non autem si ea omissa sit; omissa enim non prodest, nee si per mille annos fuisset continuata, ut recte animadvertit Castrensis. Et quamvis hoc voluisset Martianus, quod minime credendus est cogitasse, in quo loco occupatio con- ceditur, in eodem praescriptionem concedi, tamen absurdum erat quod de flumine publico dictum erat ad Mare commune, et quod de diverticulo ad sinum proferre, cum haec prae- scriptio usum quae est luregentium communis, impeditura sit, ilia autem publico usui non admodum noceat. Alterum autem Angeli argumentum quod ex aquaeductu sumitur,1 eodem Castrensi monstrante, ut a quaestione alienissimum, ab omnibus merito exploditur.
Falsum igitur est talem praescriptionem etiam eo tern- pore gigni, cuius initium omnem memoriam excedat. Vbi enim lex omnem omnino tollit praescriptionem, ne istud quidem tempus admittitur, hoc est, ut Felinus loquitur,2 ma- teria impraescriptibilis tempore immemoriali non sit prae- scriptibilis. Fatetur haec vera esse Balbus; 3 sed Angeli sententiam receptam dicit hac ratione, quia tempus extra memoriam positum idem valere creditur privilegio, cum titulus amplissimus ex tali tempore praesumatur. Apparet hinc non aliud illos sensisse, quam si pars aliqua reipublicae, puta Imperi Romani, supra omnem memoriam usa esset tali iure, ei dandam praescriptionem hoc colore, quasi Principis 1 Code XI, 43, 4 (De aquaeductu, L. Usum aquae); cf. eod. tit., L. Diligenter; cf. Digest XLIII, 20, 3 (De aqua cottidiana et aestiva, L. Hoc iure, § Ductus aquae).
1 On Decretales Gregorii Papae IX, II, 26, 11 (De praescriptionibus, c. Accedentes).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 49 cease; and occupation once interrupted, even if it had been continuous for a thousand years, loses its rights, as Paul de Castro * justly observes. And even if Marcianus had meant —which certainly was not in his mind at all — that acquisition by prescription is to be recognized wherever occupation is recognized, still it would have been absurd to apply what had been said about a public river to the common sea, or what had been said about an inlet or a river branch to a bay, since in the former case prescription would hinder the use of something common to all by the law of nations, and in the latter case would work no small injury to public use. Moreover, another argument brought forward by Angeli based on the use of aqueducts,1 has quite properly been re- jected by every one, being, as de Castro pointed out, entirely aside from the point.
It is not true then that such prescription rises even at a time beyond the period of the memory of man. For since the law absolutely denies all prescription, not even im- memorial time has any effect on the question; that is, as Felinus 2 says, things imprescriptible by nature do not be- come prescriptible by the mere efflux of immemorial time. Balbus admits the truth of these arguments,3 but says that the opinion of Angeli is to be accepted on the ground that time immemorial is believed to have the same validity as prerogative for setting up a title, since a perfect title is presumed from such efflux of time. Hence it appears that the jurists thought if some part of a state, say of the Roman empire for example, at a period before the memory of man had exercised such a right, that a title by prescription would 1 Code XI, 43, 4; cf. XI, 43, 9; cf. Digest XLIII, 20, 3.
' On the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, II, 26, 11 [Felinus Maria Sandeus » De praescriptionibus IV, 5, q. 6, n. 8 [Johannes Franciscus Balbus, a priest and jurisconsult at Muentz-hof].
• [The celebrated Italian jurist (?-1420 or 1437) of whom Cujas said: "Si vous n'avez pas Paul de Castro, vendez votre chemise pour 1'acheter." (Note from page 55 of the French translation of Grotius by de Grandpont.)]
50 MARE LIBERVM concessio praeiisset. Quare cum nemo sit dominus totius generis humani, qui ius illud adversus homines omnes homini, aut populo alicui potnisset concedere, sublato illo colore, necesse est etiam praescriptionem interimi. Et sic ex illorum etiam sententia inter reges aut populos liberos prodesse nihil potest lapsus infiniti temporis.
Vanissimum autem et illud est quod Angelus docuit, etiamsi ad dominium praescriptio proficere non potest, tamen dandam esse possidenti exceptionem. Nam Papinianus disertis verbis exceptionem negat: * et aliter non potuit sen- tire, cum ipsius saeculo praescriptio nihil esset aliud quam exceptio. Verum igitur est quod et leges Hispanicae ex- primunt 2 in his rebus quae communi hominum usui sunt attributae, nullius omnino temporis praescriptionem proce- dere, cuius definitionis ilia praeter ceteras ratio reddi potest, quod qui re communi utitur, ut communi ut videtur, non autem hire proprio, et ita praescribere non magis quam f ruc- tuarius potest vitio possessionis.3 Altera haec etiam non contemnenda est, quod in prae- scriptione temporis cuius memoria non exstat, quamvis titulus et bona fides praesumantur, tamen si re ipsa appareat titulum omnino nullum dari posse, et sic manifesta sit fides mala, quae in populo maxime quasi uno corpore perpetua esse 1 On Digest XLI, 3, 49 (De usucapionibus, L. ult). 1 Par. 3, tit. 29, I. 7 in c. Placa.; Zuarius, Consilia, num. 4. • Fachinham VIII, c. 26 et c. 33; Duarenus, De praescriptionibus, parte 2, § 2, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 50 have to be admitted on that ground, exactly as if there had been a previous grant from a Prince. But inasmuch as there is no one who is sovereign of the whole human race with competence to grant to any man or to any nation such a right against all other men, with the annihilation of that pretext, title by prescription is also necessarily destroyed. Therefore the opinion of the jurists is that not even an in- finite lapse of time is able to set up a right as between kings or independent nations.
Moreover Angeli brought forward a most foolish argu- ment, affirming that even if prescription could not create ownership, still an exception ought to be made in favor of a possessor. Papinian however in unmistakable words says there is no exception,1 nor could he think otherwise, because in his day prescription was itself an exception. It is there- fore true, as expressed also in the laws of Spain,2 that pre- scription based on no matter how immemorial a time, sets up no title to those things which are recognized as common to the use of mankind. One reason among others which can be given for this definition is that any one who uses a res communis does so evidently by virtue of common and not private right, and because of the imperfect character of possession he can therefore no more set up a legal title by prescription than can a usufructuary.3 A second reason not to be overlooked is that although a title and good faith are presumed in a prescriptive right created by the efflux of immemorial time, nevertheless if it appears from the nature of the thing itself that no title at all can be established, and if thus there becomes evident bad faith — a thing held to be permanent in a nation as well as in an individual — then prescription fails because of a 51. MARE LIBERVM censetur, et ex duplici defectu praescriptio corruit.1 Tertia vero, quia res haec est merae facultatis, quae non praescri- bitur, ut infra demonstrabimus.
Sed nullus est finis argutiarum. Inventi sunt qui in hoc argumento a praescriptione consuetudinem distinguerent, ut ilia scilicet exclusi, ad hanc confugerent. Discrimen autem quod hie statuunt sane ridiculum est: ex praescriptione aiunt' ius unius quod ab eo auf ertur alteri applicari; 2 sed cum ali- quod ius ita alicui applicatur ut alteri non auferatur, turn dici consuetudinem; quasi vero cum ius navigandi quod com- muniter ad omnes pertinet, exclusis aliis ab uno usurpatur, non necesse sit omnibus perire quantum uni accedit. Errori huic ansam dederunt Pauli verba non recte accepta, qui cum de iure proprio maris ad aliquem pertinente loqueretur,3 fieri hoc posse dixit Accursius per privilegium aut consuetu- dinem: quod additamentum ad lurisconsulti textum nullo modo accedens mali potius coniectoris esse videtur quam boni interpretis. Mens Pauli supra explicata est. Ceterum illi si vel sola Vlpiani verba,4 quae paulo ante praecedunt, satis considerassent, longe aliud dicturi erant. Fatetur enim ut quis ante aedes meas piscari prohibeatur, esse quidem usur- ' Angelus Aretinus in rubr. Digest I, 8 (De divisione rerum); Balbus, 1. c., n. 2; cf. Vasquium, Controversiae illustres c. 29, n. 38. « On Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane). 'Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § ult.)
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 51 \ double defect.1 Also a third reason is that we have under consideration a merely facultative right which is not pre- scriptible, as we shall show below.* But there is no end to their subtilties. There are jurists who in this case would distinguish custom from prescription, so that if they are debarred from the one, they may fall back upon the other. But the distinction which they set up is most absurd. They say that the right of one person which is taken away from him is given to another by pre- scription; 2 but that when any right is given to any one in such a way that it is not taken away from any one else, then it is called custom. As if indeed the right of navigation, which is common to all, upon being usurped by some one to the exclusion of all others, would not necessarily when it became the property of one be lost to all!
This error receives support from misinterpretation of what Paulus has to say about a private right of possession on the sea.3 Accursius t said that such a right could be ac- quired by privilege or custom. But this addition which in no way agrees with the text of the jurist seems to be rather the interpretation of a mischievous guesser than of a faith- ful interpreter. The real meaning of the words of Paulus has been already explained. Besides, if more careful con- sideration had been given to the words of Ulpian * which almost immediately precede those of Paulus, a very differ- ent assertion would have been made. For Ulpian acknowl- edges that if any one is prohibited from fishing in front of * Angelus Aretinus on Digest I, 8; Balbus, De praescriptionibus IV, S, q. 6, n. 2; see Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 29, n. 38.
* [See chapter XL] f [Franciscus (?) Accursius (?-1259) (a pupil of the famous Monarcha juris Azzo), with whose name the Glossa Magna is almost synonymous. He was called Advocatorura Idoluni.]
52 MARE LIBERVM patum;1 hoc est receptum consuetudine, sed nullo iure, ideoque iniuriarum actionem prohibito non denegandam.
Contemnit igitur hunc morem, et usurpationem vocat, ut et inter Christianos Doctores Ambrosius.2 Et merito. Quid enim clarius quam non valere consuetudinem, quae iuri naturae, aut gentium ex adverse opponitur? s Consuetudo enim species est iuris positivi, quod legi perpetuae obrogare non potest. Est autem lex ilia perpetua ut Mare omnibus usu commune sit. Quod autem in praescriptione diximus, idem in consuetudine verum est, si quis eorum qui diversum tradiderunt, sensus excutiat, non aliud reperturum, quam consuetudinem privilegio parari. Atqui adversus genus humanum concedendi privilegium nemo habet potestatem; quare inter diversas respublicas consuetudo ista vim non habet.
Verum omnem hanc quaestionem diligentissime tractavit Vasquius,4 decus illud Hispaniae, cuius nee in explorando iure subtilitatem, nee in docendo libertatem umquam de- sideres. Is igitur posita thesi: ' Loca publica et iure gentium communia praescribi non posse ', quam multis firmat auctori- bus; exceptiones deinde subiungit ab Angelo et aliis confictas, quas supra retulimus. Haec autem examinaturus recte iudicat istarum rerum veritatem pendere a vera Juris, tarn naturae quam gentium cognitione. lus enim naturae cum a 1 Cf. Gloss, eodem loco.
8 De offieiis ministrorum I, 28; Gentilis I, 19 (sub finem). • Auth. Ut null! ludicum § 1, c. cum tanto de consuetudine. 4 Controversiae illustres c. 89, n. 12 et seq.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 52 my house, such prohibition is a usurpation of right,1 allowed, it is true, by custom, but based on no law, and that an action for damages could not be denied the person thus prohibited from fishing.
He therefore condemns this practice, and calls it a usurpation; of the Christian jurists Ambrose 2 does likewise, and both are right. For what is clearer than that custom is not valid when it is diametrically opposed to the law of nature or of nations? 3 Indeed, custom is a sort of affirmative right, which cannot invalidate general or universal law. And it is a universal law that the sea and its use is com- mon to all. Moreover what we have said about prescription applies with equal truth and force to custom; and if any one should investigate the opinions of those who have dif- fered upon this matter, he would find no other opinion but that custom is established by privilege. No one has the power to confer a privilege which is prejudicial to the rights of the human race; wherefore such a custom has no force as between different states.
This entire question however has been most thoroughly treated by Vasquez,4 that glory of Spain, who leaves noth- ing ever to be desired when it conies to subtle examination of the law or to the exposition of the principles of liberty. He lays down this thesis: * Places public and common to all by the law of nations cannot become objects of prescription '. This thesis he supports by many authorities, and then he subjoins the objections fabricated by Angeli and others, which we have enumerated above. But before examining these objections he makes the just and reasonable statement that the truth of all these matters depends upon a true con- ception both of the law of nature and the law of nations.
1 Glossators on the reference in note 4, page 51. *De officiis ministrorum I, 28; Gentilis I, 19. 1 Auth. Ut nulli ludicum § 1, c. cum tanto de consuetudine. 4 Controversiae illustres c. 89, n. 12 ff. [Ferdinand Manchaea Vasquez (1509- 1566) the famous Spanish jurisconsult, who held many high honors of the realm].
54 MARE LIBERVM quod ab origine Mundi, ad hodiernum usque diem est, f uitque semper in communi, nulla ex parte immutatum, ut est notum '.
' Et quamvis ex LVSITANIS magnam turbam saepe audiverim in hac esse opinione ut eorum Rex ita praescrip- serit navigationem INDICI Occidentalis (forte Orientalis) eiusdemque VASTISSIMI MARIS, ita ut reliquis gentibus aequora ilia transfretare non liceat, et ex nostrismet HIS- PANIS VVLGVS in eadem opinione fere esse videtur, ut per VASTISSIMVM IMMENSVMQVE PONTVM ad Indorum regiones quas potentissimi Reges nostri subegerunt reliquis mortalium navigare, praeterquam Hispanis ius minime sit, quasi ab eis id ius praescriptum fuerit, tamen istorum omnium non minus INSANAE sunt opiniones, quam eorum qui quoad Genuenses et Venetos in eodem fere SOMNIO esse adsolent, quas sententias INEPTIRE vel ex eo dilucidius apparet, quod istarum nationum singulae contra seipsas nequeunt praescribere: hoc est, non respublica Venetiarum contra semetipsam, non respublica Genuensium contra semetipsam, non Regnum Hispanicum contra semet- ipsum, non Regnum Lusitanicum contra semetipsum.1 Esse enim debet differentia inter agentem et patientem '.
' Contra reliquas vero nationes longe minus praescribere possunt, quia ius praescriptionum est mere civile, ut fuse ostendimus supra. Ergo tale ius cessat cum agitur inter principes vel populos, superiorem non recognoscentes in tem- poralibus. lura enim mere civilia cuiilscumque regionis, 1 Digest XLI, 3, 4, 26 (27) (De usucapionibus, L. Sequitur § Si viam); Institutes IV, 6, 14. (De actionibus, § Sic itaque); Ut dictis juribus et L. cum filio, ubi multa per Bartolum et Jason on Digest XXX, 11 (De Legatis I, L. Cum filio; part. I in pr. qu. 3 et 4).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 54 very day is and always has been a res communis, and which, as is well known, has in no wise changed from that status.
' And although ', he continues, ' I have often heard that a great many Portuguese believe that their king has a pre- scriptive right over the navigation of the vast seas of the West Indies (probably the East Indies too) such that other nations are not allowed to traverse those waters; and al- though the common people among our own Spaniards seem to be of the same opinion, namely, that absolutely no one in the world except us Spaniards ourselves has the least right to navigate the great and immense sea which stretches to the regions of the Indies once subdued by our most pow- erful kings, as if that right has been ours alone by prescrip- tion; although, I repeat, I have heard both these things, nevertheless the belief of all those people is no less extrava- gantly foolish than that of those who are always cherishing the same delusions with respect to the Genoese and Vene- tians. Indeed the opinions of them all appear the more manifestly absurd, because no one of those nations can erect a prescription against itself; that is to say, not the Venetian republic, nor the Genoese republic, nor the king- dom of Spain nor of Portugal can raise prescriptions against rights they already possess by nature.1 For the one who claims a prescriptive right and the one who suffers by the establishment of such a claim must not be one and the same person.
' Against other nations they are even much less com- petent to raise a prescription, because the right of prescrip- tion is only a municipal right, as we have shown above at some length. Therefore such a right ceases to have any effect as between rulers or nations who do not recognize a superior in the temporal domain. For so far as the merely municipal laws of any place are concerned, they do not 'Digest XLI, 3, 4, 26 (27); Institutes IV, 6, 14; Bartolus and Jason on Digest XXX, 11.
55 MAKE LIBERVM quoad exteros populos, nationes. vel etiam homines singulos, non magis sunt in consideratione, quam si re vera esset tale his, aut numquam f uisset. et ad ius commune gentium pri- maevum vel secundarium recurrendum est, eoque utendum, quo hire talem maris praescriptionem et usurpationem ad- missam non fuisse satis constat. Xam, et hodie usus aquarum communis est, non secus quam erat ab orighie Mundi. Ergo et hi aequoribus et aquis nullum ius est aut esse potest hu- mano generi, praeterquam quoad usum communem. Prae- terea de iure natural! et divino est illud praeceptum, ut Quod tibinon vis fieri, alterinon facias. Vnde cum navigatio nemini possit esse nociva nisi ipsi naviganti. par est ut nemhii possit, aut debeat hnpediri, ne hi re sua natur a liber a, sibique minime noxia navigantium libertatem hnpediat, et laedat contra dic- tum praeceptum et contra regulam praesertim cum omnia hitelligantur esse permissa, quae non reperiuntur expressim prohibita.1 Quinimo non solum contra ius naturale esset, velle impedire talem navigationem, sed etiam tenemur con- trarium facere, hoc est, prodesse us quibus possumus, cum id sine damno nostro fieri potest '.
Quod cum multis auctoritatibus tarn divinis quam hu- manis confirmasset, subiungit postea: * ' Ex superioribus etiam apparet suspectam esse sententiam lohannis Fabri, Angeli, Baldi, et Francisci Balbi, quos supra retulimus, ex- istimantium loca Juris gentium communia, et si acquiri non possint praescriptione, posse tamen acquiri consuetudhie, 1 Digest I, S, 4 (De statu hominnm, L. Libertas); Institutes I, S, 1 (De iure personanim, § Et libertas); Digest XLIII, 29, 1 et 2 (De homine libero ez- hibendo); XLI V, 5, 1 (Quartan rerum actio non datur, L. lusjurandum, § Quae onerandae); Code III, 28, SS (De inofficioso testamento, L. Si quando, § Hind, T. adstringendos); Digest IV, 6, 28 (Ex quibus causis maiores, L. Xec non, § 'Quod eras').
' Code III, 44, 7 (De religiosis et sumptibns funerum, L. Statuas).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 55 affect foreign peoples, nations, or even individuals, any more than if they did not exist or never had existed. There- fore it was necessary to have recourse to the common law of nations, primary as well as secondary, and to use a law which clearly had not admitted any such prescription and usurpation of the sea. For today the use of the waters is common, exactly as it has been since the creation of the world. Therefore no man has a right nor can acquire a right over the seas and waters which would be prejudicial to their common use. Besides, there is both in natural and divine law that famous rule: ' Whatsoever ye would that men should not do to you, do not ye even so to them '. Hence it follows, since navigation cannot harm any one except the navigator himself, it is only just that no one either can or ought to be interdicted therefrom, lest nature, free in her own realm, and least hurtful to herself, be found impeding the liberty of navigation, and thus offending against the accepted precept and rule that all things are supposed to be permitted which are not found expressly forbidden.1 Besides, not only would it be contrary to nat- ural law to wish to prevent such free navigation, but we are even bound to do the opposite, that is, bound to assist such navigation in whatever way we can, when it can be done without any prejudice to ourselves '.
After Vasquez had established his point by the help of many authorities both human and divine, he added: * ' It appears then, from what has gone before that the opinion held by Johannes Faber, Angeli, Baldus, and Franciscus Balbus, whom we have cited above, is not to be trusted, be- cause they think that places common by the law of nations, even if not open to acquisition by prescription, can never- theless be acquired by custom; but this is entirely false, and 56 MARE LIBERVM quod omnino FALSVM est, eaque traditio CAECA ET NVBILA est, OMNIQVE RATIONIS LVMINE CARENS, legemque verbis non rebus imponens.1 In ex- emplis enim de Mari Hispanorum, LVSITANORVM, Venetorum, Genuensium, et reliquorum, constat consuetu- dine ius tale navigandi, et alios navigare prohibendi noh magis acquiri quam praescriptione.2 Vtroque enim casu ut apparet, eadem est ratio. Et quia per iura et rationes supra relatas id esset contra naturalem aequitatem, nee ullam induceret utilitatem, sed solam laesionem, sicque ut lege ex- pressa introduci non possent, ita etiam nee lege tacita, qualis est consuetudo.3 Et tempore id non iustificaretur, sed potius deterius et iniurius in dies fieret '.
Ostendit deinde ex prima terrarum occupatione posse populo ut venandi ius, ita piscandi in suo flumine competere, et postquam ilia semel ab antiqua communione separata sunt, ita ut particularem applicationem admittant, praescrip- tione temporis eius, cuius initi memoria non exstet, quasi tacita populi concessione acquiri posse. Hoc autem per prae- scriptionem contingere, non per consuetudinem, quia solius acquirentis condicio melior fiat, reliquorum vero deterior. Et cum tria enumerasset quae requiruntur, ut ius proprium in flumine piscandi praescribatur: ' Quid autem ', subdit, ' quoad mare? Et in eo magis est 1 Code VI, 43 (Communia de legatis, Contra L. 2, cum vulgatis).
1 Digest IX, 2, 32 (Ad legem Aquiliam, L. Illud).
• Dist. IV, C II (Erit autem lex); Digest I, 3, 1 et 2 (De legibus), 32 (eod. tit, L. De quibus, cum seq.); Decretales Gregorii Papae IX, II, 26, 20 (De prae- scriptionibus, c. Quoniam).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 56 is a teaching which is both obscure and vague, which lacks the faintest glimmer of reasonableness, and which sets up a law in word but not in fact.1 For it is well established from the examples taken from the seas of the Spaniards, Portu- guese, Venetians, Genoese, and others, that an exclusive right of navigation and a right of prohibiting others from navigation is no more to be acquired by custom than by prescription.8 And it is apparent that the reason is the same in both cases. And since according to the laws and reasons adduced above this would be contrary to natural equity and would not bring benefit but only injury, there- fore as it could not be introduced by an express law, neither could it be introduced by a tacit or implied law, and that is what custom is.8 And far from justifying itself by any lapse of time, it rather becomes worse, and every day more injurious '.
Vasquez next shows that from the time of the earliest occupation of the earth every people possessed the right of hunting in its own territory, and of fishing in its own rivers. After those rights were once separated from the ancient community of rights in such a way that they ad- mitted of particular attachments, they could be acquired by prescription based upon such an efflux of time that " the memory of its beginning does not exist," as if by the tacit permission of a nation. This comes about, however, by prescription and not by custom, because only the condi- tion of him who acquires is bettered, while that of all other persons is made worse. Then after Vasquez had enumerated three conditions which are requisite in order that a private right of fishing in a river may become a right by prescrip- tion, he continues as follows: ' But what are we to say as regards the sea? There is 1 Dist. IV, C. II; Digest I, 3, 1-2, 32; Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, II, 26, 20.
57 MARE LIBERVM quod etiam concursus istorum trium non sufficeret ad ac- quirendum ius. Ratio differentiae inter mare ex una parte, et terrain et flumina ex altera, quia illo casu ut olim ita et hodie, et semper, tarn quoad piscandum quam quoad navigan- dum mansit integrum ius gentium primaevum, neque umquam fuit a communione hominum separatum, et alicui, vel aliquibus applicatum. Posteriore autem casu, nempe in terra vel fluminibus aliud fuit, ut iam disseruimus '.
' Sed quare ius gentium secundarium, ut earn separa- tionem quoad terras et flumina facit, quoad mare facere desiit? respondeo, quia illo casu expediebat. Constat enim quod si multi venentur, aut piscentur in terra vel flumine, facile nemus feris, et flumen piscibus evacuatum redditur, id quod in mari non est. Item fluminum navigatio facile deterior sit et impeditur per aedificia, quod in mari non est. Item per aquaeductus facile evacuatur flumen, non ita in mari; l ergo in utroque non est par ratio '.
' Nee ad rem pertinet, quod supra diximus, communem esse usum aquarum, fontium etiam et fluminum. Nam in- telligitur quoad bibendum et similia, quae fluminis dominium aut ius habenti vel minime vel levissjme nocent.2 Minima enim in consideratione non sunt. Pro nostris sententiis facit, quia iniqua nullo tempore praescribuntur, et ideo lex iniqua nullo tempore praescribitur, aut iustificatur '. Mox: ' Et 'Digest XLIII, 13 (Ne quid in flumine publico fiat).
' Digest IV, 4, 3 (De minoribus, L. 3, § Seio); Vasquius, De successionum progressu I, 7.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 57 more to say about it, because even the combination of the three conditions mentioned is not sufficient here for the ac- quisition of such a right. The reason for the difference be- tween the sea on one hand and land and rivers on the other, is that in the case of the sea the same primitive right of nations regarding fishing and navigation which existed in the earliest times, still today exists undiminished and always will, and because that right was never separated from the community right of all mankind, and attached to any person or group of persons. But in the latter case, that of the land and rivers, it was different, as we have already set forth.