VIL Sixthly, if hesell a thing which he have bought (belonging to another), he is not bound*, except in so far as he sold it for more than he gave for it. Τῇ he have sold a thing given to him (belonging to another) he is held to restore the price; except it happen that he have spent the price, and would not otherwise have spent the money.
* 'These two Rules do not agree well together: according to the seventh, a thing belonging to another, which we have bought bona fide, we must restore to the owner, not requiring the price from him; according to the sixth, if we have bought it, and then sold it, we are not bound to restore the price. It appears to be assumed, in the seventh Rule, that we have a remedy against the seller. 'W.
Car. X.] EX DOMINIO ORITUR. 27 addenda mihi videtur exceptio, ^nisi quatenus dominus rei Suc possessionem recipere sine impendio aliquo probabiliter non potuit, ut puta si res apud piratas fuerit. "Tunc enim deduci poterit quantum dominus impensurus libenter fuerat: ipsa enim facti possessio, prsesertim recuperatu difficilis, est aliquid sstimabile, et in hoe dominus post rem amissam cen- setur factus locupletior. Et ideo cum rei su: emtio ordinario jure non valeat, valere tamen eam ait Paulus Jurisconsul- £ tus, si ab initio id convenit, ut possessio quee apud alterum est ematur. Neque hie requiro ut emta res sit cum animo ut domino restitueretur, quo casu negotiorum actionem nasci, sunt qui aiant, sunt qui negent. Nam negotiorum gestorum actio ex lege civili nascitur: nullum enim habet eorum funda- mentorum, ex quibus natura obligationem inducit. Nos au- tem id quod naturale est hie quzerimus.
2 Non dissimile est& quod de funeraria scripsit Ulpianus, justum judicem in ea non meram negotiorum gestorum actioetiam ab Hebrzorum magistris proba- — num. 18, tur, et a Wisigotthis libro 1x. tit. i. c. 9. € Cum animo ut domino restitueretur] et c, 14. Alc. 111. Pres. 202. Menoch. v. — Speculum Sazonicum 11, 37. Landrecht Pres. 29. num. 20. Stracham parte ll, tit. xv.
IX. 1 Seventhly, a thing belonging to another which has been bona fide bought, is to be restored, and the price paid cannot be demanded back*. ΤῸ which rule it seems to me that this exception should be made;—except in so far as the owner could not probably recover possession of his thing without some expense; as, for ex- ample, if it were in the hands of pirates: for then we may deduct as much as the owner would willingly have expended on it. For the actual possession of a thing, especially of a thing difficult to recover, is of itself a valuable matter, and in this the owner, after he has lost the thing [and recovered it] is richer than he was before. And there- fore though the buying of a thing which is one's own is not valid by ordinary law, yet Paulus says that it is valid, if it be agreed from the first that the possession which another has of it may be bought. Nor do I here require that the thing should be bought with a purpose of restoring it to the owner, in which case an action for agency would lie. Some hold one way, some the other. For the action for agency is the creation of the Civil Law, and has none of those foun- dations by means of which nature induces obligation. And we are here inquiring what is Natural Law.
2 Ulpian's opinion respecting funeral expenses is of the same kind; that a just judge in such cases does not merely imitate the effect of an action for agency, but follows equity in a larger manner, the D. de Cont.
mt. L. Si in Emt.
Ent.
L. Si Labor. 2. ὃ Si Nav. 3. ad Leg. Rhod. Vid. JEgid. Reg. Disp. 31. dub. Host. Tit. de Pan. v. quid de Pred. Ement.
Bal. et Cast. Neg. Gest. L. et si quis, 14. ὃ idem Relig. el s. f. Bals. ad can. x. Greg. Thaum.
L.Si Pupil. 6.
Covar. d. loco.
Khod.
28 DE OBLIGATIONE QUZE [Lrx. IT.
nem imitari, sed solutius z:equitatem sequi, eum hoc ei actionis natura indulgeat. Et quod alibi idem ait, si quis negotia mea "9 gesserit, non mei contemplatione, sed sui lueri causa, et circa res meas aliquid impenderit, non quidem in id quod dedit, sed in id quod ego locupletior sum, habiturum aetionem. Sie *enim et domini rerum, quarum jactu levata est navis, partem recuperant ab aliis, quorum res jactu servatze sunt: quia et qui rem alioqui perituram servavit, in hoe videtur locu- pletior.
X. Octavo, eum, qui rem alienam emit, non posse eam restituere venditori ut pretium servet, quia ex quo res in ejus fuit potestate, jam, ut diximus, ccepit obligatio restituendi.
XI. Nono, eum qui rem habeat, cujus dominus igno- ratur, non teneri naturaliter eam rem pauperibus dare: fquan- quam valde hoc pium sit, et recte multis in locis constitutum.
tatio est, quia ex dominio nemo jus habet przeter dominum. Non esse autem, et non apparere, tantundem valent quoad eum cui non apparet.
^ Heie enim,in omnibus Editionibus, exemplum, non ratio jam dictorum, positum pro etiam, errato,ut mihi vide- ὦ). B. tur, typographico, quem tamen Auctor f Quanquam valde hoc pium sit] Chry- non animadvertit. Certe est id novum sostomus indicato jam loco. (Zn 1 Conature of the action allowing him to do so. And what the same writer elsewhere says, if any one has transacted business for me, not having a regard to me, but for the sake of his own gain, he may have an action, not for all that he has expended, but for the amount by which I am richer. And so the owners of goods which are thrown overboard to lighten the ship, recover a part from the others whose goods are saved by that proceeding; for a person who preserves, by any step, his property which was in danger of perishing, is by so much the richer.
X. Eighthly; the person who has bought a thing belonging to another, cannot restore it to the seller to save himself the price: because, as soon as the thing is in his possession, the obligation of restoring it has begun.
ΧΙ. Ninthly; he who has a thing the owner of which is unknown, is not naturally bound to give it to the poor: although this is a very pious course, in many plaees properly ordered. The reason is, be- cause, in virtue of ownership, no one has a right except the owner. But that there is no owner, and no apparent owner, is the same thing to him to whom he is not apparent.
XI. '"Tenthly, by Natural Law, what is received either for a shameful cause, or for an honest cause to which any one was bound, [without reward] is not to be restored: though such a rule is not un- Car. X.] EX DOMINIO ORITUR. 29 XII. Decimo, naturaliter quod ob causam turpem aut Thom. 2.2. art. 5. honestam, ad quam quis obligabatur, acceptum est, non esse Tun o1 Cajet. ibid.
restituendum, quanquam hoc quoque non immerito legibus Rude 2. ad cap.
quibusdam introductum est. Ratio est, quia ratione rei nemo bec " tenetur, nisi res sit aliena; hie autem dominium transit ex ^9 prioris domini voluntate. Aliud erit si in ipso accipiendi modo vitium fuerit, puta extorsio: hoc enim est aliud obliga- tionis principium, de quo hie non agimus.
XIII. Addamus et hoe mendose a Medina traditum, re- Denmest.q. 10. rum alienarum in nos dominium transire sine consensu domini, si res sint tales, qu: pondere, numero, et mensura sestimari soleant. Nam res ejus generis functionem quidem recipere dieuntur, id est, restitui posse per id quod genere idem est, sed ita demum si consensus przcesserit, aut ex lege aut more: przecessisse intelligatur, ut in mutuo; aut etiam si res, utpote consumta, exhiberi nequeat. At extra talem consensum, vel r. nonas. 3. expressum, vel presumtum, et extra necessitatem functio ista A rd. it locum non habet.
Tinth. v. 8.) time hzc distinguit Augustinus epistola E Aliud erit si in ipso accipiendi τιν, (qua est cr1ur. nove Edit. Bene- modo vitium fuerit, puta extorsio] Op- — dictin.)
reasonably introduced by scme laws. The reason is, that no one is bound by the reason for which the thing is given, except it be a thing belonging to another: but in the case now supposed, the ownership passes in virtue of the will of the former owner. It is another matter if there be something wrong in the mode of acquisition; for instance, extortion: for this is another principle of obligation, concerning which we do not now speak.
XIII. Let us add also this, erroneously ruled by Medina: that the ownership of things belonging to others may pass to us without the consent of the owner, if they are such things as are commonly valued according to number, weight, aud measure. "Things of this kind are said functionem recipere, to be such that our portion may pass for another, so that they may be restored by means of that which is not identical, but only the same in kind. But this can be done only when consent has preceded, or may, by law or usage, be understood to have preceded, as in lending; or if the thing, being consumed, cannot be exhibited. But without such consent, express or presumed, and without necessity, that function has no place.
CAPUT XI. DE PROMISSIS.
I.. Refellitur. sententia, statu- ens ex promissis jus natura- liter non oriri.
IL Assertionem | nudam obligare.
III..Pollicitationem naturaliter obligare, sed inde alteri jus non nasci.
IV. Quid sit promissum wnde alteri jus oritur.
V. Requiri ad hoc in promit- tente usum, rationis: uli distinguitur jus naturale a legibus civilibus circa mi- nores.
VI..Promissio errantis am et quatenus oblige. naturali- ter.
9?on VII..JPromissionem ex metu ob- ligare, sed. qui metus cau- sam, dedit, teneri ad. liber- andwum prowmissorem. - VIII. 7d quod promittitur, wt promissio valeat, oportere in potestate sit promittentis.
IX..Am promissio ob causam vitiosum, valeat natwurali- ter, per distinctionem | ea- plicatur.
X. Quid sentiendum de pro- wnissione facta, ad. conse- quendam, rem jam ante debitam.
ΧΙ. Modus valide promittendi per nos ipsos.
Modus valide promittendi per alios; ubi et de legatis mandata, excedentibus. XIII. JEzercitoria et institoria ob- ligationes quatenus ex jure nature procedant, wbi et juris Romani error mo- tatur.
Ad. promissionis validita- tem acceptationem requiri.
XII.
2€ b ys XV. Am acceptatio innotescere debeat promissori, per dis- tinctionem explicatur.
XVI. Revocaripromissionem pos- 86, mortuo ante acceptatio- nem cui promissum erat.
XVII. An et internmuntio mortuo, per distinctiones evplicatur.
XVIII an revocabilis sit promis- sio, acceptione per. alterum facta, per. distinctiones ex- plicatur.
XIX. Omus promisso adjici quo tempore possit.
XX. Quomodo convalescere pos- sit invalida promissio. JPPromissiones sine causa natwraliter non esse irritas. XXII. Qui factum. alienum promisit ad quid naturaliter teneatur.
XXI.
L 1 [)ERDUXIT nos ordo ad obligationem quz ex pro- missis oritur: ubi statim se nobis objicit vir erudi- Libi6;v.l tionis minime vulgaris Franciseus Connanus.
CnAPTER XI.
Is enim hanc Of Promises.
I. 1 The order of our work has led us to the obligation which arises from promises.
And here we at once find opposed to us a man Car. XI.] DE PROMISSIS. 91 defendit!'sententiam, jure naturse ac gentium ea pacta, quz non habent συνάλλαγμα, nullam inducere obligationem: honeste tamen impleri si modo talis res sit, quam prsestare etiam citra promissum honestum ac virtuti alicui congruens fuerat.
2 Adfert autem pro sententia sua non tantum Juriscon- sultorum dicta, sed et rationes has: quod non minor sit culpa ejus qui temere nulla de causa pollicenti credit, quam ejus qui vanitatem adhibuit promissionis: deinde quod fortunis omnium magnum immineat periculum, si promisso, quod s:pe ex ostentatione magis quam ex voluntate proficiscitur, aut ex voluntate quidem, sed levi ac parum considerata, tenerentur homines: postremo, quod justum fuit aliqua honestati cujus- que relinquere, nec ad necessitatem obligationis exigere: turpe esse promissa non implere, non quod injuste id fiat, sed quod detegatur promissionis levitas.
Tulli quoque utitur testimonio, qui dixerit, nec promissa servanda, quse sint iis quibus promiseris inutilia, nec si plus tibi noceant, quam illi prosint cui promiseris.
Quod si res integra non sit, vult deberi non quod pro- Confer PurENponrivM, De Jure Nat, et Gent. Lib. 11, cap. 5. $9. et seqq. J. B.
of no ordinary erudition, Francis Connanus. For he maintains this opinion, that, jure nature ac gentium, those pacts which have not a consideration (συνάλλαγμα), do not induce any obligation; though no doubt they may be properly fulfilled, if the matter be such as it would have been, without promise, proper and congruent to some virtue to perform.
2 He adduces for his opinion not only the dicte of jurists, but also these reasons: (1) That there is a fault no less in him who rashly trusts a person who makes a promise for no cause: (2) That there is a great danger thrown upon the fortunes of all, if men be judged to be bound by a promise, which often proceeds more from ostentation than from real purpose; or from a purpose, but a light and inconsiderate one: (3) That it is right to leave something to each person's honesty, and not to bind men to the necessity of an obligation:—that it is disgraceful not to fulfil promises, not because such a course is unjust, but because thereby the levity of the promise is detected.
He also uses the authority of Cicero, who says, that promises are not to be kept when they are useless to those to whom they are made; nor if they do more harm to you than good to those to whom you made them. (7e Off. i. 10.)
If the matter be no longer open, in consequence of some step II.
III.
De Offic. i. 10.
Rhet. i. 15. Orat. i. adv. Zristog. p. 492. C. unde Pet. est. L.2. D. de Leg.
32 DE PROMISSIS. [Lrs. II.
missum est, sed quod interest: ceterum pacta, quam ex se non habent vim, eam accipere aut ex contractibus, quibus insunt aut adjiciuntur, aut ex rei traditione: unde nasci par- tim actiones, partim exceptiones, et vetitam repetitionem.
Quse vero pacta vim obligandi secundum leges habeant, ut pacta stipulata, et alia qusedam, habere eam legum beneficio, quarum ea est efficacia, ut quod per se honestum est, id efficere possint etiam necessarium.
3 Verum hze sententia, ita generaliter ut ab ipso effer- tur accepta, consistere non potest. Primum enim sequitur inde inter reges et populos diversos, pactorum, quamdiu nihil ex lis przsstitum est, vim esse nullam, presertim iis in locis, ubi nulla certa forma federum aut sponsionum reperta est. 'Tum vero ratio nulla reperiri potest, cur leges, quae quasi pac- tum commune sunt populi, atque hoc nomine vocantur ab Aristotele et Demosthene, obligationem pactis possint addere; voluntas autem cujusque, hoc omni modo agentis ut se obliget, idem non possit, precipue ubi lex civilis impedimentum non affert, Adde quod, voluntate sufficienter significata, trans- ferri rel dominium potest, ut ante diximus: quid ni ergo having been taken, he pronounees that what you ought to do, is not what is promised, but what is for the interest of the promisee:—that the pacts, not having any force of themselves, receive force from the con- tracts of which they are parts or additions, or from the delivery of the thing in question; whence arise, partly actions, partly exceptions to actions, and prohibitions of suit.
But pacts which have an obligatory force according to the Laws, as pacts with stipulations and some others, have, he holds, this force by the help of the laws, which have this efficacy, that what of itself is proper, they make to be necessary.
3 Butthis opinion cannot stand, in the general form in which he propounds it. For, in the first place, it follows therefrom that pacts between kings and different peoples, so long as nothing thereof is per- formed (re integrá) have no force; [the parties being bound by no common instituted law;] especially in those places in which no regular form of treaties and engagements has been introduced.
And again, no reason can be found why laws, which are in a cer- tain way a common pact of the people, and are so called by Aristotle and Demosthenes, should be able to give obligatory force to pacts; while the will of a person, directed especially, and by every means, to put himself under an obligation, should not be able to do $0; especially when the Civil Law offers no impediment.
Car. XI.] DE PROMISSIS. 33 possit transferri et jus in personam, aut ad transferendum dominium (quod jus ipso dominio minus est) aut ad aliquid agendum, quippe cum in actiones nostras par jus habeamus atque in res nostras?
4 Accedit his *sapientum consensus: nam quomodo di- citur à Jurisconsultüs, nihil esse tam naturale, quam volunta- tem domini volentis rem suam in alium transferre ratam ha- beri; eodem modo dicitur, nihil esse tam congruum fidei humans, quam ea qua inter eos placuerunt servare. Sie edictum de pecunia constituta, ubi nulla in constituente de- bendi causa precesserat prseter consensum, favere dicitur naturali zquitati. Paulus quoque Jurisconsultus eum ait na- tura debere, quem jure gentium dare oportet, cujus fidem secuti sumus: quo in loco primum vox, oportet, necessitatem quandam moralem significat: neque vero admittendum est, quod ait Connanus, fidem secutos nos censeri, ubi res integra esse desiit: agebat enim eo loco Paulus de condictione inde- biti: quee cessat si ex qualieunque pacto solutum quid sit, * Sapientum consensus] lta ut et si- — Kama cap. x. ὃ 4. [Vide ibi Commenlentium in re moram non ferente vim ἔα), Constantini Lempereur. ] sponsionis habere velint Hebrzei. Baba Add to this, that when the will is sufficiently signified, the owner- ship of a thing may be transferred, as we have already said: why then may there not also be a transfer of a jus in personam, a right to the performance of a person's promise, or a right to transfer ownership (which is a less thing than ownership itself,) or a right to do anything; since we have the same right over our actions as over the things which belong to us?
4 To this is to be added the consent of wise men; for as it is said by jurists, that nothing is so natural as that the will of the owner when he wishes to transfer to another a thing which is his, should be held valid; in the same way it is said that nothing is so congruous to the mutual confidence of mankind, as to perform the agreements which have been made among men. Thus the edict concerning paying money agreed to be paid at a certain time, when in the person so agreeing no cause had preceded except consent, is said to favour natu- ral equity. Paulus also says, that a man owes us a debt, when, jure , gentium, he ought to give it us, we relying upon his good faith; in which place, first, the word ought implies a certain moral necessity: nor can we admit what Connanus says, that we rely upon a man's good faith, only when some step has been taken in agreement with the promise: for in that place Paulus was speaking of an action for recovering what has been paid and was not owing: which falls to the ground, if the 3 [cnor. 11.
$ Per Trad. 40. Inst. de Rer. Divis.
L.1. D. de Pact.
Pec. Const. L. cum Amp. Reg. Jur.
De Offic. i. 7.
Lib. i. Od. 24.
App. de Hab. Plat. Doctr.
fin.
Apud Plat. i. De Rep.
94 DE PROMISSIS. [Lir. II.
quia jam ante, re adhuc integra, natur: ac gentium jure dari oportebat, etiamsi lex civilis ad przescindendas litium occasi- ones auxilium suum non przstabat.
5 M.autem Tullius in Officiis tantam promissis vim tri- buit, ut fundamentum justiti;e fidem appellet, quam et justi- tie sororum dixit Horatius, et Platonici seepe justitiam vocant ἀλήθειαν, quod fidelitatem transtulit Apuleius: ae Simonides justitiam definiebat, non modo acceptum reddere, sed et verum dicere.
6 Sed ut bene res intelligatur,?distinguendi sunt dili- genter tres gradus loquendi de rebus futuris quae nostra sunt potestatis, aut fore putantur.
II. Primus gradus est assertio explicans de futuro ani- mum qui nunc est: et ad hane, ut vitio careat, requiritur veritas cogitationis pro tempore przesenti, non autem ut in ea cogitatione perseveretur. Habet enim animus humanus non tantum naturalem potentiam mutandi consilium, sed et jus. Quod si in mutatione sententiz vitium sit aliquod, aut accedit, id non est intrinsecum mutationi, sed ex materia, puta quia prior sententia erat melior.
? Vide, in hanc rem, PurENDORFr. b Deum ipsum| Ita Baldus in Lib. 1. De Jure Nat. et Gent. Lib. x. cap. 5. —. D. de Pactis. $5.etseqq. J. B.
money be paid in virtue of a compact of any kind whatever: for then, even before any step had been taken (re adhuc integra,) by Natural Law and jure gentium, it ought to be paid; even if the Civil Law did not lend its aid, to cut off occasions of litigation [by stopping the ac- tion after it has been paid].
5 Cicero, in his Offices, gives so much weight to promises, that he calls good faith the foundation of justice. So Horace: and the Pla- tonists often eall Justice, T'ruth, or Truthfulness, which Apuleius trans- lates Fidelitas. Simonides, as quoted in Plato's Republie, says that justice is, to return what is entrusted to us, and to speak the truth.
6 But in order that the thing may be well understood, there are three ways of speaking concerning the future, which must be carefully distinguished.
II. The first degree is an assertion explaining our present pur- pose with respect to some future action: [1 intend to give you:] and that this may be free from fault, a requisite is, a truth of the thought for the present time, but not that the thought be persevered in. For the human mind has not only a natural power of changing its purpose, but also a right. And if there be any fault in the change, Car. XI.] DE PROMISSIS. 35 III.. Secundus gradus est, cum voluntas se ipsam pro futuro tempore determinat, cum signo sufficiente ad indican- dam perseverandi necessitatem. ^ Et hzc pollicitatio dici potest, quz seposita lege civili obligat quidem, aut absolute, aut sub conditione, sed jus proprium alteri non dat. Multis enim casibus evenit, ut obligatio sit in nobis, et nullum jus in alio: sicut in debito misericordis et gratise repo- nendz» apparet, quibus simile est hoc debitum constantis sive fidelitatis. Itaque ex tali pollicitatione res pollicitantis reti- neri aut is ipse qui pollicitus est ad implendam fidem cogi jure nature non poterit.
IV. 1 Tertius gradus est, ubi ad determinationem ta- lem aecedit signum volendi jus proprium alteri conferre: quie perfecta promissio est, similem habens effectum qualem alienatio domini. Est enim aut via ad alienationem rei, aut alienatio particulze cujusdam nostre libertatis. Illuc pertinent promissa dandi, huc promissa faciendi. Ejus quod dicimus insigne nobis argumentum przbent divina oracula, quz nos docent "Deum ipsum, qui nulla constituta lege obstringi or accessory to it, that is not intrinsic to the change, as a change, but belongs to the matter; for instance, if the first intention was the better of the two.
ΠΙ. "The second degree is, when the will determines itself for a future time, with a sufficient sign to indicate the necessity of perse- vering [7 will give you]. "This may be called pollicitation; it is obligatory without the Civil Law, either absolutely or conditionally, but it does not give to another person a proper right*. Forin many cases it happens that there is an Obligation in us, and no corresponding Right in another: as appears in the duties of mercy and gratitude; and to these, the duty of constancy or fidelity is similar. "Therefore in virtue of such pollicitation, the thing so promised cannot be retained, or he who made the promise be compelled by Natural Law to fulfil it.: IV. 1 The third degree is, when to such a determination is added a sign of wishing to confer a proper right upon another: [7 promise jow:] which is a perfect promise, with the same effects as alienation of ownership. For itis either a way to the alienation of the thing, or it is an alienation of some portion of our liberty. To the former head belong promises to give, to the latter, promises to do.
Α strong example of what we say is furnished by the Scriptures,: which teach us that God himself, who cannot be compelled by any * [t is better to use Obligation only as correlative to Fight, and Duty when there is no such correlative Right, but a moral claim,.£. M. 84, 89.
Prov. vi. 1.
36 DE PROMISSIS. [118. II.
potest, contra naturam suam facturum nisi promissa praestaret. Neh. ix. 8; Heb. vi 18, et x. 28; 9O0r.1. 8, x; ION Thess. v. 24; 2 Thess. iii. 3; 2 Tim. i. 18. Unde sequitur, ut promissa prestentur venire ex natura immutabilis justitize, qui Deo et omnibus his qui ratione utuntur, suo modo com- munis est. Accedit judicium Salomonis: ili m?, sí quid spopondisti alteri, defixisti externo volas tuas, illaqueatus es verbis oris tui: captus es enuntiationibus oris tui. Et hine Hebrais promissio vocatur ΓΝ vinculum, et * voto comparatur, Num. xxx. 4, 5, 6. — Similis origo vocis ὑποσχέ- σεως notata Eustathio ad secundum lliados: ἁλίσκει “γάρ 7S καὶ κατέχει τὸν ὑποσχόμενον ὁ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν δε- Éauevos. Capit ae. vincit. quodammodo promissorem is, cui fit promissio. Quem sensum non male secundo AMeta- morphoseon expressit Ovidius, ubi promissor ei cui promiserat ait: Vox mea facta tua est.
2 His cognitis non difficulter respondebimus ad Connani argumenta. Nam jurisconsultorum dicta de pactis nudis re- spieiunt *id, quod Romanis legibus erat introductum, quz deliberati animi signum certum constituerunt stipulationem. Neque negamus similes esse in aliis populis leges. — Que lez € Voto comparatur] Quasi pacis- ^ Sc.2. vers. 22. cuntur cum Diis homines oblatione voto- * Id, quod Romanis legibus erat in- rum. Schol. Horatii. (1η τι. Od.29. ^ troductum] Caute Paulus Sententiarum, vy. 59.) Lib. rr. Tit. 14. δὲ pactum nudum de 4 Capit ac vincit] Inde vincula fidei — pr«standis usuris interpositum est, nul- dieta. Donatus ad Eunuchum. (Act.1. ^ lius est momenti: ex mudo enim pacto instituted law, would act contrary to his nature, except he performed his promises. [See the passages.] Whence it follows, that the perform- ance of promises proceeds from the nature of immutable justice, which is, in a certain way, common to God and to all rational erea- tures. So Prov. vi. l. À promise is spoken of as indissoluble: and a vow. Numb. xxx. 4, 5,6. So the word ὑπόσχεσις is explained by Eustathius. So Ovid. [See.)
2 'This being understood, we shall have no difficulty in replying to Connanus's arguments. For the dicta of jurists respecting nude paets regard the rule which was introduced by the Roman laws, which made stipulation the certain sign of a deliberate purpose. Nor do we deny that similar laws existed in other nations. What law obliges us to. perforin what we have promised to any one? says Seneca, speaking of human law [Natural Law], and a promise not made with formal solemnity.
Gi» XI] DE PROMISSIS. 97 ad id prestandum mos quod alicui promisimus obligat? ait Seneca de lege humana et promisso non solenniter facto 7. 2e Bn. loquens.
3 Possunt autem naturalter deliberati animi alia esse signa preter stipulationem, aut si quid ei simile ad actionem pariendam lex civilis postulat. Quod autem fit animo non deliberato, id nos quoque ad vim obligandi non credimus pertinere; quod et T'heophrastus libro de legibus notaverat: 4nwt sto». imo et quod deliberato fit, sed non eo animo ut jus proprium concedat alteri, ex eo negamus jus exigendi cuiquam natu- raliter dari, quanquam non solam hine honestatem, sed et necessitatem quandam moralem nasci agnoscimus. De eo autem quod ex Cicerone adducitur agemus infra, ubi de inter- pretatione pactorum sermo erit. Sed quz ad perfect; pro- missionis vim?requirantur videamus.
V. 1 Primum requiritur usus rationis: ideo et furiosi, et amentis, et infantis nulla est promissio. Aliud censendum de minoribus, hi enim etsi non satis firmum judicium habere credantur, ut et fcemins, id tamen nec perpetuum est, nec per se sufficit ad actus vim elidendam.
2 Quando autem puer ratione uti incipiat, non potest inter cives Romanos actio non nascitur. | sponsio, verborum solennitas dicitur $8 1. Paulo, Lib. v. Sententiarum, ('Tit. 7. f De promisso non solemniter facto ὃ. 1.) et Caio titulo de obligationibus loquens] Id est, non sponso. Sic epi- — qu:e ex consensu fiunt, (r1. 9. 4.)
stola xix. distinguit: Jam non promit- 3 Confer PurENponr. Ze Jure Nat.
tunt de te, sed spondent. Stipulatus et δ Gentium, Lib. 111. cap. vi. J. B.
3 There may, however, by Natural Law, be other signs of a deliberate purpose, besides the formality of stipulation, or anything else which the Civil Law requires as a ground for an action. But what is done not of deliberate intention, we also do not hold to have the force of obligation, as Theophrastus also had noted. And even as to that which is done with deliberate intention, but not with a purpose of conceding a proper right to another, we deny that it gives to any one a right of demanding the performance by Natural Law: though, in this case, we allow that not only a propriety, but even a moral necessity arises.
As to what is adduced from Cicero, we shall treat below, when we have to speak of the interpretation of pacts.
V. But let us see what conditions are required to produce the force of a perfect promise.
1. First there is required the use of reason: and therefore mad- Orat. lxxiv.
38 DE PROMISSIS. [Lar. II.
certo definiri: sed ex quotidianis actbus, aut etiam ex eo quod communiter in quaque regione accidit, desumendum est. Itaque apud Hebrzos valebat promissio quam fecisset adole- Sscens qui annum implesset decimum tertium: puella qus duodecimum. Alibi leges civiles, justa ratione motz, quas- dam promissiones pupillorum ae minorum irritas pronuntiant, non apud Romanos tantum, sed et apud Grzcos, ut notatum Dioni Chrysostomo oratione Lxxv. adversus quasdam restitu- tionis beneficium introdueunt: sed hi effectus sunt proprii legis civilis, ac proinde cum jure naturze ac gentium nihil habent commune; nisi quod quibus locis obtinent, ibi eas servari etiam naturale est. Quare etiamsi peregrinus eum cive paciscatur, tenebitur illis legibus: quia qui in loco aliquo contrahit, tanquam subditus temporarius legibus loci subjicitur.
3 Plane aliud erit si in mari pactio fiat, aut in vaeua insula, aut per litteras inter absentes. Talia enim pacta jure solo naturz reguntur, ut et pacta eorum qui summam habent ^ Vide infra, cap. 14. hujus Libri, E Si lex fundetur in presumptione S2, J.B. aliqua facti] Exemplum vide in 1. manmen, and idiots, and children, cannot make a promise. With regard to minors, the case is different; for although these are con- ceived not to have a sufficiently stable judgment, as also women are not, yet this state is not perpetual, nor is it of itself sufficient to nullify the force of a promise.
2 When a boy begins to have the use of his reason, cannot be defined with certainty: but the inference is to be made from his daily acts, or from that which commonly happens in each country. So among the Hebrews, a promise was valid which was made by a boy after he was thirteen years old, or a girl after twelve. Else- where, the Civil Laws, moved by good reasons, pronounce certain promises of wards or minors to be void, not only among the Romans, but also among the Greeks, as Dio Chrysostom notes; and against some such promises, they introduce the benefit of restitution. But these are properly effeets of Civil Law, and therefore have nothing to do with Natural Law and jus gentium; except that when they ob- tain, it is agreeable to Natural Law that they be observed.
Hence even if a stranger make an agreement with a citizen, he is bound by the same laws: because he who makes a contract in any place, is under the laws of the place as a temporary subject *.
3 It is plainly another matter if the compact be made- at sea, Car. XI.] DE PROMISSIS. 39 potestatem, qua tales sunt. Nam in his qu: privatim agunt locum habent leges etiam quz irritum actum faciunt, ubi id in favorem ipsorum fit, *non in poenam.
VI. 1 De pacto errantis perplexa satis tractatio est.
Nam distingui solet inter errorem circa substantiam rei, et Wee qui non sit circa substantiam: an dolus causam dederit con- $6 θα. ad. ontract. de tractui, an non: fueritne alter, quicum actum est, doli parti- &« 77.
ceps: sitne actus stricti Juris an bonz fidei. Nam pro harum "ecd rerum varietate alios actus irritos pronuntiant scriptores, alios 5; "^^ 4 validos quidem, sed ut arbitrio ejus, qui lesus est, rescindi possint, aut reformari. Sed harum distüncetionum plerzque veniunt ex jure Romano, tum civili vetere, tum prztorio: quadam etiam non satis verze aut accurate sunt.
2 At viam nobis reperiends» naturali veritati pandit, quod de legum vi atque efficacia omnium ferme consensu Felin. e. 1. de receptum est, ut *si lex fundetur in presumtione aliqua facti, Put i1. i deJur.et — quod factum revera ita se non habeat, tunc ea lex non47»;« obliget, quia veritate facti deficiente, deficit totum legis fun- tora 55. LU x rt in cipia, 5. C.de Servis fugitivis. apud Gai- ^ lineum ad Consuet. Paris, Tit. 1. S 19. 8. e Navar. lium, Lib. 1. Obs. 2. Num, 7. apud Mo- — Gl. 3. eI or in ἃ desert island, or by letter between persons absent. For such paets are governed by Natural Law only; as also the pacts of sovereigns as such. For in the private acts of sovereigns, those laws have place which make the act void, when it is in their favour, not to their detriment.
VI. 1 The discussion of pacts made in error* is sufficiently per- plexed. For a distinction is commonly made between an error as to the substance of a thing, and an error not about the substance: as, whether fraud was the occasion of the contract: whether the person with whom the contract was made was a party to the fraud: whether it be an action stricti juris or bonc fideiT. | For, according to these variations, writers pronounce some acts void, others, valid, but open to be rescinded or remodelled at the choice of him who is injured. But the greater part of these distinctions come from the Roman Law, both the old Civil Law, and the decisions of Prstors; and some of them are not sufficiently true or accurate.
2 But the way to find the natural truth, is opened to us by a prin- ciple concerning the force and efficacy of laws, which is received by an almost universal consent:—that if the law be founded on the pre- sumption of some fact, which fact is really not so, then that law does not oblige: because, the truth of the fact failing, the whole founda- 40 DE PROMISSIS. [118. II.