(A state of the Ego which every one ran expe rience for himself. The philosopher may thus re fer every one to experience for the wfiat, not for the that. To postulate tliat a certain feeling must be is to proceed improperly. But its content, the what, each one must discover in himself!)
We now have a living distinct from the lifeless. Feeling of power is the principle of all life, is the transition from death to life.
3OO THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, This power is felt as impelling; the Ego feels impelled to go out of itself.
This impulse can and does not determine the real activity, does not produce a causality upon the Non-Ego. But it can and must determine the ideal activity, which depends altogether upon the Ego. The ideal activity, therefore, goes beyond and posits something as object of the impulse, as what the impulse would produce if it had causality. But neither this production nor the producing oc curs as yet in consciousness, and we only show here how the Ego can feel i mpcllcd toward an unknown something.
The impulse is to be felt as impulse, that is, as something which has not causality. But in so far as it impels, at least to a production of its object through ideal activity, it has most assuredly causal ity, and in so far is not felt as impulse.
Again: in so far as the impulse tends toward real activity, it is also not to be felt, for as such it has not causality.
Uniting both we say: an impulse can not be felt unless the ideal activity tends upon the object of the impulse; and this can not be unless the real activity is limited.
And thus there results the reflection of the Ego upon itself as a limited. But since the Ego in this reflection is never conscious, this reflection is a And thus feeling is completely deduced. It in volves a feeling of power, which does not manifest THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 3OI itself; an object of this power, which also does not manifest itself: and a feeling of compulsion of the I can not, which is the manifestation of feeling.
FURTHER DETERMINATION AND LIMITATION OF FEELING.
The Ego now feels itself limited, that is, is no longer limited like a lifeless, elastic body, for an ' outside observer, but is limited for itself. Its ac tivity is canceled for it; for, though we have seen that the Ego has produced the object of its im pulse by absolute activity, the Ego itself has not yet seen that it has so produced it But the Ego can not tolerate the total canceling of its activity, and hence, to be an Ego, must restore it, and must thus restore it for itself; that is, it must, at least, posit itself in a manner so as to be able to posit itself as free and unlimited, though only in a future reflection. This is done, of course, through absolute spontaneity. The Ego turns from one reflection to another simply because it does so.
Here is the boundary between life and intel ligence, as above we had the boundary between death and life. This self-consciousness of the Ego occurs through absolute spontaneity. Not by virtue of a law of nature, but through absolute freedom do we attain reason; not through a transi tion, but by a leap. Hence, all philosophy must necessarily start from an Ego, because the Ego 302 THE SCIENCE OF can not be deduced; and hence the undertaking of the materialists to explain the manifestations of reason from laws of nature must always remain an impossibility.
The act whereby the canceled activity is to be restored must, of course, be one of ideal activity; and since it is to be altogether grounded in the Ego, its object must be a something in the Ego. And since in the Ego there is nothing but feeling, this activity must have feeling for its object The act occurs with absolute spontaneity, and is in so far act of the Ego. It has feeling for its object, that is, firstly, the reflecting of the previous reflection, which constituted feeling. Activity thus has activity for an object; that which reflects or feels is, therefore, posited as Ego. Or, in other words, the Ego, which restores its canceled acti vity, in this act transfers its own Ego-ness to the reflecting, since itself does not become conscious in this act as Ego. Not being conscious that itself is the Ego, it makes the reflecting the Ego.
But the Ego is the self-determined. Hence, the reflecting, or that which feels, can only be posited as Ego, in so far as it is only determined by the impulse, (that is, by the Ego or by itselQ to reflect, to feel; or, in other words, in so far as it feels it self, and its oivn poivcr in itself. (Only that which feels is the Ego, and only the impulse, as produc ing feeling or reflection, belongs to the Ego. What soever is beyond this limit, that is, the impulse, which impels the Ego to go beyond, to externalize THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 303 itself, is excluded from the Ego; which should be carefully noted, for we shall return to this ex cluded.)
Hence, the/<r# becomes also Ego, in and for the present reflection, because that which feels is only in so far Ego as it is self-determined, that is, as it feels itself.
The Ego can, therefore, be posited as Ego only in so far as it is both the/<:// and the feeling; that is, as it is self-related. It is to be so posited, and we must, therefore, posit it thus. But how? That which feels is posited as active in feeling, in so far as it is that which reflects, and in so far the felt in the same reflection is passive, for it is the object of the reflection.
Again: that which feels is posited as passive in feeling, in so far as it feels itself impelled, and in so far the/r// or the impulse is active.
This contradiction must be united: That which feels is active, and only active in its relation to the felt. (Its passiveness, that is, that it is impelled to reflect, does not arise here in con sciousness, where the relation is only posited to the felt, and where the reflection and impulse is, there fore, altogether lost sight of) That which feels is passive in relation to an im pulse; to the impulse to go out of itself, whereby the Ego is driven to produce a Non-Ego through ideal activity. (And here the activity of that which feels is lost sight of in consciousness. Hence, for 304 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, itself, in the self-reflection of the Ego, the Ego ap pears to act under compulsion.)
Again: the felt is active through the impulse, which impels the reflecting to reflect; but it is also passive in the same relation, since jt is object of the reflection. But this latter does not occur in consciousness, since the Ego is posited -as feeling itself, and not, therefore, as reflecting again upon the reflection. Hence, this latter passiveness, which relates to the reflecting, is not posited, and the Ego is posited passive in another relation, that is, in so far as it is limited by a Non-Ego. In other words: every object of reflection is necessarily lim ited — has a fixed quantity. But in reflecting this limitation is never deduced from the reflection it self, because the reflecting goes only upon the ob ject, not upon the reflection itself.
Both the feeling and the felt are to be one and the same Ego, and are to be posited as such. And yet the one is viewed as active in relation to the Non-Ego, and the other as passive in the same re lation; the one as producing through ideal activity a Non-Ego, the other as limited by this Non-Ego.
SOLUTION.
Both the producing Ego and the felt Ego in the reflection were posited as, passive. Hence, tJie Ego is always for itself passive in relation to the Non- Ego, never becomes conscious of its activity in producing it, and never reflects upon this activity.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
This explains why the reality of the THING appears to be felt, when only the Ego is felt.
REMARK.
And here we have the ground of all reality. Only by the relation of feeling to the Ego does reality become possible for the Ego — reality of the Ego as well as of the Non-Ego..
Something which is possible only through the relation of a feeling, without the Ego becoming con scious of its contemplation thereof, and which ap pears, therefore, to be felt, is believed. Reality — real ity of the Ego as well as of the Non-Ego — is only a matter of belief.
THE IMPULSE ITSELF IS POSITED AND DETER MINED.
As we have posited and determined feeling, so now the impulse. But to posit means: the Ego reflects upon it. The Ego, however, can only re flect upon itself or upon its content. Hence, the impulse must be already manifested in the Ego, if the Ego is to reflect upon it.
That which feels is posited as Ego. This was determined by the felt original impulse to go be yond itself, and to produce something at least through ideal activity. But the original impulse does not tend upon mere ideal activity, but upon reality. Hence, the Ego is determined by it to produce a reality outside of itself. But since the 306 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
tendency of the Ego is always to be counterba lanced by the tendency of the Non-Ego, it can not have this external causality, and is, therefore, in so far as it is impelled by the impulse, limited by the Non-Ego.
The Ego has the tendency always to reflect upon itself, whenever the condition of all reflection, limi tation, occurs. It occurs here. The Ego, there fore, reflects, and, as in all reflection, the Ego for gets itself, that is, the reflecting Ego does not be come visible. Again: this reflection occurs in consequence of a mere impulse; hence, there is no freedom manifested in it, and it becomes, as above, a mere _/?£•//;/£-. But what sort of feeling?
The object of this reflection is the impelled, hence the idcalitcr, in itself, active Ego; impelled by an inner impulse, hence without spontaneity. This activity has an object, which it can not realize as thing, nor represent through ideal activity. Hence, it is an activity which has 110 object at all, but which is irresistibly impelled to produce an object, and which is merely felt. Such an activity is call ed a yearning — an impulse toward a completely unknown which manifests itself solely as a require ment, as dissatisfaction; as an emptiness which seeks to be filled, but does not signify whence. The Ego feels a yearning — a want Both feelings, that of yearning and the above feeling of limitation and compulsion, must be dis tinguished and related to each other. (For the im pulse is to be determined. Now, the impulse ma- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 307 nifests itself through a certain feeling. Hence, this feeling is to be determined. But it can thus be determined only through another feeling.)
Unless the first feeling of the Ego were a limita tion, the second would not be a yearning, but would be causality; for the Ego might then produce ex ternally, and its impulse would not be restricted to determine the Ego only internally.
Again: if the Ego did not feel itself as yearning, it could not feel itself limited, for only through yearning does the Ego go beyond itself, only through yearning is something posited in and for the Ego, which shall be external.
REMARK.
This yearning is an important determination. Only through it is the Ego impelled in itself \Q go out of itself; only through it does an external world reveal itself in the Ego.
Both feelings, yearning and limitation, are there fore synthetically united. Neither is possible with out the other. Both are also complete opposites. In limitation the Ego is felt as passive, in yearning as active.
Both feelings are grounded in the same impulse of the Ego. The impulse of the limited Ego, which only through this limitation obtains an im pulse, determines the reflection of the Ego, and hence arises the feeling of a compulsion. The same impulse determines the Ego to go beyond it- 308 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
self to produce an external; and since in this re spect the Ego is limited, there arises in the Ego a yearning, which being reflected upon results in a feeling of yearning. How does the same impulse result in different feelings? By appealing to differ ent powers. In the first instance, it appeals to the power of reflection; in the second, to the absolute, free tendency of the Ego to produce. (The produc tion, of course, we do not yet know, nor can know.)
Hence, yearning is the original and absolute in dependent expression of the tendency in the Ego. Independent because it pays no regard to limita tion, and transcends all limitation. (This remark is important, because it will appear hereafter that this yearning is the vehicle of all practical, that is, moral laws, (or conscience,) which laws are to be recognized by the test, whether they can be de duced from this yearning or not) Through the limitation there arises in the yearn ing also a feeling of compulsion, which must have its ground in the Non-Ego. The object of the yearning (we will call this object the ideal; it is the object which the Ego as determined by the im pulse would realize, if it Jiad causality) is perfectly congruent to the tendency of the Ego; but that object, which may be (or is) posited by the feeling of limitation, is opposed to this tendency. Both objects are, therefore, opposites.
Nevertheless, since in the Ego there can be no yearning.without compulsion, and vice versa, the Ego is synthetically united in both. And yet it is THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 309 also opposed to itself in both these determinations. The Ego is both: limited 'and unlimited, finite and infinite. Let us now solve this contradiction satis- factorfly.
The yearning wants to realize something outside of the Ego. But this it can not Yet it must ef fect what it can. It can determine the ideal acti vity of the Ego to go beyond itself, and produce an external How and what can this activity so pro duce? There is in the Ego a determined feeling of limitation, = X. Again, there is in the Ego a yearning desirous of positing reality. But reality manifests itself for the Ego only through feeling, hence the yearning yearns for a feeling. Now, the feeling X can not be the yearned for feeling, for then the Ego would neither feel itself limited nor yearning, and would indeed not feel itself at alL The yearned for feeling must, therefore, be its oppo site — X. The object which would produce this feeling in the Ego must, therefore, be produced. We will call this object also — X.v — X would be the ideal Now, if the first object, X, could be felt, this op posite object, — X, might be easily enough posited, But X can not be felt because the Ego never feels an object, only feels itself, and produces an object only through ideal activity.
Again, if the Ego could produce in itself the feeling — X, both feelings could also easily enough be placed in relation; but this the Ego can not do because it has no causality. (The Ego can not 31O THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
limit itself. Vide " Theoretical Part") The prob lem is, therefore, no less than this: To make ap pear from the feeling of limitation, not determined in any further way, the object of the opposite feel ing of yearning, or to have the Ego produce the latter by ideal activity after the mere suggestion of the former feeling of lin itation, REMARK.
(The object of the feeling of limitation is some thing real; that of yearning lias no reality, but is to (slialt] have reality. Both are opposed to each other, because through the one the Ego feels limit ed, and through the other it strives to get beyond the limitation. What the one is the other is not) We now proceed: In its free reflection of feeling above, the Ego has posited itself as Ego by virtue of the principle, that the self-positing, or that which is both deter mining and determined, is Ego. Hence, in that re flection which was manifested as self-feeling, the Ego determined itself, completely described and limited itself. In that reflection the Ego was abso lutely determining.
It is this activity upon which the external im pulse is directed, and thus becomes an impulse to determine, to modify, a something outside of the Ego, that is, the reality given by feeling. This re ality is the determinable matter, which the impelled Ego is to determine, to modify.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 311 The balance between the Ego and this external reality must be kept up; hence, the reality always remains the same, that is, reality. As such, as mat ter, it can undergo no modification, for a modifica tion would be in its case annihilation. Hence, the impulse of the Ego does not affect the reality as such, but effects a certain determination, modifica tion of the reality of the matter. (It is wrong to say: different matter. Matter as such, materiality, is absolutely simple. One can only say: matter with different determinations.)
Now, it is this determination of the external re ality through the impulse which is felt as a yearn ing. Hence, yearning does not at all tend to pro duce matter as such, but merely to modify it T\\t feeling of yearning was not possible without reflection upon the determination of the Ego through the impulse. This reflection, again, was not possible without limitation of the impulse to determine, which alone is manifested in yearning. Limitation of the Ego, however, is only felt. What feeling is it, then, whereby the impulse to determine is felt as limited?
All determining occurs through ideal activity. Hence, if the presupposed feeling is to be possible, ideal activity must have determined already an object, and this act of determining must now be related to feeling. Here occur these questions: How i£ ihc ideal activity to arrive at the possibility and reality of thiL "jtermining? How can this determining be relate^ to feeling?
3 1 2 THE SCIENCE OF KNO WLEDGE.
We have shown heretofore already how the ideal activity of the Ego is determined in a certain way by the impulse. This determination forced the Ego to posit tlie ground of tlie limitation, as an in it self determined object which, because it is thus pos ited, never enters consciousness. We have just now shown up another impulse in the Ego, an impulse to merely determine, to merely modify; and by virtue of this impulse the ideal activity must at least strive for the present to determine, modify, the posited object We can not say Jiow the Ego is to determine the object, but we know, at least, that it is to be the determining, the purely and abso lutely active in the determining. Now, can this impulse to determine the object have causality or not? I reply, as sure as the Ego is to be Ego, it can have no causality; for, unless this impulse is limited, yearning is not possible; without yearning no feeling; without feeling no life, consciousness, etc. Hence, that impulse can not have causality. But of this the ground can not be in the impulse itself, for then it would be no impulse; and, hence, it is in an opposite impulse of the Non-Ego, to de termine itself, in a causality of the Non-Ego, which proceeds its own way and follows its own laws, as the impulse follows its own.
Hence, if there is an object, and independent de terminations of this object, (that is, determinations produced by the own inner causality of nature,) and if; moreover, the ideal (contemplating) activity of the Ego is driven out, is externalized, then the THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 313 Ego must and will determine the object In this determining the Ego is guided by the impulse, and is impelled to determine the object according to the impulse; but, at the same time, it stands under the influence of the Non-Ego, and is limited by it, that is, by the real qualitativeness of the thing, limited in the higher or lower degree, in which it can de termine the object by the impulse. Through this limitation of the impulse the Ego becomes limited, and hence there arises a feeling, which is here a feeling of limitation of the Ego, not through matter, but through the qualitativeness of tJif matter. And thus we have answered also the second question, how the limitation of determining might be related to feeling.
Let us further illustrate this important result: The Ego, as we found above, in its free reflec tion of feeling determined itself through absolute spontaneity. Its activity in this determining was altogether of a reflective character, that is, the de termining was not a modification of the Ego, but merely a reproduction in reflection, an imaging of itself.
With this activity the impulse is now connected, and impels it to go out of the Ego. Of course, the character of the activity does not change thereby, only its direction changes; instead of internal it is now external, but it is still the same, merely repro ducing, imaging activity. Only, whereas, at first it imaged the Ego, it now images the Non-Ego.
But further, in the above instance the Ego de- 314 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
termined itself through absolute spontaneity as Ego, because it posited itself as the determined and determining together in that reflection. It posited that which is both determined and determining as Ego, for the very reason that it was both the deter mining and determined itself in that reflection which it produced by absolute spontaneity. This law of de termination was, therefore, in the Ego conjointly with its application.
Now, the impulse connects with the reflecting Ego, does not modify it, but merely impels it out ward. It does not, therefore, modify either that law of determination in the Ego, whereby whatso ever the Ego is to reflect upon, to determine, (idcal- itcr,} must be (realitcr) "determined and determin ing together." Hence, also, the Non-Ego, which the Ego is to determine, must be both determined and determining, or must be determined through itself. Only if the Non-Ego is self-determined can the impulse to determine be related to it, be satisfied. That impulse demands determinedness, perfect totality and wholeness. That which is de termined, and not in the same respect determining, is, in so far, ejfcct, and is excluded in reflection as something foreign from the thing. That which is not also the determined in so far as it is determin ing, is, in so far, cause, and the determining is ap plied in reflection to another somewhat, and thus excluded from the thing. Only in so far as the thing is in causality with itself is it a thing. This characteristic is applied to the things by virtue of THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 315 the law of determination, which is transferred from the Ego to the things. An important remark.
ILLUSTRATION.
Why is sweet, bitter, red, or yellow, etc., a simple sensation which can not be divided into many; or, why is it an independent sensation, and not merely a component of another one? Evidently, because in the Ego there is this law of determination a priori, and it is for the Ego that the sensation is a simple one.
The distinction of the Ego and Non-Ego, how ever, remains in spite of the sameness of their law of determination. For in the Ego the reflecting and the reflected is also one and the same; but the Non-Ego is only the reflected.
The question remains, How is the determinable given to the Ego? How is the Ego connected with the determinable?
The Ego reflects upon itself as the determined and determining together, and is in so far limited, that is, goes only so far as the determined and determining goes. But a limited has a limiting. This limiting, opposed to the Ego, can not here be produced by its ideal activity as was presupposed in the theo retical part of our science, but must be given to the Ego. This given opposite we have already as that which was above excluded in this reflection of the Ego. In other words, the Ego posits itself as Ego only in so far as it is the determined and the deter- THE SCIENCE OF XXOWLLDGE.
earning, bet it is both only \fet~j. Its tendsncyto have r«o/ activity is, however, limited, that is, is in so far posited as intern?.!, inclosed, self-dgtermiri^g power, 't'-^t is, power which is both deterr-.-'-ed and <kter7r.;r.ir.gj err, since it is without rr.^-^estation, -as ir.tgsg-r.-e matter. And now, in so far as this internal po'wer or hitensive rr^rter is refected cpoo, it is by cppositioa cztemaliztd, and thzs the in itself and original fxbjccti~e is changed into an Here we see plainly how the Ego csn* not posit itself as determined without oppositing a Non- Ego. It is the impulse — -the impulse to go out ward, which, since it r?-^ not connect with real activity, connects at least with ideal activity, and drives it outward. Through the impulse, therefore, all determinations of consciousness are connected, particularly the consciousness of the Ego and the Non-Ego.
The subjective is changed into an objective, and •zice i-crsa; all objective is original! v a subjective. Since we speak here of a general (L-ttrmir^dj and since no general determined ever arises in con sciousness, we can only illustrate this by ^fertiru- •lar determined. But this we can do cleaiy enough, For instance: something is sweet or sour, red or yellow, etc. Such a determir.edness is evidently -altogether subjective. You positively can not de- •scribe what this is: sweetness, red, yellow, etc.; THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
317 you can only feel it You can only say: in me is the feeling of bitter, sour, etc. The whole matter is utterly subjective, not at all objective. From such subjective feelings all our knowledge starts. Without feeling no representation of an external thing is possible.
Now, the subjective determination of yourself you apply to an external; the accidence of your Ego you change into an accidence of the thing, which is to be external, of a substance which is to be extended in and to fill up space. Now, you ought long ago to have had some suspicion that this sub stance itself is something purely subjective, since you found yourself able to apply something con fessedly subjective to it, without any new feeling of a substance having entered you; and since, moreover, such a substance would not at all be for you without your having applied the subjective feel ing to it. Only thus is the substance in and for you. If it had got into you originally, as a neces sary means wherewith to connect the subjective feeling, it must have gotten into you, perhaps, through the senses. But the senses only furnish us subjective determinations; the substance is not a matter of sensuous sensation, but is purely pro duct of imagination. Or do you see the substance, hear it, smell it? Somebody might say: I feel it. But the sense of feeling manifests itself only by the perception of a resistance, of an I can not; and I hope you do not fed, but merely draw a conclusion as to that which resists. The feeling only goes to TffE SCIZ.VCE OF KNOWLEDGE, the surface and manifests itself as, for instance, roughness, coldness, warmth, hardness, etc.; but does not go into the interior of the body. Whyr then, do you extend this warmth or coldness over a whole plane, instead of positing it in a single point? And, moreover, how do you come to assume an interior of the body between the planes, since you do not feel that interior? Evidently, through imagi nation. StUl you consider this substance something objective; and very justly, since you aH have agreed and must agree as to its existence, because its pro duction is grounded upon a universal law of reason.
The impulse is directed upon the self-reflecting activity of the Ego as such. The Ego is, there fore, to determine the thing, and hence to posit it self as the determining, or to reflect upon itself as the determining.
This activity of the Ego is one, and can not be directed upon many objects. It is to determine the Non-Ego, -which we will call X. Now, we have said it is also to reflect upon itself as thus deter mining. The act of determining X must, therefore, be canceled, broken off, and this through absolute spontaneity, since the reflection occurs through absolute spontaneity.
The Ego in determining is, therefore, limited, and from this arises a feeling. Originally, the im pulse to determine went outward, without any deter mination, that is, into the infinite. At present it is canceled in a point we will call C. We have thus THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 319 a limitation of the determining impulse, and a re flection of it, as the conditions of a feeling. It is a feeling of a limitation of the Ego by the deter- inine-dncss of the thing, or a feeling of a determined, of a simple.
In the reflection, which takes the place of the broken off or canceled determining impulse, the Ego is to posit itself as Ego, that is, as the self- determining in this act. It is evident that the posited product of the Ego can only be a contem plation of X, an image of X, not X itsel£ This is posited as product of the Ego in its freedom signi fies: it is posited as accidental, as that which might also be otherwise; or as accidental, not in relation to the Ego, (for the Ego does not become conscious of its freedom in imagining here— does not reflect upon its own reflection,) but in relation to another Non-Ego.
EXPLANATION.
EXPLANATION.
X, in accordance with the law of determination, was to be self-determined. But by virtue of the ex isting feeling it is also to extend to C; no further, but also precisely so far. Of this its limitation the ground lies not in the idcalitcr determining and •contemplating Ego. The Ego has no law for it- Does the self-determining X go only so far? It will appear hereafter that, considered in itself, it jextends into infinity; but even if there should be a distinction in the thing, how is that distinction to get •within the sphere of action of the ideal Ego? For 32O THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, the ideal Ego has no point of connection with the Non-Ego, and is idcaliter active only in so far as it has no such connection, as it is not limited by the Non-Ego. In popular language: why is some thing s-jucct and something else sour, opposed to the sweet? To be sure, each is a determined some thing. But, besides this general character, what is their ground of distinction? It can only exist in the ideal activity, and must, hence, be contained, at least in part, in the Ego, since it is to be a distinc tion for the Ego.