Take first the general antagonism. Every one knows that when a tremendous sound or &n astounding spectacle absorbs the attention, it is next t£> impossible to think of anything else — nest to impossible to entertain irrelevant ideas. Indeed, consciousness soraeiines becomes so entirely filled with the present overpowering impressions as to ex- trade our habitual ideas: producing what we call absence of mind. Less extreme illustrations are furnished by the interruptions to currents of voluntary thought that result from violent pains or loud noises-* And that the shutting out of primary feelings facilitates* the revival of secondary feelings, is also implied by the co-mmon habit of closing the eyes when trying to imagine anything very clearly.
The more special antagonisms &re of considerable interest. We saw" in a previous chapter1 that primary feelings of any order, while they have much power of excluding from consciousness primary feelings ctf the same order, have less power of excluding from consciousness primary feelings of other orders. Here we have? to note, what may.be re- 232 THE INL,DUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
garded as a corollary, greater obstacles to . that primary feelings of any order are secondary feelings of that order than they are to secondai ' impressions of great d resistance to the imagi a melody. The ;y feelings of other orders. Visual tistinctness offer a scarcely-appreciable nation of sounds — say those forming •il in thought of a person recognized yesterday, is but little I -interfered with by the flavours of the things we are eating, i' ^°r do tie sensations received from, objects held in the hanl-ds, hinder us much from thinking of things we have seen, oy* listened to, or tasted, or smelt. Butm the sounds we are heading tend very decidedly to keep out of consciousness other D* sounds of which we wish to think. Visual sensations stanjd considerably in the way of visual ideas. And there are j! still more conspicuous antagonisms between the primary jfeelings and the secondary feelings of lower orders. ^ The different degree^ of these antagonisms are, indeed, worthy of notice: sineje they admit of being generalized, and are not without sig;*nincance. The law appears to be that among the most relational feelings, the primary of any order resist the secondary of the same order to the least extent; and that the resistance becomes more decided in proportion as we descend to feelings that are less and less relational. $• Beginning with the most relational feelings, it "Ks observable that only by a very intense visual serjsation are the ideas of other visual sensations entirely excluded. Thus it is impos- sible while staring* at the pun to think of green; but it is quite possible, or even e.;asy, while looking at a surface coloured red, to think of a| patch of green covering part of its area; and we can, with Considerable distinctness, imagine the clustered colours fonnin- g the remembrance of any object, while the retina is receiving^ the clustered colours yielded by actual objects quite differer.it from it. Of auditory impressions the like may be) said. Loud sounds prevent us from bringing the ideas of < -ther sounds into consciousness; THE EEVIVABILITY OF FEELINGS. 238 but they must be extremely loud tc<> d0 this. And when listening to an orchestra, it will be foi^md that while., during the forte passages, it is difficult to imagine some other musical combination than that which is being? heard, it is compara- tively easy during the piano passage^. Much the same holds among feelings of touch.? The sensations yielded by an object held loosely, do not prevent us from remembering the sensations yielded by other quite* different objects; and it is needful to grasp an actual object: very strongly, so that the sensations of touch, or rather off pressure, verge into those of pain, before remembered taictual feelings are quite extruded. When we come to siUch comparatively-unre- lational feelings as the gustatory andi olfactory, we find this antagonism far more marked. While tasting something decidedly bitter, sweetness cannot "^e thought of: indeed, tastes of even moderate intensity ^trnost prevent us from imagining other tastes. And this: antagonism reaches its extreme among the visceral feeli ags, where, indeed, iii appears to be absolute. / § 99. Other things being equjal, the revivability of a feeling varies with its strength; \ and other things being equal, its revivability varies with thle number of times it has been repeated in experience. Thef triteness of these truths must not prevent us from here briefly noticing them.
The glow of a gorgeous sunset! continues to be recallable long after faintly coloured scenes of the same date have been forgotten. The sound of /a trumpet may be more quickly and clearly imagined thaii that of a bassoon. It is easier to remember the taste of Something that is intensely sour or sweet or bitter than the "feast e of something that is almost insipid. And a very severe pain leaves a trace in memory which, lasts long after-- the traces left by slight aches and discomforts have disappeared.
How repetitions even of fa "tit feelings produce great revivability of them, we see OR comparing our domestic THE OF PSYCHOLOGY.
experiences with, less tlie paper in a frequc be very distinctly rec heard daily, may be t than the tone of a voi -common experiences. The colour of tinted room, subdued though it is, can Called. The tone of a voice which is thought of much more easily and truly 3e, not more marked in character, that has been heard but on:£® or But the other things are usually not equa 3 which we have supposed to be equal, 1. Besides the psychological state which, as we have seei < ^ influences the revivability, there is the physiological state ways. These we must § 100. The degree o part on the extent to was capable of undei evolving much of the c excitation was received which also influences it in several i-now consider.
F revivability of a feeling depends in which the nervous centre concerned 'tigoing much molecular change, and Concomitant feeling, when the original ?<g Several factors co-operate to determine its capability. A! them. An active circu the materials required e complete state of repair is one of lation is another. A blood rich in /or both disintegration and integra- ^respective shares of these factors tion is a third. The cannot be determined; But the influences of 1 identified. *1 When the attention 1 lias been long occupied with any the three usually vary together. at "leastj> may be Prett7 clearly class of impressions — • that is to say, the nervous class 01 impressions — wi •••IJULC-U-J u-u.au *.& w ousjj v±±^ XAV/J.YV/IAO centres concerned have ^been worn by persistent action, the impressions received' I cannot be recalled as clearly as those received when thes p nervous centres were unworn. Excluding cases in which; Abnormal excitement of the local circulation has been produ.. 'ced (cases to be dealt with under the next head), it is a fan^liar fact that after many hours spent in listening to music g, or in looking at pictures, the clustered sensations, auditory or visual, are either not revivable at all, or are les^, distinctly revivable than those which came first in the coi <cert or the picture gallery. If THE BEVIVABILITY OF FE^/j^GS. 235 we take longer periods of continued activity, broken though they are by short periods of rest,, a likie fact meets us. The experience of every tourist supplies fan instance. His first grand mountain-views he can call to n^ind more clearly than the equally-grand views he had aflfer being among the mountains for a month. « That feelings excited when the gen $ral circulation is very vigorous are more revivable than usu'al, is a truth that may be variously exemplified. Evidence jis furnished by both temporary and permanent exaltations of the circula- tion. Impressions of trivial things in which no particular interest was taken, often sttrvive in memory when impressions of much more importa?;at or imposing things fade away; and, on considering the) circumstances, it will frequently be found that such imppessions were received when the energies were hipJ^-wheM exercise,, or pleasure, or both, had greatly raised the actior|. of the heart. That at times when strong emotion has excised the circulation to an exceptional degree, the clustered surrounding objects are revivable wi sensations yielded by th great clearness, often throughout life, is a fact noticed py writers of fiction as a trait of human nature. >As with these quicker variations of vascular activity, so with the slower variations. The receptivity of impressions is hi^h during those portions ' of life in which the blood is prcipelled in full and rapid j currents. Feelings, peripheral oif_ central, experienced in! youth, are long remembered; ^nd while the vigour^ of manhood continues, the sensaticins and emotions leave lasting traces. j Equally, or more, obvious is thje converse truth, that the revivability of feelings excited duning a stjatjg^of^ feebleness is comparatively small. The effects of depressed circula- tion, whether produced by disorder or by age, alike show this. The lowered action of the heart which accompanies great nervous prostration, has for one of its eficcls a marked decrease of receptivity. Things seen and 2J-J5 THE DICTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, •i said and heard are forgotten very quickly — often in a few days. Even the lowered vital activity which we know as great fatigue, is charac:^1^6^ by a diminished retentiveness of impressions. ^ When we pass to that flagging of the circulation wh*ci- accompanies the decline of life, abundant evidence nieets us. Gradually as the vigour decreases there conie^ ai1 increasing failure of memory.
:The experiences of a month ago, or of last week, or of yesterday, are not revp-^able: and in the closing stages of decay things that were Booked at and sounds that were heard but a few minutes ago,',are found to have left no traces.
* There is reason to think tnat, independently of the general circulation, exaltations \and depressions of the cerebral circu- lation, whether normally or abnormally produced, also affect the degree of revivabilitjj of the feelings experienced.
*» § 101. All the circu^ns^aT3ces under which an excitation originally occurred being supposed the same, the degree of revivability of the feeling tnat was produced, varies with the physiological conditions tiiat exist when the revival takes place or is attempted. ", Other things equal, a given past feeling may be broughtv ™-io consciousness vividly, faintly, or not at all, according a| tne nervous centre concerned is or is not well repaired ana ^11 supplied with blood at the moment the remembran06 ls suggested. The evidence assignable in proof of th!-S proposition is mostly entangled with that assigned in propf of t]ie last '* bnt a sufficiency of it may be disentangled.
In that state of high 'spirits which results from good nutrition and raised circu1^0^ it is observable that the memories are more distini^ t]ian ^^- Ideas rise nP in abundance without effort.' Similarly, the vascular excite- ment caused by emotion, providing it does not reach that extreme pitch at which i* prostrates the heart, causes a rush of unusually vivid ideas— ideas so vivid tliat ihey are sometimes, as under great fear> mistaken for realities.
TEE BEYIVABILITY OF FipLTNGS.
How decreased revivability of feel fogs originally strong, goes along with, enfeebled circulation, is exemplified in those exhausted by long illnesses. l Highly nervous sub- jects, too, in whom the action of the h^eart is greatly lowered* habitually complain of loss of memory and inability to think — symptoms which diminish as fast,Jas the natural rate of circulation is regained. Itl is, however, in old age that the relation between failure of circulation and decreased revivability of feelings which were efficiently impressed, is most familiar. The power to recall experiences received during adult and declining life, when! the vital energies were flagging, is the first to disappear; aikd presently experiences received during early life, when the \ital energies were high, cease to be distinctly revivable.
It may be well to add that variat] ions of local circulation, as well as of general circulation, affe ct the ability to revive exemplify the extreme The illusions of delirium vividness to which revived feelings \ feelings.
bral circulation is excessive; and caused by cerebral anaemia exempl § 102. Of course quality as we] he loss of consciousness ies the converse result.
as quantity of blood Js a factor, modifying alike* the stre ngth with whiclh an impression is retamecf and the faci recalled. The influence of this fa| in producing some of the effects al 3ove ascribed to variations of circulation; for quality of bloc along with the vigour of its pro] tions, however, show us that qua] When the circulation has be> stimulants, there is an easy andj may rise when the cerety with which it can be bor has doubtless a share generally rises and falls ulsion. Abnormal devia- ity has its separate effects, artificially exalted by rapid current of thoughts, sMwSig itself in what we describe as unusual brilliancy. And when the exaltation is proiluced Sy certain drags, as. opium and hashish, the revived Impressions of things seen and heard, approach in vividness-: to the original impressions. We have another class of examples in insane people.
THE INDt ACTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
\ That in them there has atrisen some abnormal quality of blood, is now a generally-received opinion; and to this abnormal quality is ascribed that jjjundue vividness of the representative feelings which causes a;| confusion of them with presentative feelings. i These extreme cases* warranb us in supposing that there are minor variations in^ the revivability of feelings, accom- panying those minor raj Rations in the quality of the blood which are caused by ^differences in the activities of the viscera and differences ^ the supplies of food and oxygen.
§ 103. The correspoi p.dence of these several a posteriori a P giori conclusions derivable from the conclusions with the data of Psychology, mus The fact that feelings of the same order more is to be expected if i ct be noticed, of any order tend to exclude ideas than they do- ideas of other orders, particular bundles of nerve-fibres and groups of aerve-ve.|sicjes are, the agents of particular orders of feelings; for, i%ailifestly, when the structures con- cerned are undergoing th|ose molecular changes which have vivid feelings for their cot ^relatives, other molecular changes, which have faint feeling fol r ^^ correlatives, must be greatly obscured. Moreover, we | mav see w^j $£s exclusion Ts more stringentamongthe nnrela^ ional orders of feelings than among ings; since, in proportion as an the relational orders of fee order of feelings is relation, centre, and in proportic complex, it becomes eas;y pied in one way while an another way.
That strong environing al, it must have a complex nervous L as a nervous centre becomes for one part of it to be occupther part of it is occupied in actions generate feelings which are more distinctly revivab e tlia.n ttose generated by weak environing actions, is also a ^ fact inferable from physiological premises. For as strong e^-^Qj^g actions produce strong nervous discharges and g:^eat amounts of those central molecular changes of which| feelings are the correlatives, it i- THE EEVIVABILITY OP FEELINGS. 239 is obvious that they must produce in high, degrees those structural changes, whatever they niay be, to which the revivability of the feelings is due.,-' Similarly, it follows that those exaltations of vital activity which facilitate such structural changes, and aid the rapid nutrition which perpetually prepared the parts for them, must conduce to the revivability of tlie feelings experienced 5 while depression of the energies must do the reverse.
rt CHAPTER "VI.
THE BEVIVAB1LITY 0?' RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS, § 104. Much that wis said in the last chapter in illustra* tion of the propositions Jt sets forth, serves to illustrate the parallel propositions to ^e set forth in this chapter. Mind being composed of feeling3 and relations between feelings, and everv mental act in\V^nS "both kinds of components, it happens that, in exemplifying the revivability of feelings as modified by various concfctions> tliere ^as beeri exemplified .also the revivability of re]|ati°ns between feelings.
Nevertheless, there remiam to be enunciated truths which in the last chapter were bi°-t tacitly implied, and other truths that were not even remote^ indicated, ^or though revival of a feeling involves revive ^ of tne relations in which it was originally experienced; aiM though revival of a cluster of feelings, constituting an o|dinaiT idea> involves revival of a whole plexus of relations if- ^hich the feelings stood to one another; there is not invMved ^ tne recognition of these facts, the further fact that Delations may be in great measure parted from the related feeing3 an(3- revived by themselves. Since quite different pair^ of impressions may stand to one another in the same rel^tion of co-existence; and since a sequence may hold together impressions now of this order and now of that; and sinc^ ^Differences the same in degree may be presented here by 'impressions of one species and here by impressions of anotlier; ^ results that relations of THE KEVIFABILITY OF DELATIONS. 241 Co -existence, of Sequence, and of Difference, come to "be separable from particular pairs of impressions,, and acquire a ^wasi-independence. Their independence never becomes complete; for a relation cannot be conceived without two related terms. But being common to terms of all orders, they come to be conceived apart from terms of any particular order — can have their terms changed in consciousness with- out being themselves changed; and thus gain a kind of revivability so far independent of any particular terms,, as to have an illusive appearance of being independent of all terms.
What we have here to do, then, is to consider the reviva- bility of relations as dissociated little or much from related feelings. Though the several forms of thought under which our feelings are presented and re-presented cannot exist without some contents, yet their contents may be in great part extruded; and we have to observe how these com- paratively empty forms comport themselves in respect of their revivabilities, as influenced by psychological and physio- logical conditions.
§ 105. Eelations in general are more revivable than feel- ings in general. Whether it be a compound relation of Co- existence, or a compound relation of Sequence, or a com- pound relation of Difference, we shall find that the rela- tion is more distinctly representable, and more enduring in memory, than are its terms.
Naturally, this truth is the least conspicuous among the most relational feelings, since these being highly revivable, there is a comparatively small margin for difference between their revivability and that of the relations between them. Still the difference may even here be perceived. If we recall a room frequented in childhood, the relative posi- tions of the door, the windows, the fireplace, arise in consciousness instantly: we may or may not think of some of the colours, but if we do, it is by a subsequent £ 242 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY act. Similarly with the tactually-disclosed coexistent impressions which we remember as a knife-handle. The combination of these constituting the conception of its shape, recurs more readily in thought than does the par- ticular intensity of any one of the pressures,, or than does the particular feeling of coldness.
With relations of sequence as exhibited among the audi- tory feelings,, this contrast is more decided. To begin an air in the right key, most persons find very difficult: with- out the help of an instrument, the first note is often wrong by a third or even a fifth. But the duration of the first note is more nearly remembered. Though the time at which the air is taken may differ somewhat from the time as originally heard, it does not differ so much as the pitch. It is further observable, as showing the same thing, that while the rhythm of a melody may be repeated in thought with great exactness, we cannot delight ourselves by recall- ing with the same exactness the rich timbre of the tones in which we heard the melody rendered.
When we descend to the least relational feelings, the greater revivability of relations than of their terms becomes very manifest. We remember for a long time with accu- racy the spot in which an acute pain was felt, though the pain itself is not representable with anything like its origi- nal acuteness; and if the pain was a throbbing one, we can recall its intervals with approximate correctness. So, too, is it with the central feelings. The succession of certain strong emotions passed through yesterday, is easier to recall than the emotions themselves. It is the same with the relation of each emotion to its antecedents. The cir- cumstances under which we were angry may be reproduced in consciousness instantly; but the anger itself cannot be reproduced instantly.
It is worth considering whether the possibility of ex- tended and complex thinking does not in part depend on this greater revivability of relations than of their terms.
THE KEVIVAlilUTY OF RELATIONS.
We "habitually pass in thought from concept to concept, brienv recognizing the essentials of eacli — the essential relations of its elements to one another and to other tilings. If the feelings between which all these relations exist arose in consciousness with as much promptness and vivid- ness, consciousness would be so encumbered with materials that involved processes of reasoning would be greatly im- peded, if not prevented.
§ 103. As different orders of feelings are more or less relational, so, too, in a sense, different orders of relations are more or less relational. For just as some kinds of feelings are more capable of entering into relations with one another than other kinds are, so some kinds of relations are more capable of entering into relations with one another than other kinds are. Understanding the expression in this sense, we may say that the most relational of relations are those of Co-existence. Co-existences may be trebly com- pounded, and are, indeed, trebly compounded in most acts of thought: impressions are presented and represented in those triple relations of position involved in the conception of place. Sequences are much less relational; for they can enter into relation with one another not in three directions at once, but only in one direction. Successive intervals of time stand related to one another as greater, or less, or equal; and in the beats and bars of music, these relations of equality and difference in portions of time are themselves compounded into other relations — relations, however, which are essentially serial. The least relational of relations are the primary ones — those of Difference; for though these enter into relations with one another whenever we contemplate two differences as equal, or more or less unequal, in degree, yet (unless it be in the higher divisions of Mathematics) they do not enter into relations more compound than these.
This description of the several classes of relations as more or less relational, is introductory to the fact here to tM4 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
hp set down, that just as the most relational of feelings are the most revivable, so, too, are the most relational of relations the most revivable. Relations of Co-existence, whether we take any particular plexus of them consti- tuting the perception of a form, or whether we take the &u-oTeolatfi of them constituting the consciousness of Space, Lnve a revivability far exceeding that of all other relations. We think of distances, of directions, of sizes, of shapes, of arrangements among objects, with little or no effort and with great clearness; and these variously- compounded relations we conceive as frameworks which we can imagine to be occupied by other objects, or to be unoccupied. The revivability of relations of Co-existence is, indeed, so extreme that they cannot be wholly suppressed — an assem- blage of them greater or less in extent, partly occupied and partly unoccupied, forms an inextinguishable element of consciousness.
Relations of Sequence, less relational than those of Co- existence, are less revivable. Though it is true that, as organized into the abstract conception of Time, relations of Sequence can no more be wholly excluded from conscious- ness than those of Co-existence, yet, as thus abstracted, they do not form so dominant an element of consciousness: the integrated aggregate of space-relations habitually present in thought, is much larger and much clearer than the integ- rated aggregate of time-relations. It is observable, too, that particular space-relations are more clearly and correctly representable than particular time-relations. We can mark out with greater accuracy the length of an inch or of a foot, than we can assign the length of an interval as being one minute or as being ten minutes.
Simple relations of Difference (those between feelings) are neither so readily nor so accurately revivable as relations of Difference between co-existences or between sequences, nor as the relations of Co-existence and Sequence them- selves. We can better remember the proportion between TII"3 CEVIVAlJlLITY OF DELATIONS. -rJ two lengths which we observed simultaneously, and can more truly reproduce in thought the ratio between the rhythms of movements in a machine, than we can recall the degree of contrast between two lights we saw or two weights we lifted; and where the differences are between the unre- Jational feelings, as tastes, and smells, and visceral sensa- tions, we can recall them but vaguely.
§ 107. As presented feelings hinder the representation of other feelings,?.o do presented relations hinder the represent- ation of other relations; but they do this in a smaller degree. It is with relations, too, as with feelings, that the antagonism of the presented to the represented is more mani- fest between those of the same order than between those of different orders. Omitting superfluous illustrations, we will note a few distinctive traits only.
Among the most relational relations, as among the most relational feelings, the present impedes remembrance of the past in the smallest degree • and among these, too, we find presented relations interfering in the smallest degree with the representation of relations of the same order. Visual relations, no matter how vividly impressed, never absolutely exclude from consciousness other visual relations of which we choose to think. We saw that a very intense visual feel- ing temporarily prevents us from calling to mind another visual feeling; but though it is impossible to gaze at the sun and think of green, it is quite possible to gaze at the sun and think of a square. Similarly, a trial will show that if while contemplating any scene we think of some other scene, we recall the distribution of its parts more readily than we recall its colours.
Relations of Sequence, much less relational as they are., show us a greater interference of the present with remem- brance of the past. Though while looking at one shape we can easily think of another quite unlike it, we cannot,, without difficulty, if at all, call to mind a rhythmical com- ^44 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
h^ sot down, that just as the most relational of feelings are the most revivable, so, too, are the most relational of relations the most revivable. Eelatioiis of Co-existence, whether we take any particular plexus of them consti- tuting the perception of a form, or whether we take the aggregate of them constituting the consciousness of Space, 1m re a readability far exceeding that of all other relations. We think of distances, of directions, of sizes, of shapes, of arrangements among objects, with little or no effort and with great clearness; and these variously- compounded relations we conceive as frameworks which we can imagine to be occupied by other objects, or to be unoccupied. The revivability of relations of Co-existence is, indeed, so extreme that they cannot be wholly suppressed — an assem- blage of them greater or less in extent, partly occupied and partly unoccupied, forms an inextinguishable element of consciousness.
Eelations of Sequence, less relational than those of Co- existence, are less revivable. Though it is true that, as organized into the abstract conception of Time, relations of Sequence can no more be wholly excluded from conscious- ness than those of Co-existence, yet, as thus abstracted, they do not form so dominant an element of consciousness: the integrated aggregate of space-relations habitually present in thought, is much larger and much clearer than the integ- rated aggregate of time-relations. It is observable, too, that particular space-relations are more clearly and correctly representable than particular time-relations. We can mark out with greater accuracy the length of an inch or of a foot, than we can assign the length of an interval as being one minute or as being ten minutes.
Simple relations of Difference (those between feelings) are neither so readily nor so accurately revivable as relations of Difference between co-existences or between sequences, nor as the relations of Co-existence and Sequence them- selves. We can better remember the proportion between TIIS REYIYAEIUTY OF IIJ-LATIOXS.
two lengths which we observed simultaneously, and caii more truly reproduce in thought the ratio between the rhythms of movements in a machine, than we can recall the degree of contrast "between two lights we saw or two weights we lifted; and where the differences are between the unre- lational feelings,, as tastes, and smelly and visceral sensa- tions, we can recall them but vaguely.
§ 107. As presented feelings hinder the representation of other feelings, so do presented relations hinder the represent- ation of other relations; but they do this in a smaller degree. It is with relations., too, as with feelings, that the antagonism of the presented to the represented is more mani- fest between those of the same order than "between those of different orders. Omitting superfluous illustrations, we will note a few distinctive traits only.