posfted to the Non-Ego. Hence, there is here no ascent, as in every other synthesis, but a descent. The Ego and the Non-Ego, as posited in equality and opposition to each other, are both something (accidences) in the Ego, as divisible substance, and posited through the Ego as absolute and unli- mitable substance, to which nothing is equal and nothing opposed. Hence, all judgments, of which the limitable or determinable Ego is logical sub ject, or of which something that determines the Ego is logical subject, must be limited or deter mined through something higher; but all judg ments, of which the absolute, undeterminable Ego is logical subject, can be determined by nothing higher, because the absolute Ego is determined through nothing higher; they have their ground and their determination altogether in themselves. Now, in this consists the essence of critical philo sophy, that an absolute Ego is established as abso lutely unconditioned and determinable by nothing higher than itself; and in following up the results of this fundamental principle that philosophy be comes science of knowledge.
On the other hand, that philosophy is called dog matic, which establishes something else as both equal and opposed to the Ego; which something else is its pretendedly higher conception of the thing (ens) arbitrarily established by that philo sophy as the liigJicst of all conceptions. In critical philosophy the thing is posited in the Ego, in dog matic philosophy the Ego in the thing; critical phi- THE SCIEXCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 95 losophy is, therefore, immanent, because it posits all in the Ego; dogmatism is, on the contrary, transcen dent, because it proceeds beyond the Ego. In so far as dogmatism can be logical, Spinozism is its most logical product. If you wish to treat dogmatism from its own stand-point, as should be done, ask it why it assumes a thing in itself without higher ground, whereas it did ask for a higher ground in the case of the Ego. Ask the dogmatist, Why do you accept the thing as absolute, since you would not accept the Ego as absolute? He can show no warrant for so doing, and you are perfectly justified in requiring him to hold fast to his own principles, and to assume nothing without a ground; hence, to give you again a higher conception as the ground of the thing, and then again a higher con ception for that higher conception, and so on ad infinitum.
A thorough dogmatism either denies altogether that our knowledge has a ground, and that there is a system in the human mind, or it contradicts it self. A logical dogmatism is a skepticism, which doubts that it doubts, for it must cancel the unity of consciousness, and hence the whole logic. It is, therefore, no dogmatism, and contradicts itself by pretending to be one.
Thus Spinoza posits the ground of the unity of consciousness in a substance wherein it is neces sarily determined as well in regard to its content ^that is, in regard to its determined series of repre sentation) as in regard to its form of unity. But I $6 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
ask him: What, then, is that, again, which contains the ground of the necessity of this substance, as •well in regard to its content (in regard to the dif ferent series of representations contained in it) as in regard to its form, (the form that in it all possible series of representation are to be exhausted, and to constitute a complete -whole?) Now for this ne cessity he gives no further ground, but says: It is so absolutely; and he says this because he is com pelled to assume some absolute first, some highest unity; but if he wants to do this, why did he not stop at the unity given in consciousness? "Why did he go beyond and imagine a higher unity, since nothing forced him to do so?* It would be absolutely impossible to explain how thinkers ever could have gone beyond the Ego, or, if they once went beyond it, how they ever could have come to a stand-still, if there were not a prac tical reason which explains this phenomenon. It •was a practical and not a theoretical ground, as they believed, which drove dogmatists to transcend the Ego; namely, a feeling of the dependence of our Ego, in so far as it is practical, upon a Non- Ego, which is in so far absolutely not subject to our legislation, and which is hence in so far free. Again, it was a practical reason which compelled ( Translator's Note. — This criticism of Spinoza applies with equal force to the school of dogmatic idealists which followed Fichte, and •which found its highest representatives in Schelling and HegeL Believing that they must go beyond the Ego and discover some other absolute — not so "subjective," as they foolishly fancied the Zgo to be — they fell into the same pit.)
TJfE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 97 them to come to a stand-still somewhere; namely, the feeling of necessary subordination of the Non- Ego to the practical laws of the Ego. But this subordination has not at all existence as object of a conception, but simply as object of an idea; as something which is to be effected through us in an endless time, as will appear hereafter.
And thus it appears, after all, that dogmatism is not at all what it pretends to be, and that we have done it wrong in logically carrying out its princi ples. Its highest unity is indeed no other one than the unity of consciousness, and can be no other one; and its thing is the substrate of divisibility generally, or the highest substance, wherein both the Ego and the Non-Ego ( Spinoza s Intelligence and Extension) are posited.
Far from going beyond the absolute Ego, it never reaches even so far; at the utmost, as in Spinoza's system, it goes to our second and third principles, but not to the first unconditioned one. It was reserved for critical philosophy to take this last step, and thus to complete the science.
The first part of our system (the theoretical) is really, as will be seen hereafter, systematic Spino- zism; but our system also has a second, practical part, through which the first part is grounded and determined, the whole science of knowledge com pleted, every thing which occurs in the human mind exhausted, and thus common-sense, ^hich all pre-Kantian philosophy insulted, and which our theoretical system seems to bring into a collision Q8 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE with philosophy, "which has no hope of ever being settled, forever reconciled with our science.
By completely abstracting from the dctcrmiiifd form of the judgment in our third principle, name ly, that it is an of positing or relating judgment, and looking only at the general manner of acting in it, namely, to limit one through another, we obtain the category of determination, (or, as Kant calls it, limitation.) For the positing of quantity generally, be it quantity of reality or of negation, is called II.
THEORETICAL PART OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
THEORETICAL PART OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
INTRODUCTORY.
WE have now established three logical proposi tions: that of Identity, which grounds all others; and those of Opposition and of the Ground, which mutually ground each other in the first. The latter two make synthesis generally possible, establish and furnish the ground of its form. Hence, we need nothing more to be certain of the formal validity of our future reflection. On the other hand, the first synthetical act, whereby we have united the Ego and the Non-Ego, has given us a content for all future syntheses; and, hence, we also need nothing further from this side. Our whole science of knowledge must be developed out of that first synthesis.
But, if any thing is to be developed out of it, the conceptions united in that synthesis must contain other conceptions not yet established or united, and our task is, therefore, now to discover them; which is done by looking up opposite character- IO2 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, istics in the conceptions of that synthesis, (which opposites were the Ego and Non-Ego, as mutually determining each other,) and this looking up is done through reflection, which is an arbitrary act of our mind. Our task is to discrscr them now, I said; and this expression involves the presupposi tion that they exist already, and are not, therefore, to be artificially made and produced by our reflection, (which, indeed, reflection could not do.) In other words, an originally necessary antithetical act of the Ego is presupposed. Reflection has to dis cover that act; and is in so far analytical For to become conscious of opposite characteristics con tained in a certain conception = A, as opposites, is, to analyze that conception A. In the present instance, however, our reflection is to analyze a conception, not at all given, but which must first be found through the analysis; and the question arises here, therefore, How can an unknown con ception be analyzed?
No antithetical act without a synthetical act, (§ 3.) Both are one and the same act, distinguished only in reflection. Hence, from the antithesis we can conclude as to the synthesis, and the third, wherein both are related, we can also establish; not as pro duct of the reflection, but as its discovery; and as product only of that original synthetical act of the Ego; which, for the very reason that it is such act, can not enter empirical consciousness. Hence, •we shall hereafter meet only such synthetical acts, but which are not unconditional acts like the first.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. IO3 Our deduction proves, however, that they are acts of the Ego; for this they are as sure as the first synthesis, from which they result, and with which they constitute one and the same, is an act of the Ego; and that first synthesis is such an act as sure as the highest deed-act of the Ego, that is, its self- positing, is such an act.
Hence, the acts we shall hereafter establish ars synthetical, although the reflection which establishes them is analytical.
Those antitheses, however, which have been pre supposed for the possibility of an analysis through reflection, must be thought as presupposed, that is, as such from which the possibility of our future synthetical conceptions is dependent. But no anti thesis is possible without synthesis. Hence, a higher synthesis is presupposed in advance of them, and our first business must be to look this synthesis up and establish it definitely. True, it has been already established in our § 3. But it may appear necessary to determine it in this part of our work more definitely.
DIREMPTION OF THE SYNTHESIS.
The synthesis of our § 3 was this: In and through the Ego both the Ego and t/u Non-Ego arc posited as each limi table through tJie other; that is, the reality of the one canceling that of the other, and vice versa.
This synthesis involves the following two pro positions: IC4 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
I. Tlic Ego posits the Non-Ego as limited through the Ego.
This proposition, which, in the practical part of our science will be of vast importance, seems use less to us here. For as yet the Non-Ego is noth ing, has no reality; and it is, therefore, inconceiv able how the Ego can limit a reality in the Non- Ego, which the Non-Ego has not got as yet. True, the proposition from which it results, the Ego and Non-Ego mutually limit each other, is posited; but whether that proposition really involves the present one is the as yet problematical part Perhaps the Ego can only be limited by the Non-Ego, in so fai as it has first limited the Non-Ego, as the limiting has first proceeded from the Ego. Perhaps the Non-Ego does not limit the Ego in itself at all, but only the limiting of the Ego; in which case our synthesis would remain true, although no reality were ascribed to the Non-Ego, and although the above problematical proposition were not involved in the synthesis.
2. TJic Ego posits itself as limited through tJic Non-Ego.
Of this proposition we can make use, and it must be accepted as certain, since it follows from the synthesis. For in it the Ego is posited first as ab solute reality, and next as limitable reality, and limitable through the Non-Ego.
It will appear that the second proposition grounds the theoretical part of our science, of course only after its completion; and that the first one grounds THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 1 05 the practical part of our science. But since the first one is itself problematical, the possibility of such a practical part also remains as yet problem atical. Hence, our reflection must proceed from the theoretical part, although it will appear here after that, far from it making possible the practical part, the practical part, on the contrary, makes pos sible it. (Reason is in itself only practical, and becomes theoretical only in applying its laws to a limiting Non-Ego.) In other words, this seeming subordination in our system of the practical to the theoretical part results from this: That the think ability of the practical principle is grounded in the thinkability of the theoretical principle. And in re flection we only have to do with thinkability. We now begin our task.
A.
A.
• GENERAL SYNTHESIS OF THE OPPOSITES OF OUR PROPOSITION.
The Ego posits itself as determined througfi the Non-Ego. This proposition has been deduced from our synthesis, and hence must be equally valid; and that synthesis must be valid if the unity of consciousness is to remain, and the Ego is to be Ego. Let us now analyze it, that is, see what op- posites it involves. The Ego posits itself as deter mined through the Non-Ego. Hence, the Ego is not to determine, but to be determined; and the Non- Ego is to determine, that is, to limit the reality of the Ego. Our proposition involves, therefore, JO6 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
1st. The Non-Ego determines (actively) the Ego, (in so far passive.)
But, again, the Ego posits itself, as determined, through absolute activity. It posits itself, it posits the Non-Ego, it posits both as limitable. It posits itself as determined signifies, therefore, the same as, 2d. The Ego determines itself, (through absolute activity.)
Both results evidently contradict each other; they, therefore, cancel each other, and the proposi tion which involves them cancels itself. But that proposition can.not be canceled if the unity of con sciousness is to remain. Hence, we must seek to unite the opposites involved in it. (To unite them, not through an arbitrary invention of reflection, but simply, as we said above, by discovering the point of union of these opposites in our conscious ness, where this point of union must be, since the opposites must be in it.)
The one proposition affirms what the other de nies. Reality and negation are, therefore, to be united, and this is done through limitation or deter mination.
The Ego determines itself, involves: The Ego is absolute totality of reality. It can determine it self only as reality, for it is posited absolutely as reality, (§ I,) and no negation is posited in it. And yet it is to determine itself. This can not signify, therefore, the Ego cancels part of its reality, for then it would be a self-contradiction; but it must THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. IO7 signify: The Ego determines the reality, and by means thereof determines itself. It posits all real ity as an absolute quantum, and this reality is po sited in the Ego, and there is no other reality but it The Ego is, therefore, determined, in so far as the reality is determined. (This absolute act of the Ego, whereby it thus determines itself, is indeed the same as already established in § 3, but in the present place it was necessary more clearly to de fine it.)
Now, the Non-Ego is opposed to the Ego; and in it is negation, as reality is in the Ego. If, there fore, absolute totality of reality is posited in the Ego, absolute totality of negation must be posited in the Non-Ego; and the negation itself must be posited as absolute totality.
Both totalities are to be united through determi nation. Hence, the Ego in part determines itself, and in fart is determined.
But both must be thought as one and the same; that is, in the same respect in which the Ego is determined, it must determine itself, and vice versa.
The Ego is determined signifies: Reality is can celed in the Ego. Hence, if the Ego posits in it self only part of the absolute totality of reality, it thereby cancels the rest of that totality in itself, positing this rest, by virtue of the law of opposi tion, (§ 2,) and of equality of itself and all quantity, in the Non-Ego, (§ 3.) In other words, whatever parts of negation the Ego posits in itself, so many parts of reality it posits in the Non-Ego; which i 103 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
reality in the opposite for that very reason cancels the same reality in itself.
The Ego, therefore, posits negation in itself, in so far as it posits reality in the Non-Ego, and vice versa; it therefore posits itself as determining it self in so far as it is determined, and as determined in so far as it determines itself, and our problem seems solved.
\Ve have thus under-taken a new synthesis. The conception it establishes is involved under the higher conception of determination, for it posits quantity. But if it is to be a new and other concep tion, it must have a ground of distinction from the higher one. This its specific difference is, that, while the higher conception of determination generally establishes qua ntiiy, without investigating the How? or In what manner? our present synthetical concep tion establishes the quantity of iJic one through that of its opposite, and vice versa. This more deter mined determination may. therefore, be called, Reci procal Determination. (Kant calls it Relation?)
B.
PARTICULAR SYNTHESIS OF THE OPPOSITES CON TAINED IN THE FIRST OF THE OPPOSITES OF OUR PROPOSITION, THROUGH THE CONCEPTION OF RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION.
If the fundamental proposition of our theoretical part is to involve all the opposites, which are here to be united, and if, moreover, we could unite these opposites generally through the conception THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. ICX) of reciprocal determination, then the opposites again involved in these first opposites must also be already indirectly united through that conception; or, in other words, the synthetical conception, which unites these new opposites, must already be in volved in the higher conception of reciprocal deter mination.
Hence, we must proceed with this conception precisely as we did with the conception of determi nation generally, that is, restrict its sphere to a smaller extent by an additional condition; whereby we shall obtain synthetical conceptions, involved under the higher conception of reciprocal determi nation.
The first opposite discovered in our proposition was this: The Non-Ego is to determine the Ego; that is, to cancel reality in the Ego. This it can only on the condition that it has in itself the same part of reality to be canceled in the Ego. Result: The Xon-Ego has in itself reality.
But all reality is posited in the Ego; and the non- Ego is opposed to the Ego, and hence has only ne gation. All Non-Ego is negation, and it, therefore, has no reality at all in itself.
Both results cancel each other; but they are in volved in the result: the Non-Ego determines the Ego. Hence, that result cancels itself. But it can not cancel itself without destroying the unity of consciousness. Hence, it can not cancel itself; and the opposites must be unitable.
Our conception of reciprocal determination did HO THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
not unite them; for by it we only obtained this re sult: If the absolute totality of reality is posited as divisible, then we can certainly take parts from the Ego, and must, under that condition, posit these parts in its opposite, the Non-Ego. But the ques tion, HO~JU can we posit the reality of the Ego as di visible and abstract farts from it? or, What justifies and compels us to establish any reciprocal determi nation? was left unanswered.
In other words, Reality is absolutely posited in the Ego. But our § 3 posited the Non-Ego as a quan- tnm, and every quantum is a something, hence also reality. Now, the Non-Ego is to be negation; hence, as it were, a real negation, a negative quantity.
According to the conception of mere relation, it is altogether the same to which of the two oppo- sites you ascribe reality and to which negation. It all depends from which of the two reflection starts. (It is thus in mathematics, a science which com pletely abstracts from quality, and looks only to quantity.) So also here, as far as the result esta blished by reciprocal determination is concerned. That conception says only, Whatever is negation in the Ego is reality in the Non-Ego, and vice versa; leaving it altogether in my discretion to call the Ego reality or negation. That conception estab lishes only a relative reality. This ambiguity must be removed, or the whole unity of consciousness is canceled; for, if it is not removed, the Ego is real ity and the non-Ego is also reality; both are no longer opposites, and the Ego is not = Ego, but is = Non-Ego.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 1 1 1 We must, therefore, try to remove this ambi guity; and by removing it v«re shall probably be enabled to unite the contradiction discovered in the proposition: the Non-Ego determines tfic Ego.
The Ego is the source of all reality. But the Ego is because it posits itself, and vice versa. Hence, to posit itself and to be is the same. But the conceptions of self-positing and of activity ge nerally are also one and the same. All reality is, therefore, active; and every thing active is reality. Activity is positive (in opposition to mere relative) reality.
It is important to think this conception of acti vity here pure. It is to signify nothing not con tained in the absolute self-positing of the Ego; nothing not immediately contained in the I am. Hence, not only all conditions of time, but also all object of activity, must here be abstracted from. In positing itself, the deed-act of the Ego is not directed upon any object at all, but simply returns into itself. Only when the Ego arrives at repre senting itself does it become object The Ego is to be determined, that is, reality or activity is to be canceled in it. Hence, the oppo site of activity is posited in it, namely, passivity. For passivity is positive negation, in opposition to mere relative negation. (Of course, here also all conditions of time must be abstracted from, as well as an activity producing this passivity. For pas sivity is as yet the mere negation of the above pure conception of activity, and, of course, its quantita- 1 12 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, tive negation, since that conception of activity is also quantitative; and since the mere negation of activity, without regard to quantity, would be = O or rest. Every thing in the Ego, which is not thus immediately in virtue of the I am, which is not im mediately posited in the self-positing of the Ego, is for the "Ego passivity, or affection generally.)
If the absolute totality of reality is to remain when the Ego is passive, then, by the law of reci procal determination, an equal degree of activity must be transferred into the Non-Ego.
And this solves the above contradiction. The Non-Ego has no reality in itself as Non-Ego, but it Jias reality in so far as the Ego is passive, by the law of reciprocal determination.
This result, that the Non-Ego has (at least as yet) no reality for the Ego, except in so far as the Ego is affected, is very important in its consequences.
The here deduced synthetical conception is in volved in the higher one of reciprocal determina tion, for the quantity of the one is in it determined through that of the other. But it is also specifical ly different from it. For under the conception of reciprocal determination, it was all the same to which of the two reality or negation was ascribed; only quantity and mere quantity was determined. Whereas here it is not the same, but decided which of the two has reality and which negation? The present synthesis posits, therefore, activity; and the same degree of activity in the one as of passivity in its opposite.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. HJ This synthesis is called the synthesis of causality. That to which activity is ascribed, and in so far not passivity, is called cause, (original reality;) that to which passivity is ascribed, and in so far not acti- vity, is called effect, (dependent reality.)
(Here also empirical time conditions must be altogether abstracted from. Partly because we have not yet deduced time, and have, therefore, no right to use its conception; partly because it is un true that the cause, as such, that is, as active in the effect, must be thought in time in advance of the effect. Cause and effect, by virtue of their synthe tic unity, are to be thought as one and the same. Not the cause, as such, but the substance, to which the causality is attributed, precedes the effect in time, from reasons which will appear hereafter. But in this respect the substance in which the ef fect occurs also precedes the effect produced in it.)
C.
PARTICULAR SYNTHESIS OF THE OPPOSITES CON TAINED IN THE SECOND OF THE OPPOSITES OF OUR PROPOSITION, THROUGH THE CONCEPTION OF RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION.
The second opposite discovered in our funda mental proposition was this: The Ego determines itself. This proposition con tains itself two opposites, namely: i st. The Ego determines itself; is active.
114 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
2d. It determines itself; is that which is deter mined, and hence \s passive.
That is to say, the Ego is, in one and the same act, both active and passive; which doubtless is a contradiction. This contradiction must be solved through the conception of reciprocal determination. It would be completely solved if its two opposites could be thus interpreted: The Ego cUimnincs its passivity through its activity, and vice versa. For in that case it would be both active and passive in one and the same act The question is, Is that in terpretation correct, and how can it be correct?
The possibility of all determination (measuring) presupposes a standard of a measure. This stan dard can only be the Ego, because only the Ego is absolutely posited.
Now, in the Ego is posited reality. Hence, the Ego must be posited as absolute totality (hence, as a quantum, containing all quanta, and being, there fore, a measure for all quanta) of reality; and it must be thus posited originally and absolutely, if our problematical synthesis is to be possible, and the contradiction satisfactorily solved.
The Ego, therefore, posits absolutely — without any ground, and under no possible condition — abso lute totality of reality as a quantum, beyond which no greater quantum is possible; and this absolute maximum of reality it posits in itself. (Every thing posited in the Ego is reality; and all reality which is, is posited in the Ego. (§ I.) But this THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 11$ reality is a quantum, and an absolutely posited quantum. (§ 3.) ) Through this absolutely posited standard, the quantity of a deficiency of reality is to be deter mined. But deficiency is nothing, and the deficient is nothing, (is not determined.) Hence, it can only be thus determined, that the remaining reality be determined. The Ego can, therefore, only deter mine the restricted quantity of its reality; and only through this determination of a quantity of reality is it possible to determine the quantity of negation, (by means of reciprocal determination.)
A determined quantum of reality is itself nega tion, namely, negation of the totality. "Every deter mined quantum is Non-Totality.
But if such a quantum is to be ofpositcd to total- it}', and hence related to it, a ground of relation of both must be shown up; and this ground is the conception of divisibility. (§ 3.)
In the absolute totality there are no parts; but it can be related to and opposed to parts; and thus the above contradiction is solved.
To show this more clearly, let us reflect on the conception of reality. This conception is eq-ual to the conception of activity. All reality is posited in the Ego signifies, all activity is posited in the Ego; all in the Ego is reality signifies, the Ego is only active; it is Ego only in so far as it is ac tive, and in so far as it is not active it is Non-Ego.
All passivity is not -activity. Passivity can, therefore, be only determined by being related to Il6 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
activity. A ground of relation must, therefore, be shown up. This can only be the general ground of relation of reality and negation; that is, quantity. Passivity is relatable to activity through quantity signifies: Passivity is a quantum of acthity.
To think a quantum of activity presupposes a standard of activity, that is, activity generally; (what we called above totality of reality.) The quantum generally is the measure.
If all activity is posited in the Ego, then the po siting of a quantum of activity is a lessening of that activity; and such a quantum, in so far as it is not the total activity, is passivity, although in itself it is activity.
Hence, through the positing of a quantum of ac tivity, and through the opposition of this quantum to acthity — not in so far as it is activity generally, but in so far as it is all (the total) activity — a passi vity is posited; that is, that quantum of activity AT such is itself posited and determined as passivity.
We have now found an X which is reality and negation, activity and passivity together.
X is activity in so far as it is related to the Non- Ego, because it is posited in the Ego, in the posit ing, active Ego.
X is passivity in so far as it is related to the to tality of activity. It is not that acting generally, but is a determined acting; a particular manner of acting contained in the sphere of general acting.
THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
Illustration.
Draw a circular line, = A; and the whole plane inclosed by it, = X, is opposed to the infinite plane of infinite space which remains excluded. Now, draw within A another circular line, = B, and the plane inclosed by it, Y, is, firstly, included in A, and, together with the X of A, opposed to the in finite space excluded by A; hence, in so far, fully equal to X. But if you regard Y as, secondly, in cluded in B, it is opposed to the infinite space ex cluded by B, and hence also opposed to that part of X which is not contained in it. Y is, therefore, opposed to itself; it is either a part of the plane X, or it is its own plane Y.