0 which are naturally established about them; nor, in short, is it possible to come into con- tact with them. But he artificially, and not theurgically, applies himself to the last effluxions which openly proceed from the nature of them, about the last part of the universe. For these effluxions, I think, being mingled with a partial matter, are capable of being changed and trans- formed differently at different times. They likewise receive the transposition, from some things to others, of the powers which are in partial natures. The variety, however, of such like energies, and the composition of a multi- tude of material powers, are not only entirely separated from divine fabrication, but also from natural production. For nature produces her proper works collectively, and at once, and accomplishes all things by simple and incom- posite energies. Hence it remains that a com- mixture of this kind, about the last and mani- fest celestial effluxion, and about the things which are moved by a celestial nature, is arti- ficial.
CHAP. XXIX.
Why, therefore, does the maker of images, who effects these things, desert himself, though he is better than these images, and consists of things of a more excellent nature, and confide in inanimate idols, which are inspired with the representation alone of life, contain a renovated harmony, and which is externally multiform, and are in reality diurnal? Shall we say that something genuine and true is inherent in them? Nothing, however, which is fashioned by human art is genuine and pure. But you will say, that simplicity and uniformity of energy pre- dominate in the whole of their composition. This is very far from being the case. For the idol, according to its visible composition, is mingled from all-various and contrary qualities. Shall we say then, that a certain pure and per- fect power is manifest in them? By no means. For a thing of this kind possesses an adven- titious multitude of effluxions, collected from many places, and which shows itself to be im- becile and evanescent. But if these particu- lars, which we have enumerated, are not found to take place in images, is stability present with them, as it is said to be [by the patrons of these images]? By no means, likewise, is this the case. For these idols are extinguished with much greater rapidity than the images which are seen in mirrors. For they are im- mediately formed by the accession of fumiga- tions from exhaling vapours; but when the ^ fumigation is mingled with, and diffused through, the whole air, then the idol is likewise imme- diately dissolved, and is not naturally adapted to remain for the smallest portion of time. Why, therefore, should the man who is a lover of truth, pay attention to these useless delu- sions? 1, indeed, do not think them to be of any value. For if the makers of these images know that the fictions about which they are busily employed, are nothing more than the formations of passive matter, the evil arising from an attention to them will be simple. But in addition to this, these idol-makers are simi- lar to the images in which they confide. And if they pay attention to these idols as if they were Gods, the absurdity will be so great, as neither to be effable by words, nor to be en- dured in deeds. For a certain divine splen- dour never illuminates a soul of this kind, be- cause it is not adapted to be imparted to things which are entirely repugnant to it; neither have those things which are detained by dark phantasms a place for its reception. This de- lusive formation, therefore, of phantasms, will be conversant with shadows, which are very remote from the truth.
CHAP. XXX.
CHAP. XXX.
You say, however, ''that the makers of images observe the motion of the celestial bodies, and can tell from the concurrence of what star, with a certain star or stars, predictions will be true or false; and also ivhether the things that are per- formed will be inanities, or significant and effi- cacious But neither will these phantasms, on this account, possess any thing divine. For the last of the things which are in generation are moved in conjunction with the celestial courses, and are copassive with the effluxions which descend from the heavenly bodies. More- over, if any one considers these things accu- rately, he will find that they demonstrate the contrary to what is here asserted. For how is it possible that things which are in every re- spect mutable, and this with facility, and which are all-variously turned by external motions, so as to become inefflcacious, or prophetic, or significant,, or effective, or at different times different, should contain in themselves, by par- ticipation, any portion, however small, of divine power? What then, are the powers which are inherent in matter the elements of daemons? By no means: for no partial sensible bodies generate daemons; but much more are these generated and guarded by daemons. Neither is any man able to fashion, as by a machine, certain forms of daemons; but, on the contrary, he is rather fashioned and fabricated by them, so far as he participates of a sensible body. But neither is a certain daemoniacal multitude gene- rated from the elements of sensibles; since, on the contrary, this multitude is simple, and energizes uniformly about composite natures. Hence, neither will it have sensihles more an- cient, or more stable than itself; but being itself more excellent than sensibles, both in dignity and power, it imparts to them the per- manency which they are able to receive. Unless indeed, you denominate idols daemons, not rightly employing an appellation of this kind. For the nature of daemons is one thing, and that of idols another. The order of each, like- wise, is very diiSferent. Moreover, the leader of idols is different from the great leader of dae- mons. And this, also, you admit. For you say, “ that no God or dcemon is drawn down hy idoUy What, therefore, will be the worth of a sacred deed, or of the foreknowledge of what is future, if it is entirely destitute of divinity and a daemon? So that it is requisite to know what the nature is of this wonder-working art, but by no means to use or confide in it.
CHAP. XXXI.
Again, therefore, still worse than this is the explanation of sacred operations, which assigns as the cause of divination, “ a certain genus of daemons, which is naturally fraudulent, omni- form, and various, and which assumes the appear- ance of Gods and daemons, and the souls of the deceased^ I shall, therefore, relate to you, in answer to this, what I once heard from the prophets of the Chaldeans.
Such Gods as are truly divinities, are alone the givers of good; alone associate with good men, and with those that are purified by the sacerdotal art, and from these amputate all vice, and every passion. When these, also, impart their light, that which is evil, and at the same time dsemoniacal, vanishes from before more excellent natures, in the same manner as darkness when light is present; nor is it able to disturb theurgists in the smallest degree, who receive from this light every virtue, obtain worthy manners, become orderly and elegant in their actions, are liberated from passions, and purified from every disorderly motion, and from atheistical and unholy conduct. But those who are themselves flagitious, and who leap, as it were, to things of a divine nature in an illegal and disorderly manner, these, through the imbecility of their proper energ}^ or through indigence of inherent power, are not able to associate with the Gods. Because, likewise, they are excluded, through certain defilements, from an association with pure spirits, they be- come connected with evil spirits, are filled from them with the worst kind of inspiration, are rendered depraved and unholy, become replete with intemperate pleasures, and every kind of vice, are emulous of manners foreign to the Gods, and, in. short, become similar to the depraved daemons, with whom they are connascent. These, therefore, being full of passions and vice, attract to themselves, through alliance, depraved spirits, and are excited by them to every kind of iniquity. They are also increased in wickedness by each other, like a circle conjoining the beginning to the end, and similarly making an equal compensation. Hence deeds which are the nefarious offences of im- piety, which are introduced into sacred works in a disorderly manner, and which are also confusedly performed by those who betake themselves to such works, and at one time, as it seems, cause one divinity to be present in- stead of another, and again, introduce depraved daemons instead of Gods, whom they call equal to the Gods [avnOeovg) — such deeds as these you r should never adduce in a discourse concerning sacerdotal divination. For good is more con- trary to evil than to that which is not good. As, therefore, the sacrilegious are in the most eminent degree hostile to the religious cultiva- tion of the Gods; thus, also, those who are conversant with daemons who are fraudulent, and the causes of intemperance, are undoubt- edly hostile to theurgists. For from these every depraved spirit departs, and when they are present, is entirely subverted. Every vice, too, and every passion, are by these perfectly amputated: for a pure participation of good is present with the pure, and they are supernally filled with truth from a divine fire. These, therefore, suffer no impediment from evil spirits, nor are these spirits any obstacles to the goods of their souls. Nor are theurgists disturbed by pride, or flattery, or the enjoyment of exhala- tions, or any violence; but all these, as if struck by lightning, yield and recede, without touching the theurgist, or being able to approach to them. Hence this genus of divination is undefiled and sacerdotal, and is truly divine. This, also, does not, as you say it does, require me, or any other as an arbiter, in order that I may prefer it to a multitude of other things; but it is itself exempt from all things, is super- natural, and has an eternal preexistence, neither receiving a certain opposition, nor a certain transcendency, which has a prearrangement in many things, because it is of itself liberated, and uniformly precedes all things. And to this it is requisite that you, and every one who is a genuine lover of the Gods, should give him- self wholly; since by this mean irreprehensible truth will be obtained in divinations, and per- fect virtue in souls; and through both these, an ascent will be afforded to theurgists to in- telligible fire, which ought to be preestablished as the end of all foreknowledge, and of every theurgic operation. Hence you in vain adduce the opinion of those who think that divination is effected by an evil daemon, since these do not deserve to be mentioned in speculations concerning the Gods. At the same time, like- wise, they are ignorant of the means of distin- guishing truth from falsehood, because they are from the beginning nourished in darkness, and are wholly incapable of knowing the principles from which these are produced. Here, there- fore, we shall terminate our discussion concern- ing the mode of divination.
V.
N SECTION IV.
CHAP. I.
Let us then, in the next place, consider the opposing arguments, what they are, and what reason they possess. And if we should dis- cuss some things a little more abundantly, in consequence of speaking freely and at leisure, it is requisite that you should promptly attend to, and endure what, we say. For it is neces- sary that great labour should be bestowed on the greatest disciplines, and that they should he accurately explored for a long time, if you intend to know them perfectly. Do you, there- fore, conformably to the present hypothesis, propose the arguments which occasion the doubt, and I will answer you. Say then, very much perplexes me to understand how su- perior beings^ when invoked, are commanded by those that invoke them, as if they were their in- feriors.^' But I will unfold to you the whole division, which is worthy of regard, concerning the powers that are invoked; from which you will be able clearly to define what is possible and what is impossible, in the subjects of your investigation. For the Gods, indeed, and the natures that are more excellent than we, through the wish of what is beautiful, and from an un- envying and exuberant fulness of good, benevo- lently impart to those that are worthy, such things as are fit for them, commiserating the labours of sacerdotal men, but being delighted with those that they have begotten, nourished, and instructed. But the middle genera are the inspective guardians of judgment. These in- form us what ought to be done, and from what it is fit to abstain. They also give assistance to just works, but impede such as are unjust; and as many endeavour to take away unjustly the property of others, or basely to injure or destroy some one, they cause these to suffer the same things as they have done to others. But there is, likewise, another most irrational genus of daemons,* which is without judgment, and is allotted only one power, through an arrangement by which each of these daemons presides over one work alone. As therefore, it is the province of a sword to cut, and to do * According to Proclus, in Alcibiad. Prior, there are three orders of daemons, the first of which are more intellectual, the second are of a more rational nature, and the third, of which lamblichus is now speaking, are variotis, more iri'a- tional, and more material.
nothing else than this, thus also of the spirits which are distributed in the universe, accord- ing to the partible necessity of nature, one kind divides, but another collects, things which are generated. This, however, is known from the pheenomena. For the Charonean* spira- cles, as they are called, emit from themselves a certain spirit, which is able to corrupt pro- miscuously every thing that falls into them. Thus, therefore, of certain invisible spirits, each is allotted a different power, and is alone adapted to do that which it is ordained to per- form. He, therefore, who turns from their natural course things which contribute to the universe in an orderly manner, and illegiti- mately performs a certain thing, in this case receives the injury arising from that which he uses badly. This, however, pertains to another mode of discussion.
* Charonea is a country of Asia Minor, bordering on the river Meander; and in it there are spiracles which exhale a foul odour. According to Pliny, there are places of this kind in Italy, in the country of Puteoli, now Puzzulo. In Amsanctus, also, a place in the middle of Italy, in the coun- try of the Samnites, there were sulphureous waters, the steams of which were so pestilential, that they killed all who came near them. Hence Cicero, in lib. i. De Divin. Quid enim? Non videmus, quam sint varia terrarum genera } Ex quibus et mortifera quaedam pars est, ut et Amsancti in Hii*- pinis, et in Asia Plutonia.”
CHAP. II.
CHAP. II.
But we sometimes see that take place which is now proposed to be considered. For it happens that spirits are commanded [to do this or that] who do not use a reason of their own, and have not the principle of judgment. Nor does this occur irrationally. For our dianoia naturally possessing the power of reasoning about and judging of things as they are, and comprehending in itself many powers of life, is accustomed to command the most irrational spirits, and such as derive their perfection from one energy alone. Hence, it invokes these as more excellent natures, because it endeavours to attract to particulars from the whole world, in which we are contained, things which con- tribute to wholes.* And it commands them as inferior natures, because frequently certain parts of things in the world [such as our reason- ing power] are more pure and perfect than things which extend themselves to the whole world. Thus, for instance, if one thing is in- tellectual [as is the case with our dianoia], but another is wholly inanimate or physical, then , * And these irrational spirits, so far as they contribute to wholes, are more excellent than we are, though through be- ing irrational they are inferior to us.
that which proceeds to a less extent has a more principal power than that which is more extended, though the former falls far short of the latter in magnitude and multitude of domi- nation. For these things, also, another reason may he assigned, and which is as follows: in all theurgical operations the priest sustains a twofold character; one, indeed, as man, and which preserves the order possessed by our nature in the universe; but the other, which is corroborated by divine signs, and through these is conjoined to more excellent natures, and is elevated to their order by an elegant circum- duction, this is deservedly capable of being surrounded with the external form of the Gods. Conformably, therefore, to a difference of this kind, the priest very properly invokes, as more excellent natures, the powers derived from the universe, so far as he who invokes is a man; and again, he commands these powers, because through arcane symbols, he, in a certain respect, is invested with the sacred form of the Gods.
CHAP. III.
CHAP. III.
Dissolving, however, the doubts in a way still more true, we think it requisite, in invoking superior natures, to take away the evocations which appear to be directed to them as to men, and also the mandates in the performance of works, which are given with great earnestness. For if the communion of concordant friend- ship, and a certain indissoluble connexion of union, are the bonds of sacerdotal operations, in order that these operations may be truly divine, and may transcend every common action known to men, no human work will be adapted to them; nor will the invocations of the priest resemble the manner in which we draw to ourselves things that are distant; nor are his mandates directed as to things separated from him, in the way in which we transfer one thing from others. But the energy of divine fire shines forth voluntarily, and in common, and being self-invoked and self-energetic, energizes through all things with invariable sameness, both through the natures which impart, and those that are able to receive, its light. This mode of solution, therefore, is far superior, which does not suppose that divine works are effected through contrariety, or discrepance, in the way in which generated natures are usually produced; but asserts that every such work is rightly accomplished through sameness, union, and consent. Hence, if we separate from each other that which invokes and that which is invoked, that which commands and that which is commanded, that which is more and that which is less excellent, we shall, in a certain respect, transfer the contrariety of generations to the unbegotten goods of the Gods. But if we despise all such things, as it is just we should, as of an earth-born nature, and ascribe that which is common and simple, as being more honourable, to the powers who transcend the variety which is in the realms of generation, the first hypothe- sis of these questions will be immediately sub- verted, so that no reasonable doubt concerning them will be left.
CHAP. IV.
What then shall we say concerning the next inquiry to this, viz. “ why the powers who are invoked think it requisite that he who worships them should he just ^ hut they when called upon to act unjustly do not refuse so to act? ” To this I reply, that I am dubious with respect to what you call acting justly, and am of opinion that what appears to us to be an accurate definition of justice does not also appear to be so to the Gods. For we, looking to that which is most brief, direct our attention to things present, and to this momentary life, and the manner in which it subsists. But the powers that are p p superior to us know the whole life of the soul, and all its former lives; and, in consequence of this, if they inflict a certain punishment from the prayer of those that invoke them, they do not inflict it without justice, but looking to the offences committed by souls in former lives; * which men not perceiving think that they unjustly fall into the calamities which they suffer.
I CHAP. Y.
The multitude, also, are accustomed to doubt in common the very same thing concerning providence, viz. why certain persons are afflicted undeservedly, as they have not done any thing unjustly prior to their being thus afflicted. For neither here is it possible to understand [perfectly] what the soul is, and its whole life, how many offences it has committed in former lives, and whether it now suffers from its former guilt. In this life, also, many unjust actions are concealed from human knowledge, but are known to the Gods, since neither is the same * See the justice of providence in this respect most admir- ably defended by Plotinus, in the first of his treatises on Providence, which treatise forms one of the five books of Plotinus translated by me, in 8vo. 1794.
scope of justice proposed to them as to men. For men, indeed, define justice to be the soul’s performance of its own proper business, and the distribution of desert, conformably to the established laws, and the prevailing polity. But the Gods, looking to the whole orderly arrangement of the world, and to the sub- serviency of souls to the Gods, form a judg- ment of what is just. Hence the judgment of just actions with the Gods is different from what it is with us. Nor is it wonderful, if we are unable, in most things, to arrive at the su- preme and most perfect judgment of more ex- cellent natures. What also hinders, but that to each thing by itself, and in conjunction with the whole alliance of souls, justice may in a very transcendent manner be decreed by the Gods? For if a communion of the same nature in souls, both when they are in and when they are out of bodies, produces a certain identical connexion and common order with the life of the world, it is likewise necessary that a fulfil- ment of justice should be required by wholes, and especially when the magnitude of the un- just deeds antecedently committed by one soul transcends the infliction of one' punish- * In the original, rrjv tStav rrjs avToirpayLav, which Gale very inadequately translates proprmm animce officmm.
ment due to the offences. But if any one should add other definitions, through which he can show that what is just subsists with the Gods in a way different from that in which it is known by us, from these also our design will be facilitated. For me, however, the before- mentioned canons are alone sufficient for the purpose of manifesting the universal genus, and which comprehends every thing pertaining to the medicinal punishments inflicted by di- vine justice.
CHAP. VI.
In order, therefore, that from an abundance of arguments we may contend against the objec- tion which is now adduced, we will grant, if you please, the contrary to what we have asserted, viz. that certain unjust things are performed in this business of invocations. That the Gods, however, are not to be accused as the causes of these is immediately manifest. For those that are good are the causes of good; and the Gods possess good essentially. They do nothing, therefore, that is unjust. Hence other causes of guilty deeds must be investi- gated. And if we are not able to discover these causes, it is not proper to throw away the true conception respecting the Gods, nor on account of the doubts whether these unjust deeds are performed, and how they are effected, to depart from notions concerning the Gods which are truly clear. For it is much better to acknowledge the insufficiency of our power to explain how unjust actions are perpetrated, than to admit any thing impossible and false respecting the Gods; since all the Greeks and Barbarians truly opine the contrary to be the case with divine natures. After this manner, therefore, the truth respecting these particulars subsists.
CHAP. VII.
Moreover, it is necessary to add the causes whence evils* sometimes arise, and to show how many and of what kind they are. For the form of them is not simple; but, being various, is the leader of the generation of various evils. For if what we a little before said, concerning images and evil daemons, who assume the ap- pearance of Gods and good daemons, is true, an abundant evil-producing tribe, about which a 4 * See my translation of Proclus on the Subsistence of Evil, at the end of my translation of his six books on the Theology of Plato.
contrariety of this kind usually happens, will from hence appear to flow. For an evil doemon requires that his worshipper should he just, be- cause he assumes the appearance of one belong- ing to the divine genus; but he is subservient to ivhat is unjust, because he is depraved. The same thing, likewise, that is said of good and evil may he asserted of the true and the false. As, therefore, in divinations we attribute true predictions to the Gods alone, but when we detect any falsehood in predictions we refer this to another genus of cause, viz. that of dsemons; thus, also, in things just and unjust, the beautiful and the just are to be alone ascribed to Gods and good daemons; but such daemons as are naturally depraved, perpetrate what is unjust and base. And that, indeed, which consents and accords with itself, and always subsists with invariable sameness, per- tains to more excellent natures; but that which is hostile to itself, which is discordant, and never the same, is the peculiarity in the most eminent degree of daemoniacal dissension, about which it is not at all wonderful that things of an opposing nature should subsist; but perhaps the very contrary, that this should not be the case, would be more wonderful.
CHAP. YIII.
CHAP. YIII.
AYe may, however, beginning from another liypothesis, demonstrate the same thing. We must admit that the corporeal parts of the universe are neither sluggish nor destitute of power, but as much as they excel our concerns in perfection, beauty, and magnitude, by so much also is the power which is present with them greater. Each, likewise, by itself is capa- ble of effecting different things, and produces certain different energies. They are also capa- ble of effecting things much more numerous on each other. And besides this, a certain multi- form production extends to parts from wholes; partly from sympathy, through similitude of powers, and partly from the aptitude of the agent to the patient. If, therefore, certain evils and destructions happen -to parts, they are salutary and good as with reference to wholes and the harmony of the universe, but to parts they introduce a necessary corruption, either from not being able to bear the energies of wholes, or from a certain other commixture and temperament of their own imbecility, or, in the third place, from the privation of symmetry in the parts to each other.
CHAP. IX.
CHAP. IX.
After the body of the universe, also, many things are generated by the nature of it. For the concord of similars, and the contrariety of dissimilars, effect not a few things. Farther still, the assemblage of many things into the one animal of the universe, and the powers in the world, whatever the number and quality of them may be, effect, in short, one thing in wholes and another in parts, on account of the divided imbecility of parts. Thus, for instance, the friendship, love, and contention which sub- sist in energy in the universe, become passions in the partial natures by which they are par- ticip>ated. Those things, likewise, that are preestablished in forms and pure reasons in the nature of wholes, participate of a certain material indigence, and privation of morphe, in things which subsist according to a part. And things which are conjoined to each other in wholes are separated in parts. Hence partible natures, which participate of wholes in con- junction with matter, degenerate from them in all things, and also from what is beautiful and perfect. But some parts are corrupted, in order that wholes may be preserved in a condition