' But why, it is asked, does the secondary law of nations which brings about this separation when we consider lands and rivers cease to operate in the same way when we con- sider the sea? I reply, because in the former case it was expedient and necessary. For every one admits that if a great many persons hunt on the land or fish in a river, the forest is easily exhausted of wild animals and the river of fish, but such a contingency is impossible in the case of the sea. Again, the navigation of rivers is easily lessened and impeded by constructions placed therein, but this is not true of the sea. Again, a river is easily emptied by means of aqueducts but the sea cannot be emptied by any such means.1 Therefore there is not equal reason on both sides.
' Neither does what we have said above about the com- mon use of waters, springs, and rivers, apply in this case, for common use is recognized in them all for purposes of drinking and the like, such usages namely as do not injure at all or in the slightest degree him who owns a river or has some other right in one.2 These are trifles for which we have no time. What makes for our contention is the fact that no lapse of time will give a prescriptive right to any- thing unjust. Therefore an unjust law is not capable of 'Digest XLIII, 13.
'Digest IV, 4, 3; Vasquius, De successionura progressn I, 7.
58 MARE LIBERVM quae sunt impraescriptibilia ex legis dispositione, nee per mille annos praescriberentur '; quod innumeris doctorum testimoniis fulcit.1 Nemo iam non videt, ad usum rei communis intercipien- duni nullam quantivis temporis usurpationem prodesse. Cui adiungendum est etiam eorum qui dissentiunt auctoritatem huic quaestioni non posse accommodari. Illi enim de Medi- terraneo loquuntur, nos de Oceano; illi de sinu, nos de im- menso mari, quae in ratione occupationis plurimum diff erunt. Et quibus illi indulgent praescriptionem, illi litora mari con- tinua possident, ut Veneti et Genuenses, quod de Lusitanis dici non posse modo patuit.
Immo et si prodesse posset tempus, ut quidam posse putant in publicis quae sunt, populi, tamen non ea adsunt quae necessario requiruntur. Primum enim docent omnes desiderari, ut is qui praescribit huiusmodi actum, eum exer- cuerit non longo dumtaxat tempore, sed memoriam exce- dente; deinde ut tanto tempore eundem actum nemo alius exercuerit, nisi concessione illius, vel clandestine; praeterea ut alios uti volentes prohibuerit, scientibus quidem et patien- 1 Balbus, De praescriptionibus 5 in pr. in qu. 11, illius S, quaest. pr. Gl. in cap. inter caetera 16, q. 3; Castrensis, De potestate legis poenalis II, 14; Balbus, and Angelus, on Code VII, 39, 4 (De praescriptione XXX vel XL an nor urn, L. Omnes).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 58 erecting a prescriptive right or of being justified by efflux of time '. A little farther on Vasquez says: ' Things which are imprescriptible by the disposition of the law, may not be- come objects of prescription even after the lapse of a thou- sand years '. This statement he supports by countless cita- tions from the jurists.1 Every one perceives that no usurpation no matter how long continued is competent to intercept the use of a res communis. And it must also be added, that the authority of those who hold dissenting opinions cannot possibly be applied to the question here at issue. For they are talking about the Mediterranean, we are talking about the Ocean; they speak of a gulf, we of the boundless sea; and from the point of view of occupation these are wholly different things. And too, those peoples, to whom the authorities just men- tioned concede prescription, the Venetians and Genoese for example, possess a continuous shore line on the sea, but it is clear that not even that kind of possession can be claimed for the Portuguese.
Further, even if mere lapse of time, as some think, could establish a right by prescription over public property, still the conditions absolutely indispensable for the creation of such a right are in this case absent. The conditions de- manded are these: first, all jurists teach that he who sets up a prescriptive right of this sort shall have been in actual possession not only for a considerable period, but from time immemorial; next, that during all that time no one else shall have exercised the same right of possession unless by permission of that possessor or clandestinely; besides that, it is necessary that he shall have prevented other persons wishing to use his possession from so doing, and that such measures be a matter of common knowledge and done by the suff ranee of those concerned in the matter. For even if 'Balbus, De praescriptionibus 5, 11; 16, 3; Alphonse de Castro, De potestate legis poenalis II, 14; Balbus and Angelus on Code VII, 39, 4.
59 MARE LIBERVM tibus iis ad quos ea res pertinebat; nam etsi exercuisset sem- per, et quosdam exercere volentes prohibuisset semper, non tamen omnes, quia alii fuerunt prohibiti, alii vero libere exercuerunt, id quidem non sufficeret, ex Doctorum sen- tentia.
Apparet autem debere haec omnia concurrere, turn quia praescriptioni publicarum rerum lex inimica est, turn ut videatur praescribens iure suo non autem communi usus, idque non interrupta possessione.
Cum autem tempus postulatur, cuius initi non exstet memoria, non semper sufficit, ut optimi interpretes ostendunt, probare saeculi lapsum; sed constare oportet famam rei a maioribus ad nos transmissam, ita ut nemo supersit qui con- trarium viderit, aut audierit. Occasione rerum Africanarum in ulteriora primum Oceani inquirere coeperunt regnante lohanne Lusitani,1 anno salutis millesimo quadringentesimo septuagesimo septimo. Viginti post annis, sub Rege Emanuele promontorium Bonae spei praeternavigatum est, seriusque multo ventum Malaccam, et insulas remotiores, ad quas Batavi navigare coeperunt anno millesimo quingen- tesimo nonagesimo quinto, non dubie intra annum centesi- mum. lam vero etiam eo quod intercessit tempore aliorum usurpatio adversus alios etiam omnes impedivit praescrip- tionem. Castellani ab anno millesimo quingentesimo decimo nono possessionem Lusitanis maris circa Moluccas ambiguam 1 Osorius, De rebus Emmanuells regis Lusitaniae I.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 59 he had continuously exercised his right of possession, and had always prevented from using his possession some of those who wished to do so, but not all; then, because some had been prevented from exercising and others freely al- lowed to exercise that use, that kind of possession accord- ing to the opinion of the jurists, is not sufficient to establish a right by prescription.
It is clear therefore that all these conditions should be present, both because law is opposed to the prescription of public things, and in order that he who sets up such a prescription may seem to have used his own private right, not a public right, and that too by continuous possession.
Now, inasmuch as time beyond the period of the memory of man is demanded for the creation of a prescriptive right, it is not always sufficient, as the best commentators point out, to prove the lapse of a hundred years, but as no one would be alive who had seen or heard the contrary, the tradition handed down to us by our ancestors ought to be undisputed. It was during the reign of King John,1 in the year of our Lord 1477, at the time of the wars in Africa, that the Portuguese began to push their discoveries first into the more distant parts of the Ocean. Twenty years later, during the reign of King Emmanuel, they rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and somewhat later yet, reached Malacca, and the islands beyond, the very islands, indeed, to which the Dutch began to sail in the year 1595, that is, well within a hundred years of the time that the Portuguese first arrived. And in truth even in that interval, the usurpa- tion of rights there by other parties had interrupted the competence of everybody else to create a prescriptive right. For example, from the year 1519, the Spaniards rendered the possession by the Portuguese of the sea around the Malaccas a very uncertain one. Even the French and 1 Osorius, De rebus Emmanuelis regis Lusitaniae I [Hieronymus Osorius (1506-1580) was known as the Portuguese Cicero].
60 MARE LIBERVM fecere. Galli etiam et Angli non clanculum, sed via aperta eo perruperunt. Praeterea accolae totius tractus African!, aut Asiatici partem maris quisque sibi proximam piscando et navigando perpetuo usurparunt, numquam a Lusitanis prohibit!.
Conclusum igitur sit, ius nullum esse Lusitanis quo aliam quamvis gentem a navigatione Oceani ad Indos pro- hibeant.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 60 English made their way to those newly discovered places not secretly, but by force of arms. And besides these, the inhabitants of the entire coast of Africa and Asia con- stantly used for fishing and navigation that part of the sea nearest their own several coasts, and were never interdicted from such use by the Portuguese.
The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that the Portuguese are in possession of no right whereby they may interdict to any nation whatsoever the navigation of the Ocean to the East Indies.
CAPVT VIII lure gentium inter quosvis liberam esse mercaturam Quod si dicant Lusitani cum Indis commercia exercendi ius quoddam proprium ad se pertinere, eisdem fere omnibus argumentis refellentur. Repetemus breviter et aptabimus.
lure Gentium hoc introductum est, ut cunctis hominibus inter se libera esset negotiandi facultas, quae a nemine posset adimi.1 Et hoc, sicut post dominiorum distinctionem continue necessarium fuit, ita originem videri potest anti- quiorem habuisse. Subtiliter enim Aristoteles ^eraft\rfriHr;v dixit, avanXijpooffiy rfj's Kara <pvffiv avrapxsia?, 2 hoc est, negotiatione suppleri id quod naturae deest, quo commode omnibus sufficiat. Oportet igitur communem esse iure gentium non tantum privative, sed et positive, ut dicunt magistri, sive affirmative.3 Quae autem illo modo sunt iuris gentium, mutari possunt: quae hoc modo, non possunt. Id ita intelligi potest.
Dederat natura omnia omnibus. Sed cum a rerum multarum usu, quas vita desiderat humana, locorum intervallo homines arcerentur, quia ut supra diximus, non omnia ubique 1 Digest I, 1, 6 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure); et ibi Bartolus. •Aristotle, Politics I, 9 (1257" 30). 1 Cf. Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 8.
61 CHAPTER VIII By the Law of Nations trade is free to all persons whatsoever If however the Portuguese claim that they have an exclusive right to trade with the East Indies, their claim will be refuted by practically all the same arguments which already have been brought forward. Nevertheless I shall repeat them briefly, and apply them to this particular claim.
By the law of nations the principle was introduced that the opportunity to engage in trade, of which no one can be deprived,1 should be free to all men. This principle, inasmuch as its application was continually necessary after the distinctions of private ownerships were made, can there- fore be seen to have had a very remote origin. Aristotle, in a very clever phrase, in his work entitled the Politics,2 has said that the art of exchange is a completion of the inde- pendence which Nature requires. Therefore trade ought to be common to all according to the law of nations, not only in a negative but also in a positive, or as the jurists say, affirmative sense.3 The things that come under the former category are subject to change, those of the latter category are not. This statement is to be explained in the following way.
Nature had given all things to all men. But since men were prevented from using many things which were de- sirable in every day life because they lived so far apart, * Cf. Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 8.
61 62 MARE LIBERVM proveniunt, opus fuit traiectione; nee adhuc tamen permu- tatio erat, sed aliis vicissim rebus apud alios repertis suo arbitrio utebantur; quo fere modo apud Seres dicitur rebus in solitudine relictis sola mutantium religione peragi com- mercium.1 Sed cum statim res mobiles monstrante necessitate, quae modo explicata est, in ius proprium transissent, inventa est permutatio, qua quod alteri deest ex eo quod alteri superest suppleretur.2 Ita commercia victus gratia inventa est Homero Plinius probat.8 Postquam vero res etiam immobiles in dominos distingui coeperunt, sublata undique communio non inter homines locorum spatiis discretos tan- turn, verum etiam inter vicinos necessarium fecit comnier- cium; quod ut facilius procederet, nummus postea ad- inventus est, dictus otno rov vopov quod institutum sit civile.* Ipsa igitur ratio omnium contractuum universah's, ri fitrapkrjTiKri a natura est; modi autem aliquot singulares ipsumque pretium, rf xprrpaTiffTiMi? ab institute; 5 quae vetus- tiores iuris interpretes non satis distinxerunt. Fatentur 1 Pomponius Mela, De situ orbis III, 7.
•Digest XVIII, 1, 1 (De contrahenda emptione, L. Origo).
• Naturalis historia XXXIII, 1.
• Dist. I, C. VII (Ius naturale); Aristotle, 1. c.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 62 and because, as we have said above, everything was not found everywhere, it was necessary to transport things from one place to another; not that there was yet an interchange of commodities, but that people were accustomed to make reciprocal use of things found in one another's territory according to their own judgment. They say that trade arose among the Chinese in about this way. Things were deposited at places out in the desert and left to the good faith and conscience of those who exchanged things of their own for what they took.1 But when movables passed into private ownership (a change brought about by necessity, as has been explained above), straightway there arose a method of exchange by which the lack of one person was supplemented by that of which another person had an over supply.2 Hence com- merce was born out of necessity for the commodities of life, as Pliny shows by a citation from Homer.3 But after im- movables also began to be recognized as private property, the consequent annihilation of universal community of use made commerce a necessity not only between men whose habitations were far apart but even between men who were neighbors; and in order that trade might be carried on more easily, somewhat later they invented money, which, as the derivation of the word shows, is a civic institution.* Therefore the universal basis of all contracts, namely exchange, is derived from nature; but some particular kinds of exchange, and the money payment itself, are derived from law; 5 although the older commentators on the law have not made this distinction sufficiently clear. Nevertheless all 1 Pomponins Mela, De situ orbis III, 7.
1 Natural History XXXIII, 1.
'Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5, 5, 11 (1133* 20); Politics I, 9 (1257i> 10) [Xummus =r vrf/iof. The fact that this is an incorrect derivation does not of course affect the argument].
• Dist. I, C. VII; Aristotle, see note 4 above.
63 MARE LIBERVM tamen omnes proprietatem rerum, saltern mobilium a iure gentium primario prodire, itemque contractus omnes quibus pretium non accedit.1 Philosophi 2 rfs ^era^TirjriKfj? quam translationem vertere licebit, genera statuunt duo: tffv ffjutopixj/v nal tr\v HamjhiHtjv quarum e'/inopiMTf quae ut vox ipsa indicat inter gentes dissitas, ordine naturae prior est, et sic a Platone ponitur.3 Kanr;\iHr) eadem videtur esse quae napaoraffis* Aristoteli, tabernaria sive stataria negotiatio inter cives. Idem Aristoteles B ryr e'pxopiHTfv dividit in vavM.\rjpiav et (popryyiav quarum haec terrestri itinere, ilia maritimo merces devehit. Sordidior autem est Hanrfkinri contra honestior f^nopixtj et maritima maxime, quia multa multis impertit.8 Vnde navium exercitionem ad summam rempublicam pertinere dicit Vlpianus; institorum non eundem esse usum; quia ilia omnino secundum naturam necessaria est. Aris- toteles:7 sffn yap r/ fiera/ShtjrtKr, navroav, apSapevr} TO ptv npwrov ex rov Kara <pvaiv, r<f to. fiev nXsico, rd Se f\drra> r<oY IKUYWV e'xfir rov? avBpoonovf, ' est enim translatio rerum omnium coepta ab initio, ab eo quod est secundum naturam, cum homines partim haberent plura, quam sufficerent, partim etiam pauciora '. Seneca: 8 ' quae emeris, vendere; gentium ius est '.
Commercandi igitur libertas ex iure est primario gen- 1 Castrensis ex Cino et aliis n. 20 et 28 on Digest I, 1, S (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure).
• Plato, Sophista 223d.
'Plato, Republic II (p. 371) cited in Digest L, 11, 2 (De nundinis).
• nai raiiTW fitpri rpio, vaw&Jipia, ifiopTtijia, irapatrraoif are the exact words.
• Cicero, De officiis I, 150-151; Aristotle, Politica I, 9.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 63 authorities agree that the ownership of things, particularly of movables, arises out of the primary law of nations, and that all contracts in which a price is not mentioned, are de- rived from the same source.1 The philosophers * distinguish two kinds of exchange using Greek words which we shall take the liberty to translate as ' wholesale ' and ' retail ' trade. The former, as the Greek word shows, signifies trade or exchange between widely separated nations, and it ranks first in the order of Nature, as is shown in Plato's Republic.8 The latter seems to be the same kind of ex- change that Aristotle calls by another Greek word * which means retail or shop trade between citizens. Aristotle makes a further division of wholesale trade into overland and overseas trade.5 But of the two, retail trade is the more petty and sordid, and wholesale the more honorable; but most honorable of all is the wholesale overseas trade, because it makes so many people sharers in so many things.6 Hence Ulpian says that the maintenance of ships is the highest duty of a state, because it is an absolutely natural necessity, but that the maintenance of hucksters has not the same value. In another place Aristotle says: " For the art of exchange extends to all possessions, and it arises at first in a natural manner from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much." 7 And Seneca is also to be cited in this connection for he has said that buying and selling is the law of nations.8 Therefore freedom of trade is based on a primitive right of nations which has a natural and permanent cause; and 1 Castrensis from Cinus and others on Digest I, 1, 5.
• Plato, Sophista 223d.
• [The text here is somewhat expanded.]
• Cicero, De officiis I, 150-151; Aristotle, Politics I, 9.
• De beneficiis V, 8 [Not a quotation, but a summing up of the chapter].
64 MARE LIBERVM tium, quod naturalem et perpetuam causam habet, ideoque tolli non potest, et si posset non tamen posset nisi omnium gentium consensu: tantum abest ut ullo modo gens aliqua gentes duas inter se contrahere volentes iuste impediat.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 64 so that right cannot be destroyed, or at all events it may not be destroyed except by the consent of all nations. So far is that from being the case, that any one nation may justly oppose in any way, any other two nations that desire to enter into a mutual and exclusive contractual relation.
CAPVT IX Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esse Lusitanorum titulo occupationis Primum inventio aut occupatio hie locum non habet, quia ius mercandi non est aliquid corporate, quod possit apprehendi; neque prodesset Lusitanis etiamsi primi homi- num cum Indis habuissent commercia, quod tamen non potest non esse falsissimum. Nam et cum initio populi in diversa iere, aliquos necesse est primes fuisse mercatores, quos tamen ius nullum acquisivisse certo est certius. Quare si Lusitanis ius aliquod competit, ut soli cum Indis nego- tientur, id exemplo ceterarum servitutum, ex concessione oriri debuit aut expressa aut tacita, hoc est praescriptione; neque aliter potest.
65 CHAPTER IX 65 CHAPTER IX Trade with the East Indies does not belong to the Portuguese by title of occupation Neither discovery nor occupation [which have been fully treated in Chapters II and V], is to be invoked on the point here under consideration, because the right of carrying on trade is not something corporal, which can be physically seized; nor would discovery or occupation help the case of the Portuguese even if they had been the very first persons to trade with the East Indies, although such a claim would be entirely untenable and false. For since in the beginning peoples set out along different paths, it was necessary that some become the first traders, never- theless it is absolutely certain that those traders did not on that account acquire any rights. Wherefore if the Portu- guese have any right by virtue of which they alone may trade with the East Indies, that right like other servitudes ought to arise from concession, either express or tacit, that is to say, from prescription. Otherwise no such right ean exist.
CAPVT X Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esse Lmsitanorum titulo donationis Pontificiae Concessit nemo, nisi forte Pontifex, qui non potuit.1 Nemo enim quod suum non est concedere potest. At Pon- tifex, nisi totius Mundi temporalis sit Dominus, quod negant sapientes, ius etiam commerciorum universale sui iuris dicere non potest. Maxime vero cum res sit ad solum quaestum acconunodata, nihilque ad spiritualem procura- tionem pertinens, extra quam cessat, ut f atentur omnes, Pon- tificia potestas. Praeterea si Pontifex solis illud Lusitanis ius tribuere vellet idemque adimere hominibus ceteris, dupli- cem faceret iniuriam: Primum Indis, quos ut extra Eccle- siam positos Pontifici nulla ex parte subditos esse diximus. His igitur cum nihil quod ipsorum est adimere possit Ponti- fex, etiam ius illud quod habent cum quibuslibet negotiandi adimere non potuit. Deinde aliis hominibus omnibus Chris- tianis et non Christianis, quibus idem illud ius adimere non potuit sine causa indicta. Quid quod ne temporales quidem Domini in suis imperiis prohibere possunt commerciorum libertatem, uti rationibus et auctoritatibus ante demonstra- tum est?
Sicut et illud confitendum est, contra ius perpetuum naturae gentiumque, unde ista libertas originem sumpsit in omne tempus duratura, nullam valere Pontificis auctori- tatem.
» Cf. cap. Ill et VI.
66 CHAPTER X Trade with the East Indies does not belong to the Portu- guese by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation No one has granted it except perhaps the Pope, and he did not have the power.1 For no one can give away what he does not himself possess. But the Pope, unless he were the temporal master of the whole world, which sen- sible men deny, cannot say that the universal right in re- spect of trade belongs to him. Especially is this true since trade has to do only with material gains, and has no con- cern at all with spiritual matters, outside of which, as all admit, Papal power ceases. Besides, if the Pope wished to give that right to the Portuguese alone, and to deprive all other men of the same right, he would be doing a double injustice. In the first place, he would do an injustice to the people of the East Indies who, placed as we have said outside the Church, are in no way subjects of the Pope. Therefore, since the Pope cannot take away from them anything that is theirs, he could not take away their right of trading with whomsoever they please. In the second place, he would do an injustice to all other men both Chris- tian and non-Christian, from whom he could not take that same right without a hearing. Besides, what are we to say of the fact that not even temporal lords in their own do- minions are competent to prohibit the freedom of trade, as has been demonstrated above by reasonable and authorita- tive statements?
Therefore it must be acknowledged, that the authority of the Pope has absolutely no force against the eternal law of nature and of nations, from whence came that liberty which is destined to endure for ever and ever.
1 See chapters III and VI.
66 CAPVT XI Mercaturam cum Indis non esse Lusitanorum propriam iure praescriptionis aut consuetudinis Restat praescriptio, seu consuetudinem mavis dicere.1 Sed nee huius nee illius vim esse aliquam inter liberas na- tiones, aut diversarum gentium Principes, nee adversus ea quae primigenio iure introducta sunt, cum Vasquio ostendi- mus. Quare et hie ut ius mercandi proprium fiat, quod proprietatis naturam non recipit, nullo tempore efficitur. Itaque nee titulus hie adfuisse potest, nee bona fides, quae cum manifesto desinit, praescriptio secundum Canones non ius dicetur, sed iniuria.
Quin et ipsa mercandi quasi possessio non ex iure proprio contigisse videtur, sed ex iure communi quod ad omnes aequaliter pertinet; sicut contra, quod aliae nationes cum Indis contrahere forte neglexerunt, id non Lusitanorum gratia fecisse existimandi sunt, sed quia sibi expedire credi- derunt; quod nihil obstat quo minus ubi suaserit utilitas, id facere possint, quod antea non fecerint. Certissima enim ilia regula a doctoribus traditur,2 in his quae sunt arbitrii seu merae facultatis, ita ut per se actum tantum f acultatis eius, non autem ius novum operentur, nee praescriptionis nee consuetudinis titulo annos etiam mille valituros: quod et JCf. cap. VII.
'Gloss, et Bartolus on Digest XLIII, 11, 2 (De via publics, L. Viam publicam); Balbus 4, 5 pr. qu. 1; Panormitanus on Decretales Gregorii Papae IX, III, 8, 10 (De concessione praebendae, c. Ex parte Hastenen.); Digest XLI, 2, 41 (De adquirenda possessione, L. Qui iure familiaritatis); Covarruvias In c. possessor. 2, § 4; Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 10 et 12.
67 CHAPTER XI Trade with the East Indies does not belong to the Portu- guese by title of prescription or custom Last of all, prescription, or if you prefer the term, custom.1 We have shown that according to Vasquez, neither prescription nor custom had any force as between free nations or the rulers of different peoples, or any force against those principles which were introduced by primitive law. And here as before, mere efflux of time does not bring it to pass that the right of trade, which does not partake of the nature of ownership, becomes a private possession. Now in this case neither title nor good faith can be shown, and inasmuch as good faith is clearly absent, according to legal rules prescription will not be called a right, but an injury.
Nay, the very possession involved in trading seems not to have arisen out of a private right, but out of a public right which belongs equally to all; so on the other hand, because nations perhaps neglected to trade with the East Indies, it must not be presumed that they did so as a favor to the Portuguese, but because they believed it to be to their own best interests. But nothing stands in their way, when once expediency shall have persuaded them, to prevent them from doing what they had not previously done. For the jurists 2 have handed down as incontestable the principle that where things arbitrable or facultative are such that they pro- duce nothing more than the facultative act per se, but do not create a new right, that in all such cases not even a thou- sand years will create a title by prescription or custom.
1 See chapter VII.
1 On Digest XLIII, 11, 3; Balbus 4, 5 pr. qu. 1; Panormitanus on the Decre- tals of Pope Gregory IX, III, 8, 10; Digest XLI, 2, 41; Covarruvias in c. possessor. 2, § 4; Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 10 and 12.
67 68 MARE LIBERVM affirmative et negative procedit, ut docet Vasquius. Nee enim quod libere feci facere cogor, nee quod non feci omittere.