The thorny, wearisome, and often utterly unpractical character of the old logical discipline might well suggest to Locke his objections to it, though these objections do not seem to have gone to the ex- tent of proposing to abolish it altogether. Not only were the examples generally alien to the reasonings of practical life, but a most disproportionate share of the text-books, as well as of the oral instruction, was devoted to topics like the predicaments, post- predicaments, predicables, &c., which, if forming any part of Logic at all, have little direct bearing on its main function, which I take to be the examination of evidence, or, in other words, the discrimination of truefrom false reasoning.
Locke's celebrated attack on the Syllogism is to be found in the Essay, Bk. IV, ch. 17, §§ 4-6. It is there that he makes the oftenno /VOTES, SECTION V.
quoted, though irrelevant, remark, that ' God has not been so spar- ing to men, to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational.'
SECTION V.
clear and deto-mined ideas. There is a chapter in the Essay (Bk. II, ch. 29) entitled ' On Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Con- fused Ideas.' In § 4 of that chapter, the difference between the expression ' a clear idea ' and ' a distinct idea ' is stated as follows: ' As a clear idea is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ, so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other; and a confused idea is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it ought to be different.' Cp. Descartes, Principia, Pt. I, § 45: ' Quin et permulti homines nihil plane in tota vita percipiunt satis recte, ad certum de eo judicium ferendum. Etenim ad perceptionem cui certum et indubitatum judicium possit inniti, non modo requiritur ut sit clara, sed etiam ut sit distincta. Claram voco illam, quae menti attendenti praesens et aperta est; si cut ea clare a nobis videri dicimus quae, oculo intuenti praesentia, satis fortiter et aperte ilium movent. Distinctam autem illam, quae, cum clara sit, ab omnibus aliis ita sejuncta est et praecisa, ut nihil plane aliud quam quod clarum est in se contineat.' See also Port Royal Logic, Pt. I, ch. 9, and Leibnitz, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate, et Ideis, ad init. (ed. Erdmann, p. 79). As the terms are discriminated by these authors, an idea is clear so far as we are able to distinguish the various attributes which it implies, distinct so far as we are able to distinguish it, as a whole, from all other ideas. An idea ought, of course, to be both clear and distinct.
In the Fourth Edition of the Essay, Locke proposed to substitult. for the expression ' clear and distinct ' the word ' determined ' or ' determinate.' He explains his meaning, in the Epistle to the Reader, thus: ' By determinate, when applied to a simple idea, I mean that simple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that idea is said to be in it. By deter- mined, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation as the mind has NOTES, SECTION VI. Ill before its view and sees in itself when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it. 1 say should be; because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language as to use no word, till he views in his mind the precise determined idea which he resolves to make it the sign of.' To the ' determined idea ' a particular sign should be steadily annexed, or, in other words, a name should be determined to that precise idea. What Locke seems to mean is that we should always envisage, realise, or explore our ideas, and then take care invariably to employ the same term for the same idea.
Probably he here uses the words ' clear ' and ' determined ' as synonymous, as he seems to use the words ' clear and determinate ' 'clear and distinct,' in the Essay, Bk. II, ch. ii, § 3. If the terms, however, in this place are meant to be distinguished, ' determined ' must be taken as the equivalent of distinct.
in another place. See the whole of the Third Book of the Essay, but especially chs. 9, 10, 11. The student, who reads these chapters, will do well to compare Bacon's Novum Organum, Bk. I, Aphorisms 43i 59. 60 (on the ' Idola Fori ').
SECTION VI.
SECTION VI.
Page 16. principles. Principia, "px'^'j the ultimate major premisses from which our reasonings proceed. These, according to Locke, arise from the laying together and perceiving the agreement of our ideas, and our ideas are all derived from experience, either of the operations of our own minds or of the external world, that is, to use the phraseology of the Essay, either from Sensation or Reflection. See Bk. I; and Bk. II, ch. i. Hence there are no innate principles, inas- much as there are no innate ideas To maintain that there are innate principles is ' to take men from the use of their own reason and judgment, and put them upon believing and taking principles upon trust, without further examination: in which posture of blind credulity, men may be more easily governed by, and made useful to, some sort of men, who have the skill and office to principle and guide them.' Bk. I, ch. 4, § 24. Instances of legitimate 'First Principles ' are such as these: ' Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another '; ' A body under the action of no external force will remain at rest or move uniformly in a straight line ' (First Law of Motion); 'The angles of incidence and reflexion 112 NOTES, SECTION VL of a ray of light are equal '; ' The supply and demand of com- modities have a constant tendency to become equalised.' In- stances of false ' First Principles ' would be such as the circular motion of the planets, the immutability of the heavenly bodies, the decuple proportion, in respect to density and rarity, of the elements, the proposition that the wealth of a country depends upon the excess of its exports over its imports, and the like. All legitimate ' first principles ' must either be self-evident or based on careful induction, and even those which appear to be self-evident will be found, on a more exact analysis, to have been originally formed by early and constant inductions. This is alike the doctrine of Bacon and Aristotle. See Aristotle, Anal. Post. II. 19, Metaph. I. i, Eth. Nic. VI. 3 (3), and Bacon's Novum Organum, Bk. I, Aphs. 13, 14, e?nbraced for their sake. It is plain that the premisses ought to be more certain, at least to the person who employs them, than the conclusion; else they afford no proof. On this fact Aristotle insists in An. Post. I. 2.
no ground for. Bacon is never weary of insisting on the necessity of examining first principles, and of condemning the slovenly and indolent manner in which the men of his time were accustomed to accept them either on trust, or on little or no enquiry. See, for instance, Nov. Org. Bk. I, Aphs. 14, 17: 'Syllogismus ex proposi- tionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tesserae sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsae (id quod basis rei est) confusae sint, et temere a rebus abstractae; nihil in iis, quae superstruuntur, est firmitudinis. Itaque spes est una in inductione vera.' ' Nee minor est libido et aberratio in constituendis axiomatibus, quam in notioni- bus abstrahendis; idque in ipsis principiis, quae ab inductione vulgari pendent. At multo major est in axiomatibus et proposi- tionibus inferioribus, quae educit syllogismus.' Unless we make sure of the truth of our first principles, at starting, the application of the syllogism may only result in multiplying error instead of deducing truth.
With what Locke here says on the carelessness of men in ad- mitting unproved ' First Principles,' compare the admirable chapter on ' Wrong Assent or Error ' in the Essay, Bk. IV, ch. 20, especially Page 17. in another place. See Essay, Bk. IV, ch. 12, §§ 13, 13.
NOTES, SECTION VI. I13 Cp. Bacon, Novum Organiini, Ilk. 1, Aph. 48: ' Gliscit intellectus humanus, ncqiie consistcre aut aajuiescere potis est, sed ulterius petit.' Bacon, thinking of ultimate causes, which he regards as not ascertainable, adds ' at frustra.' Counselling the encouragement of curiosity on one side, and the cultivation of modesty on the other, he concludes the Aphorism by saying: ' Est autem aeque imperiti et leviter philosophantis, in maxime universalibus causam requircre, ac in subordinatis et subalternis causam non desiiierare.'
hypothesis. The word ' hypothesis ' seems to be used here not so much in the sense of an assumption, as of a basis or foundation, a sense more akin to the original meaning of the term. Cp. Plato, Republic, p. 51 1 B: rdj viroOeaeis -rroiov/xtvos ovk upxo-i, aXKoL tw ovti vTToOiafii, oiov (niffaafis t( koX up/xcii, Plato, however, is sjieaking of the bases on which we may rise to more general truths, Locke of the general principles on which we ' bottom ' our particular beliefs. The former is thinking of the ' bases ' of inductive, the latter of the ' bases ' of deductive reasoning.
On ' scientific hypothesis ' and the circumstances which distin- guish it from unscientific hypothesis, see my Inductive Logic, ch. 2, Page 18. interest or fancy. Cp. Essay, Bk. IV, ch. 20, § 1 2.
Page 19. more fully. See the next section.
Page 20. better than niathematics. To cultivate habits of pre- cise reasoning, and to train the mind to deal with abstract ideas and principles, no discipline can be better adapted than that of mathe- matics. But a mind trained exclusively on mathematics would be very ill equipped to deal with the various and complicated problems of life and science. An early training in mathematical reasoning should always be supplemented, as education proceeds, by forming a habit of analysing and estimating the value of evidence in subjects which admit not only of certain, but of more or less probable con- clusions, such as language, law, the moral and physical sciences, history, and the affairs of ordinary life.
•\at\ all rational. This is the reading of the original edition. But, in the edition of 1781, it is printed as 'not all rational,' which, it seems to me, is much more likely to be what Locke wrote. The ' they ' must refer to ' men,' not ' conclusions.'
of reasoning -well in others. This remark is not only true, but emi- nently useful and instructive. ' Natural incapacity ' for particular I 114 NOTES, SECTION VII.
branches of study, say mathematics or language, rarely exists, except in imagination; unless indeed the subject of it is deficient in mental power generally.
Page 21. have governed all their thoughts. Men should be peculiarly on their guard against constantly repeating, to themselves or others, compact and neatly-worded maxims. Principles of this kind come after a time to exercise a tyranny over the mind, recur on every occasion, and, being taken without any qualification, often have a wonderful effect in pen-erting the judgment. The tendency to be constantly enunciating and acting on maxims of this kind is often particularly observable in old men, or persons whose ex- perience has been mainly confined to some one sphere of activity, such as seafaring men or lawyers.
Page 22. 7vith youttg scholars. Locke speaks from experience. Not only had he given much advice with respect to the education of children and young men, but he had spent a great part of his time in the practical work of instruction. In early life he acted as Tutor and Censor of Christ Church. Afterwards, he was instructor to the second, and super\-ised the studies of the third. Earl of Shaftesbury. Moreover, while in France during the years 1677 and 1678, he travelled with a pupil, the son of a rich merchant named Sir John Banks. It is curious, when we remember Locke's attacks on the logic of the Schools, to learn the nature of his objections to entering young Banks in the study of mathematics. ' To engage one in mathematics who is not yet acquainted with the ver)' rudiments of logic is a method of study I have not known piactised, and seems to me not very reasonable.' Letter to Sir John Banks, quoted in Fox-Bourne's Life of Locke, vol. i.
SECTION VII.
Page 23. transfer it. But, in doing so, they must recollect that they are, for the most part, dealing with propositions which admit only of probable, not of demonstrative, proof.
as in demonstrative knowledge. What Locke means is that the mode of proof, that is, the analysis of the reasoning, is the same in all cases, though in some cases the conclusions may be demonstrative, in others only probable. The only differences which he recognises between demonstrative and probable reasoning are that, in the one.
NOTES, SECTION VI f. Il_r; a single proof is sufTicient to cstabli^h the conclusion, which may then be taken for certain, whereas, in the other, several arguments ■of varying degrees of probability, some tending one way and some another, have to be taken into account, the conclusion expressing the preponderance of the evidence. F"or his remarks on Probability, see Essay, Bk. IV, chs. 15, 16, and ch. 17, § 5.
It is by no means correct to say that ' in all sorts of reasoning every single argument should be managed as a mathematical de- monstration.' It is indeed true that, in all cases, a belief should be traced ' to the source on which it bottoms ' or that the propositions on which our assent is based should be so put together that we may see their connection with the conclusion. But this connection may be exhibited in various ways. Thus, the best and most natural mode of representing an inductive argument (see the first chapter of my Elements of Inductive Logic) is entirely different from that ot representing a deductive argument, though, by a certain amount ot manipulation, the one form may be brought under the other. Again, even in deductive ratiocination, there are rules, quite distinct from those of the ordinary syllogism, for estimating the precise value to be attached to probable arguments, whether in single syllogisms or in combinations of syllogisms or on a balance of rival probabilities. The student will find a statement and discussion of such rules in almost any recent work on Logic. Mr. Venn's Logic of Chance is specially appropriated to the discussion of these and kindred subjects.
disputing in the schools. What Locke thought of the 'disputa- tions,' which were then in common use throughout the universities of Europe, may be gathered from the following passage, which occurs in the 'Thoughts concerning Education,' § 189: 'If the use and end of right reasoning be to have right notions and a right judgment of things, to distinguish betwixt truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and to act accordingly, be sure not to let your son be bred up in the art and formality of disputing, either practising it himself or admiring it in others, unless, instead of an able man, you desire to have him an insignificant wrangler, opinionater in discourse, and priding himself in contradicting others, or — which is worse— questioning everything, and thinking there is no such thing as truth to be sought, but only victory in disputing. There cannot be anything so disingenuous, so misbecoming a Il6 NOTES, SECTION VII.
gentleman or any one who pretends to be a rational creature, as not to yield to plain reason and the conviction of clear arguments. Is there anything more inconsistent with civil conversation, and the end of all debate, than not to take an answer, though never so full and satisfactory, but still to go on with the dispute as long as equivocal sounds can furnish a inedhis terminus, a term to wrangle with on the one side or a distinction on the other, whether pertinent or impertinent, sense or nonsense, agreeing with or contrary to what he had said before, it matters not? For this, in short, is the way and perfection of logical disputes, that the opponent never take any answer nor the respondent never yield to any argument. This, neither of them must do, whatever becomes of truth or knowledge, unless he will pass for a poor baffled wretch, and lie under the disgrace of not being able to maintain whatever he has once affirmed, which is the great aim and glory of disputing.'
one topical argument. Cp. Essay, Bk. IV, ch. 17, § 5.
The expression 'topical argument' applies to an argument de- rived from certain general heads of probability, which, in the language of Aristotle and his followers, were called tottoi, common places, or common forms. They were the main subject of the art entitled ro-niKr} or SiaXeicTiKT], and of the eight (or, including the Sophistici Elenchi, the nine) books called the Topics. This work deals with logic when applied to disputation on disputable (probable) matter, as opposed to the logic of demonstration in science, which is treated in the Posterior Analytics.
It does not seem to be essential to disputation that only one argument should be insisted on, though, of course, by changing his ground, the disputant acknowledges himself to have been defeated on the ground which he originally assumed; or, at least, shows that he has not entire confidence in it.
Page 25. out of the reckoning. Here Locke has undoubtedly hit on one of the great excellences of mathematical discipline. The power of abstracting the mind from all irrelevant data and issues is specially developed even by such elementary departments of ma- thematical work as those of solving what are called ' Problems ' in Algebraic Equations and ' Deductions ' in Plane Geometry. Exer- cises of this kind ought to form an invariable element in early education. The tendency to dwell on or diverge to irrelevant topics is, perhaps, the most frequent of all the intellectual faults NOTES, SECTION VIII. Iiy to which ordinary men are subject, whether in argument, in con- versation, or in thinking for themselves.
as it 2ve}e in the lump. Instead of reasoning in the lump, they ought carefully to distinguish the various questions to be resolved, thus ascertaining exactly where the difficulties lie. When the various questions have been disentangled, they ought to form a separate conclusion on each of the questions or groups of (juestions before them.
SECTION VIII.
SECTION VIII.
Page 26. understand and reason right. It must be recollected that Locke was himself a writer on religious topics. In 1695, about two years before he had begun to write the treatise here re-published, he published his work on ' The Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures,' wherein he attempts to discriminate between the essential and non-essential elements in Christian belief. During the last years of his life, he was engaged in writing notes on some of St. Paul's Epistles, which, however, were not published till after his death. See ch. 9 of my ' Locke ' in the series of English Men of Letters.
Page 27. in a right way to this knowledge. I have noticed in the Introduction that this book was never revised by its author, and hence that many of the sentences are ungrammatical. In this sen- tence, he must have meant to say, ' and if those who had other idle hours would only enter them (viz. those who have not), according to their several capacities, in a right way to this knowledge.'
of the reformed religion. Locke had probably seen and heard a good deal of the Huguenots during his stay at Montpellier and his journeys in the south of France. Moreover, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, in 1685, had brought over to England large numbers of them, who were remarkable for their Industry, thrift, and intelli- gence. It will be noticed that he says 'lately,' referring to the time before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which had caused such a large proportion of the French Protestants to emigrate to foreign countries.
Locke's observations, during his travels, of the intense poverty of the French peasantry are given both in Lord King's Life, and in that of Mr. Fox-Bourne. See the latter, vol. i. pp. 400-402, Il8 NOTES, SECTIONS EX, X, XL SECTION IX.
Page 29. agreement or disagreement of those ideas. This is the doctrine of the Fourth Book of Locke's Essay. See Bk IV, ch. l.
SECTION X.
Page 30. 7uith their eyes. The word ' their ' is emphatic. Page 31. haud aequus ftierit.
' Qui statiiit aliquid parte inaudita altera, Aequum licet statuerit, haud aequus fuit.'
Seneca, Medea, 199, 200.
SECTION XI.
Page 32. Examine. This section should have been headed 'Examination.'
Page 35. in the future course of his life. This is the ideal of a liberal education, the object of which is to form intellectual aptitudes rather than to infuse specific knowledge. The advocates of a special education, on the other hand, maintain that, after a certain period in a young man's life, the best mode of enabling him to learn well any subject to which he may hereafter apply himself is to exercise him thoroughly on some one branch of knowledge. Lastly, what is called an useful education is one which is designed solely with a view to fitting the pupil for his future profession or walk in life. Locke's point of view is at least as old as the time of Plato. See Republic, p. 518 B, &c., and the whole scheme of the higher education as delineated in that dialogue.
The same view is presented in Locke's Thoughts concerning Educa- tion, in a somewhat exaggerated form, so as to be fairly open, per- haps, to the charge of recommending a merely superficial education: ' The great work of a Governor is to fashion the carriage and form the mind; to settle in his pupil good habits and the principles of virtue and wisdom; to give him by little and little a view of man- kind, and work him into a love and imitation of what is excellent and praise-worthy; and, in the prosecution of it, to give him vigour, activity, and industry. The studies, which he sets him upon, are but as it were the exercises of his faculties and employment of his time, to keep him from sauntering and idleness, to teach him application, and accustom him to take pains, and to give him some little taste of NOTES, SECTION XIII. JI9 what his own industry must perfect. For who exjKcts that, umlcr a tutor, a young gentleman should be an accom])lished critic, orator, or logician; go to the bottom of Metaphysics, Natural Philosophy, or Mathematics; or be a master in History or Chronology? Though something of each of these is to be taught him. But it is only to open the door, that he may look in and as it were begin an acquaint- ance, l)ut not to dwell there. And a Governor would be much lilamcd, that should keep his pupil too long and lead him too far in most of them. But of good breeding, knowledge of the world, virtue, industry, and a love of reputation, he cannot have too much. And, if he have these, he will not long want what he needs or desires of the other.' § 94. He seems, however, immediately to lajise into recommending a merely useful education. ' And since it cannot be hoped he should have time and strength to leani all things, most j)ains should be taken about that which is most necessary, and that principally looked after, which will be of most and frequcntcst use to him in the world.' Then, after speaking of the time devoted to learning the technicalities of Logic, he adds: ' Reason, if consulted with, would advise that their children's time should be spent in acquiring what might be useful to them when tlicy come to be men. rather than to have their heads stuffed wi'.h a deal of trash, a great part whereof they usually never do ('tis certain they never need to) think on again as long as they live.'
SECTION xin.
Page 36. to draio from ihcm cciiclusions. The conclusions being inductions, which are based on the facts. Here, again, the spirit of Locke's remarks is thoroughly Baconian.
from every particular they meet luith. Cp. Bacon, Novum C)r- ganum, Bk. I, Aph. 95: 'Qui tractaverunt scientias aut empirici aut dogmatici fuerunt. Empirici, formicae more, congerunt tantum, tt utuntur: rationales, aranearum more, telas ex se conficiunt: apis vero ratio media est, quae materiam ex floribus horti ct agri elicit; sed tamen eam propria facultate vertit et digerit. Neque absimile philosophiae verum opificium est; quod nee mentis viribus tantum aut praecipue nititur, neque ex historia naturali et mcchanicis cxperimentis praebitam materiam, in memoria intcgram, sed in inttl- lectu mutatani et subactam, repoiiit. Itaque ex harum facultatum I20 NOTES, SECTIONS XIV, XV.
(experimentalis scilicet et rationalis) arctiore et sanctiore foedere (quod adhuc factum non est) bene sperandum est.'
Page 37. of history. We must recollect that the word history was at this time used for a collection of facts of any kind. Bacon commonly uses the term in this sense. Thus the alternative title of the Sylva Sylvarum is ' A Natural History,' and the third part of the Instauratio Magna was to be entitled ' Phaenomena Universi. sive Historia Naturalis et Experimentalis ad condendam Philosophiam.' In the title of Aristotle's work, the Historia Animalium (nept ra ^wa laTopiai), the word means 'enquiry,' but it quickly passes from this meaning to signify the result of such an enquir}% the information thus obtained.
pudder, to confuse, throw up a dust round. The more ordinary term \s pother (from poudre, dust). Both words are used alike as substan- tives and verbs. Thus in the Essay, Bk. Ill, ch. 5, § 16, Locke says, ' When it is considered, what a pudder is made about essences,' &c.
SECTION XIV.
SECTION XIV.
Page 38. or themselves for his sake. Cp. Bacon's Advancement of Learning, Book I, Aldis Wright's edition, p. 9: ' And as for the conceit that too much knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance of second causes should make a more devout dependence upon God, which is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question which Job asked of his friends: Will yoit lie for God, as one man will do for another, to gratify him? For certain it is that God worketh nothing in nature but by second causes: and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards God; and nothing else but to offer to the author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie.'
SECTION XV.
Page 39. A}td\it']. I have ventured to attempt to reconstruct this and the next sentence.
light.? lit or lighted.
those determined ideas. This is tlie doctrine expounded at large in the third and fourth books of the Essay.
Page 40. implicit hnozuledge. That is, knowledge which he has merely taken on trust, second-hand knowledge which he has never verified for himself.
NOTES, SECTIONS XV/, XIX, XX, XX /. 12 r SECTION XVI.
Page 41. jump to the conclusion. This procedure is wli.-il Ibcon calls ' anticipatio mentis."
SECTION XIX.
Page 43. and that will become everything. Cp. Bacon, Novum Organum, Bk. I, Aph. 54: 'Adamant homines scicntias et contem- plationes particiilares; aiit quia authores et iiiventores se earum credunt; aut quia plurimum in illis operae posuerunt, iisque maxime assueverunt. Huju^modi vero homines, si ad philosophiam et con- templationes univeisales se contulerint, illas ex prioribus phnntasiis detorquent, et corrumpunt; id quod maxime conspicuuni ceinitur in Aristotele, qui nalurakm suam philosophiam logicae suae prorsus mancipavit, ut earn fere inutilem et contenliosam reddiderit. Chcmi- corum autem genus, ex paucis experimentis foniacis, philosophiam constituerunt phantasticam, ct ad pauca spectantem: quineiiam Gilbertus, postquam in contemplationibus magnctis se laboriosissime exercuisset, confinxit statim philosophiam consentaneam rei apud ipsum praepollenti.'
Page 44. and Alerciity. This was the Triad of Paracelsus, and. at an earlier time, of Basilius Valentinus. See my edition of Bacon's Novum Organum, note 35 on Bk. II, Aph. 50, pp. 576,;.
SECTION XX.
Page 46. mizmaze. A maze or labyrinth. The word is dupli- cated, for the sake of emphasis.
SECTION XXI.
Page 47. intermediate principles. These are those 'axiomata media' of which Bacon speaks, when he says: 'At media sunt axiomata ilia vera et solida et viva, in quibus humanae res et for- tunae sitae sunt.' Nov. Org. Bk. I, Aph. 104. They may be arrived at in two ways: either by an induction, through the 'axiomata infima,' from particulars; or by deduction from the 'suprema et generalissima axiomata,' only that, in this latter case, the higher axioms themselves must previously have been constituted as the result of a careful induction Both Locke and Bacon give good advice, when they recommend men, as a general rule, not to rua 122 AZOTES, SECTIONS XXII, XXIII, XXIV.