• c, if posited accidental, must thus be posited as pre- eeded by a synthesis with b, and dependent upon that, but not vice versa. The synthesis with b, • again, must be posited as accidental, and hence, as preceded by another synthesis, and so on ad infini- • turn. Thus, we attain a series of points as points • of synthetical union between a causality of the Ego • and of the Non-Ego in contemplation, wherein each point depends upon a determined other which does not depend upon it, and wherein each lias a deter- • rained other which is dependent upon it while k- • self does not depend upon this other; in short, we • obtain a time series.
13. The Ego posited itself as perfectly free to unite with the point whatever it might choose, hence the whole infinite Non-Ego. The thus de- ' termined point is only accidental and not necessary; is only dependent without having another which is THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 2$$ dependent upon it, and is called the present point, the present moment 14. Hence, if we abstract from the synthetical union of a determined point with the object — and thus from the whole causality of the Ego, which is only connected with the Non-Ego through this point — all things, considered in themselves, and in dependent from the Ego, are at tlie same time in space, that is, are synthetically linkable with one and the same point. But they Can be posited in perception only after each otJier in a successive se ries, wherein each link depends upon another which does not depend upon it.
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
a. There is for us no past except in so far as it is thought in the present. Whatsoever was yesterday is not; it is only in so far as I think in the present moment that it *was. The question, Has not really a time passed away? is just of the same nature as the question, Is there a thing in itself? Of course, a time has past if you posit one as past, and, if you ask that question, you do posit a past time; if you do not posit it, you will not ask that question, and then no time has past for you. A very evident observation which ought long ago to have led to the cor. ect conception of the ideality of time.
b. But a past is necessary for us; for only on Condition of a past is a present, and only on condi- 254 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
tion of a present is consciousness possible. This proof we recapitulate as follows: Consciousness is only possible on condition that the Ego posit a Non-Ego as its opposite, and this oppositing de mands that the ideal activity of the Ego should be directed upon the Non-Ego. This activity belongs- to the Ego only in so far as it is free; hence, in so- far as it may be directed upon any of all possible objects. In this, its freedom, it must be posited and is posited, and it is the character of the present moment that any other possible perception might fill it This, again, is only possible if another mo ment is posited wherein no other perception can be posited than that which is posited therein; and this is the character of the past moment. Con sciousness, therefore, is necessarily consciousness- of freedom and of identity; of freedom, as we have shown; of identity, because every moment, to be a moment, must be connected with another.
The perception, B, is no perception, unless an other perception, A, is presupposed You may posit C now, and then A may vanish, but you will now have to posit B as the condition of C, and so on ad infinitum. This is the law of the identity of consciousness, for which we only need, strictly speaking, two moments. There is no first moment of consciousness, only a second.
c. True, the past moment can again be posited in consciousness, can be represented or reproduced in the present, can be posited as having occurred in the same subject, if you reflect that another per- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 255 •ception might have filled him. In that case, you again oppose to it a preceding moment, in which, if you posit in the latter a determined perception, no other perception could occur but that which did occur in it Hence, we can always go back in this scries of moments so far as we please into the infi nite.
d. A determined quantity of space is always at the same time; a quantity of time always in a suc cession, one moment after another. Hence, we can only measure the one through the other: space through the time we need to pass over it; time through the space we, or any other regular moving body, (the sun, the pendulum, etc.,) can pass through In it IV. PRACTICAL PART OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, PRACTICAL PART OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE.
The Ego posits itself as determining the Non-Ego.
We might proceed to evolve this principle in the •same manner as we did the fundamental principle of the theoretical part; but a shorter way is possi ble. For there is one chief antithesis in this prin ciple which embraces the whole conflict between the Ego as intelligence, and in so far limited, and the Ego as absolutely posited, and hence unlimited being, and which compels us to assume as connect ing link a practical power of the Ego. We shall first look up this antithesis.
The Ego is Ego; it is absolutely one and the same Ego by virtue of its being posited through it- self, <§!.)• Now, in so far as the Ego is particularly repre senting, or an intelligence, it is as such also one, true enough; is one power of representation under 260 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, necessary laws, but it is not in so far one and the same with the absolute through itself posited Ego.
For, although the Ego, in so far as it is already intelligence, is in its particular determinations within this sphere of the intelligence determined through itself, and although also in so far nothing ever oc curs in the Ego which it has not posited within itself, yet this sphere itself, considered generally and in itself, is not posited by the Ego for itself, but is posited for it through an external something. True, the mode and manner of representing objects is determined through the Ego itself; but that the Ego is at all representing, is an intelligence, is not determined through the Ego, as we have seen. For we could only think representation on the pre supposition that the undetermined and infinite acti vity of the Ego receives a check. Hence, the Ego, as intelligence generally, is dependent upon an un determined and as yet altogether undeterminable Non-Ego; and only by means of such a Non-Ego is the Ego intelligence,* But the Ego is to be in all its determinations ab solutely posited through itself, and, hence, perfectly independent of any possible Non-Ego.
Hence, the absolute Ego and the intelligent Ego (if it is permissible to express myself thus) are not • Whosoever may conjecture a profound significance and vast consequences in this expression is a welcome reader to me. A finite being is finite only as intelligence; the practical (moral) legis lation which he is to have in common with the infinite can not de pend upon any thing external THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 26 1 one and the same, but opposed to each other, which contradicts the absolute identity of the Ego.
This contradiction must be solved, and that can only be done as follows: Since it is the dependence of the Ego, as intelligence, which is to be removed, the Ego must determine through itself tJiat same un known Non-Ego, to which the check has been as cribed, which makes the Ego intelligence. Thus, the absolute Ego would determine the Non-Ego of the representation immediately, and the represent ing Ego mediately, by means of that determination of the Non-Ego, and the Ego would become com pletely independent, that is, self-determined.
The Ego, as intelligence, stood in the relation of causality to the Non-Ego to which it ascribed the check. The Non-Ego was the cause; it the effect For the causality relation consists in this, that, by restricting activity in the one, the same quantity of activity which is restricted is posited in the opposite of the one, according to the law of mutual determination. Now, if the Ego is to be intelligence, part of its infinitely extending activity must be canceled, and thus posited in its opposite, the Non-Ego. But since the absolute Ego can not be restricted at all, being absolute activity and nothing but absolute activity, it must be assumed, as we have shown, that the postulated Non-Ego is also determined, that is, passive, and hence the quantity of activity which is opposed to this passi vity of the Non-Ego must be posited in the oppo site of the Non-Ego, that is, in the Ego; not in the 262 TffE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
Ego as intelligence, however, since as such it is de termined by the Non-Ego, but in the absolute Ego. And such a relation being a relation of causality, it follows that the absolute Ego is to be cause of the Non-Ego, in so far as the Non-Ego is last ground of all representation.
The absolute Ego is only active and thus deter mines the Non-Ego, which is now passive, in so far as this Non-Ego is to determine the Ego as intelli gence. The activity opposed to this passivity of the Non-Ego is now posited in the absolute Ego as a determined activity; and thus the Ego, as in telligence, and as absolute, is placed in a state of self -relation. The grounds of this circuitous way of the Ego to influence itself are as yet unknown, but may, perhaps, appear in the future.
The absolute Ego is, therefore, cause of that in the Non-Ego which remains, when we abstract from all forms of representation; for those forms re sult, as we have shown, from the laws of represen tation in the Ego as intelligence. That is, the abso lute Ego is to be the cause of the mysterious thing in itself, the hidden substance, the check; all the rest follow necessarily in the manner shown.
But, whereas it was easy enough to show how — after once assuming the check — the Ego as intelli gence is cause of all the necessary laws of repre sentation, it is a far different question, How can the Ego be cause of the Non-Ego? Surely not through absolute positing.
For the Ego can certainly posit itself without THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 263 any further ground, and must posit itself if it is to posit any thing else; for that which is not can not posit, and the Ego is (for itself) only by virtue of its positing itself The Ego can not posit the Non-Ego without limiting itself. For the Non-Ego is the complete opposite to the Ego, and whatsoever the Non-Ego is, that the Ego is not; hence, in so far as the Non- Ego is posited, the Ego is not posited. If the Non-Ego were posited without quantity, that is, unlimited and infinite, then the Ego would not be posited at all, which is a contradiction. Hence, the Non-Ego must be posited in a determined quantity, and the Ego must be restricted by the posited quantity of reality of the Non-Ego.
The Ego is, therefore, in our presupposition to posit a Non-Ego absolutely and without any ground, or to limit itself without any ground The ground thus to limit itself must, therefore, be in the Ego itself; it must have the principle in itself to posit itself, and also the principle not to posit itself Hence, the Ego in its essence must be contradic tory and self-annihilating, and cancels itself.
We stand here at a point from which the true significance of our second fundamental principle, a Non-Ego is opposed to the Ego, and thus the true sig nificance of our whole science of knowledge, can be more clearly explained than was heretofore possible, Of that second fundamental principle of the whole science of knowledge only part is absolute; but part of it presupposes a fact, which a priori can 264 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
not be shown up at all, but only in the experience of each individual Namely, besides the self-positing of the Ego there is to be another positing. This is a priori a mere hypothesis; that there is such another positing (or, that there is any thing at all) can not be pro ven, but can only be shown up by a fact of con sciousness; and every one must prove it to himself by this fact, but no one can prove it to another by demonstrations.
(True, he might reduce any admitted fact, through thinking, to that highest fact; but such a fact would only show to the other, that by admitting any fact he has also confessed that highest fact.) But it is absolutely certain and grounded in the essence of the Ego that, if there is such another positing, then it must be an oppositing, and that which is thus posited must be a Non-Ego. In other words, how the Ego can distinguish something from itself can not be proven by any higher ground of possibility; on the contrary, the fact that the Ego thus does dis tinguish (separate or dirempt) is itself the ground of all deduction and all grounding. But it is abso lutely certain that all positing, which is not a posit ing of the Ego, must be an oppositing. Hence, the argumentation of the science of knowledge is d priori valid, that is, it establishes only propositions which are d priori certain; but reality it obtains only in experience. If any one could not become conscious of the postulated fact — it can be certainly known that this can not be the case with any finite THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, rational being — then the whole science of know ledge has no content for him; and yet its formal correctness he also must acknowledge. Let me illustrate this: For a Godhead, that is, for a consciousness (to us unthinkable) for which the self-positing of the Ego is the positing of all, our science of knowledge would have no content; for its consciousness would embrace no other positing than the self-positing of the Ego; but ihtform of our system would be valid even for God, since it is the form of pure reason itself.
The contradiction existing between the indepen dence of the Ego as absolute being, and the depen dence thereof as intelligence, we sought to remove by postulating the absolute Ego as cause of the Non-Ego. But this postulate we also discovered to be a contradiction; for if the Ego has causality upon the Non-Ego, then the Non-Ego ceases to be Non-Ego, ceases to be the opposite of the Ego, and becomes itself Ego. But the Ego has itself posited the Non-Ego as its opposite, and, if that positing is canceled, then the Ego itself ceases to be Ego. The contradiction lies, therefore, in this, that al though the Ego is to be the cause of the Non-Ego, the Non-Ego is to remain opposed to the Ego. We must solve this contradiction.
In so far as the Ego is absolute, it is infinite and unlimited. Every thing that is the Ego posits, and what it does not posit is not; and whatever it posits it posits as Ego, and it posits the Ego as 266 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
every thing it posits. Hence, as absolute Ego the Ego contains in itself all reality, that is, an infinite, unlimited reality..
But in so far as the Ego opposits a Non-Ego, it necessarily posits limits, and posits itself in these limits. It divides the totality of posited reality be tween the Ego and Non-Ego, and hence posits it self necessarily in so far as finite.
Here we have, therefore, a still higher contradic tion: The Ego posits itself one time as infinite, and then again as finite. How can this contradiction be reunited?
The Ego posits itself as infinite in so far as its activity is directed upon itself, or returns in itself; for then the product of this activity, being the Ego- again, is infinite. (Infinite product — infinite acti vity, and vice versa.)
The Ego posits itself as finite in so far as its acti vity is directed upon a Non-Ego which it opposes ta itself. This is no longer pure (infinite) but object ive, limited activity.
Both activities are to be one and the same. Let us find their synthetical connection, and then we shall doubtless see how the required causality is possible; for such a connection would be this very relation of causality, since it would make the in it self returning activity the cause of the objective activity; and through the former the Ego would determine itself to the latter; the pure activity •would return into the Ego, but in so returning de termine the Ego as determining the Non-Ego, and, THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. Zfy hence, mediately it would be directed upon the Non-Ego, while immediately it would be directed upon the Ego.
The self-positing of the Ego is, therefore, now to be the cause of its positing the Non-Ego. But if this were so, then the Ego would posit the Non- Ego by positing itself, and thus would cancel itsel£ Moreover: the second fundamental principle from which we started (—A not = A) resulted in this, that the Ego opposits a Non-Ego to itself absolute ly, and without any ground. The present result, therefore, unqualified, would overthrow § 2, and hence our whole system. That second fundamental principle, however, showed itself — though absolute in form — to be conditioned in content; the opposite was to be an opposite of the Ego. Let us examine this.
THESIS.
THESIS.
The Ego opposes absolutely to itself an object, an opposite Non-Ego. In the positing thereof the Ego is utterly independent. That is, the Ego may posit the object where it chooses, but is conditioned in this, that by positing the object it limits itself. The Ego is finite, because by positing the Non- Ego it limits itself; it is also infinite, because it may posit the Non-Ego infinitely. It is finite in its infinity; infinite in its finity. It is utterly inde pendent, absolute in positing an object; it limits itself simply because it does. But this absolute self-limitation is opposed to § I, to the absolute self-positing the Ego, and hence impossible.
268 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, ANTITHESIS, The Ego posits an cbjcct, and thus posits an acti vity independent of its own, opposed to its own. This activity of the object must be, in one sense, in the Ego, (since the Ego posits it,) but in another sense in the Non-Ego, in the object In the latter sense it must be opposed to that activity of the Ego which posits it, (since to this it is related,) and hence, if there is to be an object, tlic possibility of positing it presupposes an activity in tJte Ego differ ent from the activity ivhich posits tlie object. Let us call this unknown activity X.
SYNTHESIS.
X zf ill not be canceled by the object, since both are opposites. Both are to be posited; each must be independent of the other. X must be absolutely grounded in the Ego, since it depends not upon the positing of the object, but rather the object depends upon it X is, therefore, posited by the absolute self-positing of the Ego. Again, X must be infi nite, since it is opposed to the object which can be extended into the infinite, X is, therefore, the infi nite activity, posited by the Ego in itself, and winch is related to the objective activity of the Ego as the ground of possibility to the grounded; that is. the object is posited only in so far as an activity of the Ego meets resistance; no such activity of the Ego, no object. Again, it is related as the determining to THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 269 the determined; that is, only in so far as that acti vity is resisted can an object be posited; no resist ance, no object Now, consider this infinite activity in relation to the activity of the object. Both are utterly inde pendent of each other; there is no relation between them. And yet, when an object is posited, they must be so related by means of the objective acti vity of the Ego, of which X is the ground. That, is, they are related in so far as an object is posited; not, not. Again, as the object is absolutely posited, so the relation must be absolute, without ground. They are absolutely related means, they are posited as equals. At the same time, as sure as an object is posited, they are not equal They sJiall be equal, but are not. (Kant's Categorical Imperative.)
The question remains, In which of both is the ground of relation to be posited? Which is to rule? The Ego is the totality of all reality; it is to be absolutely independent; all else dependent upon it. The object is, therefore, to be equal to the Ego; and' it is the absolute Ego which demands this for the very sake of its absolute being.
For instance: let the activity Y be given, (in what will hereafter appear as object,) and place an activ ity of the Ego in relation to it Thereby you think an activity outside of the Ego, (= — Y,) which is equal to that activity of the Ego. Wherein now lies the equality ground of this relation? Of course, in the thesis that all activity is to be equal to that of the Ego. — Y lies, therefore, in a world wherein 2/0 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, all activity would really be equal to that of the Ego, and is an ideal. Now, since Y is not equal to — Y, but is opposed to it, we ascribe Y to an object, Without this relation and the absolute thesis which is the ground of it, there would be no object for the Ego; and the Ego would be every thing, and for that very reason nothing.
The absolute Ego, therefore, relates itself abso lutely to a Non-Ego ( — Y) which it appears is to be a Non-Ego in its form, (that is, in so far as it is to be any thing outside of the Ego, a thing in itself,) but not in its content, since it is to be perfectly equal to the Ego. But it can not be thus perfectly equal so long as it is, though but in form, a Non-Ego; and, hence, the activity of the Ego related to it can not be a determining, but merely a tendency toward determination, RESULT.
The pure, self-returning activity of the Ego is, in its relation to a possible object, a tendency; and, according to the above, an infinite tendency. This tendency is the condition of the possibility of all object; no tendency, no object.
The pure activity of the Ego is, therefore, now, as was required, the cause of the objective activity of the Ego, since no object can be posited without it. But in so far as this pure activity originally is directed upon no object — both, therefore, being mutually independent of the other — it is not its cause, but related to it by an absolute act of the THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
Ego. This absolute act of the Ego, as act, is in its form (in its realization) absolute, (and this, its abso luteness, is the ground of the absolute spontaneity of reflection in the theoretical part, and of the will in the practical part of the science of knowledge, as we shall see;) but in its content (in this, that it is a relation} it is conditioned by the absolute self-posit ing of the Ego as totality of all reality. In other words, that the pure activity is placed in relation to an object, has not its ground in the pure activity as such; but that, if it is so posited, it must be posited as a tendency; of this itself is the ground.
A system which would assert that the pure acti vity, as such, is directed upon an object, would be a system of intelligible fatalism. As applied to finite beings, the argument would be: Since no pure ac tivity is posited unless it manifests itself, and since in finite beings it can not manifest itself, it must be posited by something outside. This system would be valid for a Godhead, that is, a being, with whose pure activity its objective activity were also posited. But such a being is not conceivable.
The thesis, that all reality must be absolutely posited through the Ego, is the thesis of what has been called practical reason. We have now shown that practical and theoretical reason are inseparable. Theoretical intelligence is impossible without the practical power, since an object is impossible with out a tendency.
2J2 TJfE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
FURTHER DIFFICULTY.
But how can the tendency of the pure activity be placed in relation to the activity of the object, unless the latter is first given to the Ego? To ex plain the latter activity from the former would in volve a circle and explain nothing. There must be an absolute first ground of the relation.
The Ego is only = Ego, it has no other deter mination; it is all, and it is nothing, because it is nothing for itself An inequality, an Other appears in it TJiat this Other appears is a fact, and can not be proven a priori; every one must find it so. This Other can not be deduced from the conception of the absolute Ego as simply a positing of itself If we imagine an intelligence outside of the Ego, to that intelligence the Other would appear as limit ing the Ego; but the Ego itself is to be that intel ligence and to posit that limit If the Ego is equal to itself, it must strive to cancel this limit, to restore the activity, not inter rupted by itself, and then it can -compare and relate its condition of limitation to its condition of re stored activity, and thus establish a mere self-rela tion.
Let us suppose the activity of the Ego to tend from A to C without check. Between A and C there is nothing to distinguish, nothing of which the Ego can become conscious. In C this activity — the ground of all consciousness, but never itself made conscious — is checked. But by its nature it THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
can not be checked. Hence, it continues beyond C, but as an activity which has been checked, and now maintains itself only through its own power. But as such it continues only to that point where the check ceases = D. Byond D it is again not an object of consciousness.
Limited and restored activity are, therefore, syn thetically united in the Ego, and mutually condition each other. Neither can be posited without the other. This synthesis of limited and restored acti vity in the mere subject is, therefore, the condition of all positing of the Ego. As such purely sub jective relation it is called feeling.
Now, since the ground of this feeling is posited in an activity of the object, and since this activity of the object is thus given, as was required, to the relating subject through feeling, we have shown how the activity of the object can be related to the pure activity of the Ego.
Let us now return to our stand-point Its result was, no infinite tendency of the Ego, no finite ob ject in the Ego. By this result we thought to have solved the contradiction. We said, the infinite activity is not objective, but only returning into it self, whereas the finite activity is objective. But, since we have now placed this infinite activity, as tendency, in relation to the object, we have made it also in so far objective activity; and thus we have now one infinite objective, and one finite objective activity of the Ego, which is a contradiction, to be solved only by showing that the infinite activity is 274 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, objective in another manner than the objective ac tivity.
The infinite activity (tendency) of the Ego, in so far as it is objective, must be finite, (determined.) Now, since the objective activity is posited as its opposite, it must be posited in a different manner. If both were finite in the same manner, they could not be distinguished. This finite objective activity, presupposing, as we have shown, the activity of an object, and thus having its ground not in itself, but outside of itself, goes upon an object not grounded in itself, that is, a real object.
Now, the infinite activity can, therefore, not be finite in this manner. It can not depend upon and determine the real world, which presupposes an ac tivity of the Non-Ego reciprocally related to the objective activity of the Ego. The infinite activity determines, on the contrary, a world wherein through the Ego is posited all reality, wherein no activity of the Non-Ego is presupposed, an ideal world, ab solutely posited through the Ego.
How, then, is it also finite? In so far as it tends upon an object at all, and as it hence must deter mine that object. When the real object was placed in relation to the objective activity of the Ego, not the act of determining it, as such, depended upon the Non-Ego, but the limit of the determination. But in regard to the ideal object, both the act of determining it, and the limit of the determination, is to be dependent upon the Ego; and the Ego is THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 2/5 conditioned only in that it must positJimits at aJ, which, however, it can infinitely extend.
The ideal is absolute product of the Ego; it may be extended infinitely, but in every determined mo ment it has its limit The undetermined tendency generally — which, however, can not properly be called tendency, since it has no object, and can, in deed, have no name — is infinite, but, as such, it can not enter consciousness, since consciousness is only possible through reflection, and, hence, through determination.
But as soon as you reflect upon it, you neces sarily posit it as finite. And as soon as you be come conscious that it is finite, you extend it again and make it infinite. Then, when you ask once more, Is it now infinite? you make it again, by that very question, finite; and so on ad infinitum.
Infinite and objective is, therefore, contradictory. This contradiction could only be solved by alto gether removing the object But it is removed only in a finished infinity, that is, never. The Ego can infinitely extend the object of its tendency; but, if it had extended it in any one moment to an infinity, the object, as such, would have vanished, and the idea of infinity would have been realized. But this is a contradiction.
In this contradiction lies the certitude of immor tality. The very conception of the Ego involves this, that it ever infinitely extends its object, but never completes it It always posits the absolute 27.6 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.