t The auspices were said to be pestiferous when there was no heart in the entrails, or when the head was wanting in the liver. This was the case with the animals that were sacrificed by Caesar on the day in which he was slain. The same thing also happened to Caius Marius, when he was sacrificing at Utica. But when Pertinax was sacrificing, both the heart and the liver of the victim were wanting, whence his death was predicted, which happened shortly after. In the sacrifices, likewise, which Marcellus per- formed prior to the unfortunate battle with the Carthagi- nians, the liver was found to be without a head, as Plutarch and Livy, Pliny and Valerius Maximus relate.
not natural for any thing to do; but this is something supernatural, so that it is some other thing which produces these effects through birds.
Moreover, the lations of the stars approxi- mate to the eternal circulations of the heavens, not only locally, but also in powers, and the irradiations of, light. But these are moved conformably to the mandates of the celestial Gods. For the most pure, agile, and supreme part of the air, is adapted to be enkindled \i. e. is most inflammable], so that when the Gods assent, it is immediately set on fire. And if some one thinks that certain effluxions of the celestial bodies are imparted to the air, his opinion will not be discordant with what is frequently effected by the divine art. The union, also, and sympathy of the universe, and the simultaneous motion of the most remote parts, as if they were near, and belonged to one animal, cause these signs to be sent from the Gods to men in the most luminous manner, primarily, indeed, through the heavens, but afterwards through the air.
From all that has been said, therefore, this becomes manifest, that the Gods, employing many instruments as media, send indications to men; and that they also use the ministrant aid of daemons and souls, and the whole of nature, and of every thing in the world which is willingly obedient to them, they being the primordial leaders of all these, and transmitting the motion which descends from them wherever they please. lienee, they being separate from all things, and liberated from all habitude and co- arrangement with things in generation, lead all that generation and nature contains, according to their own proper will. This explanation, therefore, of divination accords with the doc- trine of the fabricative energy and providence of the Gods. For it does not draw down the intellect of more excellent natures to sublunary concerns and to us, but this intellect being established in itself, converts to itself signs and the whole of divination, and discovers that these proceed from it.
CHAP. XYII.
CHAP. XYII.
In the next place you inquire ''concerning the mode of divination^ what it is, and what the quality is hy which it is distinguished^^ which we have already explained, both generally and particularly. But you, in the first place, re- present diviners as asserting, “ that all of them obtain a foreknowledge of future events through Gods or deemonsy and that it is not possible for any others to know that which is future, than those who are the lords of futurity!' After- wards you doubt, '^whether divinity is so far subservient to men, as not to he averse to some becoming diviners from meal." You do not, however, properly apprehend the abundance of the power of the Gods, their transcendent goodness, and the cause which comprehends all things, when you denominate their provi- dential care and defence of us subserviency. And, besides this, you are ignorant of the mode of divine energy, that it is not drawn down and converted to us, but that it has a separate precedency, and gives itself, indeed, to its par- ticipants, yet neither departs from itself, nor becomes diminished, nor is ministrant to those that receive it; but, on the contrary, uses all things as subservient to itself. The present doubt also appears to me to be erroneous in another respect, for supposing the works of the Gods to be like those of men, it inquires how they are effected. For because we are con- verted to our works, and sometimes adhere to the passions of the things which we provi- dentially attend to, on this account you badly conjecture that the power of the Gods is sub- servient to the natures which are governed by them. But this power is never drawn down to its participants either in the production of the worlds, or in the providential inspection of the realms of generation, or in predicting con- cerning it. For it imparts to all things good, and renders all things similar to itself. It likewise benefits the subjects of its government most abundantly, and without envy, and by how much the more it abides in itself, by so much the more it is filled with its own proper perfection. And it does not itself, indeed, be- come any thing belonging to its participants, but it causes the things which receive it to partake of its peculiarities, and preserves them in an all-perfect manner. It also abides at the same time perfectly in itself, and comprehends them at once in itself, but is neither vanquished nor comprehended by any one of them. In vain, therefore, are men disturbed by a sus- picion of this kind. For divinity is not divided together with the above mentioned modes of divination, but produces all of them impartibly. Nor does he effect different things at a different time, in a distributed manner, but produces all of them according to one energy, collectively and at once. Nor is he detained about signs, being comprehended in, or divided about, them; but contains them in himself, and in one order, and comprehends them in unity, and produces them from himself, according to one invariable will.
IGl If, also, the power of the Gods proceeds in premanifestation as far as to things inanimate, such as pebble stones, rods,"^ pieces of wood, stones, corn, or wheat, this very thing is most admirable in the presignification of divine pro- phesy; because it imparts soul to things inani- mate, motion to things immoveable, and makes all things to be clear and known, to partake of reason, and to be defined by the measures of intellection, though possessing no portion of reason from themselves. Another divine miracle * Gale observes that this appears to have been a very ancient mode of divination, and does not differ from that Avhich is comprehended under the term wood. Hence the Scholiast, in Nicandri Theriaca, says, “that the Magi and Scythians predicted from the wood of the tamarisk. For in many places they predict from rods. And that Dinon, in the first book of his third Syntaxis, observes, “that the Median diviners predict from rods.” The Scholiast like- wise adds the testimony of Metrodorus, who says, “that the tamarisk is a most ancient plant, and that the Egyptians, in the solemnity of Jupiter, were crowned with the tamarisk, and also the Magi among the Medes.” He adds, “that Apollo also ordained that prophets should predict from this plant, and that in Lesbos he wears a tamarisk crown, has often been seen thus adorned, and that in consequence of this he was called by the Lesbians [xvpiKaLov, Muricaion, [from. ixvptKT], the tamarisk].” What the Scholiast here says, is confirmed by Herodotus, in lib. iv. and elsewhere. To this, also, what every where occurs about prediction from the laurel pertains. For if the leaves of the laurel when committed to the fire made a noise, it was considered as a good omen, but if they made none, a bad one.
M also divinity appears to me to exhibit through signs in these things. For, as he sometimes makes some stupid man to speak wisely, through which it becomes manifest to every one, that this is not a certain human but a divine work; thus, also, he reveals through things which are deprived of knowledge, conceptions which precede all knowledge. And, at the same time, he declares to ipen that the signs which are exhibited are worthy of belief, and that they are superior to nature, from which he is exempt. Thus he makes things to be known which are naturally unknown, and things which are without knowledge gnostic. Through them, also, he inserts in us wisdom, and through every thing which is in the world excites our intellect to the truth of real beings, of things which are in generation, and of future events. From these things, therefore, I think it is manifest, that the mode of divination is perfectly contrary to what you suspected it to be. For it is of a ruling and primordial nature, of an unrestrained power, and transcendent nature, comprehending in itself all things, but not being comprehended by any thing, nor enclosed by its participants. For it ascends into, and rules over, all things simultaneously, and without circumscription, and collectively signifies future events. Hence, from what has been said, you may easily dissolve these vulgar doubts, which disturb most men, and may in a becoming manner elevate yourself to the in- tellectual, divine, and irreprehensible presigni- fication of the Gods from all things. Through this, therefore, we have evinced, that divinity is not drawn down to the signs employed by divination.
CHAP. XYIII.
Another contest, however, awaits us, not less than that in which we have been before en- gaged, and which you immediately announce, concerning the causes of divination, ivhether a God, an angel, or a dcemon, or some other •power, is present in manifestations, or divina^ tions, or certain other sacred energies'’ But our reply to your question is simply this, that it is not possible for any thing to be performed in a manner adapted to sacred concerns in divine works, without the presence of some one of the more excellent natures, as inspect- ing and giving completion to the sacred energy. And where the felicitous operations are perfect, sufiicient to themselves, and unindigent, of these the Gods are the leaders. But where they are media, and in a small degree fall short of the extremes, they have angels as the powers that perfect and unfold them into light. And it is the province of daemons to effect those operations which rank as the last. But the right performance of actions which are effected in a divine manner, is entirely to be ascribed to some one of the more excellent natures. For since it is not possible to speak rightly about the Gods without the Gods, much less can any one perform works which are of an equal dignity with divinity, and obtain the fore- knowledge of every thing without [the inspiring influence of] the Gods. For the human race is imbecile, and of small estimation, sees but a little, and possesses a connascent nothingness; and the only remedy of its inherent error, per- turbation, and unstable mutation, is its par- ticipation, as much as possible, of a certain portion of divine light. But he who excludes this, does the same thing as those who attempt to produce soul from things inanimate, or to generate intellect from things unintelligent. For without the cooperation of a cause, he constitutes divine works from things which are not divine.
Let it be granted, therefore, that a God, a deemon, or an angel, gives completion to more excellent works, yet we must not on this ac- count admit what you adduce as a thing acknowledged, “ that they affect these things, in conse- quence of being drawn through us by the neces- sities ivith ivhich invocation is attended” For divinity is superior to necessity, and this is likewise the case with all the choir of more excellent natures that is suspended from him. Nor is he alone exempt from the necessity which is introduced by men, but also from that which comprehends in itself the world; be- cause it is not the province of an immaterial nature, and which does not receive any adven- titious order, to be subservient to any necessity introduced from any thing else. And in the next place, invocation, and the things performed by a scientific operator, accede and are con- joined to more excellent natures through simi- litude and alliance, and do not accomplish their energies through violence. Hence, the effects which are seen to take place in diviners, do not happen as you think, from the scientific theurgist being passively affected; nor is divi- nation thus effected through necessity, passion preoccupying the predictor; for these things are foreign from, and incongruous to, the es- sence of more excellent natures.
CHAP. XIX.
CHAP. XIX.
But neither does the cause [of the energies] of more excellent natures subsist as a certain middle instrument,* nor does he who invokes operate through him who prophesies; for to assert these things is impious. And it is much more true to say, that God is all things, is able to effect all things, and that he fills all things with himself, and is alone worthy of sedulous attention,! esteem, the energy of reason, and * Gale, in his translation, has totally mistaken the mean- ing of the original in this place, and it is not unusual with him to do so. For the original is aA.X’ ovSe ws opyavov tl fjLGcrov TO twv Kpeirrovoiv atrLov, Kai Spa 8ta tov ^eoTri^ovTos o KaXoiv. This he thus translates: Sed neque dicendum est fatidicum animum esse instrumentum intermedium divi- norum, sacerdotemveroinvocantem essetanquam efficientem causam.” In consequence, also, of this mistake, he errone- ously conceives that lamblichus dissents from himself.
t God is all things causally, and is able to effect all things. He likewise does produce all things, yet not by himself alone, but in conjunction with those divine powers which continually germinate, as it were, from him, as from a perennial root. Not that he is in want of these powers to the efficacy of his productive energy, but the universe re- quires their cooperation, in order to the distinct subsistence of its various parts and different forms. For as the essence of the first cause, if it be lawful so to speak, is full of deity, his immediate energy must be deific, and his first progeny must be Gods. But as he is ineffable and superessential, all things proceed from him ineffably and superessentially.
felicitous honour; that which is human being vile, of no account, and ludicrous, when com- pared with that which is divine. Hence I laugh, when I hear it said, that divinity is spon- taneously present with certain persons or things, F'or progressions are conformable to the characteristics of the natures from which they proceed. Hence the cooperat- ing energy of his first progeny is necessary to the evolution of tilings into effable, essential, and distinct subsistence. The supreme God, therefore, is, as lamblichus justly ob- serves, alone worthy of sedulous attention, esteem, the energy o f reason, and felicitous honour; but this is not to the ex- clusion of paying appropriate attention and honour to other powers that are subordinate to him, who largely participate of his divinity, and are more or less allied to him. For in reverencing and paying attention to these appropnately, we also attend to and reverence him. For that which we sedu- lously attend to, honour, and esteem in them, is that alone which is of a deified nature, and is therefore a portion, as it were, of the ineffable principle of all things.
Gale, from not understanding this, exclaims, “if these things are true, (viz. that God is alone worthy of sedulous attention, &c.) as they are, indeed, most true, to what pur- pose, O lamblichus, is that mighty study and labour about daemons and other spirits } ” But the answer to this, by regarding what has been above said, is easy. For mighty study and labour about these intermediate powers is neces- sary, in order to our union with their ineffable cause. For as we are but the dregs of the rational nature, and the first principle of things is something so transcendent as to be even beyond essence, it is impossible that we should be united to him without media; viz. without the Gods, and their perpetual attendants, who are on this account the true saviours of soids. For in a union with the supreme deity our true salvation consists.
either through the period of generation, or through other causes. For thus that which is unbegotten will no longer be more excellent, if it is led by the period of generation; nor will it be primarily the cause of all things, if it is coarranged with certain things, according to other causes. These assertions, therefore, are unworthy of the conceptions which we should frame of the Gods, and foreign from the works wdiich are effected in theurgy. But an in- vestigation of this kind suffers the same thing as the multitude suffer, about the fabrication of the universe and providence. For not be- ing able to learn what the mode is in which these are effected, and refusing to ascribe human cares and reasonings to the Gods, they wholly abolish the providential and fabricative energy of divinity. As, therefore, we are accus- tomed to answer these, that the divine mode of production and providential inspection is very different from that which is human, and which it is not proper wholly to reject through * For these conceptions and these works teach us, that in reality we, through sacred operations, approach to di\dnity, but that divinity does not draw near to us. Hence Proclus in Alcibiad. ev rats KXrjcrecrL, Kai eu rats avro^tais irpoa-Levai 7TWS r][xiv cfiatverai to Oeiov, rjfjiuyv e7ravaT€ivop.ev(ov ctt avro. i. e. “ In invocations of the Gods, and when they are clearly seen, divinity, in a certain respect, appears to approach to us, though it is we that are extended to him.”
ignorance, as if it had not from the first any subsistence; thus, also, it may be justly con- tended against you, that all prediction, and the performance of divine works, are the works of the Gods, as they are not effected through other and these human causes, but through such as are alone known to the Gods.
CHAP. XX.
CHAP. XX.
Omitting, therefore, these things, we may reasonably adduce a second cause, assigned by you, of the above mentioned particulars: viz. “ that the soul says and imagines these things, and that they are the passions of it, excited from small incentives” Neither, how- ever, does nature possess these passions, nor does reason admit them. For every thing which is generated is generated from a certain cause, and that which is of a kindred nature derives its completion from a kindred nature. But a divine work is neither casual, for a thing of this kind is without a cause, and is not en- tirely arranged, nor is it produced by a human cause. For this is a thing foreign and sub- ordinate; but that which is more perfect cannot be produced from the imperfect. All works, therefore, which have a similitude to divinity germinate from a divine cause. For the human soul is contained by one form, and is on all sides darkened by body, which he who deno- minates the river of Negligence, or the water of Oblivion, or ignorance and delirium,* or a * Gale, in his note on these words, after having observed that Porphyry says, that ignorance, darkness, and folly attend the soul in its lapse into body; and that, according to Servius, the soul, when it begins to descend into body, drinks of folly and oblivion, quotes also Irenseus (lib. ii. c. 59), who makes the following stupid remark: “ Souls entering into this life [it is said] drink of oblivion, before they enter into bodies, from the daemon who is above this ingress. But whence do you know this, O Plato, since your soul also is now in body } For if you remember the daemon, the cup, and the entrance, it is likewise requisite that you should know the rest.” To this it is easy to reply, that a soul purified and enlightened by philosophy, like that of Plato, is able to recognise many things pertaining to its pre- existent state, even while in the present body, in conse- quence of partially emerging from corporeal darkness and oblivion; but that it is not capable of knowing every thing distinctly, till it is perfectly liberated from the delirium of the body. And Gale, no less sillily, adds, " respond ebunt Platonici haec omnia cognovisse Platonem ex narratione, quae circumferebatur de Ere Armenio, qui Lethes aquam non biberat. i. e. “ The Platonists will answer that Plato knew all these things from the narration of the Armenian Erus [in the Republic] who did not drink of the water of Lethe.” For Plato did not obtain this knowledge from any historical narration, but from possessing in a transcendent degree th^ cathartic and theoretic virtues, and from ener- gizing enthusiastically (or according to a divinely inspired energy) through the latter of these virtues.
bond through passions,"^ or the privation of life, or some other evil, will not by such appel- lations sufficiently express its turpitude. How, therefore, is it possible that the soul, which is detained by so many evils, can ever become sufficient to an energy of this kind? It is, in- deed, by no means reasonable to suppose that she can. For if at any time we appear to be capable of effecting this, it is alone through participating of, and being illuminated by, the Gods, that we enjoy the divine energy. Hence the soul does not participate of divine works, so far as she possesses her own proper virtue and wisdom; though if works of this kind per- tained to the soul, every soul would perform them, or that soul alone which possessed its proper perfection. Now, however, neither of these is sufficiently prepared for this purpose; but even the perfect soul is imperfect as with reference to divine energy. The tkeurgic energy, * Agi-eeably to this, Porphyiy says in his Acfiopixac Trpos ra vorjTa, or Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, KaraSeiTaL Trpos TO CT(jop.a, ry €Tri<^po(f>r] ry Trpos ra vaOy ra air’ avrov.
And fSTjcrev eavryv ev to) crwpLaTL. i. e. “The soul is bound to the body, by a conversion to the passions arising from her union with it.” And, “the soul binds herself in the body.” Philolaus also says, that the ancient theologists and prophets asserted, ws Slo. TLva<s np-cDpias a to) o-ojputTL crwe^evKTat, Kai KadaTrep ev crap,aTi TOVTcp TeOaTrraL, “ that the soul is conjoined to the body on account of cer- tain punishments, and that it is buried in it as in asepulchre.”
therefore, is a different thing, and the felicitous accomplishment of divine works is imparted by the Gods alone. For if this were not the case, the worship of the Gods would not, in short, be requisite, but divine goods might be present with us from ourselves, without the exercise of religion. If, therefore, these opi- nions are insane and stupid, it is proper to abandon an hypothesis of this kind, as not affording a cause which deserves to be men- tioned of the accomplishment of divine works.
CHAP. XXI.
CHAP. XXI.
Is, therefore, what you add in the third place more true; viz. “ that there is a certain mixed form of hypostasis, consisting of our soul and divine inspiration externally derived f” Consider this then more accurately, lest we should be deceived by it, being impeded by its plausi- bility. For wherever one thipg is effected from two, this one thing is wholly of a similar species, nature, and essence. Thus the elements which concur in the same thing, produce one certain thing from many, and many souls co- alesce in one total soul. That, however, which is perfectly exempt, can never become one with that which departs from itself so that neither will there be one certain form of hypos- * This assertion, that the nature which is perfectly exempt can never become one with that which departs from itself, is opposed by Gale, who says that man is composed of soul and body, and yet the latter is far inferior to, and less ex- cellent than, the former. But in adducing this instance, he clearly shows that he does not understand what lamblichus says. For the human soul being a medium between a cer- tain impartible and paidible essence, so far as it partakes of the partible essence, has a certain alliance with body, and is not perfectly exempt from it. But this is not the case with divine inspiration and our soul: for the former in a perfectly exempt manner transcends the latter. Let it, therefore, be granted him that, as Psellus says, hypostatic union con- ducts different essences or natures to one hypostasis,” yet such a union can never take place between two things, one of which has no habitude, proximity, or alliance to the other. Gale was led into this mistake by not properly attending to the words perfectly exempt, to TravreAws e^yprjpevov, which are here employed by lamblichus. But such mistakes are usual with Gale, from his inaccurate and rambling manner of thinking. He likewise forgot, at the time he was writing notes,on lamblichus, that he was the master of a grammar school, and not a philosopher.
From what^has been said, the absurdity, also, of their opinion is immediately obvious, who fancy that the divine essence can be mingled and united with the mortal nature. For if such a union were possible, it would benefit and exalt the latter, but injure and degrade the former. Just as in the union of the rational soul with the body (as Proclus beautifully observes in Tim. p. 339), “ the former, by verg- ing to a material life, kindles indeed a light in the body, but becomes herself situated in darkness; and by giving life to the body, destroys both herself and her own intellect [in as great a degree as these are capable of receiving destruction].