sentative, such as those implied in the domestic relations,. I there is produced an extremely involved and massive j feeling of the emotional order, answering to the idea, r home. But now let it be remarked that as fast I as these compound states of consciousness in their ascend-; ing grades, severally become, by integration of their j elements, practically single; so fast do they begin to play j the same parts in the mental processes that single states j do. The continuance of a sensation being inconsistent with I the occurrence of a change, we saw that consciousness of!
changes, or relations among sensations, is ever at variance jwith consciousness of the sensations. Here we may f 478 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
similarly see that in proportion as a composite feeling includ- ing" many sensations and their relations, becomes consoli- dated,, its continuance must be at variance with the occurrence of a change to some other composite feeling; that is — must be at variance with the establishnie-it of a relation between the thing causing such composite feeling, and any thing- else; that is — must be at variance with cognition. And hence arises the fact known to persons analytically inclined-, that when they think about any gratification they are re- ceiving— speculate upon the cause of it, or criticise the object of it — the gratification is suspended.
These several expositions have, I think, made it clear that cognition and feeling, throughout all phases of their evolution, are at once antithetical and inseparable. The implication is that they are but different aspects of the same development, and may so be expected to arise from the same root by the same process. This being understood we may now go on to consider the feelings synthetically.
§ 212. "Where action is perfectly automatic, feeling does not exist. Of this we have several proofs. We have the proof that in creatures most markedly exhibiting them, automatic actions go on equally well when the chief nervous centre has been removed. We have the proof that our own automatic actions are unaccompanied by feelings: as wit- "ness those of the viscera in their normal states. And we have the further proof that actions which in ourselves are partly voluntary, partly reflex (as that by which the foot is withdrawn from scalding water), and which, so long as they are accompanied by feeling, are accompanied by will, be- come more energetically automatic if feeling is lost. When injury of the afferent nerves has destroyed sensibility in a limb, the slightest stimulus, as the touch of a feather, pro- duces reflex movements that are stronger than those pro- duced in a limb retaining its sensibility.
This antagonism, of automatic action and feeling will be THE FEELINGS. 479 better understood on observing that feeling involves a per- sistence which automatic action negatives. To have the state of consciousness recognizable as a particular feeling, implies some duration of that state; and in proportion as it fills a smaller interval in the chain of states, in the same proportion does it lapse out of consciousness — in the same proportion does it cease to be felt. The proposition is a truism. To say that a state of consciousness has consider- able continuity, is to say that it is a distinct element of consciousness; which is the same thing as being known or felt. To say that it has scarcely any continuity, is to say that it forms a scarcely perceivable element in conscious- ness; which is the same thing as being scarcely at all known or felt. And to say that it is a state of conscious- ness having no appreciable length, is to say that it forms no element in consciousness; which is the same thing as being not known or felt. It follows, therefore, that when a set of psychical changes occurs instantaneously, the psychical states forming the antecedents and consequents of the changes are not felt; and the further the consolidation of • any set of psychical changes is carried, the more complete must be the absence of feeling. Now the completely-consolidated sets of changes are the automatic changes. The automatic changes are those of which the elements are practically fused into one change. Consequently, where all the psychical actions are perfectly automatic, there is no feeling.
"While an entire absence of Memory and Reason is accom- panied by an entire absence of Peeling, the same progress which gives origin to Memory and Reason simultaneously gives origin to Peeling. For what did we find to be the circumstances under which Memory and Reason become nascent? We found that when the adjustments of the organism to its environment begin to take in involved and infrequent groups of outer relations — when, consequently, the answering groups of inner relations include many ele- 4SO SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
inents, of which some are not often repeated in experience — when, that is, there are formed groups of inner relations whose components are imperfectly coherent — when, as a necessary result, there come to be hesitating automatic actions; then, Memory and Reason simultaneously become nascent. The ceasing to be automatic and the becoming rational, are, as we saw, the same thing. We have just seen, however, that when psychical changes are perfectly automatic, they are without feeling. The existence of feel- ing we have seen to imply psychical states having some per- sistence. But psychical states having some persistence are the states which result when automatic action fails. Thus then, as the psychical changes become too complicated to be perfectly automatic, they become incipiently sensational. Memory, Reason, and Feeling take their rise at the same time.
A confirmation of this view, parallel to confirmations given in the two preceding chapters, may be set down. Among our own mental processes, many which were once slow, and were then accompanied by feeling, are by the same repeti- tion which renders them automatic, also rendered indifferent or feelingless. This is equally the case whether the accom- panying feelings are painful or pleasurable. In spelling out its reading-lessons, the child experiences a disagreeable sense of effort; but in the adult, the identifi- cation of words is a totally unemotional process. The learning of a new language requires labour that is more or less unpleasant, and the first attempts to speak it soon produce weariness; but after due practice it is spoken with entire indifference. And not to multiply illustrations, I may quote the general remark that habit renders easy the actions that once were hard, as showing that this law- holds throughout; since by calling actions hard we mean to some extent painful, and becoming easy is ceasing to be painful. Equally general is the kindred truth. So long as the combinations of properties they present are THE FEELINGS. 481 THE FEELINGS. 481 new to it, the commonest objects give pleasure to tlie infant; but as fast as, by constant repetition, the com- pound impressions produced become consolidated into per- fect cognitions of the objects, so fast do the objects become indifferent. Throughout childhood, youth, and manhood, the same fact is daily manifested. The often-repeated groups of psychical changes cease to be interesting; and there arises a demand for those that have not been experi- enced, or have been little experienced.
The parallel is complete. We found that not only do Memory and Reason begin where the psychical changes cease to be automatic; but that where they have existed they disappear when, by perpetual repetition, the psychical changes become automatic. And here we find both that Feeling arises under the same conditions, and that it ceases under the same conditions.
Let us now devote our attention to the genesis of Feel- ings of more complex kinds.
§ 213. When there come to be cases in which two very similar groups of external attributes and relations have been followed in experience by different motor changes; and when, consequently, the presentation of one of these groups partially excites two sets of motor changes, each of which is prevented by their mutual anta- gonism from at once taking place; then, while one of these sets of nascent motor changes and nascent im- pressions habitually accompanying it, constitutes a memory of such motor changes as before performed and impressions as before received, and while it also constitutes a prevision of the action appropriate to the new occasion, it further con- stitutes the desire to perform the action. For different as these three things eventually become, they are originally one. A further development of an illustration already used will make this manifest. Suppose the subject of the psychical phenomena we are considering, to have I I 482 SFSCIAL SYNTHESIS.
occasional experiences of two animals somewhat similar in colour, size, and general contour, one of which serves for prey and the other of which is a dangerous enemy. The complex impression produced by the enemy, has been fol- lowed in experience by injuries, by some defensive actions, j» by certain cries, and eventually by flight. The complex 1 impression produced by the prey has been followed in ex- I perience by motions of pursuit, by successful grappling and: biting, by processes of tearing to pieces and swallowing. But I as these two complex impressions have many elements in • common, each tends in so far as there is a confusion between them, to arouse either of these two sets of psychical changes; and when one of these similar- animals is seen, each set be-; comes nascent according as the impression produced varies. At one moment the defensive actions, the cries, and the movements of escape, which have followed some such im- pression as that received, tend to arise; and the next i moment a change in the position of the perceived animal so alters the impression, as partially to excite the psychical; states involved in pursuit, attack, destroying, and devouring.; But what is either of these partial excitations? It is nothing; else than an emotional impulse — a combination of represen- tative feelings which forms the stimulus to action — a desire. To have in a slight degree such psychical states as accom- pany the reception of wounds, and are experienced during I flight, is to be in a state of what we call fear. And to have.! in a slight degree such psychical states as the processes of:. catching, killing, and eating imply, is to have the desires to ' catch, kill, and eat. That the propensities to the | acts are nothing else than nascent excitations of the > psychical state involved in the acts, is proved by the natural language of the propensities. Fear, when strong, expresses [ itself in cries, in efforts to escape, in palpitations, in •< tremblings; and these are just the manifestations that go; along with an actual suffering of the evil feared. The de-? stmctive passion is shown in a general tension of the mus- i THE FEELINGS. 483 cular system, in gnashing of teeth and protrusion of the claws, in dilated eyes and nostrils, in growls; and these are weaker forms of the actions that accompany the killing of prey. To such objective evidences,, every one can add sub- jective evidences. Every one can testify that the psychical state called fear, consists of mental representations of certain painful results; and that the one called anger, consists of mental representations of the actions and impressions which would occur while inflicting some kind of pain.
Possibly it may be objected, that to describe the group of nascent psychical changes produced by some complex im- pression, as constituting at once a memory of the psychical changes which had before followed this impression and a desire again to go through such changes, is absurd; • since the subject-matter of memory is retrospective, while that of desire is prospective. The reply is, that though, when a high degree of intelligence has been reached, these nascent changes are joined with a consciousness of time past and time future, and so come to have different aspects; yet, at the stage in which automatic action merges into the higher forms of action, no such abstract conception as that of Time can exist, and no such duality of aspect in these groups of nascent psychical changes can arise. And a further reply is, that even in ourselves, acts and feelings which become nascent in connexion with the idea of something prospective, are at the same time retrospective; since they cannot be represented at all unless they have been previously pre- sented in experience, and the representation of anything previously presented is memory.
§ 214. The progress from these forms of feeling consider- ably compounded to those highly-compounded forms of fgel- ing seen in human beings, equally harmonizes with the general principles of evolution that have been laid down. We saw that advance from the simplest to the most complex cognitions, is explicable on the principle that the outer rela- 4St SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
tious produce the Inner relations. We shall see that this same principle supplies an explanation of the advance from the simplest to the most complex feelings.
For when the development of Life reaches this repeatedly- described stage in which automatic actions merge into actions that are at once conscious, rational,, and emotive; what must be the effect of farther experiences? The effect must bo that if, in connexion with a group of impressions and the nascent- motor changes resulting from it, there is habitually experienced some other impression or group of impressions, some other motor change or group of motor changes, this will, in process of time, be rendered so coherent to the original group, that it, too, will become nascent when the original group becomes nascent, and will render the original group nascent if it is itself induced. Let us take a case. If along with the running down of certain prey, a certain scent has been habitually expe- rienced, then, the presentation of that scent will render nascent the motor changes and impressions which accom- pany the running down of the prey. If the motor changes and impressions that precede and accompany the catching of prey, have been constantly followed by destructive actions, then, when they are rendered nascent, they will in their turn render nascent the psychical states implied by destructive actions. An.d if these have been followed by those connected with eating, then those connected with eating will also be made nascent. So that the simple olfactory sensation will make nascent those many and varied states of consciousness Involved in the running down, catching, killing, and eating of prey: the sensa- tions, visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory, muscular, that are Abound up with the successive phases of these actions, will be present to consciousness as what we call ideas — will, in their aggregate, constitute the desires to catch, kill, and devour — and will, in conjunction with that olfactory sensa- tion which aroused them all, form, the impulse which sets THE FEELINGS. 485 THE FEELINGS. 485 going the limbs in pursuit. The entire genesis of these emotions thus results from successive complications in the groups of psychical states that are co-ordinated; and is just as much determined by experience as is the union of any two simple sensations that constantly occur together.
A like explanation may be given of emotions, which leave the, subject of them comparatively passive; as,, for instance, that produced by scenery. By compounding groups of sensa- tions and ideas there are at length formed those vast aggre- gations which a grand landscape excites and suggests. An infant taken into the midst of mountains, is totally un- affected; but is delighted with the small group of attributes and relations presented in a toy. Children can appreciate, and be pleased with, the more complicated relations of household objects and localities — of the garden, the field, and the street. But it is only in youth and mature age, when individual things and small assemblages of them have become familiar and are automatically cognizable, that those immense assemblages which landscapes present can be ade- quately grasped, and the highly integrated states of con- sciousness produced by them, experienced. Then, however, the various minor groups of states that have been in earlier days severally produced by trees and flowers, by fields and moors and rocky wastes, by streams, by cascades, by ravines and precipices, by blue skies and clouds and storms, are aroused together. Along with the immediate sensations there are partially excited the myriads of sensations that have been in times past received from objects such as those presented; further, there are partially excited the multitudinous incidental feelings that were experienced on these many past occasions; and there are also excited certain deeper, but now vague, combinations of states which were organized in the race during barbarous times, wh?en its pleasurable activities were chiefly among the woods and waters. And out of all these excitations, some of them; actual but most of them, nascent, is composed the emotion which a fine landscape produces in us.
486 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
§ 215. One of the corollaries from the foregoing doctrines Is that, other things equal., feelings are strong in proportion as they include many actnal sensations, or nascent sensa- tions^ or both. As every one of the elementary states of consciousness aggregated in the way described, is originally a feeling of some kind; and as progressive integration though it abbreviates each, leaves it to the last a feeling, however infinitesimal in amount; it follows that the greater the accumulation of such infinitesimal amounts of feeling, the greater must be the sum total of feeling ex- perienced. Quantity of feeling is of two kinds — that which arises from intense excitation of few nerves, and that which arises from slight excitation of many nerves. Thus, an unbearable sensation results if the tip of a finger be held in boiling water. Conversely, though there is no difficulty in holding the tip of a finger in water above 110° Fahrenheit, an unbearable sensation results if the whole body be plunged into water of that temperature. So that the moderate excitation of all the nerves distributed over the surface of the body, is equivalent, as measured by its motor effects, to the extreme excitation of a few of them.
Similarly, though a very faint colour cannot be discerned when it covers only a very minute surface; yet, when it covers a great surface it can be discerned with ease. And that the truth thus holding with actual sensations, holds also with those nascent sensations which, as aggregated into masses of ideas, distinct and indistinct, constitute the emo- tions, will be manifest on calling to mind how actions are continually determined by the accumulation of motives; that is, by the accumulation of such nascent feelings. r From this corollary there is a second corollary. With a ; qualification to be hereafter made, the higher the evolution ] rises, the stronger..dp._the_-emotions become. For~"Sthe increasingly-complex emotions successivelyr*"developed, re- sult from integration of pre-existing groups of actual and nascent sensations, the resulting totals must grow con- THE FEELINGS. 487 tinually larger. A marked illustration of this truth is furnished by the passion which unites the sexes. This is habitually spoken of as though it were a simple feeling; whereas it is the most.compound, and therefore the most powerful, of all the feelings. Added to the purely physical elements of it, are first to be noticed those highly complex impressions produced by personal beauty; around which are aggregated a variety of plea- surable ideas, not in themselves amatory, but which have an organized relation to the amatory feeling. With this there is united the complex sentiment which we term affection — a sentiment which, as it can exist between those of the same sex, must be regarded as an independent sen- timent, but one which is here greatly exalted. Then there is the sentiment of admiration, respect, or reverence: in itself one of considerable power, and which in this relation becomes in a high degree active. There comes next the feeling called love of approbation. To be preferred above all the world, and that by one admired beyond all others, is to have the love of approbation gratified in a degree passing every previous experience: especially as there is added that indirect gratification of it which results from the preference being witnessed by unconcerned persons. Further, the allied emotion of self-esteem comes into play. To have succeeded in gaining such attachment from., and sway over, another, is a proof of power which cannot fail agreeably to excite the amour propre. Yet again, the proprietary feel- ing has its share in the general activity: there is the plea- sure of possession — the two belong to each other. Once more, the relation allows of an extended liberty of action. Towards other persons a restrained behaviour is requisite. Round each there is a subtle boundary that may not be crossed — an individuality on which none may trespass. But in this case the barriers are thrown down; and tbus the love of unrestrained activity is. gratified. Finally, there is an exaltation of the sympathies. Egoistic pleasures of all 488 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
kinds are doubled by another's sympathetic participation; and the pleasures of another are added to the egoistic pleasures. Thus, round the physical feeling forming the nucleus of the whole, are gathered the feelings produced by personal beauty, that constituting simple attachment, those of reverence, of love of approbation, of self-esteem, of pro- perty, of love of freedom, of sympathy. These, all greatly exalted, and severally tending to reflect their excitements on one another, unite to form the mental state we call love. And as each of them is itself comprehensive of mul- titudinous states of consciousness, we may say that this passion fuses into one immense aggregate most of the ele- mentary excitations of which we are capable j and that hence results its irresistible power.
Other emotions than those which arise by the simple aggregation of large groups of psychical states into still larger groups, are similarly interpret able. There goes on at the same time, and as a result of the same cause, an evo- lution of emotions that are not only more complex, but also more abstract. Of this, the love of property supplies a,n example. When the development of intelligence has rendered time and locality cognizable; and when, by consequence, an uneaten portion of food can, when hunger next makes nascent the psychical states that accompany eating, be remembered as having been left in a particular place; then, repetition of these experiences of a satiated hunger, and a subsequently-recurring hunger that prompts return to the remaining food, will establish an organized connexion between the remembrance of such remaining food and the various states of consciousness produced by a return to it. Thus will be constituted an anticipation of a return to it — a tendency to perform all such actions accompanying a return to it as are not negatived by satiety — a tendency, therefore, to take possession of it. An analogous process will develop a tendency to take possession of some habitual place of shelter; and afterwards to take possession of things THE FEELINGS.
THE FEELINGS.
serving for artificial shelter and for clothing. Later still, things indirectly connected with personal welfare will come to be included; as, for instance, the club used for a weapon, the impressions produced by which will make nascent the various pleasurable feelings that have accompanied its suc- cessful use, and the conception of further use. The same process rising to still higher complications, will generate a propensity to take possession not only of various weapons and appliances of daily life, but also of the tools and materials required to make such weapons and appliances; afterwards of the materials required to make such tools • and so on until the things accumulated for one purpose or other become numerous and varied. But now observe that in proportion as these things become numerous and varied, and in proportion as the acts of acquiring them and preserving them become frequent, a great variety of pleasurable excitements will come to be associated with the act of taking possession or holding possession. Hence this act itself, being continually the initiator of pleasurable ex- citements, will become a source of pleasurable excitement. And as the excitement thus caused must be more habitual than that caused by any particular order of objects; as, further*, the special excitements attaching to special objects possessed, must, in virtue of their variety, prevent the ex- citement of possession from being connected with any one of them in particular; it results that the excitement of pos- session will grow into one of a new kind, uniting into a large but vague aggregate the various excitements to which it ministers. And when money comes to be the represen- tative of value in general — value as abstracted from special objects — the miser shows us how the desire of possession in the abstract may become almost independent of those from which it arose; and may exceed in strength any of them in- dividually.