tween inner and outer relations that are very simple or general; in Reason, the correspondence is between inner and outer relations that are complex, or special, or abstract, or infrequent. But the complexity, speciality, abstractncss, and infreqnency of relations, are entirely matters of degree. From a group of two co-existent attributes, up through groups of three, four, five, six, seven co-existent attributes, we may step by step ascend to such involved groups of co- existent attributes as are exhibited in a living body under a particular state of feeling, or under a particular physical disorder. Between relations experienced every moment and relations experienced but once in a life, there are relations jthat occur with all degrees of commonness. How then can jany particular phase of complexity or infrequency be fixed lupon as that at which Instinct ends and Reason begins? "" From whatever point of view regarded, the facts imply a gradual transition from the lower forms of psychical action to the higher. That progressive complication of the instincts, which, as we have found, involves a progressive diminution of their purely automatic character, likewise in- volves a simultaneous commencement of Memory and Reason. But this joint evolution must be specifically described.
§ 204. When the correspondence has advanced to those environing objects and acts which present groups of attri- butes and relations of considerable complexity, and whicli occur with comparative rareness— when, consequently, the repetition of experiences has been insufficient to make the sensory changes produced by such groups cohere perfectly with the adapted motor changes— when such motor change' and the impressions that accompany them simply become nascent; then, by implication, there result ideas of suck metor Changes and impressions, or, as already explained memones of the motor changes before performed under like circumstances, and of the concomitant impressions. Did the process end here, there would be no manifestation of ration.
REASON. 455 ality. But the process does not end here, as we shall soon see.
For though when the confusion of a complex impression with some allied one causes a confusion among the nascent motor excitations, there is entailed a certain hesitation; and though this hesitation continues as long as these nascent motor excitations, or ideas of the correlative actions, go on superseding one another; yet, ultimately, some one set of motor excitations will prevail over the rest. As the groups of antagonistic tendencies aroused will scarcely ever be exactly balanced, the strongest group will at length pass into action; and as this sequence will usually be the one that has recurred oftenest in experience, the action will, on the average of cases, be the one best adapted to the cir- cumstances. But an action thus produced is nothing else than a rational action. Each of the actions which we call* rational, presents three.phases answering to those here de- scribed: — first, a certain combination of impressions signify- ing some combination of phenomena to which the organism; is to be adjusted; second, an idea of the actions before per-! formed under like conditions, which idea is a nascent exci-; tation of the nervous agents before concerned in such' actions, either as producers of them or as affected by the production of them; and, third, the actions themselves, which are simply the results of the nascent excitation rising ^ into an actual excitation. An illustration will make this clear. A snarling dog (S&mmonly turns tail when a stone is thrown at him; or even when he sees the stooping motion required for picking up a stone. Suppose that, having often experienced this sequence, I am again at- tacked by such a dog; what are the resulting psychical processes? The combined impressions produced on my senses, and the state of consciousness which they arouse, have before been followed by those motor changes required for picking up and throwing a stone, and by those visual changes resulting from the dog's retreat. As these psy- 456 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS, chical states have repeatedly succeeded one another in experience, they have acquired some cohesion — there is a tendency for the psychical states excited in me by the snarlino- dog, to be followed by those other psychical states that have before followed them. In other words, there is a nascent excitation of the motor apparatus concerned in pickino* up and throwing; there is a nascent excitation of all the sensory nerves affected during such acts; and, through these, there is a nascent excitation of the visual nerves, which on previous occasions received impressions of a flying dog. That is, I have the ideas of picking up and throwing a stone, and of seeing a dog run away; for these that we call ideas, are nothing else than weak repetitions of the psychical states caused by actual impressions and motions. But what happens further? If there is no an- tagonist impulse — if no other ideas or partial excitations arise, and if the dog's aggressive demonstrations produce in me feelings of adequate vividness, these partial excita- tions pass into complete excitations. I go through the pre- viously-imagined actions. The nascent motor changes become real motor changes; and the adjustment of inner relations to outer relations is completed. This, however, is just the process which we saw must arise whenever, from increasing complexity and decreasing frequency, the automatic adjustment of inner to outer re- lations becomes uncertain or hesitating. Hence it is clear ythat the actions we call instinctive pass gradually into the factions we call rational.
Further proof is furnished by the converse fact, that the actions we call rational are, by long-continued repetition, rendered automatic or instinctive. By implication, this lapsing of reason into instinct was shown in the last chapter, when exemplifying the lapsing of memory into instinct: the two facts are different aspects of the same fact. But some instances specially exhibiting this second aspect may here be fitly given. Take, as one, EEASOK. 457 EEASOK. 457 tlio actions gono through in shaving, or in tying a neckerchief. Every man will remember that when, as a youth, he first attempted to guide his hands "by watching the reflections of them in the looking-glass,, he was unable to move them rightly. The ordinary con- nexions between the visual impressions received from his moving fingers, and the muscular feelings accompanying their motions, no longer holding good when he had to deal with the images of his fingers, he was led to make move- ments contrary to those he intended. Only after setting himself to watch how the muscular feelings and the reflected appearances are related, and then consciously making a certain motion in expecbation of a certain appearance, did he slowly master the difficulty. By daily practice, how- ever, these psychical changes have become so well co- ordinated, that he now shaves while thinking of something, else. Still more marked is the analogous process that occurs in the microscopist. Whatever he places under the object glass is seen inverted, and with its right and left sides interchanged. All adjustments of the stage and all motions of his dissecting instruments, have to be made in directions opposite to those which the uninitiated eye would dictate. Yet habit renders this reversed manipulation as easy as ordinary manipulation — it becomes as unnecessary for the microscopist to take thought how he shall.move his hands in the one case as in the other. The approximately-automatic character of habitual actions _.is clearly proved when they are performed, as they often are. inappropriately. Any one accustomed to traverse particular streets on his way to some place of business, finds that, when intending to branch-off elsewhere, he is apt, if engaged in thought, to follow the usual route — often for a long way beyond the point at which he should have diverged: the im- pressions received from the familiar objects he passes, cause him to make the ordinary crossings and turnings. In reading aloud, again, the law is well displayed. Originally, 458 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
sight of the letters was followed by thought of the sounds; and thought of the sounds, by such vocal actions as made the sounds. But eventually, the connexions between visual impressions and vocal actions grow so far automatic, that it becomes possible to read aloud sentence after sen- tence while occupied in thinking of something else — while unconscious of the words uttered and the ideas conveyed by them. In short, many if not most of our common dai]y actions (actions every step of which was originally pre- ceded by a consciousness of consequences and was therefore rational) have, by perpetual repetition, been rendered more or less automatic. The requisite impressions being made on us, the appropriate movements follow; without memory, reason, or volition, coming into play, § 205. A further interpretation here becomes possible. We have seen that rational action arises out of instinctive \ action when this grows too complex to be perfectly auto- ^matic. We have now to observe that, at the same time, there ': arises that kind of reasoning which does not directly lead to -action — that reasoning through which the great mass of surrounding co-existences and sequences are known.
As fast as the groups of external attributes and relations recognized, become too complex to be consolidated into single psychical states, there result both the opportunity and the power of inferring such attributes or relations belonging to any group, as are not immediately presented. Pure in- stinct continues so long as the stimuli responded to are made up of few and constant components. While the combined impressions of colour, position, size, and motion, which together stand for an adjacent object that can be seized for prey, are alone receivable, the actions will be purely auto- matic. But by the time that the organization of experiences has given a power of appreciating the complicated relations of form, of mixed colouring, of peculiar motions, &c., along with the more general ones of colour, position, size, and REASON. 459 motion; tlie attributes and relations united into a group, have grown not only too numerous to be all mentally presented at the same instant, but too numerous to be all physically presented at the same instant. For the same experiences which have rendered these complex groups of attributes cognizable, have also brought them before the senses in such various ways, that sometimes one part of a group has been perceptible and sometimes another part of it: now these elements of an animaFs form and markings and actions have been visible, and now those. Though on the average each experience of the group has resembled previous ones, yet it has presented some attributes which they did not present, and has not presented others which they did present. Hence, by an accumulation of such ex- periences, each complex group of external phenomena establishes in the organism an answering complex group of psychical states, which has the peculiarity that it contains more states than were ever produced, or ever can be pro- duced, by any one presentation of the external group. What must happen from this? It must happen that when, on any future presentation of the external group, certain of these aggregated psychical states are directly produced by the impressions made on the senses, various others of the psychical states that have been aggregated with them, or made coherent to them by experience, will become nascent: \ ' the ideas of one or more unperceived attributes will be \ aroused: the unperceived attributes will be inferred. ' Here, also, the doctrine enunciated is verified by the established truth of its obverse. We lately saw that while, on the one hand, instinctive actions pass into rational actions when from increasing complexity and infrequency they be- come imperfectly automatic; on the other hand, rational actions pass, by constant repetition, into automatic or instinc- tive actions. Similarly, we may here see that while, on the one hand, rational inferences arise when the groups of attri- butes and relations "cogmzed become such that the impres- 460 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
sions of them cannot be simultaneously co-ordinated; on the other hand, rational inferences pass, by constant recurrence,, into automatic inferences or organic intuitions. All ac- quired perceptions exemplify this truth. The numberless cases in which we seem directly to know the distances, forms, solidities, textures, &c., of the things around us, are cases in which psychical states originally answering to phe- nomena separately perceived, and afterwards connected in thought by inference, have, by repetition, become indis- solubly united, so as to constitute a rational knowledge that appears intuitive.
-, Thus, the experience-hypothesis furnishes an adequate so- lution. The genesis of instinct, the development of memory and reason out of it, and the consolidation* of rational actions and, inferences into instinctive ones, are alike explic- able on the single principle, that the cohesion between psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which the relation between the answering external phenomena has ; been repeated in experience.
( § 206. But does the experience-hypothesis also explain I the evolution of the higher forms of rationality out of the I lower? It does. Beginning with reasoning from parti cu- f lars to particulars — familiarly exhibited by children and by f domestic animals — the progress to inductive and deductive reasoning is similarly unbroken, as well as similarly deter- mined. And by the accumulation of experiences is also determined the advance from narrow generalizations to generalizations successively wider and wider.
Were it not for the prevalent anxiety to establish some absolute distinction between animal intelligence and human intelligence, it would be needless to assign proof of this. &ren as it is, the truth is so manifest that under most of its aspects none question it. Evory one admits that the infant, while occupied in drawing those simplest inferences which by and by become consolidated into acquired perceptions, is REASON. 4$1 exercising no higher rationality than the dog that recognizes his own name, the different members of the household, and the hours of meals. Every one must also admit that the steps by which these simplest inferences of the infant pass into those inferences of high complexity drawn in adult life, are so gradual that it is impossible to mark the successive steps: no one can name that day in any human life when the alleged division between special and general conclusions was crossed. Hence, every one is bound to admit that as the rationality of an infant is no higher than that of a dog, if so high; and as, from the rationality of the infant to that! of the man the progress is through gradations which are in- 1 finitesimal; there is also a series of infinitesimal gradations) through whioh brute rationality may pass into human ration- \ ality. Furtlier, it must be admitted that as the assimilation " of experiences of successively-increasing complexity, suffices! for the unfolding of reason in the individual human being; » so must it suffice for the evolution of reason in general. t Equally clear is the argument from the history of civilization, - or from the comparison of existing races of men. That there is an immense difference in abstractness between the reason- ings of the aboriginal races who peopled Britain, and the I reasonings of the Bacons and Newtons who have descended j from them, is a trite remark. That the Papuan cannot draw inferences approaching in complexity to those daily drawn by European savants } is no less a platitude. Yet no one alleges an absolute distinction between our faculties and those of our remote ancestors, or between the faculties of civilized men and those of savages. Fortunately, there are records showing that the advance towards conceptions of great com- plication and high generality, has taken place by slow steps — by natural growth. Let us glance at them. Simple | numeration existed before arithmetic; arithmetic before j algebra; algebra before the infinitesimal calculus; and the } more special forms of the infinitesimal calculus before its more general forms. The law of the scales was known 462 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
before the general law of the lever was known; the law of the lever was known before the laws of composition and resolution of forces were known; and these were known before the laws of motion under their universal forms were known. From the ancient doctrine that the curve in which the sun, the moon, and each of the planets, moves, is a circle (a perfectly simple and constant figure); to the doc- trine taught by Kepler, that each member of the planetary system describes an ellipse (a much less simple and constant figure); and afterwards to the doctrine taught by Newton, that the curve described by every heavenly body is some conic section (a still less simple and constant figure); the advance in generality,, in complexity, in ab- Stractness, is manifest. Numerous like illustrations are furnished by Physics, by Chemistry, by Physiology: all of them showing, in common with the foregoing ones, that the advance has been gradual, and that each more general relation has become known through the experience of relations a degree less general. If, then, we have proof that in the course of civilization there has been an advance from rational cognitions of a low order of generality to those of a high order of generality, brought about solely by the accumulation of experiences; if this advance is as great as that from the higher forms of brute rationality to the lower forms of human rationality (which no one who compares the generalizations of a Hottentot with those of La Place can deny); it is a legitimate conclusion that the accumulation of experiences suffices to account for "the evolution of all rationality out of its simplest forms. The iistinction, contended for by Whately, between special reasoning and general reasoning, is untenable. Generality is entirely a thing of degree; and unless it be asserted that the* rational faculty of the cultivated European is essentially different from that of a savage or a child, it., cannot conf^iS^y^^.^ll^d that there is any essential difEerence (between brute reason and human reason, —..,»,»'*»-,w.,..«..-.-",.Xr.,< _ _ ^ REASON.
§ 207. To complete tlie argument it needs but to show, by a special synthesis, that the establishment of every generalization, simple or complex, concrete or abstract, is definitely explicable in conformity with the principle hither- to traced. The general law that the cohesion of psychical states is determined by the frequency with which they have followed one another in experience, affords a satisfactory solution of the highest as of the lowest psychological phe- nomena. When treating of the integration of correspon- dences, something was done towards showing that the for- mation of the most extended generalizations does not differ in method from the formation of the simplest perceptions; but here, this may be more definitely shown.
As an instance let us take the discovery of the relation between degree of evolution of the nervous system and degree of intelligence. Originally, no such relation was recog- nized or was suspected. It was known that certain creatures have more sagacity than others. It was known that certain creatures have larger heads than others. To some it was known that the larger heads commonly contain larger masses of soft whitish matter. But the causal connexions among these traits were obscured by other connexions. In- telligent creatures were seen to have various other charac- teristics besides large brains. Most of them are four- legged j most of them are covered with fur; most of them have teeth. And creatures having large brains were seen to have other characteristics than that of intelligence: as strength, length of life, viviparousness. Hence, there was' at first no reason why height of intelligence and extent of \ nervous development, should be thought of together. 1 What, then, was needed to establish a mental connexion. between them? Nothing but an accumulation of ex-1: pcriences; *or, as we say — a multiplying of observations.! That the rationale of this, and its conformity to the general law, may be understood, let us have recourse to symbols. Let A stand for the known characteristic, intelligence.
on 4151 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
And let us put X to represent the unknown characteristic which it Is dependent— a developed nervous system. Now A is found along with many varieties of size, form, colour, structure, habit, &c.; and X co-exists with this, that, and the other peculiarity, besides intelligence. That is to say,, there are many different groups of attributes variously as- sociated with A and X, and by which the relation of A to X is disguised; or, to continue the symbols — there are Lrroaps,BCDXLFZA, P L P A Q N X Y, EDZE X B A 0 Y, and so on, in countless combinations. Bui BOW if, other things "being equal, the cohesion of psychical states is proportionate to the number of times they have been connected in experience, what must result in the minds of those who are continually impressed with groups of attributes which, differing as they do in other respects, are alike in presenting the relation A to X? As the rela- tion of A to X is constant; as the relations of A to any other attribute, and of X to any other attribute, are not con- stant; as, consequently, the relation of A to X occurs with. greater frequency than the relation of A to anything else, or of X to anything else; it follows from the general luw that the psychical states answering to A and X, will become more coherent to each other than either is to the rest of the states with which they occur — there will even- tually arise a tendency for A to call up X, and for X to call up A. In other words, A and X will be connected in thought as attributes that constantly co-exist; and so will be esta- blished the generalization that the degree of intelligence varies as the development of the nervous system.
Manifestly, the same reasoning holds however compli- cated the relations, and however greatly obscured. In- volved and varied as may be the phenomena to be gene- ralised, if there has already been reached that grade of intelligence required for cognition of the complex terms of the relation common to them; then, repeated experiences will eventually generalize the relation, in virtue of tnat BEASON.
same simple law of psychical changes -which we have found sufficient to explain the lower phenomena of intelligence.
§ 208. Here seems to be the fittest place for pointing out * liow the general doctrine that has been developed, supplies a reconciliation between the experience-hypothesis as com- monly interpreted, and the hypothesis which the trail- 3 soendentalists oppose to it.*.., * * In the first edition of this work there here followed a paragraph. whicK ia no longer required, nor can indeed be properly embodied in the text — a paragraph expressing a belief in the natural genesis of organic forms, in contrast with the current belief in their supernatural genesis. But while this paragraph is now needless, it formed a needful part of the argument as originally worked out; and I here append it for this reasoD, as well as for the purpose of indicating the view I held on the question of the origin of species at the time when the first edition of this work was published IE 1855. The paragraph is intentionally reproduced without verbal amend uients or changes of any kind.
'* As most who have read thus far will have perceived, both the general argument unfolded in the synthetical divisions of this work, and many of the special arguments by which it has been supported, imply a tacit adhe- sion to the development hypothesis — the hypothesis thatj-ife^n its multi- 1 tudinous and infinitely- varied embodiments, has arisen out of tlieTowest | and simplest beginnings, by steps as^ gradual as those which evolve a homo- J geneous microscopic germ into a complex organism. This tacit adhesion, | winch the progress of the argument has rendered much more obvious than 1 anticipated it would become, I do not hesitate to acknowledge. Not, indeed, that I adopt the current edition of the hypothesis. Ever since the recent revival of the controversy of 'law versus miracle,' I have not ceased to regret that so unfortunate a statement of the law should have been given — a statement quite irreconcilable with very obvious truths, and one that not only suggests insurmountable objections, but makes over to opponents a vast series of facts which, rightly interpreted, would tell with great force against them. [This referred to the V&ttiges of the Natural History of Creation."] What may be a better statement of the law, this ia not the place to inquire. It must suffice to enunciate the belief that Life j under all its forms has arisen by a progressive, unbroken evolution; and through the immediate instrumentality of whaiTwe call natural cauJSfes. That this is an hypothesis, I readily admit. That it may never be anything more, seems probable. That even in its most defensible shape there are \ serious difficulties in its way, I cheerfully acknowledge: though, consider- I ing the extreme complexity of the phenomena: the entire destruction of