Among 658 or any such large number of persons taken at random, there will be persons of all charac- ters: if the measure is a good one, will it become bad because it is supported by a bad man? If it is bad, will it become good because supported by a good man? If the measure be really inexpedient, why not at once show that it is so? — Your producing these irrelevant and inconclusive arguments in lieu of direct ones, though not sufficient to prove that the measure you thus oppose is a good one, contributes to prove that you yourselves regard it as a good one.
After these general observations, let us examine, more in detail, the various shapes the fallacy assumes.
Sect. J.J FALLACIES OF DANGER. |31 Sect. 1. To begin with the Imputation of had design.
The measure in question is not charged with being itself a bad one; for if it be, and in so far as it is thus charged, the argument is not irrelevant and fallacious. The bad design imputed, consists not in the design of carrying this measure, but some other measure, which is thus, by necessary implication, charged with being a bad one. Here, then, four things ought to be proved: viz. — 1. That the design of bringing forward the sup- posed bad measure is really entertained: 2. That this design will be carried into effect: 3. That the measure will prove to be a bad one: 4. That, but for the ac- tually proposed measure, the supposed bad one would not be carried into effect.
This is, in effect, a modification of the fallacy of distrust, which will shortly be treated of.
But on what ground rests the supposition, that the supposed bad measure will, as such a consequence, be carried into effect? The persons by whom, if at all, it will be carried into effect, will be, either the legislators for the time being, or the legislators of some future contingent time: as to the legislators for the time being, observe the character and frame of mind which the orator imputes to these his judges;-^ " Give not your sanction to this measure; for though there may be no particular harm in it, yetj if you do give your sanction to it, the same man by whom this is proposed, will propose to you others that will be bad; and such is your weakness, that, however bad 132 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [CV/. 1.
they may be, you will want either the discernment necessary to enable you to see them in their true light, or the resolution to enable you to put a negative upon measures, of the mischief of which you are fully con- vinced." The imbecility of the persons thus addressed in the character of legislators and judges, their conse- quent unfitness for the situation, — such, it is manifest, is the basis of this fallacy. On the part of these le- gislators themselves, the forbearance manifested under such treatment, — on the part of the orator, the confi- dence entertained of his experiencing such forbearance, — aftbrd no inconsiderable presumption of the reality of the character so imputed to them.
Sect. 2. Imputation of had character.
The inference meant to be drawn from an imputa- tion of bad character is, either to cause the person in question to be considered as entertaining bad design, i. e. about to be concerned in bringing forward future contingent and pernicious measures, or simply to de- stroy any persuasive force, with which, in the charac- ter of authority, his opinion is likely to be attended.
In this last case, it is a fallacy opposed to a fallacy of the same complexion, played off on the other side: to employ it, is to combat the antagonist with his own weapons. In the former case, it is another modifica- tion oi the fallacy of distrust, of which, hereafter.
In proportion to the degree of efficiency with which a man suffers these instruments of deception to operate upon his mind, he enables bad men to exercise over Sect. 3.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. J 33 him a sort of power, the thought of which ought to cover him with shame. Allow this argument the effect of a conclusive one, you put it into the power of any man to draw you at pleasure from the support of every measure, which in your own eyes is good, to force you to give your support to any and every measure which in your own eyes is bad. Is it good? — the bad man embraces it, and, by the supposition, you reject it. Is it bad? — he vituperates it, and that suffices for driving you into its embrace. You split upon the rocks, because he has avoided them; you miss the harbour, because he has steered into it.
Give yourself up to any such blind antipathy, you are no less in the power of your adversaries than by a correspondently irrational sympathy and obsequious- ness you put yourself into the power of your friends.
Sect. 3. Imputation of bad motive.
The proposer of the measure, it is asserted, is actuated by bad motives, from whence it is inferred that he en- tertains some bad design. This, again, is no more than a moditication of the fallacy of distrust; but one of the very weakest; 1. because motives are hidden in the human breast; 2. because, if the measure is benefi- cial, it would be absurd to reject it on account of the motives of its author. But what is peculiar to this particular fallacy, is the falsity of the supposition on which it is grounded: viz. the existence of a class or species of motives, to which any such epithet as bad can, with propriety, be applied. What constitutes a 134 FALLACIES OF DANGER. \Ch. 1.
motive, is the eventual expectation, either of some pleasure, or exemption from pain; but forasmuch as in itself there is nothing good but pleasure, or exemp- tion from pain, it follows that no motive is bad in it- self, though every kind of motive may, according to circumstances, occasion good or bad actions *; and motives of the dissocial cast may aggravate the mis- chief of a pernicious act. But if the act itself to vi^hich the motive gives birth, — if, in the proposed measure in question, there be nothing pernicious, — it is not in the motive's being of the dissocial class, — it is not in its being of the self-regarding class, — that there is any reason for calling it a bad one. Upon the influence and prevalence of motives of the self- regarding class, depends the preservation, not only of the species, but of each individual belonging to it. When, from the introduction of a measure, a man beholds the prospect of personal advantage in any shape whatever to himself, — say, for example, a pe- cuniary advantage, as being the most ordinary and palpable, or, dyslogistically speaking, the most gross, - — it is certain that the contemplation of this advan- tage must have had some share in causing the conduct he pursues — it may have been the only cause. The measure itself being by the supposition not pernicious, is it the worse for this advantage? On the contrary, it is so much the better. For of what stuff is public advan- tage composed, but of private and personal advantage?
* See Dumont Traites de Legislation, torn. ii. c. 8. ed. 2; Bentham, Theory of Morals and Legislation.
Sect. 4.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 135 Sect. 4. Imputation of inconsistency.
Admitting the fact of the inconsistency, the utmost it can amount to in the character of an argument against the proposed measure, is, the affording a pre- sumption of bad design in a certain way, or of bad character in a certain way and to a certain degree, on the part of the proposer or supporter of the measure. Of the futility of that argument, a view has been already given; and this, again, is a modification of the fallacy of distrust.
That inconsistency, when pushed to a certain de- gree, may afford but too conclusive evidence of a sort of relatively bad character, is not to be denied: if, for example, on a former occasion, personal interest inclining him one way (say against the measure), ar- guments have been urged by the person in question against the measure, while on the present occasion personal interest inclining him the opposite way, ar- guments are urged by him in favour of the measure, — or if a matter of fact, which on a former occasion was denied, be now asserted, or *vice versa, — and in each case if no notice of the inconsistency is taken by the person himself, — the operation of it to his prejudice will naturally be stronger than if an account more or less satisfactory is given by him of the circumstances and causes of the variance.
But be the evidence with regard to the cause of the change what it may, no inference can be drawn from it against the measure unless it be that such inconsis- 136 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ch. 1.
tency, if established, may weaken the persuasive force of the opinion of the person in question in the cha- racter of authority: and in what respect and degree an argument of this complexion is irrelevant, has been already brought to view.
Sect. 5. Imputatioji of suspicious connexions.
Noscitur ex sociis.
The alleged badness of character, on the part of the alleged associate, being admitted, the ar- gument now in question will stand upon the same footing as the four preceding; the weakness of which has been already exposed, and will constitute only another branch of the fallacy of distrust. But before it can stand on a par even with those weak ones, two ulterior points remain to be established.
1. One, is the badness of character on the part of the alleged associate.
2. Another, is the existence of a social connexion between the person in question and his supposed as- sociate, 3. A third, is, that the influence exercised on the mind of the person in question is such, thai in conse- quence of the connexion he will be induced to intro- duce and support measures (and those mischievous ones), which otherwise he would not have introduced or supported.
As to the two first of these three supposed facts, their respective degrees of probability will depend on the circums^tances of each case. Of the third, the Sect, 6.] TALLACIKS OF DANGER. 13.7 weakness may be exposed by considerations of a ge- neral nature. In private life, the force of the pre- sumption in question is established by daily expe- rience: but in the case of a political connexion, such as that which is created by an opposition to one and the same political measure or set of measures, the presumption loses a great part, sometimes the whole, of its force. Few are the political measures, on the occasion of which men of all characters, men of all degrees, in the scale of probity and improbity, may not be seen on both sides.
The mere need of information respecting matters of fact, is a cause capable of bringing together, in a state of apparent connexion, some of the most oppo- site characters.
Sect. 6. Imputationjoimded on identity of denomination.
Noscitur ex cognominibus.
The circumstances by which this fallacy is distin- guished from the last preceding, is, that in this case between the person in question and the obnoxious per- sons by whose opinions and conduct he is supposed to be determined or influenced, neither personal inter- course nor possibility of personal intercourse can exist. In the last case, his measures were to be opposed be- cause he was connected with persons of bad charac- ter; in the present, because he bears the same deno- mination as persons now no more, but who, in their own time, were the authors of pernicious measures. In so far as a community of interest exists between 138 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ch. 1.
the persons thus connected by community of denomi- nation, the allegation of a certain community of de- signs is not altogether destitute of weight. Commu- nity of denomination, however, is but the sign, not the efficient cause, of community of interest. What have the Romans of the present day in common with the Romans of early times? Do they aspire to recover the empire of the world?
But when evil designs are imputed to men of the present day, on the ground that evil designs were en- tertained and prosecuted by their namesakes in time past, whatsoever may be the community of interest, one circumstance ought never to be out of mind: — this is, the gradual melioration of character from the most remote and barbarous, down to the present lime; the consequence of which is, that in many par- ticulars the same ends which were formerly pursued by persons of the same denomination are not now pursued; and if in many others the same ends are pursued, they are not pursued by the same bad means. If this observation pass unheeded, the consequences may be no less mischievous than absurd: that which has been, is unalterable. If, then, this fallacy be suffered to influence the mind and determine human conduct, whatsoever degree of depravity be imputed to preceding generations of the obnoxious denomina- tion,— whatsoever opposition may have been mani- fested towards them or their successors, — must con- tinue without abatement to the end of time. " Be my friendship immortal, my enmity mortal," is the senti- Sect. 6.] TALLACIES OF DANGER. 139 ment that has been so warmly and so justly applaud- ed in the mouth of a sage of antiquity: but the fallacy here in question proposes to maintain its baneful in- fluence for ever.
It is in matters touching religious persuasion, and to the prejudice of certain sects, that this fallacy has been played off with the greatest and most pernicious effect. In England, particularly against measures for the relief of the Catholics, " those of our ancestors, who, professing the same branch of the Christian re- ligion as that which you now profess, were thence di- stinguished by the same name, entertained pernicious designs, that for some time showed themselves in per- nicious measures; therefore you, entertaining the same pernicious designs, would now, had you but power enough, carry into effect the same pernicious mea- sures: — they, having the power, destroyed by fire and faggot those who, in respect of religious opinions and ceremonies, differed from them; therefore, had you but power enough, so would you." Upon this ground, in one of the three kingdoms, a system of government continues, which does not so much as profess to have in view the welfare of the majority of the inhabitants, — a system of government in which the interest of the many is avowedly, so long as the government lasts, intended to be kept in a state of perpetual sacrifice to the interest of the few. In vain is it urged, these in- ferences, drawn from times and measures long since past, are completely belied by the universal experience of all present time. In the Saxon kingdom, in the 140 lALLACIES OF DANGER. [67/. 1.
Austrian empire, in the vast and ever-flourishing em- pire of France, though the sovereign is Catholic, what- soever degree of security the Government allows of is possessed alike by Catholics and Protestants. In vain is it observed (not that to this purpose this or any other part of the history of the 17th century is worth observing), in vain is it observed, and truly observed, the church of England continued her fires after the church of Rome had discontinued hers"^; It is only in the absence of interest that experience can hope to be regarded, or reason heard. In the character of sinecurists and over-paid placemen, it is the interest of the members of the English Government to treat the majority of the people of Ireland on the double footing of enemies and subjects; and such is the treatment which is in store for them to the extent of their endurance.
Sect. 7. Cause of the prevalence of' the fallacies he- longing to this class.
Whatsoever be the nature of the several instru- ments of deception by which the mind is liable to be operated upon and deceived, — the degree of prevalence they experience, — the degree of success they enjoy, — depends ultimately upon one common cause: viz. the ignorance and mental imbecility of those on whom they operate. In the present instance, » Under James I., when, for being Anabaptists or Arians, two men nere burnt in Smithfield.
Sect. 7.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 141 besides this ultimate cause or root, they find in an- other fallacy, and the corresponding propensity of the human mind, a sort of intermediate cause. This is the fallacy of authority: the corresponding propensity is the propensity to save exertion by resting satisfied with authority. Derived from, and proportioned to, the ignorance and weakness of the minds to which political arguments are addressed, is the propensity to judge of the propriety or impropriety of a measure from the supposed character or disposition of its sup- porters or opposers, in preference to, or even in ex- clusion of, its own intrinsic character and tendency. Proportioned to the degree of importance attached to the character and disposition of the author or sup- porter of the measure, is the degree of persuasive force with which the fallacies belonging to this class will naturally act.
Besides, nothing but laborious application, and a clear and comprehensive intellect, can enable a man on any given subject to employ successfully relevant arguments drawn from the subject itself. To employ personalities, neither labour nor intellect is required: in this sort of contest, the most idle and the most ig- norant are quite on a par with, if not superior to, the most industrious and the most highly-gifted individuals. Nothing can be more convenient for those who would speak without the trouble of thinking; the same ideas are brought forward over and over again, and all that is required is to vary the turn of expression. Close and relevant arguments have very little hold on the 142 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [C/l. 1.
passions, and serve rather to quell than to inflame them; while in personalities, there is always some- thing stimulant, whether on the part of him who praises or him who blames. Praise forms a kind of connexion between the party praising and the party praised, and vituperation gives an air of courage and independence to the party who blames.
Ignorance and indolence, friendship and enmity, concurring and conflicting interest, servility and inde- pendence, all conspire to give personalities the ascen- dancy they so unhappily maintain. The more we lie under the influence of our own passions, the more we rely on others being affected in a similar degree. A man who can repel these injuries with dignity may often convert them into triumph: " Strike me, but hear," says he; and the fury of his antagonist redounds to his own discomfiture.
Ch. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 143 CHAPTER IT.
The Hobgoblin Argument, or^ No Innovation!
Ad metum.
Exposition.
The hobgoblin, the eventual appearance of which is denounced by this argument, is Anarchy; which tremendous spectre has for its forerunner the monster Innovation* The forms in which this monster may be denounced are as numerous and various as the sen- tences in which the word innovation can be placed.
" Here it comes! " exclaims the barbarous or un- thinking servant in the hearing of the affrighted child, when, to rid herself of the burthen of attendance, such servant scruples not to employ an instrument of terror, the effects of which may continue during life. " Here it comes! " is the cry; and the hobgoblin is rendered but the more terrific by the suppression of its name.
Of a similar nature, and productive of similar ef- fects, is the political device here exposed to view. As an instrument of deception, the device is gene- rally accompanied by personalities of the vitupera- tive kind. Imputation of bad motives, bad designs, bad conduct and character, &c. are ordinarily cast on the authors and advocates of the obnoxious measure; whilst the term employed is such as to beg the ques- tion in dispute. Thus, in the present instance, i7ino- 144 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [C/t. 2.
vation means a bad change, presenting to the mind, besides the idea of a change, the proposition, either that change in general is a bad thing, or at least tliat the sort of change in question is a bad change.
Exposure.
All-comprehensiveness of the condemnation passed by this fallacy.
This is one of the many cases in which it is diffi- cult to render the absurdity of the argument more glaring than it is upon the face of the argument itself.
Whatever reason it affords for looking upon the proposed measure, be it what it may, as about to be mischievous, it affords the same reason for entertain- ing the same opinion of every thing that exists at pre- sent. To say all new things are bad, is as much as to say all things are bad, or, at any event, at their commencement: for of all the old things ever seen or heard of, there is not one that was not once new. Whatever is now establishment was once innovation.
He who on this ground condemns a proposed mea- sure, condemns, in the same breath, whatsoever he would be most averse to be thought to disapprove. — He condemns the Revolution, the Reformation, the assumption made by the House of Commons of a part in the penning of the laws in the reign of Henry VI., the institution of the House of Commons itself in the reign of Henry HI., — all these he bids us regard as sure forerunners of the monster Anarchy, but particu- larly the birth and first efiicient agency of the House of Commons; an innovation, in comparison of which all Others, past or future, are for efficiency, ami conse- quently iiiischievousness, but as grains of dust in the balance.
Sect. 2. AppreJicnaion of mischief from cJiangc, what jouniJation it has in trulJi.
A circumstance that gives a sort of colour to tlie use of this fallacy is, that it can scarcely ever be found without a certain degree of truth adhering to it. Sup- posing the change to be one uhicl) cannot be effected without the interposition of the legislature, even this circumstance is sufficient to attach to it a certain quantity of mischief. The words necessary to com- mit the change even to writing cannot be put into that form without labour, importing a proportional quantity of vexation to the head employed in it; wliich labour and vexation, if paid for, is compensated by and productive of expense. When disseminated by the operation of the press, as it always must be, before it can be productive of whatever effect is aimed at, it becomes productive of ulterior vexation and expense. Here, then, is so much unavoidable mischief, of which the most salutary and indispensable change cannot fail to be productive: to this natural and unavoidable portion of mischief, the additions that have been made in the shape of factitious and avoidable mischief of the same kind are such as have sufficient claim to notice, but to a notice not proper for this place.
Here, then, we have the minimum of mischief^ L \46 PALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ck. 2.
which accompanies every change; and in tliis mini- mum of miscliief we have the minimum of truth with which this fallacy is accompanied, and which is suf- ficient to protect it against exposure, from a flat and undiscriminating denial.
It is seldom, however, that the whole of the mis- chief, with the corresponding portion of truth, is con- fined within such narrow bounds.
Wheresoever any portion, however great or small, of the aggregate mass of the objects of desire in any shape, — matter of wealth, power, dignity, or even re- putation; — ^and whether in possession or only in pro- spect, and that ever so remote and contingent, must, in consequence of the change, pass out of any hand or hands that are not willing to part with it, — viz. either without compensation, or with no other than what, in their estimation, is insufficient, — here we have, in some shape or other, a quantity of vexation uncompensated: so much vexation, so much mischief beyond dispute.
But in one way or other, whether from the total omission of this or that item, or from the supposed inadequacy of the compensation given for it, or from its incapacity of being included in any estimate, as in case of remote and but weakly probable as well as contingent profits, it will not unfrequently happen that the compensation allotted in this case shall be inade- quate, not only to the desires, but to the imagined rights of the party from whom the sacrifice is exacted.
Sect. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 147 In so far as such insutiicicncy appears to himself to exist, he will feel himself urged by a motive, the force of which will be in proportion to the amount of such deficiency, to oppose the measure: and in so far as in his eyes such motive is fit to be displayed, it vvill constitute what in his language will be reason., and what will be received in that character by all other persons in whose estimate any such deficiency shall appear to exist. So far as any such deficiency is spe- cifically alleged in the character of u reason, it forms a relevant and si)ecific argument; and belongs not to the account of fallacies; and, if well founded, consti- tutes a just reason — if not for quashing the measure, at any rate for adding to the compensation thus shown to be deficient. xA.nd in this shape, viz. in that of a specific argument, will a man of course present his motive to view, if it be susceptible of it. But when the alleged damage and eventual injury will not, even in his own view of it, bear the test of inquiry, then, this specific argument failing him, he will betake him- self to the general fallacy in lieu of it. He will set up the cry of Innovation! Innovation I hoping by this watchword to bring to his aid all whose sinister