, definite, and coherent in their relations, that this compound clustering is carried to the greatest extent. Along with the ability to form that complex consciousness of lights, shades, and colours, joined in relative positions, which constitute a inan as present to sight, there goes the ability to form a consciousness of two men in a definite 'and coherent relation of position — there goes the ability to form a consciousness of aj crowd of such men; nay, two or more such crowds may be [mentally combined. The aggregate of definitely-related visual feelings known as a house, itself aggregates with others such to form tie consciousness of a street, and the streets to form the consciousness of a town. Though the compound clustering of visual feelings in sequence is not so 1 distinct or so strong, it is still very marked. Numerous complicated images produced by objects seen in succession, harjig together in consciousness with con- siderable tenacity. j There is little, if any, cluster- ing of clusters among*, the simultaneous auditpry feelings. But among the successive auditory feelings there are definite and coherent <bombinations of groups with groups. The fused set of sounjds we call a word, unites with many others such into a sentence. In some rninds these clusters of clusters of successive > sounds again cluster very definitely and coherently: many successive sentences are, as we say, accurately remembered. And similarly, musical phrases will cling together into a long and elaborate melody. Among the tactual feelings this com- pound clustering is scarcely traceable, either in space or THE COMPOSITION OF MIND. 17?
time; and there is not the remotest approach to it in the olfactory and gustatory feelings.
For form's sake it is needful to say that these highe? degrees of mental composition are entirely wanting among the internally-initiated feelings. Only among those which accompany muscular motion is there any approach to it; and here the compound clustering, like the simple cluster- ing, entails progressing unconsciousness.
§ 72. One more kindred trait of composition- must "be set down. Thus far we have observed only the degrees of mu- tual limitation, of cohesion, and of complex combining power, among feelings within each order. It remains to observe the extent to which feelings of one order enter into rela- tions with those of another,, and the consequent amounts of their mutual limitations and of their combining powers. To trace out these at all fully would carry us into unman- ageable detail. We must confine ourselves to leading facts.
Feelings of different orders do not limit one another as clearly as feelings of the same order do. The clus-^ tered colours produced by an object a': which we look are but little interfered with by a soun£L->the sound does not put any appreciable boundary to them in consciousness, but serves merely to diminish their dominance in consciousness. Neither the combined noises which make up a conversation at table, nor the impressions received through the eyes from' the dishes on the table, are excluded from the niind by the accompanying tactual feelings and tastes and smells, as much as colours are excluded by colours, sounds by sounds, tastes by tastes, or one tactual feeling by another. Ofi sensations arising within the body, and still more of emotions, it may be said that, unless intense, they disturb but slightly the sensations otherwise arising. It would almost seem as though a sensation of colour, a sensation of sound, a,nd a pleasurable emotion produced by the sound, admit of being superposed in consciousness with but little 180 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
mutual obscuration. Doubtless in most cases two simple feelings,, or two clustered feelings of different orders, put bounds to one another in time if not in space: there is an extremely rapid extrusion of each by the other rather than a continuous presence of either. But it is manifest that these alternating extrusions, partial or complete, by feelings of different orders, are less distinct than the extrusion of one another by feelings of the same order.
It is a correlative truth that feelings of different orders cohere with one another less strongly than do feelings of the same order. The impressions which make up the visual consciousness of an object, hang together more firmly than the group of them does with the group of sounds making up the name of the object. The notes composing a melody have a stronger tendency to drag one another into conscious- ness than any one, or all of them, have to drag into con- sciousness the sights along with which they occurred: these last may or may noil cohere with them -y but the following of one note by the next is often difficult to prevent. Simi- larly., though there is considerable cohesion between the visual sensations produced by an orange and the taste or soiell of the orange, yet it is quite usual to have a visual consciousness of an orange without its taste or its smell arising in consciousness; while it is scarcely possible to have before the mind one of its apparent characters unaccom- panied by other apparent characters.
A further fact of moment must be added. The feelings of different orders which enter into definite relations and cohere most strongly, are those among which there is a pre- dominance of the relational elements; and there is an especial facility of combination between those feelings of different orders which are respectively held together by re- lations of the same order. Thus the co-existent visual feel- ings, most relational of all, enter into very definite anrl coherent relations with co-existent tactual feelings. To tne group of lights and shades an object yields to the eyes, there THE COMPOSITION OF MIND. 181 attaches itself very strongly the group of impressions pro- duced by touching and grasping the object. Next in order of strength are the connections between sensations received through the eyes and those received through the ears; or rather — between clusters of the one and clusters of the other. But though the feelings clustered in co-existence that form the visual consciousness of anything, are linked with much strength to the feelings clustered in sequence that form the consciousness of its name; yet,, probably because the feelings forming the one cluster not only differ in kind from those forming the other but are held together by relations of a different order, the cohesion of the two clusters is not so strong. As we descend towards the unrelational feelings we find that this combining power of class with class decreases. Between tastes and smells and certain visceral sensations, such as hunger and nausea., there is, indeed, a considerable aptitude to cohere. But after admitting exceptions, it remains true on the average that the extremely-nnrelational states of consciousness of different orders, connect but feebly with one another and with the extremely-relational states of con- sciousness.
§ 73. Thus far we have proceeded as though Mind were ' composed entirely of the primary or vivid feelings, andj the relations among them; ignoring the secondary or faint I feelings. Or if, as must be admitted, there has been a tacit / recognition of these secondary feelings in parts of the foregoing sections which deal with the relations and cohesions of feelings in sequence (since in a sequence of feel- ings those which have passed have become faint, and only the one present is vivid); yet there has been no avowed recognition of them as components of Mind different from, though closely allied with, " the primary feelings. We must now specially consider them and the part they play.
The cardinal fact to be noted as of co-ordinate im- ;182 THE lOTUCTIOXS OF PSYCHOLOGY* portance with the facts above noted, is that while each vivi< feeling is joined to, but distinguished from,, other vivid fee] ings, simultaneous or successive,, it is joined to, and identi fled with, faint feelings that have resulted from foregoing similar vivid feeling's. Each particular colour, each specia sound., each sensation of touch, taste, or smell, is at one known as unlike other sensations that limit it in space o time, and known as like the faint forms of certain sensation that have preceded it in time — unites itself with foregoing sensations from which it does not differ in quality but onb in intensity.
On this law of composition depends the orderly struc: ture of Mind. In its absence there could be nothing bu1 •a perpetual kaleidoscopic change of feelings — an ever- transforming present without past or future. It is because of this tendency which vivid feelings have severally tc " cohere with the faint forms of all preceding feelings like themselves, that there arise what we call ideaSf A vivid feeling does not by itself constitute a unit of that aggre- gate of ideas entitled knowledge. Nor does a single faint feeling constitute such a unit. But an idea, or unit of knowledge, results when a vivid feeling is assimilated to, or coheres with, one or more of the faint feelings left by sucli vivid feelings previously experienced. From moment to moment the feelings that constitute consciousness segregate — each becoming fused with the whole series of others like itself that have gone before it; and what we call knowing- each feeling as such or such, is our name for this act of segregation.
The process so carried on does not stop with the union of each feeling, as it occurs, with the faint forms of all pre- ceding like feelings. Clusters^of feelings are simultaneously- joined with the faint forms of preceding like clusters. An idea of an object or act is composed of groups of similar and similarly-related feelings that have arisen in conscious- ness from time to time, and have formed a consolidated series THE COMPOSITION OF MDTD. 183 of which tlie members have partially or completely lost their individualities.
This union of present clustered feelings with past clus- tered feelings is carried to a much greater degree of com- plexity. Groups of groups coalesce with kindred groups of groups that preceded them; and in the higher types of Mind., tracts of consciousness of an excessively composite character are produced after the same manner.
To complete this general conception it is needful to say that as with feelings, so with the relations between feelings. Parted so far as may be from the particular pairs of feelings and pairs of groups of feelings they severally unite, rela- tions themselves are perpetually segregated. From mo- ment to moment relations are distinguished from one another in respect of the degrees of contrast between their terms and the kinds of contrast between their terms; and each relation, while distinguished from various concurrent relations, is assimilated to previously- experienced relations like itself. Thus result -ideas of relations as those of strong contrast or weak contrast, of descending intensity or ascending intensity, of homogeneity of kind or heterogeneity of kind. Simultaneously occurs a segre- gation of a different species. Each relation of co-existence is classed with other like relations of co-existence and separated from relations of co-existence that are unlike it; and a kindred classing goes on among relations of sequence. Finally, by a further segregation, are formed that consolidated abstract of relations of co-existence which we know as Space, and that consolidated abstract of rela- tions of sequence which we know as Time. This process, here briefly indicated merely to show its congruity with the general process of composition, cannot be explained at length: the elucidation must come hereafter.
§ 74 And now having roughly sketched the composi- tion of Mind — having, to preserve clearness of outline, 184 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
omitted details and passed over minor qualifications; let me go on to indicate the essential truth which it is a chief purpose of this chapter to bring into view — the truth that the method of composition remains the same throughout the entire fabric of Mind, from the formation of its simplest feelings up to the formation of those immense and complex aggregates of feelings which characterize its highest deve- lopments.
In the last chapter we saw that what is objectively a wave of molecular change propagated through a nerve- centre, is subjectively a unit of feeling,, akin in nature to what we call a nervous shock. In one case we found con- clusive proof that when a rapid succession of such waves yield a rapid succession of such units of feeling, there results the continuous feeling known as a sensation; and that the quality of the feeling changes when these waves and corresponding units of feeling recur with a different rapidity. Further, it was shown that by unions among simultaneous series of such units recurring at unlike rates, countless other seemingly-simple sensations are pro- duced. And we inferred that what unquestionably holds among these primary feelings of one order, probably holds among primary feelings of all orders. To what does this conclusion amount, expressed in another way? It amounts to the conclusion that one of these feelings which, as introspectively contemplated, appears uniform, is really generated by the perpetual assimilation of a new pulse of feeling to pulses of feeling immediately preceding it: the sensation is constituted by the linking of each vivid pulse as it occurs, with the series of past pulses that were severally vivid but have severally.become iaint. And what, otherwise stated, is the conclusion that compound sensations result from unions among different concurrent series of such pulses? It is that while the component pulses of each series are, as they occur, severally assimilated to, or linked with, preceding pulses of their own kind, they are also THE COMPOSITION OP MIND. 185 severally combined in some relation with the pulses of concurrent series; and the compound sensation so gene- rated is known as different from other compound sensa- tions of the same order,, by virtue of some speciality in the relations among the concurrent series.
Consider now,, under its most general form, the process of composition of Mind described in foregoing sections. It is no other than this same process carried out on higher and higher platforms, with increasing extent and complication. As we have lately seen,, the feelings called sensations cannot of themselves constitute Mind, even when great numbers of various kinds are present together. Mind is constituted only when each sensation is assimilated to the faint forms of antecedent like sensations. The consolidation of suc- cessive units of feeling to form a sensation, is paralleled in a larger way by the consolidation of successive sensations to form what we call a knowledge of the sensation as such or such — to form the smallest separable portion of what we call thought, as distinguished from mere confused sentiency. So too is it with the relations among those feelings that occur together and limit one another in space or time. Each of these relations, so long as it stands alone in ex- perience with no antecedent like relations, is not fully cognizable as a relation: it assumes its character as a component of intelligence only when, by recurrence of it, there is produced a serial aggregate of such rela- tions. Observe further that while each special sensation is raised into a proximate constituent of simple thought only by being fused with like predecessors, it becomes a proximate constituent of compound thought by simultaneously entering into relations of unlikeness with other sensations which limit it in space or time; just as we saw that the units or pulses that form simple sensations by serial union with their.kind, may simul- taneously help to form complex sensations by entering inio relations of difference with units of other kinds.
186 THE INDUCTIONS OP PSYCHOLOGY.
The same thing obviously holds of the relations them- selves, that exist between these unlike sensations. And thus it becomes manifest that the method by which simple sensations, and the relations among them, are compounded into states of definite consciousness, is essentially analogous to the method by which primitive units of feeling are com- pounded into sensations.
The nest higher stage of mental composition shows us this process repeating itself. The vivid cluster of related sensations produced in us by a special object, has to be united with the faint forms of clusters like it that have been before produced by such objects. What we call knowing the object, is the assimilation of this combined group of real feelings it excites, with one or more preceding ideal groups which objects of the same kind once excited; and the knowledge is clear only when the series of ideal groups is long. Equally does this principle hold of the connexions, static and dynamic, between each such special cluster and the special clusters generated by other objects. Knowledge of the powers and habits of things, dead and living, is constituted by assimilating the more or less complex relations exhibited by their actions in space and time with other such complex relations. If we cannot so assimilate them, or parts of them, we have no knowledge of their actions.
That the same law of composition continues without de- finite limit through tracts of higher consciousness, formed of clusters of clusters of feelings held together by relations of an extremely involved kind, scarcely needs adding.
§ 75. How clearly the evolution of Mind, as thus traced through ascending sta^^^T^^o^ion, conforms to the laws of Evolution in general, will be seen as soon as it is said. We will glance at the correspondence under each of its leading aspects, \ Evolution is primarily a progressing integration; and THE COMPOSITION OF MIND. 1S7 throughout this chapter,, as well as the last, progressing inj tegration has thrust itself upon us as the fundamental iacf in mental evolution. We came upon it quite unexpectedly? in the conclusion that a sensation is an integrated series of nervous shocks or units of feeling; and in the further con- clusion that by integration of two or more such series,, com- pound sensations are formed. We have lately seen that "by an integration of successive like sensations., there arises the knowledge of a sensation as such or such; and that each sensation as it occurs,, while thus integrated with its like, also unites into an aggregate with other sensations that limit it in space or time. And we have similarly seen that the integrated clusters resulting, enter into higher in- tegrations of both these kinds; and so on to the end. The significance of these facts will be* appreciated when it is remembered that the tracts of con- sciousness in which integration is undecided,, are tracts of consciousness hardly included in what we commonly think of as Mind; and that the tracts of consciousness presenting the attributes of Mind in the highest degree, are those in which the integration is carried furthest. Hunger, thirst,i nausea, and visceral feelings in general, as well as feelings; of ^ love, hatred^ anger, &c., which cohere little with.one f another and with other feelings, and thu$. integrate, but! feebly into groups, are portions of consciousness that play! but subordinate parts in the actions we chiefly class^ as mental/ Mental actions, ordinarily so called, are nearly all: carried on in terms of those tactual, auditory, and visual feel-; ings, which exhibit cohesion, and consequent ability to inte-' grate, in so conspicuous a manner. Our intellectual opera- • tions are indeed mostly confined to the auditory feelings (as j integrated into words) and the visual feelings (as integrated; into impressions and ideas of objects, their relations, and their motions). After closing the eyes and observing how relatively-immense is the part of intellectual consciousness that is suddenly shorn away, it will be manifest that the 188 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
most developed portion of perceptive Mind is formed of these visual feelings which cohere so rigidly,, which, inte- grate into such large and numerous aggregates, and which re-integrate into aggregates immensely exceeding in their degree of composition all aggregates formed "by other feel- ings. And then, on rising to what we for convenience dis- tinguish as rational Hind, we find the integration taking a still wider reach.
The ascending phases of Mind show us no less conspicu- ously, the increasing heterogeneity of these integrated aggregates of feelings. In the last chapter, we saw how sensations that are all composed of units of one kind, are rendered heterogeneous by the combination and re-combina- tion of such units in multitudinous ways. We have lately seen that the portions of consciousness occupied by the in- ternal bodily feelings and by the emotions, are, as judged by introspection, relatively very simple or homogeneous: thirst is not made up of contrasted parts, nor can we separate a gust of passion into many distinguishable com- ponents. But on passing upwards to intellectual conscious- ness, there meets us an increasing variety of kinds of feel- ings present together. When we come to the auditory^fepl- ings, which play so important a part in processes of thought, we find that the groups of them are formed of many com- ponents, and that those groups of groups used as symbols of propositions are very heterogeneous. As before howeverwith integration, so here with heterogeneity, a far higher degree is reached in that consciousness formed of visual feelings, which is the most developed part of perceptive Mind. And muchmore heterogeneous still are those tracts of consciousness distinguished as jratiocinative tracts, in which the multiform feelings given us by objects through eyes, ears, and tactual organs, nose, and palate, are formed into conceptions that answer to the objects in all their attributes, and all their activities.