The OUTS, acting under the impulse of the same spur, sharpened by continual privation, and continually repeated disappointment, have on their part a still more urgent demand for the same fallacy, though the opportunities of making application of it but rarely present themselves to their hands.
The oracular party adage-— invented by the Whigs: — Not men but measures, or Not measures but men: — for according as you complete the sentence, you may word it either way, — This bold but slippery in- strument of fallacy has manifest alliance with the pre- sent. Seating in office fit men, being the end, every thing depending upon that end, and the men in ques- tion being the only ones by which it can be attained, no means can be imagined by which such an end may not be justified.
344 FALLAClliS OF CONFUSION. [C/l. 14 CHAPTER XIV.
Oppostr-Generats Justijlcation: — Not measures but men; or, Not men but measures.
Ad invidiam.
According to the notions commonly entertained of moral duty under the head of probity, and in par- ticular under the head of that branch of probity which consists in sincerity, wliatsoever be the nature and extent of the business in question, private or public, it is not right for a man to argue agajnst his own opi- nion;— \yhen his opinion is so and so, to profess it to be the reverse, and in so doing to bend the force of his mind to the purpose of causing others to embrace the opinion thus opposite to his real one.
That, in particular, if being a member of the House of Commons, and in opposition, a measure which to him seems a proper one, is brought on the carpet on the ministerial side, it is not right that he should de- clare it to be, in his opinion, pernicious, and use his endeavours to have it thought so, and treated as sucii by the House; and so again, if, being on that same side, a measure such as to him appears pernicious, is brought on the carpet on the side of opposition, it is not right that he should declare it to be, in his opi- nion, beneficial and fit to be adopted, and accordingly use his endeavours to make it generally thought so, and as such adopted by the House.
Ch. 14.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 345 All aphorism, said to have been a favourite one with the late Mr. Charles Fox, is the proposition at the head of this chapter.
Not men but measures! or, Not measures but men! are the two forms in either of which, according as the ellipsis is filled up, the aphorism may be couched.
Not 7neasures but men! is the more simple expres- sion of the two, it being in that form that the apho- rism is marked out for approbation: reprobation be- ing the sentiment attached to its opposite. Not men but measures I If you look to speeches, then comes the constant and constantly interminable question — what were the words in the speeches. The words are in that case on each occasion genuine or spurious, the interpreta- tion correct or incorrect, according as it suits the pur- pose of him who is speaking of it, and more particu- larly of him who spoke it, that it should be.
But on one occasion we have the aphorism from the pen of Charles Fox himself: and then, if applied to the question of sincerity or insincerity, as above, it is found to have no direct bearing on it.
" Are to be attended to,'' are the words employed on this occasion to complete the proposition. " How vain, how idle, how presumptuous (says the declaimer in his attempt to put on the historian) is the o[)inion that laws can do every thing! and how weak and per- nicious the maxim founded upon it, that measures not men, are to be attended to! ' Weak enough as thub expressed, it niust be con- '316 F7\LLACl£S OF CONFUSION. [Ck. 14.
fessed: and abundantly too weak to be by a statesman considered as worth noticing even by so vague and ungrounded a note of reprobation. — As if any one ever thought of denying that both ought to be " at- tended to r and as if, even in a debating ckib, words so vague and unmeaning as '■^ attended to^ were a fit subject of debate.
What must be confessed is, that to a man who wishes well to his country, and sees a set of men who in his opinion are a bad set, conducting the affairs of it, few things are more provoking than by this or that comparatively unimportant, but so far as it goes be- neficial measure, to see them obtain a degree of repu- tation of which one eftect may be to confirm them in their seat.
But what seems not to have been sufficiently " at- tended to'' is, that it is by the badness of their mea- sures that the only warrant for giving to the men the appellation of bad men can be grounded: that if they are really the bad men they are supposed to be, have a little patience, and they will come out with some bad measure, against which, it being by the supposi- tion bad, and by yourself looked upon as such, you may without prejudice to your sincerity, point your attacks: and if no such bad measure ever came from them, the imputation of their being bad men, is rather premature.
Distressing indeed to a man of real probity must be the alternative: to sec a set of men fixed in this their all-commanding seat, and making a proportion- Ch. 14.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 347 ally extensive and pernicious use of it; or, for the purpose of taking what chance is to be had of pre- cluding them from this advantage, to keep on strain- ing every endeavour to make tlie House and the pub- lic look upon as pernicious, a measure of the utility of which he is himself satisfied.
In the abomination of long and regularly corrupt parliaments lies the cause of this distress.
Under this system, when the whole system of abuses has a determined patron on the throne, and that pa- tron has got a set of ministers that suit this ruling purpose, misrule may swell to such a pitch, that with- out any one measure in such sort bad that you can fix upon it and say this is a sufficient ground for pu- nishment, or even for dismission, the State may be at the brink of ruin: — meantime some measure may be introduced, against which, though good or at least in- noxious of itself, the people, by means of some misre- presentation of matter of fact, or some erroneous opi- nion or other which prevails among them, may to the disgrace and expulsion of the ministry be turned against it, and then comes the distressing alternative.
But were the duration of the assembly short, and the great and surely effective mass of the matter of corruption expelled and kept out of it, no such alter- native would ever present itself. The chance of rid- ding the country of a bad set of ministers would be renewed continually. The question supposed to be tried on each occasion might be the question really tried: whereas at present on each occasion the ques- 348 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. 14.
tion tried is but one and the same, viz. Shall the mi- nistry or shall it not continue?
The question brought on the carpet is like the wager in a feigned issue, a mere farce, which, but for its con- nection with the principal question above mentioned, would not be deemed worth trying, and would not be tried.
Ch. 15.] fALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 349 CHAPTER XV.
Rejection i?istead of Amendment.
Ad judicium.
E.vposition.
This fallacy consists in urging in the character of a bar, or conclusive objection against the proposed measure, some consideration, which, if presented in the character of a proposed amendment, might have more or less claim to notice.
It generally consists of some real or imaginary in- convenience, alleged commonly, but not necessarily, as eventually to result from the adoption of the measure.
This inconvenience, supposing it real, will either be preponderant over the promised benefit or not pre- ponderant.
In either case it will be either remediable or irre- mediable.
If at the same time irremediable and preponderant, then it is, and then only, that in the character of an ob- jection it is of itself conclusive.
By him in whose mind discernment and candour are combined, this distinction will be not only felt, but brought to view. If in respect of adequate dis- cernment there be a failure, it will not be felt: if in re- spect of candour only, it will have been felt, but it will not be brought to view.
The occasion by which opportunity is afforded for 350 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. 15.
the working of this fallacy, is the creation of any new office, including the mass of emolument which, with- out inquiry into the necessity, or any means taken for keeping down the quantum of it within the narrowed limits which the good of the service admits of, is, by the union of habit with the sinister interest that gave birth to it, annexed as of course, upon their creation, to all new offices.
The fallacy, what there is of fallacy in the case consists in the practice of setting up the two univer^ sally applicable objections, viz.?ieed of eco?iomt/, and mischief or danger from the increase of the influeiice of the crown, in the character of peremptory bars to the proposed measure.
Exposure, The groimd on which an objection of this stamp may with propriety be considered and spoken of under the denomination of a fallacy, is where the utility of the proposed new establishment is left unimj)eached, and the sole reason for the rejection proposed to be put upon the proposed measure consists in the above topics or one of them.
In such case, on the part of him by whom any ob- jections so inconclusive in their nature are relied on, the reliance placed on them amounts to a virtual ac- knowledgement of the utility of the proposed new es- tablishment: inasmuch as in an address from one ra- tional being to another, nothing seems, upoil the face of the statement at least, more unnatural, tiian that if Ch. \5.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 551 a man could find any objection that would apply to the particular establishment in question in contra- distinction to all others, he should confine himself to an objection vvhich applies alike to almost all existing establishments; that is, to almost the whole frame of the existing government.
Such is the case where the two common-place ob- jections in question, or either of them, are brought out in the character of objections by themselves, and without being accompanied by any specific ones.
But even when added to specific ones, an objection thus inconclusive in its nature, if urged in a direct way, and dwelt upon with any emphasis, can scarcely, at least while there remain any useless places unabo- lished, or any overpaid places, from which the over- plus of emolument remains undefalcated, be exempted from the imputation of irrelevancy.
At any rate, wherever it happens that a minister at present in office sees opposite to him in the House another person who has at any time been in office, it seems an obseiTation not very easy to answer in the character of an argument ad hominem, should it be said, " When you were in office, there were such and such offices which were of no manner of use; these you never used your endeavours to abolish, notwith- standino the use that would have resulted from the abolition, in the shape of diminution of needless ex- penditure and sinister influence: yet now, when a set of offices is proposed, for which you cannot deny but that there is.so?)ie use, your exertions for the benefit 352 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [C'/f. 15.
of economy are reserved to be directed against these useful ones."
No doubt but that on the supposition that the two opposite masses of advantage and disadvantage being completely in equilibrio, — advantage in the shape of service expected to be rendered in the proposed new offices on the one hand, disadvantage in the shape of expense of the emolument proposed to be attached to them on the other, — a weight much less than that of the mischief from the increase of sinister influence,- would suffice to turn the scale.
Take also another supposition. Suppose (wliat is not in every case possible) that the value of the service expected to be obtained by means of the proposed new offices is capable of being obtained, and has ac- cordingly been obtained in figures. Suppose on the other hand (what will very frequently be feasible) that the expense of the establishment may with sufficient precision be obtained in figures, and being so obtained, on striking the balance, found to be less than the ad- vantage so expected from the service. Suppose lastly, (what is impossible) that the value of the mischief which, in the shape of introduction of additional in- fluence, were with sufficient precision capable of stand- ing expressed in figures had been so expressed, and being so expressed^ the quantity of mischief in this shape were found sufficient to turn the scale on the side of disadvantage.
Here would be a sufficient reason for tlie rejection of the proposed establishment, and Ihence a sufficient Ch. 15.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. S53 warrant for bringing into the field the argument in question, common-place as it is. But in regard to this last supposition at any rate, how far it is from being capable of being realized, is but too evident.
Upon the whole, therefore, so far at least as con- cerns the objection drawn from the increase that would result to the sinister influence of the crown, it may be said that whatsoever time is spent in descanting upon this topic may be set down to the account of lost time.
It is a topic, the importance of which is surdy suf- ficient to entide it to be considered by itself. The influence of the crown, it ought always to be remem- bered, can no otherwise receive with propriety the epithet sinister, than in so far as, by being directed to and reaching a member of Parliament or a parliamen- tary elector, it affects the purity of Parliament. But by a system of measures properly directed to that end, the constitution of Parliament might be eflfec- tually guarded against any degree of impurity capable of being productive of any sensible inconvenience, whatsoever were the lucrativeness of the utmost number of offices, for the creation or preservation of which so much as a plausible reason could be found: and were it otherwise, the proper remedy would be found, not in the refusal to create any new office, the service of which was understood to over- balance in any determinate and unquestionable degree the mischief of the expense, but in the taking the no- mination out of the hands of the crown, and vesting it in some other and independent hands.
354 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Cll. 15.
The putting all placesinthese respects upon the same footing— necessary and unnecessary ones, — properly paid and overpaid ones, — 'wears out and weakens that energy which should be reserved for, and directed with all its force against, unnecessary places, and the over- plus part of the pay of overpaid ones.
Another occasion on which this fallacy is often wont to be applied, is the case in which, from the mere observation of a profit as likely from any trans- action to accrue to this or that individual, a censure is grounded, pronouncing it dijob.
The error in case of sincerity, the fallacy in case of insincerity, consists, in forgetting that individuals are the stuff of which the public is made; that there is no way of benefiting the public but by benefiting in- dividuals; and that a benefit which, in the shape of pleasure or exemption from pain, does not sooner or later come home to the bosom of at least some one individual, is not in reality a benefit — is not entitled to that name.
So far then from constituting an argument in dis- favour of the proposed measure, every benefit that can be pointed out as accruing or likely to accrue to any determinate individual or individuals, constitutes, as far as it goes, an argument in favour of the measure.
In no case whatsoever — on no imaginable suppo- sition— can this consideration serve with propriety in the character of an argument in disfavour of any measure. In no case whatsoever — on no imaginable supposition — can it, so far as it goes, fail of serving Ch, 15.] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. S55 with propriety in the character of an argument in fa- vour of the measure. Is the measure good? — It adds to the mass of its advantages. Is the measure upon the whole a bad one? — It subtracts, by the whole amount of it, from the real amount of the disadvan- tages attached to the measure.
At the same time in practice, there is no argument, perhaps, which is more frequently employed, or on which more stress is laid, without doors at any rate, if not within doors, than this, in the character of an argument in disfavour of a proposed measure: no ar- gument which, even when taken by itself, is with more confidence relied on in the character of a conclusive one.
To what cause is so general a perversion of the fa- culty of reason to be ascribed?
Two causes present themselves as acting in this character: 1. It is apt to be received (and that certainly not without reason) in the character of evidence — conclu- sive evidence — of the nature of the motive, to the in- fluence of which the part taken by the supporters of the measure, or some of them, (viz. all who in any way are partakers of the private benefit in question,) ought to be ascribed.
In this character, to the justness of the conclusion thus drawn, there can in general be nothing to object.
But the consideration of the motive in which the part taken either by the supporters or the opposers of a measure finds its cause, has elsewhere been shown S56 rALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [C/l. 15.
to be a consideration altogether irrelevant*; and the use of the argument has been shown to be of the num- ber of those fallacies, the influence of which is in its natural and general tendency unfavourable to every good cause.
The other cause is the prevalence of the passion of envy. To the man to whom it is an object of envy, the good of another man is evil to himself. By the envy of the speaker or writer, the supposed advantage to the third person is denounced in the character of an evil, to the envy of the hearers or the readers: — denounced, and perhaps without any perception of the mistake, so rare is the habit of self-examination, and so gross and so perpetual the errors into which, for want of it, the human mind is capable of being led.
In speaking of the passion or affection of envi/, as being productive of this fallacious argument, and of the error, but for which shame would frequently re- strain a man from the employment of it, it is not meant to speak of this passion or this affection as one of which, on the occasion in question, the influence ought to be considered as pernicious on the whole.
So far from being pernicious, the more thoroughly it is considered, the more closely it will be seen to be salutary upon the whole; and not merely salutary, at least in the best state of things that has yet been realized, but so necessary, that without it, society would hardly have been kept together.
* See Part 2. Personalities.
Ch. 15.] TALLACJES OF CONFUSION. 357 The legislator who resolves not to accept assistance from any but social motives, from none, save what in his vocabulary pass under the denomination of pure mo- tives, will find his laws without vigour and without use.
The judge who resolves to have no prosecutors who are brought to him by any but pure motives, will not find that part of his emolument which, under the pre- sent system of abuse, is composed of fees, and may save himself the trouble of going into court — of sitting on penal causes. The judge who should determine to receive no evidence but what was at the same time brought to him, and, when before him, guided by pure motives, need scarcely trouble himself to hear evi- dence.
The practical inference is — that, if he would avoid drawing down disgrace upon himself instead of upon the measure he is opposing, a nrian ought to abstain from employing this argument in confutation of the fallacy; since, in as far as he employs it, he is employing in refutation of one fallacy (and that so gross an one, that the bare mention of it in that character may na- turally be sufficient to reduce the employer to silence), he is employing another fallacy, which is of itself sus- ceptible of a refutation no less easy and conclusive.
It is only by the interests, the affections, the pas- sions (all these words mean nothing more than the same psychological object appearing in different cha- racters), that the legislator, labouring for the good and in the service of mankind, can effect his j)urposes. Those interests, acting in the character of motives, 358 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. 15.
may be of the self-regarding class, the dissocial, or the social: — the social he will, on every occasion where he finds them already iu action, endeavour not only to engage in his service, but cherish and cultivate: the self-regarding and the dissocial, though his study will be rather to restrain than encourage them, he will at any rate, wherever he sees them in action or likely to come into action, use his best endeavours to avail himself of directing their influence, with whatever force he can muster, to his own social purposes.
PART THE FIFTH.
CHAPTER I.
Characters common to all these Fallacies.
Upon the whole, the following are the characters which appertain in common to all the several argu- ments here distinguished by the name of fallacies: 1. Whatsoever be the measure in hand, they are, with relation to it, irrelevant.
2. They are all of them such, that the application of these irrelevant arguments, affords a presumption either of the weakness or total absence of relevant ar- guments on the side on which they are employed.
3. To any. good purpose they are all of them un- necessary.
4. They are all of them not only capable of being applied, but actually in the habit of being applied, and with advantage, to bad purposes: viz. to the ob- struction and defeat of all such measures as have for their object and their tendency, the removal of the abuses or other imperfections still discernible in the frame and practice of the government.
5. By means of their irrelevancy, they all of them consume and misapply time, thereby obstructing the course, and retarding the progress of all necessary and useful business.
6. By that irritative quality which, in virtue of their irrelevancy, with the improbity or weakness of which it is indicative, they possess, all of them, in a degree more or less considerable, but, in a more particular degree such of them as consist in personalities, they are productive of ill-humour, which in some instances has been productive of bloodshed, and is continually productive as above, of waste of time and hindrance of business.
7. On the part of those who, whether in spoken or written discourses, give utterance to them, they are indicative either of improbity or intellectual weakness, or of a contempt for the understandings of those on whose minds they are destined to operate.
8. On the part of those on whom they operate, they are indicative of intellectual weakness: and on the part of those in and by whom they are pretended to operate, they are indicative of improbity, viz. in the shape of insincerity.
The practical conclusion is, that in proportion as the acceptance and thence the utterance of them can be prevented, the understanding of the public will be strengthened, the morals of the public will be purified, and the practice of government improved.
Ch. 2.] MISCHIEF PRODUCIBLE. 361 CHAPTER 11.
Of the mischief producible by Fallacies, The first division that presents itself in relation to the mischief of a fallacy, may be expressed by the words specific and general.
The specific mischief of a fallacy, consists in the tendency which it has to prevent or obstruct the intro- duction of this or that useful measure in particular.
The general mischief, consists in that moral or in- tellectual depravation which produces habits of false reasoning and insincerity: — this mischief may again be distinguished into mischief produced within doors and mischief produced without doors.
Under the appellation of mischief within doors, is to be understood all that mischief, that deception, which has its seat in the bosom of any member of the supreme legislative body.
Under the appellation of mischief without doors, all that which has its seat in the bosom of any person not included in that body, — of any person whose sta- tion is among the people at large.
362 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [C/l. 3.
CHAPTER III.
Causes of the utterance of these Fallacies.
The causes of the utterance of these fallacies may, it should seem, be thus denominated and enumerated.
terest.
4. Self-defence, i. e. sense of the need of selfdefence against counter fallacies.
First Cause.
Sinister interest, of the operation of which the parti/ affected by it is conscious.
The mind of every public man is subject at all times to the operation of two distinct interests; a public and a private one. His public interest is that which is constituted of the share he has in the happiness and M'ell-being of the whole community, or of the major part of it: his private interest is constituted of, or by, the share he has in the well-being of some portion of the community less than the major part: of which private interest the smallest possible portion is that which is composed of his own individual — his own personal — interest.
In the greater number of instances, these two inter- ests are not only distinct, but opposite: and that to Ch. 3.] CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. 363 such a degree, that if either be exclusively pursued, the other must be sacrificed to it.
Take for example pecuniary interest: It is the per- sonal interest of every public man, at whose disposal public money extracted by taxes from the whole com- munity is placed, that as large a share as possible, and if possible the whole of it, should remain there for his own use: it is at the same time the interest of the public, including his own portion of the public interest, that as small a share as possible, and if possible no part at all, remain in these same hands for his personal or any other private use.
Taking the whole of life together, there exists not, nor ever can exist, that human being in whose instance any public interest he can have had, will not in so far as depends upon himself, have been sacrificed to his own personal interest. Towards the advancement of the public interest all that the most public-spirited, which is as much as to say the most virtuous of men can do, is to do what depends upon himself towards bringing the public interest, that is his own personal share in the public interest, to a state as nearly ap- proaching to coincidence, and on as few occasions amounting to a state of repugnance, as possible with his private interests.
Were there ever so much reason for regretting it, the sort of relation which is thus seen to have place between public and private interest, would not be the less true: nor would it be the less incumbent on the legislator, nor would the legislator, in so far as he findf» 364 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [Ch. 3.
it reconcileable to his personal interest to pursue the public interest, be the less disposed and determined to act and shape his measures accordingly.
But the more correct and complete a man's concep- tion of the subject is, the more clearly will he under- stand, that in this natural and general predominance of personal, over every more extensive interest, there is no just cause for regret. Why? Because upon this predominance depends the existence of the species, and the existence of every individual belonging to it. Suppose for a moment the opposite state of things — a state in which every one should prefer the public to himself — and the consequences — the necessary con- sequences, would be no less ridiculous in idea, than disastrous and destructive in reality.
In the ordinary course and strain of legislation, no supposition inconsistent with this only true and ra- tional one, is acted upon. On this supposition is built whatsoever is done in the application made either of the matter of reward, or of the matter of punishment, to the purposes of government. The sup- position is — that on the part of every individual whose conduct it is thus endeavoured to shape and regulate, interest, and that, private interest, will be the cause by the operation of which his conduct will be deternjined: not only so, but that in case of competition as be- tween such public and such private interest, it is the private interest that will predominate.
If the contrary supposition were acted upon, what -would be the consequence? that neither in the shape Ch. 3.] CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. SGS of reward, nor in the shape of eventual punishment, would the precious matter of good and evil be wasted or exposed to waste, but (in lieu of requisition, with reward or punishment, or both, for its sanction, for securing compliance) advice and recommendation would be employed throughout the system of law pe- nal as well as remuneratory.