INTRODUCTION. 2$ second one determined through itself in form; and a third one determined through itself in content. If there are still other propositions in the science of knowledge, they must be determined both in re gard to form and content by the fundamental prin ciple. Hence, a science of knowledge must deter mine the form of all its propositions, in so far as they are separately considered. But such a deter mination of the separate propositions is only thus possible: that they reciprocally determine each other. But each proposition must be perfectly de termined, that is, its form must suit only its and no other content, and its content must only suit its and no other form; for else such a proposition would not be equal to the first principle, in so far as that first principle is certain, and hence would not be certain. If, nevertheless, all the propositions of a science of knowledge are to be different, which they must be if they are to be many propositions and not one proposition, then no proposition can obtain its com plete determination otherwise than through a single one of all propositions. And thus the whole series of propositions becomes determined, and no proposi tion can occupy another place in the system than that •which it occupies. Each proposition in the science of knowledge has its position determined by a de termined other proposition, and on its part deter mines the position of a determined third proposi tion. Hence, the science of knowledge establishes itself the form of its whole for itself.
This form of the science of knowledge is neces- 26 INTRODUCTION.
sarily valid for its content For if the absolute first principle was immediately certain, that is, if its form was fit only for its content, and its content only for its form, and if through this first principle all possible subsequent propositions are determined, immediately or mediately, in form or content; if all subsequent theorems, in other words, are, as it were, contained already in the first one, then it fol lows that what holds good for the first must also hold good in regard to the others; that is, that their form is only fit for their content, and their content only for their form. It is true, this relates only to the separate propositions; but the form of the whole is nothing but the form of the separate propositions, thought in one; and what is valid for each separate must be valid for all, thought as one. But the science of knowledge is to give not only itself its own form, but is also to give all otJicr pos sible sciences their form; and is to make certain the validity of this form for all other sciences. This can only be thought possible on condition that every thing which is to be a proposition of any other science must be already involved in some proposition of the science of knowledge, and hence must have obtained its proper form already in that science. This opens to us an easy way of getting back to the content of the absolute first principle of the science of knowledge, of which we can now say something more than was possible before. If we assume for the present that to be certain means simply to have an insight into the inseparability INTRODUCTION. -7 of a determined content from a determined form, (which is to be only a definition of a name, since a real definition of knowledge is simply impossible,) then we might understand already to some extent how the fact that the fundamental principle of all knowledge determines its form only through its content, and its content only through its form, could determine the form of all the content of knowledge; that is to say, if all possible content were contained in the content of that first prin ciple. If, therefore, there is to be an absolute first principle of all knowledge, this assumption must be correct; that is, the content of this first principle must contain all other possible content, but must itself be contained in no other content. In short, it must be the absolute content.
It is easy to remember that, in presupposing the possibility of a science of knowledge, and partic ularly of its first principle, we always presuppose that there is really a system in human knowledge. If such a system, however, is to be in it, it can be shown — even apart from our description of the sci ence of knowledge — that there must be such an ab solute first principle. If there is not to be any such system, two cases only are possible. Either there is no immediate certainty at all, and thef our knowledge forms many series or one infinite scries, wherein each theorem is derived from a higher one, and this again from a higher one, etc., etc. We build our houses on the earth, the earth rests on an elephant, the elephant on a tortoise, the tor- D 23 INTRODUCTION.
toise again — who knows on what? — and so on ad infinitum. True, if our knowledge is thus con stituted, we can not alter it; but neither have we, then, any firm knowledge. We may have gone back to a certain link of our series, and have found every thing firm up to this link; but who can guar antee us that, if we go further back, we may not find it ungrounded, and shall thus have to abandon it? Our certainty is only assumed, and we can never be sure of it for a single following day.
Or the second case: Our knowledge consists of finite series, but of many finite series, each series ending in a fundamental principle, which has its ground in no other one, but only in itself; all these fundamental principles having no connection among each other, and being perfectly independent and isolated. In this case there are, perhaps, sev eral inborn truths in us, all more or less inborn, and in the connection of which we can expect no further insight, since it lies beyond these inborn truths; or there is, perhaps, a manifold simple in the things outside of us, which is communicated to us by means of the impression produced upon us by the things, but into the connection v.-hereof we can not penetrate, since there can not be any thing more simple than the simplest in the impression. If this second case is the truth, if human know ledge is in itself such a piecework — as the real knowledge of so many men unhappily is — if origin ally a number of threads lie in our minds, which are or can be connected with each other in no INTRODUCTION, 2Q point, then again we may not be able to alter this state of things, and our knowledge is, as far as it extends, certain enough; but it is no unit, it is a manifold knowledge. Our building stands firm, but, instead of being a connected structure, it is an aggregate of chambers, from none of which we can enter the other; a building wherein we always get lost, and never feel ourselves at home. There is no light in it; and in spite of our riches we always remain poor, because we can never calculate them, never consider them as a whole, and hence never know what we really possess; we can never use part of it to improve the rest, because no part is relatable to the rest. Nay, more: our knowledge will never be completed; we must expect every day that a new inborn truth may manifest itself in us, or that experience may furnish us with a new •simple. We must always be prepared to build a new house for ourselves. No general science of knowledge will be possible as containing the ground of other sciences. Each will be grounded in itself. There wi.ll be as many sciences as there are separate immediately certain propositions. But if neither the first case is to be correct, namely, that there are one or more mere fragments of a system, nor the second, that there are to be a manifold of systems, then a highest and absolute first fundamental principle must exist as the basis of a complete and unit-system in the human mind. From this first principle our knowledge may ex pand into ever so many series, each of which again may expand into series, etc., still all of them must 3O INTRODUCTION.
rest firm upon one single link, which is not de pendent upon another one, which holds itself and the whole system by virtue of its own power. In this link we shall possess a globe, holding itself firm by virtue of its own gravitation, the central point whereof attracts with almighty force whatso ever we have but erected upon its surface and per pendicularly, and not in the air or obliquely, and which allows no grain of dust to be torn away from its sphere of power.
Whether such a system and its condition, a first principle, exist, can not be decided in advance of the investigation. This fundamental principle can neither be proven as mere principle, nor as the basis of all knowledge. Every thing depends upon the attempt. If we shall find a proposition which has the internal conditions of the fundamental prin ciple of all human knowledge, we shall try to dis cover whether it has also its external conditions, whether every thing we know or believe to know can be traced back to it If we succeed in this, we shall have proven by the realization of the science of knowledge that it is possible, and that there is a system of human knowledge, whereof it is the rep resentation. If we do not succeed in this, there either is no such system or we have merely failed in discovering it, and must leave the discovery to more fortunate successors. To maintain that there is no such system merely because we have failed to discover it would be an assumption, the refutation whereof is beneath the dignity of earnest investiga tion.
PART SECOND.
§ 3. — DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
To develop a conception scientifically is to assign to it its place in the system of human sciences gen erally, that is, to show what conception determines its position in the system, and of which conception it determines the position. But the conception of the science of knowledge generally, as well as of knowledge generally, can evidently have no position in the system of all sciences, since it is itself rather the place for all scientific conceptions, and assigns to all their positions in itself and through itself It is clear, therefore, that we can speak here only of a hypothetical development; that is, the question is, If we assume that there are sciences, and that there is truth in them, (which can not be known in ad vance of *the science of knowledge,) how is the science of knowledge related to these sciences?
This question also is answered by the mere con ception of that science. The latter sciences are related to it as the grounded is to its ground; they 32 INTRODUCTION.
do not assign to it its place, but it assigns to them their places in itself and through itself. All we can, therefore, propose to ourselves here is a further explanation of this answer.
1. The science of knowledge is to be a science of all sciences. Here arises the question: How can the science of knowledge guarantee that it has furnished the ground, not only of all as yet discov ered and known, but also of all discoverable and knoivable sciences, and that it has completely ex hausted the whole field of human knowledge?
2. As the science of all sciences, the science of knowledge is to furnish to all sciences their funda mental principles. Hence, all propositions, which are fundamental principles of the particular sci ences, are at the same time inherent propositions of the science of knowledge; and thus one and the same propositions may be regarded both as a pro position of the science of knowledge, and as the fundamental principle of a particular science. The science of knowledge evolves from the same propo sition further deductions; and the particular science whereof it is the fundamental principle also evolves from it further deductions. Hence, either the de ductions of both sciences are the same — and then there is no such a thing as a particular science — or both sciences have a distinct and peculiar mode of deduction; and this is impossible, because the science of knowledge is to furnish the fonn of all sciences; or something is added to a proposition of the science of knowledge, which something must, INTRODUCTION. 33 INTRODUCTION. 33 of course, be derived from the same science, "where by it becomes fundamental principle of a particular science. Here the question arises: What is this which is added? or, since this additional is to frame the distinction, what is the definite boundary be tween the general science of knowledge and every particular science?
3. Again, the science of knowledge is to deter mine the form of all sciences. How this can be done we have shown above. But another science, under the name of logic, pretends to have this same object. Sentence must be passed upon the claims of both sciences, that is, it must be decided how the science of knowledge is related to logic.
4. The science of knowledge is itself a science, What it is to accomplish as such we have shown above. But in so far as it is a mere science, a knowledge, in the formal significance of the word, it is a science of a something; it has an object, and it is clear from the above that this object can be no other than the system of human knowledge gen erally. The question arises: How is the science of knowledge, as science, related to its object as such?
§ 4. IN HOW FAR CAN THE SCIENCE OF KNOW LEDGE BE SURE OF HAVING EXHAUSTED HUMAN KNOWLEDGE GENERALLY?
The JntJicrto true or imaginary human knowledge is not human knowledge generally; and, though a 34 INTRODUCTION philosopher had really exhausted the former, and shown by a perfect induction that it were contained in his system, he would yet by no means have sat isfied the task imposed upon philosophy; for how could he prove by his induction from present expe rience that in the future some discovery might not be made which would not fit into his system?
Quite as unsatisfactory would be the excuse that he only intended to exhaust the knowledge pos sible in the present sphere of human existence; for if his philosophy is only valid for this sphere, he clearly confesses that he knows no possible other sphere, and hence, also, not the limits of that sphere which his philosophy claims to exhaust. Hence, he has arbitrarily drawn a limit, 'the validity whereof he can only prove by past experience, and which may, therefore, be contradicted by any possible future experience even within his own posited sphere. Human knowledge generally is to be exhausted, signifies: it is to be absolutely and unconditionally determined what man can know not only on the present stage, but on all possible and conceivable stages of his existence.
This is only possible if it can be shown, firstly, that the accepted fundamental principle is exhaust ed; and, secondly, that no other fundamental prin ciple is possible than the accepted one. A funda mental principle is exhausted when a complete system has been erected upon it, that is, when that fundamental principle necessarily leads to all the propositions deduced from it, and when, again, all INTRODUCTION. 35 INTRODUCTION. 35 deduced propositions necessarily lead back to it When no proposition occurs in the whole system which could be true if the fundamental principle were false, or false if the fundamental principle were true; then this is the negative proof that no super fluous proposition has been accepted in the system; for the superfluous one, which did not belong to the system, might be true though the fundamental principle were false, or false though the latter were true. When the fundamental principle is given, all propositions must be given. Each particular one is given in and through the fundamental principle. This connection of the separate propositions of the science of knowledge proves that the science has the required negative proof in and through itsell This negative proof shows that the science is sys tematic, that all its parts are connected in a single fundamental principle.
Again, the science is a system, or is completed, if no further proposition can be deduced; and this furnishes the positive proof that all the propositions of the system have been admitted. Still, of this there must be other evidence; for the mere relative and negative assertion, / do not see what other deductions might be made, is not sufficient. Some one else might arise hereafter, and see what I did not see. We need, therefore, a positive proof that no other propositions could possibly follow, and this proof can only arise if the same fundamental prin ciple from which we started shall also show itself to be the final result; since, then, we could not pro- 36 JNTKODUCTIOtf.
ceed without describing the same circle we should have already drawn. When the time comes to rep resent this science, it will be shown, also, that it really describes this circle, leaving the student pre cisely at the point from which it started, and thus furnishing also the second positive proof in and through itseLC* But although the fundamental principle be exhausted and a complete system erected upon it, it does not follow that thereby hu man knowledge generally is exhausted, unless we presuppose what ought first to be proven, namely, that this fundamental principle is the fundamental principle of human knowledge generally. Of course, nothing can be added or taken away from the com pleted system which has been erected; but why might not the future, through augmented expe rience, cause propositions to arise in human consci ousness which can not be grounded upon that fun damental principle, and which, therefore, presup pose one or more other fundamental principles? In short, why could not one or more other systems coexist in the human mind with the first one? To be sure, they would be neither connected with the first one nor with each other in any common point; but neither is this required, if they are to form many * The science of knowledge has absolute totality. In it one leads to all, and all to one. But it is also the only science which can be completed. Completion is, therefore, its distinguishing character istic All other sciences are infinite, and can not be completed, for they do not return to their fundamental principles. This the science of knowledge has to prove for all other sciences, and show up the ground of it INTRODUCTION. 37 systems. Hence, if the impossibility of new dis coveries is to be satisfactorily proven, it must be shown tJiat only one system can be in human kno-iv- Icdgc. Now, since the proposition that all human knowledge results only in one in itself connected knowledge — is itself to be a component of human knowledge — it can not be grounded upon any other principle than the one assumed as the fundamental principle of all human knowledge, and can only be proven by it. By this we have gained, at least for the present, so much that we see how such a future proposition as we supposed might possibly arise in consciousness would not only be another one, dif ferent from the fundamental principle of our sys tem, but would also be contradictory of the latter in form. For, according to all we have said, the fundamental principle of our system must involve • the proposition that there is a unit-system in hu man knowledge. Ever)- proposition, therefore, which is not to belong to this system must not only be a different system, but must be a direct contradiction of it, in so far as the former system asserts itself to be the only possible one. It must be a contra diction of the deduced proposition of the unity of the system; and, since all its propositions are in separably connected, of each single theorem, and particularly of the fundamental principle thereof! Hence, it would have to rest on a fundamental principle directly opposed to the first fundamental principle. If, for instance, the first fundamental 38 IKTKODUCTION.
principle should turn out to be: I am I; this second one would have to be: I am not I.
Now, it would be wrong to conclude from this contradiction the impossibility of such a second fundamental principle. If the first fundamental principle involves the proposition that the system of human knowledge is a unit, it involves also, it is true, that nothing must contradict this system. But both these propositions are merely deductions from the first fundamental principle, and hence, by ac cepting the absolute validity of the deductions, we already assume that itself is the absolute first and only fundamental principle of human knowledge. Here, therefore, is a circle which the human mind can never get out of; and it is well to confess this circle plainly, lest its unexpected discover}' at some time might confound men. This circle is as fol lows: If the proposition X is the first, highest, and absolute fundamental principle of human know ledge, then there is in human knowledge a unit- system, for the latter is the result of the proposition X. Now, since there is to be in human knowledge a unit-system, the proposition X, which really does establish such a system, is the fundamental princi ple of human knowledge, and the svstcm based * J * J upon it is that unit-system of human knowledge.
It is unnecessary to be surprised at this circle. For to demand that it should be annihilated is to demand that human knowledge should be utterly groundless, that there should be no absolute cer tainty, and that all human knowledge should be IjNTRODUCTlON. 39 only conditioned; in short, it is to assert that there is no immediate truth at all, but only mediated truth, and this without any thing whereby it is mediated. Whosoever feels thereunto inclined may investi gate as much as he pleases what he would know if his Ego were not Ego; that is, if he did not exist, and if he could not distinguish a Non-Ego from his Ego.
§ 5. — WHAT IS THE LIMIT WHICH SEPARATES THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE PARTICULAR SCIENCES?
We discovered above (§ 3) that one and the same proposition could not be in the same respect a proposition of the science of knowledge and of a particular science; and that to be the latter, it would be necessary to have something added to it This character which is to be added can only be derived from the science of knowledge, since it contains all possible human knowledge; but can not, as is evident, be contained in that science in the same proposition wrhich is to become funda mental principle of the particular science. Hence, it must be, perhaps, contained in another separate proposition of the science of knowledge, which is connected with the proposition which is to become the fundamental principle of a particular science. Since we have here to meet an objection which does not arise from the conception of the science of knowledge itself, but merely from the presuppo- 4O INTRODUCTION.
4O INTRODUCTION.
sition that there exist also other separate sciences, we can meet it also only by a presupposition, and shall have done enough for the present if we but show a possibility of the required limitation. That it will be the true limitation — although it may, nevertheless, turn out so— we neither care nor need to prove here.
Let it be, therefore, assumed that the science of knowledge contains those determined acts' of the human mind which it — be it conditioned or uncon ditioned — enacts necessarily and under compul sion; but that it posits at the same time, as the highest explanatory ground of those necessary acts, a power to determine itself, (absolutely and without compulsion or necessity:) A? act generally. Under this assumption the science of knowledge will re sult in a necessary and a not necessary or free act ing. The acts of the human mind, in so far as it acts necessarily, will be determined by the science, but not in so far as it acts free.