tasis with the soul and divine inspiration. For if divinity is unmingled, the soul will not be mingled with it; and if he is immutable, he will not be changed through a concretion into that which is common, from the simplicity of his subsistence. Some, therefore, prior to us, were of opinion that certain small sparks excite in us divine forms. It is impossible, however, that these sparks, whether they are physical, or in some other way corporeal-formed, should be transferred from things of a casual nature to things which are divine. But in what is now asserted by you, the soul is said to be a concause of the divine comixture; and it is evident, this being admitted, that the soul be- comes of an equal dignity with the Gods, that it gives a certain part to them and receives a part from them, and that it also affords a measure to natures more excellent than itself, and is itself bounded by them. That likewise follows which is asserted by some, and is most dire, that the Gods precedaneously subsisting in the order of elements, are inl^erent in their For thus the mortal nature participates of intellect, but the intellectual part of death, and the whole, as Plato observes in the Laws, becomes a prodigy composed of the mortal and the immortal, of the intellectual and that which is deprived of intellect. For this physical law which binds the soul to the body is the death of the immoi’tal life, but vivifies the mortal body.”
effects, and there will be a certain thing pro- duced in time, and from a mixture according to time, which will contain the Gods in itself. What, likewise, is this comingled form of sub- sistence? For if it is both [soul and divine in- spiration externally derived], it will not be one thing consisting of two, but a certain compo- site, and a coacervatinn from two things. But if it is as something different from both, eternal natures will be mutable, and divine natures will in no respect differ from physical sub- stances in generation.* And as it is absurd Here again Gale, from not understanding, opposes lamblichus. For he says, “ sed nee hoc sequitur. S. Max- imus, ubi hypostaticam unionem declarat; haec inquit, cer- nuntur in corpore et anima, Una ex utroque confit hypos- tasis composita. Servat autem in se naturam perfectam utriusque sc. corporis et animee, nai ry]v tovtiov Suacfiopav a(Tvp.(f)vpTov Kai xa iStw/xara acrvpcfivpTa /cat aarvy^^yra. {. e. “ But neither does this follow. S. Maximus, where he un- folds hypostatic union, says these things are perceived in the soul and body. One composite hypostasis is produced from both. But this hypostasis preserves in itself the perfect nature of each, and likewise the difference of these unmin- gled, and the peculiarities unmingled and unconfused.” This hypostatic union, however, as we have before observed, cannot take place between divine inspiration and the soul, because the former is perfectly exempt from the latter.
Gale adds, “ Qusero autem quid velit lamblichus per ap(f)OLV? Opinor, ^v)(r}v et Trjv detav eTnirvoiav.
Non facile evincet eTmrvoiav esse atStov tl, utpote quae sit transiens dei actio.” i. e. “ I ask what lamblichus means by hoik. I think the soul and divine inspiratio7i externally to admit that an eternal nature is produced through generation, it is still more absurd to suppose that any thing which consists of eternal natures can be dissolved. Neither, therefore, is this opinion concerning divination by any means reasonable; and besides this, it is also paradoxical, whether it is considered as one supposition or as two.
CHAP. XXII.
You say, therefore, “ that the soul generates the poiver ivhich has an imaginative perception of futurity, through motions of this hind, or derived. But he will not easily prove that inspiration is something eternal, because it is a transient energy of God.” Gale is right in his conjecture, that lamblichus by the word both in this place, means the soul and divine inspiration ex- ternally derived; for it can admit of no other meaning; but when he adds, that inspiration cannot be something eternal, because it is a transient energy of divinity, he shows himself to be as bad a theologist as he is a philosopher. For God being an eternal, or rather a supereternal nature, his energies have nothing to do with time and its transitive progressions, but are stably simultaneous; so that transition does not exist in his inspiring influence, but in the recipients of it, these being of a temporal and mutable nature. Hence it is just as absurd to call any energy of divinity transient, as it would be to say that the light of the sun is transient, because it shines through diaphanous, but not through opaque, substances.
that the things ivhich are adduced from matter constitute dcemons through the powers that are inherent in them, and especially things adduced from the matter ivhich is taken from animals” It appeal’s to me, however, that what is now asserted by you exhibits a dire illegality with reference to the whole of theology and the theurgic energy. For one absurdity in it, and which is the first that presents itself to the view, is this, that it makes daemons to be generable and corruptible. And another, which is more dire than this, is that things which are prior will be produced from things which are pos- terior to themselves. For daemons exist prior to soul, and to the powers which are distri- buted about bodies. In addition to these things, also, how can the energies of a partible soul which is detained in body, become es- sence, and be by themselves separate out of soul? Or how can the powders which are di- vided about, be separated from bodies, though they have their very being in bodies? And who is it that liberating them from a corporeal condition of subsistence, again collects the cor- poreal dissolution, and causes it to coalesce in one thing? For thus a thing of this kind will be a daemon, who will have an existence prior to his being constituted. This assertion, likewise, is attended with certain common doubts.
N For how can divination be produced from things which have no divining power? And how can soul be generated from things which are without soul? And, in short, how can things which are more perfect be the progeny of such as are more imperfect? The mode, likewise, of production appears to me to he impossible. For it is impossible that essence should be produced through the motions of the soul, and through the powers which are in bodies. For from things which are without essence, it is impossible that essence should be generated.
Whence, also, does the imagination, receiv ing from a certain thing a divining power, be- come prophetic of futurity? For we do not see that any one of the things which are sown through generation possess any thing more than wdiat is imparted to it by its first generat- ing cause. But, in the present instance, the imagination will receive a certain more excel- lent addition from that which has no existence. Unless some one should say, that dsemons preside over the matter which is derived from animals, and that when this matter is adduced, the presiding dsemon is sympathetically moved towards it. According to this opinion, there- fore, dsemons are not generated from the powers in bodies; but preceding and having an exist- ence prior to bodies, they are moved in conformity to them. Let it, however, be admitted, that daemons are thus sympathetic, yet I do not see after what manner there will be some- thing true respecting futurity. For the fore- knowledge and premanifestation of futurity is not the province of a copassive and material power, which is detained in a certain place and body; but, on the contrary, this pertains to a power which is liberated from all these. Such, therefore, are the corrections of this opinion.
CHAP. XXIII.
CHAP. XXIII.
The animadversions which are after this ad- duced, at first, indeed, doubt about the mode of divination, but as they proceed, endeavour entirely to subvert it. We shall, therefore, discuss both these. And, in the first place, we shall begin to dissolve the former of these doubts. For in sleep, when we are not em- ployed about any thing, we sometimes obtain a knowledge of the future” Not that the cause of divination is derived both from us and ex- ternally: for in things the principle of which definitely subsists in us, and that which is con- sequent is externally derived, if these two have a coarrangement and connexion with each other, in this case the works of the two are definitely effected, and the things which are suspended from them follow their precedaneous causes. But when the cause is independent of us, and preexists by itself, the end is not defined on account of us, but the whole depends on things external to us. Now, therefore, since the truth which is in dreams does not entirely concur with our works, but frequently shines forth from itself, it shows that divination is externally derived from the Gods, that it possesses an in- dependent power, and that it benevolently un- folds futurity when it pleases, and in such a way as it pleases. These things, therefore, should have an answer of this kind.
CHAP. XXIY.
In what follows, while you endeavour to unfold divination, you entirely subvert it. For if a passion of the soul is admitted to he the cause of it, what wise man will attribute to an un- stable and stupid thing orderly and stable fore- knowledge'? Or how is it possible that the soul, which is in a sane and stable condition according to its better powers, viz. those that are intellectual and dianoetic, should be igno- rant of futurity; but that the soul which suffers according to disorderly and tumultuous motions, should have a knowledge of what is future? For what has passion in itself adapted to the theory of beings? And is it not rather an impediment to the more true intellection of things? Farther still, therefore, if the things contained in the world were constituted through passions, in this case passions, through their similitude, would have a certain alliance to them. But if they are produced through rea- sons and through forms, there will be another foreknowledge of them, which is liberated from all passion. Again, passion alone perceives that which is present, and which now has a subsist- ence; but foreknowledge apprehends things which do not yet exist. Hence, to foreknow is different from being passively affected.
Let us, however, consider your arguments in support of this opinion. That “ the senses are occupied” therefore tends to the contrary to what you say; for it is an indication that no human phantasm is then excited. But “ the fumigations which are introduced” have an alli- ance to divinity, but not to the soul of the spectator. And “ the invocations” do not ex- cite the inspiration of the reasoning power, or corporeal passions in the recipient; for they are perfectly unknown and arcane, and are alone known to the God whom they invoke. But that ''not all men, hut those that are more simple and young are more adapted to divina- tion,^' manifests that such as these are more prepared for the reception of the externally acceding and inspiring spirit. From these in- dications, however, you do not truly conjecture that enthusiasm is a passion. For it follows from these signs, that the influx of it, in the same manner as the inspiration, is externally derived. In this way, therefore, these things subsist.
CHAP. XXV.
CHAP. XXV.
That which follows in the next place, de- scends from a divine alienation of mind to an ecstasy of the reasoning power which leads it to a worse condition, and absurdly says, ''that the cause of divination is the mania which hap- pens in diseases." For, as we may conjecture, it assimilates enthusiasm to the redundancy of the black bile, to the aberrations of intoxica- tion, and to the fury which happens from mad dogs. It is necessary, therefore, from the be- ginning, to divide ecstasy into two species, one of which leads to a worse condition of being, and fills us with stupidity and folly; but the other imparts goods which are more honour- able than human temperance. One species also deviates to a disorderly, confused, and material motion; but the other gives itself to the cause which rules over the orderly distri- bution of things in the world. And the one, indeed, as being deprived of knowledge, wan- ders from wisdom; but the other conjoins with natures that transcend all our wisdom. The one, likewise, is unstable, but the other is immutable. The one is preternatural, but the other is above nature. The one draws down the soul, but the other elevates it. And the one entirely separates us from a divine allot- ment, but the other connects us with it.
Why, therefore, does your assertion so much wander from the proposed hypothesis, as to dechne from things primary and good to the last evils of insanity? For in what is enthusi- asm similar to melancholy, or intoxication, or any other delirium excited by the body? Or what prediction can ever be produced from diseases of the body? Is not a derivation of this kind a perfect corruption, but divine in- spiration the perfection and salvation of the soul? And does not depraved enthusiasm take place through imbecility, but the enthusiasm which is more excellent through a plenitude of power? In short, the latter being quies- cent, according to its own proper life and in- telligence, gives itself to be used by another [power which is superior to itself]; but the former, energizing according to its proper ener- gies, renders these most depraved and turbu- lent. This, therefore, is a difference the most manifest of all others, because all the works of divine natures differ [in a transcendent degree] from the works of other beings. For as the more excellent genera are exempt from all others, thus also their energies do not resemble those of any other nature. Hence, when you speak of divine mania, immediately remove from it all human perversions. And if you ascribe a sacred '^sobriety and vigilance'’ to divine natures, you must not consider human sobriety and vigilance as similar to it. But by no means compare the diseases of the body, such as suffusions, and the imaginations ex- cited by diseases, with divine imaginations. For what have the two in common with each other? Nor again, must you compare an ambiguous state," such as that which takes place between a sober condition of mind and ecstasy, with sacred visions of the Gods, which are defined by one energy. But neither must you compare the most manifest surveys of the Gods with the imaginations artificially pro- cured by enchantment. For the latter have neither the energy, nor the essence, nor the truth of the things that are seen, but extend r' r' mere phantasms, as far as to appearances only.
All such doubts as these, however, which are adduced foreign to the purpose, and tend from contraries to contraries, we do not con- sider as pertinent to the present hypothesis. Hence, as we have shown the unappropriate- ness of them, we do not think it requisite to discuss them any further, because they are con- tentiously introduced, and not with philosophi- cal investigation.
CHAP. XXVI.
There are many other contentious innovations also, which may be the subject of wonder. But some one may justly be astonished at the contrariety of opinions produced by admitting either that the truth of divination is with en- chanters, the whole of which subsists in mere appearances alone, but has no real existence; or that it is with those who are incited by passion or disease, since every thing which they have the boldness to utter is fraudulently asserted. For what principle of truth, or what auxiliary of intelligence, either smaller or great- er, can there be in those who are thus insane? It is necessary, however, not to receive truth of such a kind as that which may be fortuitous; for this, it is said, may happen to those that are rashly borne along. Nor must such truth be admitted as that which subsists between agents and patients, when they are concordantly ho- mologous with each other; for truth of this kind is present with the senses and imagina- tions of animals. Hence this truth has nothing peculiar, or^ divine, or superior to common nature. But the truth of divination is estab- lished in energy with invariable sameness, has the whole knowledge of beings present with it, and is connascent with the essence of things. It likewise employs stable reasons, and per- fectly, aptly, and definitely knows all things. This truth, therefore, is adapted to divination. Hence, it is very far from being a certain natu- ral prescience, such as the preperception which is inherent in some animals of earthquakes and rain. For this arises from sympathy, when certain animals are moved in conjunction with certain parts and powers of the universe; or when, through the acuteness of a certain sense, they antecedently perceive things which hap- pen in the air, before they accede to places about the earth.
If, therefore, these assertions are true, though we derive from nature impressions by which we obtain a knowledge of things, or come into contact with futurity, it is not proper to con- sider an impression of this kind as prophetic foreknowledge; but it is, indeed, similar to this knowledge, yet falls short of it in stability and truth, is conversant with that which fre- quently, but not always, happens, and appre- hends the truth in certain, but not in all things. Hence, if there is a discipline which foresees the future in the arts, as, for instance, in the piloting or medical art, this does not all pertain to divine foreknowledge. For it conjectures the future by certain signs, and these such as are not always credible, nor such as have that of which they are the signs, connected with them with invariable sameness. ^But with di- vine providence, a stable knowledge of the future precedes; [and this is attended with] an immutable ‘faith suspended from causes; an indissoluble comprehension of all things in all; and a perpetually abiding and invariable know- ledge of all things as present and definite.
CHAP. XXVII.
CHAP. XXVII.
Moreover, neither is it sufficient to assert, “ that nature^ art, and the sympathy of things in the universe, as if they were the parts of one animal, contain premanifestations of certain things ivith reference to each other; nor that bodies are so prepared, that there is a presignifi- cation of some by others!^ For these things, which are very clearly seen, exhibit a certain divulsed vestige of divine prediction, in a greater or less degree; since it is not possible for any thing to be perfectly destitute of divine divina- tion. But as in all things the image of good exhibits a similitude of divinity; thus, likewise, in all things a certain obscure or more manifest image of divine prediction shines forth to the view. Nevertheless, no one of these is such as the divine species of divination; nor must the one, divine, and unmingled form of it be cha- racterized from the many phantasms which proceed from it into generation. Nor, if there are certain other false and deceitful resem- blances, which are still more remote from reality, is it fit to adduce these in forming a judgment of it. But the divine form or spe- cies of divination is to be apprehended accord- ing to one intelligible and immutable truth; and the mutation which subsists differently at different times is to be rejected as unstable and unadapted to the Gods. If, therefore, that which is truly divination is a thing of this kind, ^. e. is a divine work, who would not blush to ascribe it to nature, which produces its effects without reason and intellect, as if nature elaborated in us a certain prophetic apparatus, and inserted this aptitude in some things in a greater but in others in a less de- gree? For in those things in which men re- ceive auxiliaries from nature in the attainment of their proper perfection, in these, also, certain aptitudes of nature precede; but in things in which no human work is proposed [to be effected], in these neither does the end pertain to us. And when a certain good, which is more ancient than our nature, has a prior arrangement, it is not possible in this case that a certain natural excellence should become the prepared subject of it. For in those things of which there are perfections, in these imperfect preparations are ingenerated; but both these are the habits of men [and not of Gods]. Hence, of those things which are not present with us, so far as we are men, there will not be a pre- parative from nature. There is not, therefore, a natural seed in us of divine prediction. If some one, however, should in a more general way assert, that there is a certain human divi- nation, of this there will be a certain physical preparation. But with respect to that which may be truly denominated divination, and which pertains to the Gods, it is not proper to think that this is ingrafted by nature. For both other things, and also the indefinite, according to the more and the less, are the attendants on this. Hence it is separated from divine divi- nation, which abides in stable boundaries. On this account, also, it is requisite strenuously to contend against him who asserts that divination originates from us. You likewise adduce clear indications of this from the works performed in predicting what is future. For you say, “ that those who invoke [the divinities for the purposes of divination^ have about them stones and herbs, bind certain sacred bonds, which they also dis- solve, open places that are shut, and change the deliberate intentions of the recipients, so as to render them worthy, though they were before depraved.’" All these particulars, therefore, signify that the inspiration accedes externally. It is requisite, however, not only to preassume this, but also to define what the inspiration of divine origin is, which produces divine divina- tion. For if this is not done, we shall not pre- viously know what its peculiarity is, in conse- quence of not attributing to it its proper charac- ter, and adapting this to it as a certain seal. And this, indeed, has been accurately done by us a little before.
CHAP. XXVIII.
CHAP. XXVIII.
You adduce, however, as a thing by no means to be despised, “ the artificers of efficacious images” But I should wonder if these were admitted by any one of the theurgists who survey the true forms of the Gods. For why should any one exchange truly existing beings for images, and descend from the first to the last of things? Or do we not know that all things effected by an adumbration of this kind, have an obscure subsistence, are the phantasms only of that which is true, and appear to be good, but in no respect are so? Other things, also, of this kind that accede, are borne along in a flowing condition of being; but obtain nothing genuine, or perfect, or manifest. But this is evident from the mode of their production: for not divinity, but man is the maker of them. Nor are they produced from uniform and in- telligible essences, but from matter, which is assumed for this purpose. What good, there- fore, can germinate from matter, and from the material and corporeal - formed powers which are in bodies? Or is not that which derives its subsistence from human art, more imbecile than men themselves, who impart existence to it? By what kind of art, likewise, is this image lashioned? For it is said, indeed, to be fashioned by demiurgic art; but this is effective of true essences, and not of certain images. Hence the image-producing art is distant by a great inter- val from the seminal production of realities. Be- sides, neither does it preserve a certain analogy with divine fabrication. For divinity does not fabricate all things, either through the celestial physical motions, or through a partial matter, or through powers thus divided; but he pro- duces the worlds by conceptions, will, and im- material forms, and through an eternal and supermundane soul. The maker of images, however, is said to elaborate them through the revolving stars. But the thing does not in reality subsist so as it appears to do. For since there are certain infinite powers in the celestial Gods, the last genus of all the powers in them is physical. But again, of this power one portion being inherent in spermatic rea- sons [or productive powers], and prior to these reasons being established in immoveable na- tures, essentially precedes generation. But another portion being inherent in sensible and visible motions and powers, and in celestial effluxions and qualities, has dominion over the whole visible order of things. This last power, therefore, in all these rules over the circumterrestrial manifest generation in places about the earth. Many other arts, however, as for instance, the medical * and gymnastic, use this power, which has dominion over visible gene- ration, and the qualities of the effluxions sent from the heavens employ it, and likewise all such arts as in their operations communicate with nature. And moreover, the image-making art attracts a certain very obscure genesiurgic portion from the celestial effluxions.
Such, therefore, as the truth is, such also it is requisite to unfold it to others. It must be said, then, that the maker of images neither uses the celestial circulations, nor the powers which are inherent in them, nor those powers * Hippocrates was of opinion that physicians ought to be skilled in astronomy. And Galen derides those physicians who deny that astronomy is necessary to their art. See his treatise entitled Si quis sit Medicus eundem esse philoso- phum. And in lib. viii. cap. 20, of his treatise De Ingenio Sanitatis, he calls physicians that are ignorant of astronomy homicides. But by astronomy here, both Hippocrates and Galen intended to signify what is now called astrology. Roger Bacon also, in his Epistle to Pope Clement, says, “ Opera quae hunt hie inferius, variantur secundum diversitatem coelestium constellationum, ut opera medicinae et alkimiae." i. e. “The works which are performed in these inferior realms are varied according to the diversity of the celestial constellations, as, for instance, the works of medicine and alchemy.” If, however, as Galen says, and doubtless with great truth, physicians that are ignorant of this are homi- cides, how numerous must the medical homicides be of the present age!
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