your conception of peculiarities will be reason- able. For these peculiarities of things, which have an eternal subsistence, are simple, and entirely exempt. The inquiry, however, pro- ceeds imperfectly. For it was necessary, in the first place, to inquire what the peculiarities are of the more excellent genera, according to essence; in the next place, what they are according to power; and thus afterwards, what they are according to energy. But, as your question now stands, with respect to the pecu- liarities by which these genera are separated, you alone speak of the peculiarities of energies. Hence you inquire concerning the dilference in the last things pertaining to them; but you leave uninvestigated such things as are first, and most honourable in them, and which are the elements of their difference. In the same place, also, something is added concerning “ efficacious and passive motions,'’ which is a division by no means adapted to the difference of the more excellent genera. For the contra- riety of action and passion is not inherent in any one of them; but their energies are unre- strained, immutable, and without habitude to their opposites. Hence, neither must we ad- mit in them motions of such a kind as arise from action and passion. For neither do we admit in the soul a self-motion, which consists 28 of the mover and that which is moved; but we conceive that it is a certain simple essential motion, subsisting from itself,* and not possess- ing a habitude to another thing, and exempt from acting on, and suffering from, itself. Who, therefore, can endure that the peculiarities of the genera superior to the soul, should be distinguished according to active or passive motions?
That also which is added by you, “ or of accidents” is foreign from these genera. Tor in composites, and things which exist together with, or in others, or are comprehended by others, some things are conceived to be prece- daneous, but others consequent; and some as essences, but others, as afterwards acceding to essences. For there is a certain coarrange- ment of them, and incongruity and interval in- tervenes. But, in the more excellent genera, all things must be conceived in rw eLvm, i. e. in merely existing; and wholes have a precedane- ous subsistence, are separate by themselves, and have not their hypostasis from, or in others; so that there is not any thing in them which is accidental. Hence the peculiarity of them is not characterized from accidents.
At the end, likewise, of your inquiry, you * For avrrjv eavroi? ovcrav in this place, it is necessarj’^ to read avrrjv eavTijs ovcrav.
29 introduce a distinction according to nature. For your question asks, “ How essences are hnoivn hy energies, hy gyliysical motions, and hy accidents?'^ The very contrary, however, to all this takes place. For if energies and motions were constitutive of essences, they would be the lords of the difference which is between them. But if essences generate energies, the former being separate prior to the latter, will impart to motions, energies, and accidents, that by which they differ from each other. This, therefore, subsists contrarily to what you sup- pose, for the purpose of discovering the pecu- liarity which you now investigate.
In short, whether you think that there is one genus of the Gods, one of daemons, and in a similar manner of heroes, and souls essentially incorporeal; or whether you admit that these are severally many, you inquire what the diffe- rence of them is according to peculiarities. For if you apprehend that each of these is one [and the same genus] the whole arrangement of scientific theology is confounded. But if, as truth requires, you admit that they are gene- rically distinguished, and that there is not in them one common essential definition, but that those of them which are prior, are exempt from those that are inferior, it is not possible to dis- cover their common boundaries. And even if 30 30 this were possible, this very thing would de- stroy their peculiarities. In this way, there- fore, the object of investigation cannot be found. He, however, he who directs his attention to the analogous sameness which exists in superior natures, as, for instance, in the many genera of the Gods, and again in daemons and heroes, and, in the last place, in souls, will be able to define their peculiarities. Hence through this, it is demonstrated by us what the rectitude is of the present inquiry, and what its [accurate] distinction, and also in what manner it is im- possible, and in what manner it is possible, for it to subsist.
CHAP. y.
In the next place, let us direct our attention to the solution of your inquiries. There is, there- fore, the good itself which is beyond essence, and there is that good which subsists accord- ing to essence; I mean the essence which is most ancient and most honourable, and by itself incorporeal. And this is the illustrious peculiarity of the Gods, which exists in all the genera that subsist about them, preserving 31 their appropriate distribution and order, and not being divulsed from it, and at the same time being inherent with invariable sameness in all the Gods, and their perpetual attendants.
In souls, however, which rule over bodies, and precedaneously pay attention to them, and which, prior to generation, have by themselves a perpetual arrangement, essential good is not present, nor the cause of good, which is prior to essence; but to these a certain participation * and habit, proceeding from essential good, ac- cedes; just as we see that the participation of beauty and virtue is very different [in these souls] from that which we behold in men. For the latter is ambiguous, and accedes to com- posite natures as something adventitious. But the former has an immutable and never failing establishment in souls, and neither itself ever departs from itself, nor can be taken away by any thing else. Such, therefore, being the be- ginning and end in the divine genera, conceive two media between these extreme boundaries, viz. the order of heroes, which has an arrange- ment more elevated than that of souls, in power and virtue, in beauty and magnitude, and in all the goods which subsist about souls, and which, though it entirely transcends the 32 psychical order, yet, at the same time, is proxi- mately conjoined to it, through the alliance of a similar formed life. But the other medium, which is suspended from the Gods, though it is far inferior to them, is that of dmmons, which is not of a primarily operative nature, but is sub- servient to, and follows the beneficent will of the Gods. It likewise unfolds into energy the invisible good of the Gods, being itself assimi- lated to it, and gives completion to its fabrica- tions conformably to it. For it renders that which is ineffable in the good of the Gods effable, illuminates that which is formless in forms, and produces into visible reasons [or productive forms] that which in divine good is above all reason. Receiving also a connascent participation of things beautiful, it imparts and transfers it, in unenvying abundance, to the genera posterior to itself. These middle genera, therefore, give completion' to the common bond of the Gods and souls, and cause the connexion of them to be indissoluble. They also bind together the one continuity of things from on high as far as to the end; make the commu- nion of wholes to be inseparable; cause all things to have the best, and a commensurate mixture; in a certain respect, equally transmit the progression from more excellent to inferior natures, and the elevation from things posterior 33 to such as are prior; insert in more imperfect beings order and measures of the communica- tion which descends from more excellent na- tures, and of that by which it is received; and make all things to be familiar and coadapted to all, supernally receiving the causes of all these from the Gods.
You must not, therefore, think that this divi- sion is the peculiarity of powers or energies, or of essence; nor assuming it separately, must you survey it in one of these. But by extend- ing it in common through all the genera, you will give perfection to the answer concerning the peculiarities of Gods, dsemons, and heroes, and also of those in souls which are now the subjects of your inquiry.
Again, however, according to another mode of considering the subject, it is necessary to ascribe to the Gods the whole of that which is united, of whatever kind it may be; that which is firmly established in itself, and which is the cause of impartible essences; the immoveable, which also is to be considered as the cause of all motion, and which transcends the whole of things, and has nothing in common with them; and the unmingled and the separate, understood in common in essence, power and energy, and every thing else of this kind. But that which D 34 D 34 is now separated into multitude, and is able to impart itself to other things, and which receives from others bound in itself, and is sufficient in the distributions of partible natures, so as to give completion to them; which also partici- pates of the primarily operative and vivific, having communion with all real and generated beings; receives a commixture from all things, imparts a contemperation to all things from itself, and extends these peculiarities through all the powers, essences, and energies, in itself; all this we shall truly ascribe to souls, by assert- ing that it is naturally implanted in them.
CHAP. YI.
What, therefore, shall we say concerning the media? I think, indeed, that from what has been before said, they will be manifest to every one; for these give completion to the indivisi- ble connexion of the extremes. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be more explicit. I consider, therefore, the dsemoniacal tribe to be multiplied, but, unitedly, to be comingled, but in an un- mingled manner, and to comprehend all other I 35 things of a subordinate nature, according to the idea of that which is more excellent. But again, the tribe of heroes supernally presides over a more obvious division and multitude, and likewise over motion, commixture, and things allied to these. It also receives gifts of a more excellent nature, concealed as it were inwardly; I mean union, purity, a firm estab- lishment, impartible sameness, and a transcen- dency above other things. For one of these middle genera is proximate to the first, but the other to the last, of the extremes. But it rea- sonably follows, according to continuity of alliance, that the medium which begins from the most excellent natures, should proceed to such as are less excellent; but that the medium which primarily produces a contact with the last of things, should also in a certain respect communicate with the natures that transcend it. From these media, also, the completion may be seen of the first and last genera, and this entirely connascent, in a similar manner, in existence, in power, and in energy. As we have, therefore, in these two ways, perfectly completed the division of the four genera, we shall deem it sufficient in the others, to exhibit the extreme peculiarities alone, for the sake of conciseness, and because what remains, i. e.
the comprehension of the media, is in a certain 36 respect evident. But the media themselves, as being known from the extremes, we shall omit; making a definition of the extremes in the shortest way, as follows.
CHAP. VII.
Of the extremes, therefore, one is supreme, transcendent, and perfect; but the other is last in dignity, deficient, and more imperfect. And the former, indeed, is capable of accomplishing all things at once, uniformly in an instant; but the latter is neither able to effect all things, nor at once, nor suddenly, nor impartibly. The former also generates and governs all things, without being inclined towards them; but the latter is naturally disposed to verge, and be converted to the things which it generates and governs. And the former, indeed, as primordial and cause, precedes all things in power; but the latter, being suspended from the will of the Gods, as from a cause, is from eternity consubsistent with it. The former, likewise, according to one vigorous acme, com- prehends the ends of all energies and essences; but the latter passes from some things to others.
37 37 and proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Farther still, to the former that which is highest and that which is incomprehensible pertain, and also that which is better than all measure, and is in such a nianner formless, as not to be circumscribed by any form; but the latter is vanquished by inclination, habitude, and pro- pensity; and is detained by appetites directed to that which is less excellent, and by fami- liarity with secondary natures. Hence, in the last place, it is formalized by all various mea- sures derived from them. Intellect, therefore, which is the leader and king of all beings, and which is the demiurgic art of the universe, is always present with the Gods with invariable sameness, perfectly, and without indigence, being purely established in itself, according to one energy. But soul participates of a partible and multiform intellect, having its attention' directed to the government of the whole. It also providentially attends to inanimate natures, becoming at different times ingenerated in diffe- rent forms.
From the same causes, therefore, order and beauty itself are consubsistent with the more excellent genera; or, if some one had rather admit it, the cause of these is consubsistent with them. But with soul, the participation of intellectual order and divine beauty is always present. And with the former, indeed, the 38 measure of wholes, or the cause of this, per- petually concurs. But soul is terminated by the divine boundary, and participates of this in a partible manner. To the former, also, empire over all beings, through the power and domination of cause, may be reasonably as- cribed. But soul has certain distinct bounda- ries, as far as to which it is able to have do- minion. Such, therefore, being the different peculiarities in the extremes, it will not be difficult to understand what we have now said, and to perceive the middle peculiarities of daemons and heroes, which are allied to each of the extremes, possessing a similitude to each, departing from both to the medium, and embracing a concordant communion comingled from them, and connected with it in appro- priate measures. Such, therefore, must be conceived to he the peculiarities of the first divine genera.
CHAP. YIII.
CHAP. YIII.
But neither must we admit that cause of the distinction of these genera which you sub- join, viz. ‘‘ that it is an arrangement ivith reference to different bodies; as, for instance, * 39 of Gods to etherial bodies, hut of dcemons to aerial bodies, and of soids to such as are ter- rene” For such an arrangement as this, which resembles that of Socrates to a tribe, when he is a senator, is unworthy of the divine genera, because all of them are essentially un- restrained and free. To which may be added, that it is dreadfully absurd to ascribe to bodies a principal power of giving a specific distinc- tion to the first causes of themselves. For bodies are in servile subjection to these causes, and are ministrant to generation. And farther still, the genera of the more excellent natures are not in bodies, but the former externally rule over the latter. Hence they are not changed in conjunction with bodies. Again, they impart from themselves to bodies every such good as they are able to receive, but they themselves receive nothing from bodies; so that neither will they derive from them certain peculiarities. For if they were as the habits of bodies, or as material forms, or were in some other way corporeal-formed, it would, perhaps, be possible for them to be changed together with the differences of bodies. But if they are separate from bodies, and essentially preexist unmingled with them, what reason- able distinction, produced from bodies, can be transfeiTed to them? To which also may be r 40 added, that this assertion of yours makes bodies to be more excellent than the divine genera, since the former afford a seat to supe- rior causes, and insert in them peculiarities essentially. He, therefore, who coarranges allotments, distributions, and consociations of governors with the governed, will evidently assign a principal authority to more excellent natures. For, because the presiding powers are such [as we have shown them to be], on this account they have such an allotment, and give to it an essential specific distinction, but they are not assimilated to the nature of their receptacles.
It is necessary, therefore, to admit a thing of this kind in partial souls. For such as is the life which the soul received, prior to its insertion in a human body, and such as the form which it readily exerted; such also is the organical body which it has suspended from itself, and such the consequent corresponding nature, which receives the more perfect life of the soul. But with respect to more excellent natures, and which, as wholes, comprehend the principle [of parts] in these, inferior are produced in superior natures; bodies, in incor- poreal essences; things fabricated, in the fabri- cators; and, being circularly comprehended in, are directed and governed by, them. Hence, 41 41 the circulations of the celestial bodies, being primarily inserted in the celestial circulations of the etherial soul, are perpetually inherent in them; and the souls of the worlds [^. e. of the spheres], being extended to their intellect, are perfectly comprehended by it, and are pri- marily generated in it. Intellect, also, both that which is partial and that which is uni- versal, is in a similar manner comprehended in the genera that are more excellent than in- tellect. Since, therefore, second are always converted to first natures, and superior are the leaders of inferior essences, as being the para- digms of them, hence essence and form accede to subordinate from superior natures, and things posterior are primarily produced in such as are more excellent; so that order and mea- sure are derived from primary to secondary beings, and the latter possess that which they are from the former. But the contrary must not be admitted, viz. that peculiarities emanate from things less excellent to the natures which precede them.
Hence, through these things such a corporeal- formed division as you introduce, is demon- strated to be false. It is, indeed, especially necessary not to propose any thing of this kind; but if this should appear to you to be requisite, yet you must not think, that what is 42 false deserves to be discussed. For such a discussion does not exhibit a copiousness of arguments; but he wearies himself in vain, who, proposing things that are false, endeavours afterwards to subvert them, as things that are not true. For how is it possible that an essence, which is of itself incorporeal, and which has nothing in common with the bodies that participate of it, should be distinguished from other things by corporeal qualities? How can that which is not locally present with bodies, be separated by corporeal places? And how can that which is not inclosed by the partible circumscriptions of subjects, be parti- bly detained by the parts of the world? What, also, is that which can prevent the Gods fi’om being every where? And what can restrain their power from extending as far as to the celestial arch? For to effect this, must be the work of a more powerful cause, which is able to inclose and circumscribe them in certain parts. But truly existing being, and which is essentially incorporeal, is every where, where- ever it may wish to be. And that which is divine, and which transcends all things, would [if what you say were admitted] be transcended by the perfection of the whole world, and, as a certain part, would be comprehended by it.
Hence, it would be inferior to corporeal magni- 43 tilde. I do not, however, see after what man- ner these sensible natures could be produced and specifically distinguished, if there was no divine fabrication, and if no participation of divine forms, extended through the whole world.
In short, this opinion wholly subverts sacred institutions, and the theurgic communion of the Gods with men; since it exterminates from the earth the presence of the more excellent genera. For it says nothing else than that divine dwell remote from earthly natures, and that this our place of abode is deserted by them. Accord- ing to this assertion, therefore, neither can we, that are priests, learn any thing from the Gods, nor do you rightly inquire of us, as knowing more than others, since we shall differ in no respect from other men.
No one, however, of these assertions is sane. For neither are the Gods detained in certain parts of the world, nor are terrene natures destitute of their providential attention. But the divinities are characterized by this, that they are not comprehended by any thing, and that they comprehend all things in themselves. But terrestrial natures possess their existence in the pleromas* of the Gods; and when they become adapted to divine participation, then * Fiz. In the plenitudes, or total perfections, of the Gods.
44 44 prior to their own proper essence, they imme- diately possess the Gods, which [latently] pre- existed in it.
Through these things, therefore, we have shown that the whole of this division is false; that the method [employed by you] of investi- gating peculiarities is irrational; and that to suppose the government of the Gods is fixed in a certain place, is by no means to apprehend the whole essence and power which is in them. It would have been proper, therefore, to have omitted the opposite inquiry made by you, about this distribution of more excellent na- tures, as not contradicting in any respect true conceptions. Because, however, it is necessary rather to direct the attention to true science, but not to dispute with men, on this account, we also shall adapt the present inquiry to a certain rational and theological apprehension.
CHAP. IX.
I CONSIDER you, therefore, as asking, for it is your inquiry, “ Why, since the Gods dwell in the heavens alone, there are invocations by theur- gists of terrestrial and subterranean Gods f ” For 45 what you assert in the beginning is not true, that the Gods circumvolve in the heavens alone: since all things are full of them. You also in- quire, Hoiv some of the Gods are said to he aerial, and different Gods are allotted different places, and circumscribed portions of bodies, though they possess infinite, impartible, and in- comprehensible power? And how, likewise, thei'e will be a union of them ivith each other, as they are separated by divisible circumscriptions of pai'ts, and by difference of places and subject bodies? ” Of all these, therefore, and an infinite number of other similar questions, one and the best solution will be obtained by surveying the mode of divine allotment.
A divine nature, therefore, whether it is allotted certain parts of the universe, such as heaven or earth, or sacred cities and regions, or certain groves, or sacred statues, externally* illuminates all these, in the same manner as the sun externally irradiates all things with his rays. Hence, as light comprehends the things which are illuminated by it, thus also the power of the Gods externally comprehends its participants. As, likewise, the solar light is present with the air in an unmingled man- ner; but this is manifest from no light being left * i. e. Without habitude, proximity, or alliance to the things which it illuminates.
4G in the air, when once that which illuminated it has departed, though heat is still present with it, when that which heated it is entirely with- drawn; thus also the light of the Gods illumi- nates separately, and being firmly established in itself, w^holly proceeds through all beings. Moreover, the light which is the object of sen- sible perception, is one, continuous, and eveiy where the same, whole; so that it is not possible for any part of it to be separate and cut off from the whole, nor to be inclosed in a circle, nor at any time to depart from its illuminating source. After the same manner, therefore, the whole world being partible, is divided about the one and impartible light of the Gods. But this light is every where one and the same whole, and is impartibly present with all things that are able to participate of it; through an all perfect power fills all things, and by a cer- tain causal comprehension, incloses and termi- nates the whole of things in itself, and is every where united to itself, and conjoins ends to beginnings. This too, all heaven and the world imitating, revolve with a circular motion, are united to themselves, and lead the elements which are carried round in a circle. Hence the world causes all things to be in each other, and to tend to each other, makes the end of one thing to coalesce with the b%inning of another,