Diremption of the Synthesis. •.. 103 A. General Synthesis of the Opposites of our Proposition. 105 (a) The Non-ego determines the Ego...106 (//) The Ego determines itself...106 B. Particular Synthesis of the Opposites contained in the first of the Opposites of our Proposition, through the Conception of Reciprocal Determination...108 (a) Synthesis of Causality...113 CONTENTS.
Hum C. Particular Synthesis of the Oppositcs contained in the second of the Opposite* of our proposition through the Conception of Reciprocal Determination..113 (a) Passivity a Quantum of Activity...116 (6) Illustration: The Conception of Substantiality. 117 D. Sj'nthesis of the Opposition between the two discovered modes of Reciprocal Determination, Causality and Substantiality 123 1. An Independent Activity is determined through Re ciprocal Activity and Passivity...128 (a) Application under the Conception of Causality. 129 Idealism and Realism...133 (6) Application under the Conception of Substantiality. 134 2. An Independent Activity determines a Reciprocal Activity and Passivity...137 (a) Application under the Conception of Causality. 138 (/') Application under ihe Conception of Substantiality 140 3. Both the Reciprocity and the Activity, independent thereof, mutually determine one another.. 142 (a) The Activity independent of the Form and the Activity independent of the Content of the Reci procity are mutually to determine one another. 143 (£) The Form of Reciprocity ami its Content are mutually to determine one another.. 144 f!
ii CONTENTS. 5 BMB (e) The Independent Activity as Synthetical Unity determines the Reciprocity as Synthetical Unity and vice versd 145 The Fivefold Nature of every Synthesis of Conscious ness 146 4. Application under the Conception of Causality.. 147 (1) The Activity of the Form determines that of the Content, ami vice -versd...148 (2) The Form and the Content of the Reciprocity determine one another mutually...152 (3) The Synthetically United Activity and the Synthe tically United Reciprocity mutually determine one another, and constitute in themselves a Synthetical Unity 153 5. Application under the category of Substantiality..160 (1) The Activity of the Form and of the Content mutually determine one another...161 (2) The Form and the Content of the Reciprocity mutually determine one another...164 (3) The Activity as Synthetical Unity, and the Reci procity as Synthetical Unity, mutually determine one another...171 final Remarks 182 CONTENTS* 111. SKETCH OP WHAT IS PECULIAR TO THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE IN RESPECT TO THE THEORETICAL FACULTY (pp. 189-255).
PACK III. SECOND PART OF THE THEORETICAL PART OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE...189 Jniroduftory Remarks...: 191 (a) Deduction of Sensation...193 (3) Deduction of Contemplation...197 (f) Union of Contemplation and Sensation...2OI Explanatory: The Conception of Limitation...205 Thesis: The Ego is free in so far as it acts...221 Antithesis: The Ego is to Posit itself free because limited 221 Synthesis: The limitation the product of the Ego. 222 Remark...229 Time and Space 235 Remarks on Space...244 Time 249 Concluding Remarks...253 IV. PRACTICAL PART OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 256 Fundamental Principle: The Ego posits itself as determin ing the Non-ego 259 /• (a) Thesis...267 CONTENTS. 7 PAG* (f) Antithesis 268 (f) Synthesis 269 Result 270} Further difficulty 272 Other statements of the same result...276) Rtmark: On Centripetal Power...279 Second Rtuiark: On God's Self-comcionsness...279 Result 280 Addenda...281 V. SECOND PART OF THE PRACTICAL PART OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE 287 Introductory...289 (a) The tendency of the Ego is posited as Impulse, the Counter-tendency of the Non-ego as Check, and the Balance of lx>ih as Feeling...291 Explanatory Remark...293 (/') Feeling iiself is Posited and Determined.. 295 Preliminary...295 Further Determination and Limitation of Feeling.. 301 Solution 334 Remark...305 The Impulse itself is Posited and Determined...305 Remark \ 307 Remark 2...310 Illustration...315 Remarks...316 8 CONTENTS.
MMB Remark 322 Illustration...323 The Feelings themselves must be Posited as Opposites. 324 Remark. * 328 IV. THE DIGNITY OF MAN. THE DIGNITY OF MAN (Lecture) S31 V. THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE 339 INTRODUCTORY.
CONCERNING THE CONCEPTION SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
PART FIRST.
CONCERNING THE CONCEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE GENERALLY.
"§ I. — HYPOTHETICAL CONCEPTION OF THIS SCIENCE.
To unite divided parties it is best to proceed from the point wherein they agree. Philosophy is a science; in this all descriptions of philosophy are as atrreed as they are divided in determining the abject of this science. This division, may it not have arisen, because the conception of that sci ence, which they unanimously asserted philosophy to be, had not yet been wholly developed? And may not the determination of this one character istic, wherein they all agree, suffice to determine the conception of philosophy itself? A science has systematic form. All propositions in it are con nected in one single fundamental proposition or principle, and unite with it to form a whole. This is universally conceded. But does this character istic exhaust the conception of a science?
Supposing somebody were to build up ever so 12 INTRODUCTION.
systematic a natural history of certain spirits of the air, on the unproven and improvable assumption, that such creatures exist in the air, with human passions, inclinations, and conceptions, should we call such a system a science, no matter how closely its several parts might be connected with each other into a whole? On the other hand, supposing somebody were to utter a single proposition — a me chanic, for instance, the proposition that a pillar erected on a horizontal base in a right angle stands perpendicular, and will not incline toward either side, however far you extend it into infinity — a pro position which he may have heard at some time and approved as true in experience: would not all men concede that such a person had a scientific knowledge of the proposition, although he should not be able to evolve the deduction of his proposi tion from the first fundamental principle of geome try? Now, why do we call the fixed system, which rests on an unproven and unprovable first principle, no science at all, and why do we assert the know ledge of the mechanic to be science, although it ' does not connect in his reason with a system?
Evidently, because the first, in spite of its cor rect form, does not contain any thing that can be known; and because the second, although without a correct form, asserts something which is really known and can be known. The characteristic of science, therefore, seems to consist in the quality of its content and the relation thereof to the con sciousness of the person of whom a knowledge is INTRODUCTION. 13 asserted; and the systematic form appears to be only accidental to the science; is not the object of science, but merely a means to attain that object This may, perhaps, be conceived in the following manner. If we suppose that from some reason or another the human mind can know only very little, and can have of every thing else only opinions, pre sentiments, or arbitrary meanings; and if we sup pose, moreover, that from some reason or another the human mind can not well rest content with this limited or uncertain knowledge: then the only means of extending and securing that knowledge would be to compare all uncertain knowledge with the certain knowledge, and to draw conclusions from the equality or inequality of both as to the cor rectness or incorrectness of the former. If an un certain knowledge were thus discovered to be equal to a certain knowledge, it might be properly as sumed to be also certain; but if it were discovered unequal, it would now be definitely known as false, and could no longer deceive. We should be de livered from an error, although we might not have gained positive truth.
I speak plainer. Science is to be one and a whole. The proposition that a pillar erected in a right angle on a horizontal base occupies a perpen dicular position, is doubtless a whole, and in so far a science for a person who has no connected know ledge of geometry.
But we also consider the whole geometry, which contains much more than that one proposition, a 14 INTRODUCTION.
science How then, and by what means do a multi tude of very different propositions unite into one science, into one and the same whole?
Clearly by this, that the separate propositions are not science, but form a science only in the whole, and through their connection in the whole. But by a composition of parts you can not put something into the whole which is not to be found in one of the parts. Hence, if none of the con nected propositions had certainty, there would also be no certainty in the whole formed by them. One of the propositions, at least, therefore, must be certain, and this one, perhaps, communicates its certainty to the others in this manner: that if the one is to be true, then the second must be true, etc. Thus a multiplicity of propositions would at tain only one certainty, and result in only one sci ence, for the very reason that they all have cer tainty and the same certainty. That one proposi tion which we have just now spoken of as positively certain, can not obtain its certainty from its con nection with the others, but must have it before hand; for by uniting parts you can not produce something which is in none of the parts. But all other propositions receive their truth from the first one. The first one must therefore be certain be fore all connection with the others; and all the otJiers must receive their certainty only through and after the connection. From this it imme diately appears that our above assumption is the only correct one, and that in a science there can INTRODUCTION. 1 5 only be one proposition which is certain before the connection with others. For if there were many such propositions, they would either be not at all connected with the former, and then they would not belong with it to the same whole; or they would be thus connected; but since they are only to be connected by one and the same certainty — that is, z/the one theorem is true, then the other •must be true — they can not have independent cer tainty; for in that case one proposition might have independent certainty, although others had no cer tainty, and hence they would not be connected through common certainty.
Such a proposition, which has certainty before and independent of all connection, is a fundamental principle. Every science must have a fundamental principle; nay, it might consist of simply such one principle, which in that case could not be called fundamental, however, since it would not be the foundation of others. But a science also can not' have more than one fundamental principle, for else it would result in many sciences.
The other propositions which a science may con tain get certainty only through their connection with the fundamental principle; and the connec tion, as we have shown, is this: If the proposition A is true, then the proposition B is also true; and if B is true, then must C be true, etc. This con nection is called the systematic form of the whole, which results from the several component parts. Wherefore this connection? Surely not to produce 1 6 INTRODUCTION.
an artistic combination, but in order to give cer tainty to propositions, which have not certainty in themselves. And thus the systematic form is not the object of science, but an accidence, a means, and on the condition that the science is to have a manifold of propositions. It is not the essence of science, but an accidental quality thereof Let science be a building, and let the chief ob ject of this building be firmness. The foundation is firm, and as soon as it is laid down, the object would therefore be attained. But since you can not live on the foundation, nor protect yourself by its means against the arbitrary attacks of enemies, or the unarbitrary attacks of the weather, you pro ceed to erect walls, and over the walls you build a roof. All the parts of the building you connect with the foundation and with each other, and thus the whole gets firmness. But you do not build a building in order to connect the parts; rather you connect the parts in order to make the building firm; and it is firm in so far as all its parts rest upon a firm foundation.
The foundation is firm, for it is not built on an other foundation, but rests on the solid earth. But whereupon shall we erect the foundation of our sci entific structure? The fundamental principles of our systems must and shall be certain in advance of the system. Their certainty can not be proven "j^itJiin the system; but every possible proof in the system presupposes already their certainty. If tJicy are certain, then of course all their results INTRODUCTION. I/ are certain; but from what does their own certainty follow f And even after we shall have satisfactorily an swered this question, does not a new and quite dif ferent one threaten us? We are going to draw our conclusions thus: If the fundamental principle is certain, then another proposition also is certain. How do we get at this thai f What is the ground of the necessary connection between the two, where by the one is to have the same certainty which be longs to the other? What are the conditions of this connection, and whence do we know that they are the conditions and the exclusive conditions and the only conditions of this connection? And how do we get at all to assume a necessary connection between different propositions, and exclusive but exhausted conditions of this connection?
In short, how shall the absolute certainly of the fundamental principle, and how shall the authority- to draw from it conclusions as to the certainty of other propositions, be demonstrated? That which the fundamental principle is to have itself and to communicate to all other propositions which occur in the science, I call the inner content of the funda mental principle and of science generally; the man ner in which it communicates this certainty to other propositions I call the jfo;?;/ of science. The ques tion is, therefore, How are form and content of a science possible? or how is science itself possible?
That which would give an answer to this ques- 1 8 INTRODUCTION.
tion would be itself a science, and would be, more over, the science of science generally.
It is impossible to determine in advance of the investigation whether such an answer is possible or not; that is, whether our whole knowledge has a cognizable, firm basis, or whether it rests, after all — however closely its separate parts may be con nected — upon nothing, that is to say, upon nothing for us. But if our knowledge is to have a basis for us, then such an answer must be possible, and there must be a science which gives this answer. And if there is such a science, then our knowledge has a cognizable ground. Hence, in advance of the investigation, it is impossible to say whether our knowledge has a basis or has no basis at all; and the possibility of the science in question can only be demonstrated by its actual realization.
The naming of such a science, whereof the very possibility is as yet problematical, is altogether ar bitrary. Still, if it should appear that all the terri tory hitherto considered useful for the cultivation •/ of sciences has already been appropriated, and that only one piece of uncultivated land has been left vacant for the science of all other sciences; and if, moreover, it should appear that under a well-known name — the name of Philosophy — the idea of a sci ence exists which pretends to be, or wishes to be. also a science, and is only in doubt where to settle down; then it might not be improper to assign this science to the empty and uncultivated place. Wheth er the word Philosophy has hitherto signified pre- INTRODUCTION. 19 cisely that very same object is immaterial; and, moreover, if this science should really thus turn out to be a science, it would doubtless very Justly dis card a name which it has hitherto borne from a surely not over great modesty, namely, that of a Dilettanteism. The nation which shall discover this science is well worthy of giving it a name from its own language, and might name it simply Science, or the Science of Knowledge. What has been here tofore called philosophy would thus be the science of science generally.
§ 2 — EXPLANATION OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
It is not allowable to draw conclusions from defi nitions. This rule signifies: from the fact that it is possible to think a certain characteristic in the description of a thing, which thing exists altogether independently of such a description, it is not allow able to conclude that this characteristic is therefore really discoverable in the thing; or, when we produce a thing after a conception formed of it, which coi. ception expresses the purposes of the thing, it is not allowable to conclude from the thinkability of the purpose that it is actually realized. On no ac count, however, can the above rule signify that we must have no well-defined purpose in our bodily or mental labors, but must leave it to our fancy or to our fingers what the result of our labor shall be. The inventor of the aerostatic balls was perfectly 2O INTRODUCTION.
2O INTRODUCTION.
warranted in calculating the relation of the gas in the balls to the weight of the atmosphere, and thus to discover the velocity of movement of his machine, although he did not know yet whether he would ever be able to discover a gas sufficiently lighter than air; and Archimedes was able to cal culate the machine by which he could move the globe out of its place, although he knew well enough that he could find no place beyond the at traction of the earth from which to operate with his machine. Thus, also, with our science of know ledge. It is not as such something which exists in dependent of us, but rather something which must first be produced by the freedom of our mind, work ing in a certain direction, that is, if there is such a freedom, which, of course, can also not be known as yet Let us determine this direction in advance, and obtain a clear conception of wliat is to be our work. Whether we can produce it or not will ap pear from the fact whether we do produce it, but this is not yet our purpose. We at present merely wish to see what it really is we intend to do.
1st First of all, the described science is to be a science of science generally. Every possible science has one fundamental principle, which can not be proven in it, but must be certain in advance of it. But where, then, is this first principle to be proven? Evidently in that science which is to be the ground of all possible sciences. In this respect the science of knowledge would have a twofold object: Firstly, to show the possibility of fundamental principles INTRODUCTION. 21 generally; to show how, to what extent, and under what conditions, and perhaps in what degree some thing can be certain, and indeed to show what it really means to be certain; and, secondly, to prove particularly the fundamental principles of all possi ble sciences, which can not be proven in those sciences themselves.
Every science, which is to be a whole of compo nent parts, has a systematic fortn. This form — the condition of the connection of the deduced propo sitions with the fundamental principle, and the ground which justifies us in drawing conclusions from this connection, that the deduced propositions have necessarily the same certainty which pertains to the fundamental principle— can also, like the truth of the fundamental principle, not be demonstrated in the particular science itself, but is presupposed as the possibility of its form. Hence, a general science of knowledge must, moreover, show up the ground for the systematic form of all possible sci ences.
2d. The science of knowledge is itself a science. Hence it must also have one fundamental principle, which can not be proven in it, but must be presup posed for its very possibility as a science. But this fundamental principle can not be proven in another higher science, since otherwise this other higher science would be the science of knowledge. This fundamental principle of the science of knowledge, and hence of all sciences and of all knowledge, is, therefore, absolutely not to be proven; that is, it 22 can not be deduced from a higher principle, the re> lation to which might demonstrate its certainty. Since, nevertheless, it is to be the basis of all cer tainty, it must be certain in itself, through itself and for the sake of itself. All other propositions will be certain, because it can be shown that they are in some respect related to it, but this one must be certain merely because it is related to itsel£ All • other propositions will only have a mediated cer tainty derived from it, but itself must have imme- ate certainty. Upon it all knowledge is grounded, without it no knowledge were indeed possible; but itself has its ground in no other knowledge, being, on the contrary, itself the ground of all knowledge. This fundamental principle is absolutely certain; that is, it is certain because it is certain. You can not inquire after its ground without contradiction. It is the ground of all certainty; that is, every thing which is certain is certain, because this fundamental principle is certain, and nothing is certain if it is not certain. It is the ground of all knowledge; that is, you know what it asserts, simply because you know any thing at all; you know it immediate ly when you know any thing at all. It accompanies all knowledge, is contained in all knowledge, and is presupposed by all knowledge. The science of knowledge, in so far as it is a science, and is to con sist of more than its fundamental principle — which seems necessary, since it is to furnish the funda mental principles of all sciences — must have a sys tematic form. It is evident that it can not derive INTRODUCTION. 23 this form, either in regard to its dcterminatcncss or in regard to its validity, from any other science, since itself is to furnish all other sciences their sys tematic form. Hence, the science of knowledge must contain this form within itself, and must it self show up the ground of this form. Let us con sider this a little, and it will directly appear what this assertion means. That whereof any thing is known we will, in the mean while, call the content, and that which is known thereof the form of a prop osition. (In the proposition, gold is a body; that whereof is known is gold and the body; that which is known of them is, that they are in a certain re spect equal, and might in so far replace each other. It is an affirmative proposition, and this relation is its form.)
No proposition is possible without content or without form. It must contain something whereof we know, and something which is known thereof! Hence, the first principle of the science of know ledge must have both content and form. Now, this first principle is to be immediately and of itself cer tain, and this can only signify: its content must determine its form, and its form its content Its form can only fit its content, and its content can only fit its form; every other form connected with that content, or every other content connected with that form, would cancel that principle itself, and thus annihilate all knowledge. Hence, the form of the absolute first principle of the science of knowledge is not only contained in that principle itself, but is 24 INTRODUCTION.
also presented as absolutely valid for the content of that principle. Again: if there should be, besides this absolute first principle, still other fundamental principles of the science of knowledge — which in that case can only be partly absolute, and must be partly derived from the first principle, since other wise in the first case they would not be fundamen tal principles, and in the latter case not connected with the first and highest principle — then the abso lute part of these other fundamental principles could only be either the content or the form; and, like wise, the conditioned or derived part of these prin ciples could only be either the content or the form. If the content of these other fundamental principles be their absolute or unconditioned part, then the absolute first principle of the science of knowledge must condition the fonn of those contents; or if the form of those other principles be the uncondi tioned part, then their content must be conditioned by the first principle of the science of knowledge; and thus indirectly also their form, that is, in so fai as the form is to be form of the content. In either case, therefore, the form would be determined by the first absolute principle of the science of know ledge. And since it is impossible that there should be a fundamental principle not determined either in form or in content by the first absolute principle, (that is, if we are to have a science of knowledge at all,) it follows that there can only be three funda mental principles: one absolutely in and through itself determined both in form and in content; a