The ignorance of Kant and Fichte in the fields of the history of philosophy, though it- is perfectly accounted for by the contempt for former systems of philosophy with which an insight into a new method had filled them — this ignorance of the history of Philosophy is the occa sion of what we must regard as the chief defects in their application of philosophy to other departments.
Looked at from the standpoint of the history of all Till PREFACE.
European philosophy, the Kantian movement shows its true significance. There are only two original philo sophic movements in history— the Greek and the German. The Greek has an ontological principle and the German a psychological one. The former considers the neces sary form of being, while the latter sees the necessary element of thought.
Plato finds that true being is a totality, independent and self-active. He names it Idea. An idea has all its potentialities realized, and hence it is not a changing somewhat nor a becoming. It is not dependent on others. Strictly considered, every dependent being must be a part of an independent being. Aristotle has the same thought, but gives it a different technical designa tion. He calls true being entelechy. This too is wholly real, having no unrealized potentiality (Sura/nr) or matter (vXq). It is all form (<iSor). Form means self-activity, and he calls this active reason.
Ontology when completed arrives at pure activity in the form of Absolute Reason as the explanation of the world. But ontology does not and cannot demonstrate its method or subjective procedure. Hence it is possible to attack it from the standpoint of scepticism. Scep ticism may ask: how do you know your "true being"? Or it may go farther and attempt to demonstrate our subjective incapacity to know such true being if it really exists. This scepticism is evidently founded on intro spection, and it marks the transition from the objec tive attitude of ontology to the subjective attitude of psychology.
The main movement in the attack on Greek ontology takes the form of the doctrine of Nominalism, the doctrine that universal ideas are factitious unities or 1 PREFACE.' IX mere subjective devices of classification, and that they have no objective being corresponding to them. This movement reaches its culmination in the philosophy of Hume. This intrepid thinker draws out its extreme con sequences and denies both Causality and the identity of the Ego, as a self transcending its stream of conscious sutes.
At this point in history begins the German movement inaugurated by Kant. German philosophy has the task of exploring the subjective field exhaustively. Sceptic ism had explored it partially. Kant and Fichte com plete this subjective inventory of facts and processes of consciousness; Schelling and Hegel compare the results with those of the old philosophy based on Greek ontology and demonstrate their substantial identity.
The net outcome is the same in both. Psychology presupposes an absolute ego identical with Aristotle's purely active reason. (Scholasticism understood this actus purus to be God.)
In Fichte's system we may see all the steps of de monstrating this astonishing result Moreover, we may see iu his various works all the stages of a consciousness awakening to realize the true significance of the con sequences that he derived from his own philosophy.
This is a strange phenomenon in the history of philosophy. We are surprised to see a philosopher unconscious of the consequences of his own system. Kant was vividly conscious of his deductions, but he was not aware that there was a second series of deduc tions to be made from his system. Fichte discovered this second series, and united into one whole the critique of Pure Reason, and the critique of Practical Reason. He showed how the fundamental principle oi conscious- 3C PREFACE.
ness—" the ego is the ego " — unfolded into two principles, one of which is theoretical and leads to the "Pure Reason," while the other is a principle of the will, or a practical reason."
But this second series (Fichte's) of deductions or consequences from the first series (Kant's) gave rise to a third series of deductions or consequences; namely, a series of inferences as to the Absolute Ego or First Prin ciple presupposed by the Science of Knowledge. Fichte gradually became conscious of this third series of deduc tions, making continual progress as long as he lived.
The question whether Fichte changed his system or not has been much discussed in recent years. If a change of system means a repudiation of his earlier system, there was no change on the part of Fichte. But if the progressive discovery of a further series of consequences flowing from his Science of Knowledge is a change, then a change cannot be denied. Fichte con tinued to bring out "new expositions " of his system until his death. I count eleven of these (and have named them below). Now these new expositions will be found to be occasioned by his own progress in dis covering the ontological consequences of his system. He felt impelled to make these repeated expositions in order to absorb those consequences into the Science of Knowledge itself. His first attempt in this direction produced the remarkable exposition of 1797, published in the " Philosophisches Journal" (vol. vii. 1797). In this he had begun to unfold more concretely what had been vaguely contained in the non-ego and in the general or absolute ego. He began to speak frequently of " exist ence for itself," "Absolute ego as absolute form of know ledge," "absolute being," etc. In the episode that PREFACE. XI PREFACE. XI soon followed — the accusation against him for atheism — we find that he had been led by his impulse towards ontology to state prematurely his idea of God as a moral world-order.
The reader of the present work may turn to " The Doctrine of Religion" (in the excellent translation of Dr. William Smith, published by Messrs. Triibner & Co.) for Fichte's most advanced conclusions in ontology. The system is the same as the Science of Knowledge, but in the Doctrine of Religion Fichte reveals to us a nearly complete third system of deductions founded on the Science of Knowledge. This third system is an ontology derived from " critical" psychology (the word "critical" is used to mean founded on the doctrine of Kant's Critiques) and in harmony with the ontology of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas.
Fichte found the finite ego necessarily limited by the non-ego in order to produce consciousness. God there fore, he had at first reasoned, cannot be a conscious ego because He cannot have a not-me like man.
But in his Science of Knowledge he showed how the ego may have itself for object and become self-conscious by knowing its own nature as expounded in that science. So too in the practical part, and in the sciences of Morals and Rights he showed again how the ego may have the Absolute for its object and become conscious of its absolute self. This at least was the true logical con sequence, and it was deduced in Hegel's system. Had Fichte lived to old age it is likely that he would have fully recognized this consequence to h'j system. It was Plato's doctrine of the Logos or eternally begotten Word that provided for the consciousness of God — who must behold himself in an eternal not-me that is likewise Xll PREFACE.
Xll PREFACE.
an Ego or independent Person. God is not limited by his not-me or object, but He is reflected by it. For his not-me is himself as self-object, and an independent Person, and yet one with Him. This insight into the unity of opposites through reflection is Hegel's. It was really implied, though not here fully expressed, in Fichte's dialectic. Because there is no end to the dialectic movement forward to new antitheses unless the system comes to an antithesis in which the first term is perfectly reflected by its opposite.
On the whole, the peculiarity of Fichte's expositions — as contrasted with the general significance of his system above considered — is his insight into free activity, spontaneity, — the being which is an essential activity rather than activity which depends on a being. For the ego is not unless it acts — it is a pure activity without a substratum of being, but its activity furnishes a substra tum of being. Quiescent being cannot be a substrate, but requires or presupposes a substrate of pure activity. In a letter to Reinhold, cited by Professor Kuno Fischer (Ge- schichte der neuern Philosophic, Bd. V. s. 453), Fichte says — "My system is from beginning to end only an analysis of the idea of freedom."
The beginner who wishes to increase his powers of mind by adding a new faculty — the faculty of seeing pure activity — to his already existent faculty of seeing external being and forming mental images or pictures of it — will not grudge the labour necessary to master this difficult work of Fichte. To him who studies a philosophical book only to store his memory with dogmatical con clusions, Fichte's works are apt to prove sterile. But Fichte can teach him, if he will do some deep thinking, how to behold at first hand tnose subtle processes of the PREFACE. XU1 PREFACE. XU1 mind which escape all ordinary perception, and are only a matter of hearsay to those who dwell in external intui tion and the understanding. " To writers of the English school," says Professor Adarason in his very able work on Fichte in the "Philosophical Classics for English Readers " (published by William Elackwood 6: Sons), " the restriction of philosophical inquiry to experience has always meant that phenomena of inner and outer life are known in the same way, and that beyond the knowledge thus obtained there is nothing standing in need of in.- vestigation or capable of being investigated. 'Psychology,' says Huxley, 'differs from physical science only in the nature of its subject-matter, and not in its method of in vestigation...It is not putting the matter too strongly to say that the categorical rejection of this psychological method is the very essence of critical philosophy. " Mr. Kroeger, the translator of the present work, commended the Science of Knowledge to the public in these words: " The few students whom this work may interest I would beg not to be discouraged by any possible failure to comprehend it at its first, second, or even third reading The Science of Knowledge is not a book to read, but a work to study, as you would study the science of the higher mathematics, page by page, and year after year. Five or ten years may be needed to get full possession of it; but he who has possession of it has possession of all sciences."
Of the present work Mr. Kroeger said: " I omitted all those sentences and paragraphs which I considered out of place in a book presentation — though probably very much in place in a lecture presentation [the work was printed directly from the lectures given at Jena]; and I added the whole of the second portion of the theo- XIV PREFACE, retical port which in the German edition is published as a separate work, but which really belongs where I have placed it — additions and omissions which, in my judg ment, make my English version of the Science of Knowedge of 1794 much superior to the German original."
In order to make clear what the "additions and omissions," alluded to by Mr. Kroeger, are, I give here a general statement of the contents of this work. This translation contains: I. Introduction. Concerning the conception of the Science of Knowledge generally (pp. n— 60). This is a translation of Fichte's " Ueber den Begriffder Wissen- schaftslehre oder der sogenannten Philosophic." Weimar, 1794. It was written as a sort of programme or state ment of his point of view to be read by his hearers preparatory to his course of lectures at Jena, just before entering upon the duties of his professorship. Its fitness as an introduction here is obvious.
II. Fundamental Principles of the whole Science of Knowledge (pp. 61-331, except pp. 189-255, which contains the treatise described under III., below)- This is the translation of Fichte's first course of lectures, given at Jena in 1794, and printed while the lectures were in progress. Its title was " Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. Als Handschrift fuer seine Zuhoerer." Jena, 1795.
III. Second part of the Theoretical Part of the Science of Knowledge (pp. 189-255). The title of thh work, published separately, was "Grundriss des Eigenthuem- lichen der "\Yissencha ftslehre in Ruecksicht auf das theoretische Vennoegen. Als Handschrift fuer seine Zuhoerer." Jena, 1795. This work completes with great PREFACE. XV minuteness the theoretical deduction, and, as Mr. Kroeger said, belongs in this place.
IV. The Dignity of Man: Speech delivered by Fichte at the close of his first course of lectures on the Science of Knowledge. This is printed on pages 331-336. Its original title is "Ueber die Wuerde des Menschen. Beim Schluss seiner philosophischen Vorlesungen gespro- chen," 1794. Its great importance is due to the fact that Fichte gives hints in it of the ontological views that he developed in later expositions.
V. The Religious Significance of the Science of Know ledge (pp. 338-377). This is an appendix containing fragments from Fichte's writings in defence of his system against the charce of atheism. They are found in the polemical writings written early in 1799 and left in complete, but published only in the complete edition of his works after his death, under the title, " Rueckerin- nerungen, Antworten, Fragen. Eine Schrift die den Streitpunkt genau anzugeben bestimmt ist, uud auf welche jeder, der in dem neulich entstandenen Streite ueber die Lehre von Gott mitsprechen will, sich einzu- lassen hat oder ausserdem abzmveisen ist" We have seen that Fichte wrote out many expositions of his Theory of Knowledge. His wonderful originality is manifested in the ever fresh devices of technique and illustration, by which he strove to make clear his subtle insights into the operations of mental activity. The following are the titles and dates of these exposi tions: — 1. The exposition in the present volume described above under " II." and " III." 1794, 1795.
2. Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der W.L. (Wis- senschaitslehre ). Published in the " Philosophisches XVI PREFACE.
Journal," edited by Fichte and Niethammer, voLvil 1795. This was translated by Mr. Kroeger and published in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy," SL Louis, 1869.
3. Die Bestimmung des Menschen. Berlin, 1800. ("The Vocation of Man.") This is the most popular and impressive of all the expositions of the Science of Knowledge and the least technical, though as profound as any. A translation is contained in Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Popular Works, with a Memoir, by William Smith, LL.D. London, Trubner &: Co., 1873.
4. Die Anweisungen zum seligen Leben, cder auch die Religionslehre. Berlin, 1806. A course of lectures on the Way to a Blessed Life, or the Doctrine of Religion. For a good English translation see the work by Dr. Smith, above referred to. I include this among the expositions of the Science of Knowledge, because in laying down the grounds for religion Fichte was obliged to state the fundamental grounds of his system.
5. Darstellung der W.L. aus dem Jahre 1801. Printed in 1845 fr°m the (till then) unpublished manuscript 6. Die W.L. 1804. The lectures of 1804 printed in the posthumous (nachgelassene) works.
7. Die W.L. in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse. Berlin, 1810. Of this wonderful outline of Fichte's W.L. as related to the doctrine o( the Absolute, there is a trans lation by Dr. Smith in the second volume of Fichte's Popular Works as published by John Chapman; Lon don, 1849. Fichte treats the system of Knowledge after the manner that the doctrine of the Logos is treated by the Platonists. It is a brief summary of the doctrine expounded in the Way to a Blessed Life (see No. 4 above).
8. Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns, Vorlesungen PREFACE. XVII gehalten an der Universitaet zu Berlin in Winter- halbjahr iSio-iSu. '-The Facts of Consciousness," printed in 1817. An English translation of this work, by Mr. Kroeger, was printed in the " Journal of Specu lative Philosophy," in volumes v., vi., vii., xvii. and xviii- (years 1871, 1872, 1873, l883» 1884). This work might perhaps be classed more appropriately with the introduc tions to the Science of Knowledge given below.
9. Die W.L. vorgetragen im Jahre 1812. Lectures published in the posthumous works.
10. Die W.L. vorgetragen im Fruehjahr 1813. Lec tures delivered in the Spring of 1813 and left incomplete on the outbreak of the war (vol. ii. of the posthumous works).
n. Die Thatsachen des Lewusstseyns, vorgetragen zu Anfang des Jahres 1813. " Facts of Consciousness:" lectures delivered early in 1813, published in the posthu mous works.
The " Facts of Consciousness " goes over the imme diate data for which the W.L. finds a ground in the ego. But Fichte could not help interpreting these data in the process of inventorying them. Hence we are justified in placing these two expositions (No. 7 and No. 9) here as versions of the W.L. They furnish interesting views of the W.L. from an opposite standpoint — i.e., they show us the W.L. approached from the ordinary consciousness which looks upon its objects as facts and things.
Besides these expositions of the Theory of Knowledge in its essentials, there are several writings that are called " Introductions " (Einleitungen), in which Fichte under took to lead the reader up to the conviction in which the Theory of Knowledge takes its root. These works are: — i. The Introduction to the present work already XV111 PREFACE.
named above, a work not prefixed to the W.L. by Fichte himself, but placed in the hands of his students at the beginning.
2. Erste Einleitung in die W.L. This was printed in the " Philosophische Journal," vol. v. 1797. (Translated by Mr. Kroeger and printed in the Jour. Spec. Phil. 1867.)
3. Zweite Einleitung in die W.L. fuer Leser die schon ein philosophisches System haben. " Second intro duction to the Theory of Knowledge for readers who already have a philosophical system." Printed in the " Philosophisches Journal," vols. v. and vi. 1 797. (Trans lated by Mr. Kroeger and printed in the Jour. Spec, Phil, for 1867.)
4. Sonnenklarer Bericht an das groessere Publicum ueber das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophic. Ein Versuch die Leser zum Yerstehen zu zwingen. Berlin, 1801. "A sun-clear statement to the larger public concerning the nature of the most recent philo sophy. An attempt to compel the reader to understand it" (Translated by Mr. Kroeger and published in Jour. Spec Phil. 1868.)
5. Bericht ueber den Begriff der W.L. und die bishe- rigen Schicksale derselben. *' A statement of the idea of the W.L. and the history of its reception up to this time." Written in 1806 and published in 1834. (Eng lish translation by Mr. Kroeger in the Jour. Spec. Phil., vols. xii. and xiii. 1878-79.)
6. Einleitungsvorlesungen in die W.L. " Lectures introductory to the Theory of Knowledge," delivered in the autumn of 1813 at the University of Berlin, and pub lished in 1843.
Here are eleven expositions of the Science of Know- PREFACE. XIX ledge and six introductions to it, left us by the author of the system. One might suppose at first that this number was due to the fact that Fichte could not satisfy himself as to the requirements of his description of its necessary steps. But, as I have already suggested above, the gradual unfolding in his mind of the ontologica consequences of his system may have been one of the causes of this impulse to modify the exposition at each new course of Lectures. Another cause was doubtless this: He saw so clearly the logical necessity of his system that he could not understand the difficulties which his students found in following him. Hence he described again and again the characteristics so vividly and originally conceived whenever he came to lecture anew upon his theme.
In order to assist the reader, I add the following hints as to the development of the thought of this work, referring him, if he wishes to compare his progress in gaining an insight into Fichte's argument with the re-statements of the thought by others, to the work cf Professor Adamson above cited, and to the able exposi tion of the Science of Knowledge by Professor C. G. Everett (in Griggs & Co.'s "German Philosophical Classics," Chicago, 1884).
Given first the fact of consciousness, I am I. The ego posits itself— it is through its o\vn activity. Instead of being a " fact " (German Thatsachc means a deed-thing), Fichte would call this fundamental act of consciousness a Deed-act (" That-Handlung " instead of " Thatsache "), because it is not a thing or fact but an act — its very being is an act. Much of the obscurity of Fichte'r, Science of Knowledge is due to this distinction. Fichte always bears in mind that the being of the ego is its B P KEF ACE.
B P KEF ACE.
activity, anu it is not a being which has activity only as a transient state of it Its activity is its immanent state or its very essence. Cease action, cease consciousness; the self ceases to be for itself and thus ceases to be. Hence Fichte often in his expositions opposes existence or Being to the Ego, calling the latter freedom. The being of the deed-act is pure activity, while the existence that we learn to kiiow in the world seems to be a quiescent being which takes on movement or activity as a transient state that does not affect its being. Here is found the chief ground of Fichte's seeming atheism. The ego is not an existence, but something more funda mental — it posits existence. So it might be said the Absolute Ego or God is not existence, but the pure activity that posits aii existence. But this denial of exist ence to God misleads the reader if he has not care fully noted the distinction. Hegel saw that existence and being are simply phases of this pure activity that arise through its relation to itself.
Hence Hegel defined existence and being as the phase of self-relation of the pure activity, while change, difference, causality, force and the like categories are the phase of self-negation of the same principle of pure activity. Hence, too, Hegel would re-affirm Plato's doctrine that external existences are in a process of becoming, and are not real being, but a mixture of being and non-being. The self is a. true being because one with itself — that is to say, the identity of subject and object Fichte in the Introduction (pp. 1-60, and on pp. 63-98 of the main exposition) finds the fundamental basis of all consciousness to be the three laws of identity, distinction and limitation — (a) the ego is identical with PREFACE. XXI the ego; (<$) the non-ego is not identical -with the ego; (c) the ego limits the non-ego and is limited by the non-ego.
The first and second principles (a and b) express only partially the fact of consciousness, but the third nearly expresses the whole. Every act of consciousness gives us the fact of mental limitation of the ego and non-ego. But it is necessary to add: " Consciousness is a whole activity that distinguishes within itself a me that limits itself by a not-me and hence is limited by a not-me."
This ck>5« the Introduction. In the third principle we have twc opposite principles given us to unfold and explain (see p. 104). The first part of the Science of Knowledge must explain the principle, "the ego is limited or determined by the non-ego; " while the second part must explain the other principle, " the non-ego is limited by the ego." The first part will be the theo retical part, or the science of cognition, while the second part will be the practical part, the science of the will. Kant's second critique was called that of the " Practical Reason," and Fichte, we see, is able to unite it in one science with the critique of Pure Reason by deducing both from the primitive act of consciousness — the " deed- act" But the theoretical part is twofold (see p. 106). In the first part of this theoretical part (pp. 108-187) we must consider how " the non-ego determines the ego," while in the second part of the theoretical part (pp. 189— 25S) we must consider that it is the ego that determines this limitation of itself by the non-ego, and therefore is a pure activity as the ground of its passivity. By this he explains the faculties of cognition. This will lead us directly to the practical part of the science. (This second XXII PREFACE.
XXII PREFACE.
portion of the theoretical part of the science is the work inserted by Mr. Kroeger. It was published as a separate work under the title, " A Sketch of the peculiar Doctrine of the Science of Knowledge on the subject of the Theoretic Faculty"). In the first portion of the theoretical part of the science Fichte grounds two views of nature: (a) the materialisticand fatalistic view that holds the mind to be a product of nature and denies free-will (a view that is given with surpassing eloquence in the " Vocation of Man," referred to above; (b) the idealistic view, that denies objective existence and makes the ego respon sible for all that it sees.
The second portion of the theoretical part of the science unfolds the system of critical idealism, which shows how time and space and sense-perception arise. Materialism, idealism, and critical idealism cover the entire ground of the first or theoretical part of the science. Fichte considers idealism to be as one-sided as the materialism that it opposes, and hence he deduces as the correct view the critical position of Kant. The true point of view should include both idealism and realism, and limit them each through the other, after the manner of the third general principle (that of reciprocal limitation of the ego and non-ego). In the critical idealism that unites the two partial views, we see the ego as a whole opposed to the particular ego. We see then that the non-ego is not the opposite of the universal ego, but only of the particular ego. Here we arrive at the practical part of the science.
In the practical part of the science we have also two portions, the iirst of which shows that the pure self- activity of the ego necessitates a counter self-activity on the part of the non-ego. While the second portion of PREFACE. XX111 the theoretical part deduced sense-perception, sensation, time, and space, the second portion of the practical part deduces impulse, feeling, and the qualities of things.
It will be seen that the moral will is the highest principle reached in the system. Man's vocation is to realize an infinite ideal He must transform the non-ego into his ideal. He is immortal in consequence of this destiny.
WILLIAM T. HARRIS.
CONCORD, MASSACHUSETTS, CONTENTS.
I. INTRODUCTION: CONCERNING THE CONCEP TION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE GENERALLY (pp. 11-60).
A. PART FIRST OF INTRODUCTION (pp. 11-30).
FAGZ CONCERNING THE CONCEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE GENERALLY 11 § I. Hypothetical Conception of this Science...II § 2. Explanation of the Conception of the Science of Know ledge...19 (a) It is to be a Science of Science generally, and have a Systematic Form, and therefore have one Funda mental Principle 2O (£) The Science of Knowledge is a Science, and there fore hai one Fundamental Principle which cnnnot be proven in it.. •...21 CONTENTS.
rxcx 1. Either there is no immediate Certainty and our know ledge is Derivative, ad iiifinilum...27 2. Or our knowledge consists of Finite Series...28 3. Or there must be a highest and first Fundamental Principle as the basis of a complete system of the Human Mind.••••••29 B. PART SECOND OF INTRODUCTION (pp. 31-60). 51 § 3. Development of the Conception of the Science of Knowledge; its four questions — treated in §§ 4-7. 31 § 4. First question: In kow far can the Science of Know- ledge be sure of having exhausted Human Know ledge generally?...33 § 5. What is the limit which separates the Science of Knowledge from the particular Sciences? • • 39 § 6. How is the Science of Knowledge related to Logic?. 44 (a) Logic based on Science of Knowledge, and not the latter on the former...46 (£) Principle of Identity based on the Identity of the Ego, and not the contrary...47 § 7. How is the Science of Knowledge as Science related to CONTEXTS, 3 II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE WHOLE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE (pp. 61-3^1, except pp. 189-2*5)- THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
L FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE WHOLE SCIENCE. 63 § I. First and absolutely unconditioned Fundamental Prin ciple...• (-: /Lustration: The Ego posits originally its own being. 70 Ptuiarks: Kant, Reinhold, and Spinoza, on the Ego. 73 § 2. Second, and in regard to its contents, Conditioned Fundamental Principle...75 § 3. Third, in its form Conditioned Fundamental Principle. 79 Rcniarks: (a) The logical proposition of ground.. 85 (£) Synthetical judgments a friori.. 88 II. THEORETICAL PART OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 99 Introductory...IOI