eluded from giving his concurrence to any law, the effect of which would be to abolish or change any other rights. For by this first clause he is made "solemnly" to "promise and swear to govern the people...according to the statutes in parlia- ment agreed on, and the laws and customs of the same." After this, governing according to any new law, he could not govern according to the old law abrogated by it.
If, by any such ceremony, misrule in this shape could be converted into a duty or a right, so miglit it in any other.
If Henry VIII. at his coronation had sworn to " maintain " that Catholic " religion," which for so many centuries was " established by law," and by fire and sword to keep out the Protestant religion, and had been considered bound by such oatli, he could never have taken one step towards the Reformation, and the religion of the state must have been still Ca- tholic.
But would you put a force upon the conscience of your sovereign? By any construction, which in your judgment may be the [)roper one, would you preclude him from the free exercise of his?
Most assuredly not: even were it as completely within as it is out of my power.
All I plead for is, that on so easy a condition as that of pronouncing the word conscience, it may not be in his power either to make himself absolute, or in any shape to give continuance to misrule.
]10 FALLACIES OF AUTIIOI^ITV. [Ch. 3.
Let him but resign his power, conscience can never reproach him with any misuse of it.
It seems difficult to say what can be a misuse of it, if it be not a determinate and persevering habit of using it in such a manner as in the judgment of the two houses is not " conducive," but repugnant " to the utility of the subjects," with reference to whom, and whose utility alone, either laws or kings can be of any use.
According to the form in which it is conceived, any such engagement is in effect either a check or a license: — a license under the appearance of a check, and for that very reason but the more efficiently ope- rative.
Chains to the man in power? Yes: — but such as lie figures with on the stage: to the spectators as im- posing, to himself as light as [possible. Modelled by the wearer to suit his own purposes, they serve to rattle but not to restrain.
Suppose a king of Great Britain and Ireland to have expressed his fixed determination, in the event of any proposed law being tendered to him for his assent, to refuse such assent, and this not on the per- suasion that the law would not be " for the utility of the subjects," but that by his coronation oath he stands precluded from so doing: — the course proper to be taken by parliament, the course pointed out by prin- ciple and precedent would be, a vote of abdication: — a vote declaring the king to have abdicated his royal authority, and that, as in case of death or incurable mental derangement, now is the time for the person next in succession to take his place.
In the celebrated case in which a vote to this effect was actually passed, the declaration of abdication was in lawyers' language a fiction, — in plain truth a false- hood,— and that falsehood a mockery; not a particle of his power was it the wish of James to abdicate, to part with; but to increase it to a maximum was the manifest object of all his efforts.
But in the case here supposed, with respect to a part, and that a principal part of the royal authority, the will and purpose to abdicate is actually declared: and this, being such a part, without which the re- mainder cannot, " to the utility of the subjects," be exercised, the remainder must of necessity be, on their part and for their sake, added \ * The variety of the notions entertained at diiTerent periods, in dif- ferent stages of societ}', respecting the duration of laws, presents a cu- rious and not uninstructive picture of human weakness.
1. At one time we see, under the name of king, a single person, whose will makes law, or, at any rate, without whose will no law is made; and when this law-giver dies, his laws die with him.
Such was the state of things in Saxon times, — such even continued to be the state of things for several reigns after the Norman Conquest *.
2. Next to this comes a period in which the duration of the law, during the life-time of the monarch to whom it owed its birth, was unsettled and left to chance f.
3. In the third place comes the period in which the notions re- specting the duration of the law concur with the dictates of reason and utility, not so much from reflection as because no occasion of a * To Ric. I. inclusive, t John, Ed. I and II.
ll'i FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [Ch. 3.
nature to suggest and urge any attempt so absurd as that of tyrannizing over futurity had as yet happened to present itself.
4. Lastly, upon the spur of an occasion of the sort in question, comes the attempt to give eternity to human laws.
Provisional and eventual perpetuity is an attribute which, in that stage of society at which laws have ceased to expire with the individual legislator, is understood to be inherent in all laws in which no expres- sion is found to the contrary.
But if a particular length of time be marked out, during which, in the enactment of a law, it is declared that that law shall not be liable to suffer abrogation or alteration, the determination to tie up the hands of succeeding legislators is expressed in unequivocal terms.
Such, in respect of their constitutional code, was the pretension set up by the first assembly of legislators brought together by the French revolution.
A position not less absurd in principle, but by the limitation in point of time, not pregnant with any thing like equal mischief, was before that time acted upon, and still continues to be acted upon, in English legislation.
In various statutes, a clause may be found by which the statute is declared capable of being altered or repealed in the course of the same session. In this clause is contained, in the way of necessary impli- cation, that a statute in which no such clause is inserted is not capable of being repealed or altered during the session, — no, not by the very hands by which it was made.
Ch. 4.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. 113 CHAPTER IV.
No-precedent Argument.
Ad verecundiam.
E.rposition.
" The proposition is of a novel and unprecedented complexion: the present is surely the first time that any such thing was ever heard of in this house."
Whatsoever may happen to be the subject intro- duced, above is a specimen of the infinite variety of forms in which the opposing predicate may be clothed.
To such an observation there could be no objec- tion, if the object with which it were made was only to fix attention to a new or difficult subject: " Deli- berate well before you act, as you have no precedent to direct your course:" E.vposure.
But in the character of an argument, as a ground for the rejection of the proposed measure, it is ob- viously a fallacy.
Whether or no the alleged novelty actually exists, is an inquiry which it can never be worth while to make.
That it is impossible that it should in any case af- ford the smallest ground for the rejection of the mea- sure,—~that the observation is completely irrelevant in I U.4 FxVLLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [67/. 4.
relation to the question, whether or no it is expedient that such a measure should be adopted, — is a propo- sition to which it seems difficult to conceive how an immediate assent can be refused. If no specific good is indicated as likely to be produced by the proi)osed measure, this deficiency is itself sufficient to warrant the rejection of it. If any such specific good is indi- cated, it must be minute indeed if an observation of this nature can affiDrd a sufficient ground for the rejec- tion of the measure.
If the observation presents a conclusive objection against the parucular measure proposed, so it would against any other that ever was proposed, including every measure that ever was adopted, and therein every institution that exists at present. If it proves that this ought not to be done, it proves that nothing else ought ever to have been done.
It may be urged, that, if the measure had been a fit one, it would have been brought upon the carpet before. But there are several obstacles besides the inexpediency of a measure, which, for any length of time, may prevent its being brought forward.
1. If, though beyond dispute promotive of the in- terest of the many, there be any thing in it that is ad- verse to the interests^ the prejudices, or the humours of the ruling few, the wonder is, not that it should not have been brought forward before, but that it should be brought forward even now.
2. If, in the complexion of it, there be any thing which it required a particular degree of ingenuity to Ch. 4>.] FALLACIES or AUTHORITY. 115 contrive and adapt to the purpose, this would of itself be sufficient to account for the tardiness of its appear- ance.
In legislation, the birth of ingenuity is obstructed and retarded by dilficulties, beyond any which exist in other matters. Besides the more general sinister interest of the powerful few in whose hands the func- tions of government are lodged, the more particular sinister interest affecting the body of lawyers, is one to which any given measure, in proportion to the in- genuity displayed in it, is likely to be adverse.
Measures which come under the head of indirect legislation, and in particular those which have the quality of executing themselves, are the measures which, as they possess most efficiency when establish- ed, so they require greater ingenuity in the contri- vance. Now in proportion as laws execute them- selves, in other words, are attended with voluntary obedience, in that proportion are they efficient; but it is only in proportion as they fail of being efficient, that, to the man of law, they are beneficial and pro- ductive; because it is only in proportion as they stand in need of enforcement, that business makes its way into the hands of the man of law.
12 CHAPTER V.
Self-assumed Authority.
Ad ignorantiam; ad verecundiam.
This fallacy presents itself in two shapes: — 1. An avowal made with a sort of mock modesty and cau- tion by a person in exalted station, that he is incapa- ble of forming a judgment on the question in debate, such incapacity being sometimes real, sometimes pre- tended: ^. Open assertion by a person so situated of the purity of his motives and integrity of his life, and the entire reliance which may consequently be reposed on all he says or does.
Sect. 1.
Sect. 1.
The first is commonly played off as follows: — An evil or defect in our institutions is pointed out clearly, and a remedy proposed, to which no objection can be made; — up starts a man high in office, and, instead of stating any specific objection, says, " I am not pre- pared " to do so and so, " I am not prepared to say," &c. The meaning evidently intended to be conveyed is, " If I, who am so dignified and supposed to be so capable of forming a judgment, avow myself incompe- tent to do so, what presumption, what folly must there be in the conclusion formed by any one else! " In truth, this is nothing else but an indirect way of brow- beating; — arrogance under a thin veil of modesty.
If you are not prepared to pass a judgment, you Sect. 1.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. 117 are not prepared to condemn, and ought not, there- fore, to oppose: the utmost you are warranted in doing, if sincere, is to ask for a little time for consi- deration.
Supposing the unpreparedness real, the reasonable and practical inference is, — say nothing, take no part in the business.
A proposition for the reforming of this or that abuse in the administration of justice, is the common occa- sion for the employment of this fallacy.
In virtue of his office, every judge, every law-officer, is supposed and pronounced to be profoundly versed in the science of the law; Yes; of the science of the law as it is, probably as much as any other man: but law, as it ought to be, is a very different thing; and the proposal in question has for its avowed, and commonly for its real object, the bringing law as it is somewhat nearer to law as it ought to be. But this is one of those things for which the great dignitary is sure to be at all times unpre- pared: — unprepared to join in any such design; every thing of this sort having been at all times contrary to his interest: — unprepared so much as to form any judgment concerning the conduciveness of the pro- posed measure to such its declared object: in any such point of view it has never been his interest to consider it.
A mind that, from its first entrance upon this sub- ject, has been applying its whole force to the inquiry, as to what are the most effectual means of making its 118 FALLACIES OF AUTHOiaXY. [Ck. 5, profit of the imperfections of the system; — a mind to which of consequence the profit from these sources of affliction has been all along an object of complacency, and the affliction itself, at best, but an object of indif- ference;— a mind which has, throughout the whole course of its career, been receiving a correspondent bias, and has in consequence contracted a corre- spondent distortion; — cannot with reason be expected to exert itself with much alacrity or facility in a track so opposite and so new.
For the quiet of his conscience, if, at the outset of his career, it were his fortune to have one, he will naturally have been feeding himself with the notion, that, if there be any thing that is amiss, in practice it cannot be otherwise; which being granted, and, ac- cordingly, that suffering to a certain amount cannot but take place, whatsoever profit can be extracted from it, is fair game, and as such, belongs of right to the first occupant among persons duly qualified.
The wonder would not be great if an officer of the military profession should exhibit, for a time at least, some awkwardness if forced to act in the character of a surgeon's mate: to inflict wounds requires one sort of skill, to dress and heal them requires another. Te- lephus is the only man upon record who possessed an instrument by which wounds were with equal dispatch and efficiency made and healed. The race of Telephus is extinct; and as to his spears, if ever any of them ~ found their way into Pompeii or Herculaneum, they remain still among the ruins.
Sect. 1.] FALLACIES OF AUTllORFrY. I J9 Unfortunately in this case, were the ability to form a judgment ever so complete, the likelihood of co- operation would not be increased. None are so com- pletely deaf as those who will not hear, — none are so completely unintelligent as those who will not under- stand.
Call upon a chief justice to concur in a measure for giving possibility to the recovery of a debt, the re- covery of which is in his own court rendered impos- sible by costs which partly go into his own pocket, as well might you call upon the Pope to abjure the errors of the church of Rome. If not hard pressed, he will maintain a prudent and easy silence; if hard pressed, he will let fly a volley of fallacies: he will play off the argument drawn from the imputation of bad motives, and tell you of the profit expected by the party by whom the bill was framed, and petition procured, to form a ground for it. If that be not suf- ficient, he will transform himself in the first place into a witness, giving evidence upon a committee; in the next place, after multiplying himself into the number of members necessary to hear and re- port upon that evidence, he will make a report ac- cordingly.
He will report in that character, that when in any town a set of tradesmen have, on their petition, ob- tained a judicatory in which the recovery of a debt under ^Os. or 51. is not attended with that obstruction of accumulated expense by whiclj the relief wliich his judicatory professes to afford is always accompanied, 120 FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [C/l. 5.
it has been with no other effect than that of giving in the character of judges effect to claims, which in the character of witnesses it was originally their design, and afterwards their practice, to give support to by perjury.
Sect. 2. The second of these txvo devices may be called The Self-trumpeter s Fallacy.
By this name it is not intended to designate those occasional impulses of vanity which lead a man to dis- play or overrate his pretensions to superior intelli- gence. Against the self-love of the man whose altar to himself is raised on this ground, rival altars, from every one of which he is sure of discouragement, raise themselves all around.
But there are certain men in office who, in discharge of their functions, arrogate to themselves a degree of probity, which is to exclude all imputations and all inquiry: their assertions are to be deemed equivalent to proof; their virtues are guarantees for the faithful discharge of their duties; and the most implicit con- fidence is to be reposed in them on all occasions. If you expose any abuse, propose any reform, call for securities, inquiry, or measures to promote publicity, they set up a cry of surprise, amounting almost to in- dignation, as if their integrity were questioned, or their honour wounded. With all this, they dexterously mix up intimations, that the most exalted patriotism, honour, and perhaps religion, are the only sources of all their actions.
Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. 121 Sucli assertions must be classed among fallacies, because, 1. they are irrelevant to the subject in dis- cussion: 2. the degree in which the predominance of motives of the social or disinterested cast is com- monly asserted or insinuated, is, by the very nature of man, rendered impossible: 3. the sort of testimony thus given affords no legitimate reason for regarding; the assertion in question to be true; for it is no less completely in the power of the most profligate than in that of the most virtuous of mankind: nor is it in a less degree the interest of the profligate man to make such assertions. Be they ever so completely false, not any the least danger of punishment does he see himself exposed to, at the hands either of the law or of public opinion.
For ascribing to any one of these self- trumpeters the smallest possible particle of that virtue which they are so loud in the profession of, there is no more ra- tional cause, than for looking ppon this or that actor as a good man because he acts well the part of Othello, or bad because he acts well the part of lago.
4. On the contrary, the interest he has in trying what may be done by these means, is more de- cided and exclusive than in the case of the man of real probity and social feeling. The virtuous man, being what he is, has that chance for being looked upon as such; whereas the self-trumpeter in question, having no such ground of reliance, beholds his only chance in the conjunct efiect of lii^ own effiontery, and the imbecility of his hearers.
122 I'ALLACIES or AUTHORITY. [Ch. 6.
These assertions of authority, therefore, by men in office, who would have us estimate their conduct by their character, and not their character by their con- duct, must be classed among political fallacies. If there be anyone maxim in politics more certain than another, it is, that no possible degree of virtue in the governor can render it expedient for the governed to dispense with good laws and good institutions \ * Madame de Stael says, that in a conversation which she had at Petersburgh with the Emperor of Russia, he expressed his desire to better the condition of the peasantry, who are still in a state of absolute slavery; upon which the female sentimentalist exclaimed, "Sire, your character is a constitution for your country, and your conscience is its guarantee." His reply was, " Quand cela serait,je ne serais jamais qu'un accident heureux." — Du- Annies cVExil, p. 313.
Ch. 6.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. 123 CHAPTER VI.
Laudatory Personalities.
Ad amicitiam.
Personalities of this class are the opposites, and in some respects the counterparts, of vitupera- tive personalities, which will be treated of next in order, at the commencement of the ensuing book.
Laudatory personalities are susceptible of the same number of modifications as will be shown to exist in the case of vituperative personalities: but in this case the argument is so much weaker than in the other, that the shades and modifications of it are seldom re- sorted to, and are therefore not worth a detailed ex- position. The object of vituperative personalities is to effect the rejection of a measure, on account of the alleged bad character of those who promote it; and the argument advanced is, " The persons who propose or promote the measure, are bad: therefore the measure is bad, or ought to be rejected." The ob- ject of laudatory personalities is to effect the rejection of a measure on account of the alleged good charac- ter of those who oppose it; and the argument ad- vanced is, " The measure is rendered unnecessary by the virtues of those who are in power, — their oppo- sition is a sufficient authority for the rejection of the measure."
124 TALLACIES OP AUTHORITY. [Cll. 6.
The argument indeed is generally confined to per- sons of this description, and is little else than an ex- tension of the self-trumpeter's fallacy. In both of them, authority derived from the virtues or talents of the persons lauded is brought forward as superseding the necessity of all in\ estigation.
" The measure proposed implies a distrust of the members of His Majesty's Government; but so great is their integrity, so complete their disinterestedness, so uniformly do they prefer the public advantage to their own, that such a measure is altogether unnecessary. Their disapproval is sufficient to warrant an opposi- tion; precautions can only be requisite where danger is apprehended; here, the high character of the indi- viduals in question is a sufficient guarantee against any ground of alarm."
The panegyric goes on increasing in proportion to the dignity of the functionary thus panegyrized.
Subordinates in office are the very models of assi- duity, attention, and fidelity to their trust; ministers, the perfection of probity and intelligence: and as for the highest magistrate in the state, no adulation is equal to describe the extent of his various merits.
There can be no difficulty in exposing the fallacy of the argument attempted to be deduced from these panegyrics.
1st, Tliey have the common character of being ir- relevant to the question under discussion. The mea- sure must have something extraordinary in it, if a right judgment cannot be founded on its merits without first Ch. 6.] FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. 125 estimating the character of the members of the Govern- ment.
2nd, If the goodness of the measure be sufficiently established by direct arguments, the reception given to it by those who oppose it, will form a better criterion forjudging of their character, than their character, (as inferred from the places which they occupy,) for judg- ing of the goodness or badness of the measure.
3rd, If this argument be good in any one case, it is equally good in every other; and the effect of it, if admitted, would be to give to the persons occupying for the time being the situation in question, an abso- lute and universal negative upon every measure not agreeable to their inclinations.
4th, In every public trust, the legislator should, for the purpose of prevention, suppose the trustee dis- posed to break the trust in every imaginable way in which it would be possible for him to reap, from the breach of it, any personal advantage. This is the principle on which public institutions ought to be formed; and when it is applied to all men indiscri- minately, it is injurious to none. The practical in- ference is, to oppose to such possible (and what will always be probable) breaches of trust every bar that can be opposed, consistently with the power requisite for the efficient and due discharge of the trust. In- deed, these arguments, drawn from the supposed vir- tues of men in power, are opposed to the first princi- ples on which all laws proceed.
5th, Such allegations of individual virtue are never 125 fALLACIES OF AUTHORITY. [Ch. 6.
supported by specific proof, are scarce ever suscepti- ble of specific disproof; and specific disproof, if of- fered, could not be admitted: viz. in either house of parliament. If attempted elsewhere, the punishment would fall, not on the unworthy trustee, but on him by whom the un worthiness had been proved.
PART THE SECOND, FALLACIES OF DANGER, The subject matter of which is Da?iger in various shapes, and the object, to repi^ess discussion altoge- ther, by e.vciting alarm.
CHAPTER I.
Vituperative Personalities.
Ad odium.
To this class belongs a cluster of fallacies so inti- mately connected with each other, that they may first be enumei'ated and some observations be made upon them in the lump. By seeing their mutual relations to each other, by observing in what circumstances they agree, and in what they differ, a much more cor- rect as well as complete view will be obtained of them, than if they were considered each of them by itself.
The fallacies that belong to this cluster may be denominated, 1. Imputation of bad design.
2. Imputation of bad character.
3. Imputation of bad motive.
128 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [C/i. 1.
4. Imputation of inconsistency.
5. Imputation of suspicious connexions^ — Nosci- tiir ex sociis.
6. Imputation founded on identity of denomina- tion.— Noscitur ex cognommibus.
Of the fallacies belontrino; to this class, the common character is the endeavour to draw aside attention from the measure to the man *; and this in such sort as, from the supposed imperfection on the part of the man by whom a measure is supported or opposed, to cause a correspondent imperfection to be imputed to the measure so supported, or excellence to the mea- sure so opposed. The argument in its various shapes * On the subject of personalities of the vituperative kind, the fol- lowing are the instructions given by Gerard Hamilton: they contain all he says upon the subject. I. 31. 367. p. 67. " It is an artifice to be used (but if used by others, to be detected), to begin some persona- lity, or to throw in something that may bring on a personal altercation, and draw off the attention of the House from the main point." II. 36. (470) p. 86. " If your cause is too bad, call, in aid, the party " (meaning, probably, the individual who stands in the situation of party, not the assemblage of men of whom a political party is composed): " if the party is bad, call, in aid, the cause: if neither is good, wound the opponent.'^ III. " If a person is powerful, he is to be made ob- noxious; if helpless, contemptible: if wicked, detestable." In this we have, so far as concerns the head of personalities, " the whole fruit and result of the experience of one who was by no means unconversantwith law " (says his editor, p. 6), " and had himself sat in Parliament for mors than forty years;...devoting almost all his leisure and thoughts, during the long period above mentioned, to the examination and discussion of all the principal questions agitated in Parliament, and of the several topics and modes of reasoning by which they were either supported or opposed."
Ch. 1.] FALLACIF.S OF DANGER. \%i^ amounts to this: — In bringing forward or supportino- the measure in question, the person in question enter- tains a bad design; therefore the measure is bad: — he is a person of a bad character, therefore the mea- sure is bad: — he is actuated by a bad motive, there- fore the measure is bad: — he has fallen into incon- sistencies; on a former occasion he either opposed it, or made some observation not reconcileable with some observation which he has advanced on the present occasion; therefore the measure is bad: — he is on a footing of intimacy with this or that person, who is a man of dangerous principles and designs, or has been seen more or less frequently in his company, or has professed or is suspected of entertaining some opinion which the other has professed, or been suspected of entertaining; therefore the measure is bad: — he bears a name that at a former period was borne by a set of men now no more, by whom bad principles were en- tertained, or bad things done; therefore the measure is bad.
In these arguments thus arranged, a sort of anti- climax may be observed; the fact intimated by each succeeding argument being suggested in the character of evidence of the one immediately preceding it, or at least of some one or more of those which precede it, and the conclusion being accordingly weaker and weaker at each step. The second is a sort of circum- stantial evidence of tiie first, the third of the second, and so on. If the first is inconclusive, the rest fall at once to the ground.
K 130 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ch. 1.
E.vposure.
Various are the considerations which concur in de- monstrating the futility of the fallacies comprehended in this class, and (not to speak of the improbity of the utterers) the weakness of those with whom they obtain currency, — the weakness of the acceptors.
1. In the first place, comes that general character of irrelevancy which belongs to these, in common with the several other articles that stand upon the list of fallacies.
2. In the next place, comes the complete inconclu- siveness. Whatsoever be their force as applied to a bad measure, to the worst measure that can be ima- gined^ they would be found to apply with little less force to all good measures, to the best measures that can be imagined.