back their conclusions to first principles, but to be content with showing their dependence on nearer and intermediate principles, provided that these last be such as themselves admit of satisfactory proof. When men begin by enunciating some general and abstract principle, and then attach to it the particular conclusion which they wish us to receive, we may reasonably suspect that the intermediate links are wanting, and, any way, we should insist on having them supplied. On the other hand, the connection between the ultimate conclusion and the intermediate principle is often pretty obvious, and the intermediate principle may be one which most men, having any acquaintance with the subject, recognise as not itself requiring proof. The demonstrations in geometry are well cited by Locke as instances in point.
SECTION XXII.
Page 48. partiality to studies. This section has much in common with the latter half of Section 19, 'On Universality.'
SECTION XXIII.
Page 50. words of revelation. He is here thinking of the dis- tinction between natural and revealed religion, a distinction so much dwelt on by writers in the 17th and iSth centuries.
SECTION XXIV.
Page 51. chymistry. Cp. what Locke here says with Sections Satyrs. Or, as the word would now be written, Satires. The Latin word is Satura or Satira, tiot Satyra, which is an incorrect form. The allusion must be to the Epistles, Bk. II, Ep. i. The Epistles have often been regarded as continuations of the Satires.
giants. A recent writer, Mr. Gold win Smith, has somewhere remarked that we have measured the bones of these giants, and found them to be of the same length as our own.
Page 52. mould and rottenness. Cp. Bacon, Nov. Org. Bk. I, Aph. 56: ' Reperiuntur ingenia alia in admirationem antiquitatis, alia in amorem et amplexum novitatis effusa; pauca vero ejus tem- peramenti sunt, ut modum tenere possint, quin aut quae recte posita sunt ab antiquis convellant, aut ea contemnant quae recte afferuntur a novis. Hoc vero magno scientiarum et philosophiae detrimento NOTES, SECTION XXIF. 123 fit, quum studia potius sint anliquitatis ct novitatis, quam judicia: Veritas autem non a felicitate teniporis alicujus, tjuae res varia est; sed a lumine naturae et experientiae, (juod actcrnuin est, pelenda est. llaque abnej^aiuH sunt ista studia; et videndum, ne intcllectus ab illis ad consensum abripiatur.'
less (rue or less genuine. Bacon (Novum Orj^anuni, Uk. I, Aph. 84) has some extremely striking remarks on the exaggerated love for antiquity, though it must be confessed that his own tendency was to err in the direction of unduly depreciating the merits of previous authors: 'Rursus vero homines a progressu in scientiis detinuit et fere iri- cantavit rcverentia antiquitatis, et virorum, qui in philosoi)hia magni habiti sunt, authoritas, atcjue deindc consensus. Atque dc consensu sujDerius dictum est.
' De antiquitate autem opinio, quam homines de ipsa fovent, negligens omnino est, et vix verbo ipsi congrua. Mundi enim .senium et grandaevitas pro antiquitate veie habenda sunt; quae temporibus nostris tribui debent, non juniori aetati mundi, qualis apud antiques fuit. Ilia enim aetas, respectu nostri, ajitiqua et major; respectu mimdi ipsius, nova et minor fuit. Atque revera quemadmodum majorem rerum humanarum notitiam et maturius judicium ab homine sene expectamus quam a juvene, propter ex- perientiam et rerum, quas vidit, et audivit, et cogitavit, varietateni et copiam; eodem modo et a nostra aetate (si vires suas nosset, et experiri et intendere vellet) majora multo quam a priscis temporibus expectari par est; utpote aetate mundi grandiore, et infiiiitis ex- perimentis et observationibus aucta et cumulata.
' Neque pro nihilo aestimandum, quod per longinquas navigationes et peregrinationes (quae seculis nostris increbuerunt) plurima in natura patuerint, et reperta sint, quae novam philosophiae hicem immittere possint. Quin et turpe hominibus foret, si globi ma- tcrialis tractus, terrarum videlicet, marium, astrorum, nostris tem- poribus immensum aperti et illuslrati sint; globi autem intellectualis finis inter veterum inventa et anguslias cohibeantur.
' Authorcs vero quod attinet, summae pusillanimitatis est authoribus infuiita tribuere, authori autem authorum, atque adeo omnis authori- talis, Tcmpori, jus suum denegare. Kecte enim Veritas Teniporis fdia dicitur, non Authoritatis. Itaque mirum non est, si fascina ista antiquitatis et authorum et consensus hominum virtutem ita 124 NOTES, SECTION XXV.
ligaverint, ut cum rebus ipsis consuescere (tanquam maleficiati) non potuerint.', The reader may consult my notes, and the various parallel passages which I have cited in illustration of this Aphorism. See my edition of the Novum Organum, pp. 276-8.
Page 54. artificial??ianncr. The distinction here drawn is that between observation and experiment. In my Inductive Logic (ch. 2, § i), I have distinguished between these processes as follows: 'To observe is to watch with attention phenomena as they occur, to experiment (or, to adopt more ordinary language^ to perform an expe7'iment) is, not only to observe, but also to place the phenomena under pecviliarly favourable circumstances, as a preliminary to obser- vation. Thus, every experiment implies an observation, but it also implies something more. In an experiment, I arrange or create the circumstances under which I wish to make my observation. Thus, if two bodies are falling to the ground, and I attend to the pheno- menon, I am said to observe it; but, if I place the bodies under the exhausted receiver of an air-pump, or cause them to be dropped under any special circumstances whatever, I may be said not only to make an observation, but also to perform an experiment. Bacon has not inaptly compared experiment with the torture of witnesses. Mr. Mill distinguishes between the two processes, by saying that in observation we Jind our instance in nature, in experiment we make it by an artificial arrangement of circumstances.* Page 56. cati be imputed. Here again we have an unrevised sentence, which cannot be construed grammatically. The sentence might, perhaps, be recast thus: ' There are not seldom to be found even amongst such as aim...men who make,' &c.
of that authors opinions. Hallam, somewhere in his Introduction to the Literature of Europe, says, speaking, I think, of the writers of the 1 7th century, that they read too many books and entertained too great a respect for their authors.
upon authorities. On the illegitimate employment of the Argument from Authority, see my Inductive Logic, ch. 6, 3rd ed., pp. 285-293.
Page 57. beholding.? beholden.
SECTION XXV.
Page 58. savanas. Spanish, sabana. Tlie word is now usually spelt savannah. It is used in those parts of America which are or have been Spanish, to express what is elsewhere called a prairie, that is, a tract of land covered with natural vegetation.
Page 59. 7v/icrcott to foimd those general axioms. Here again Locke is on ground thoroughly familiar to the readers of the Novum Organum. See, for instance, amongst many other places, Bk. I, Aphs. 19-26. There can he no <loubl that Locke is indebted to Bacon both for the thought and language of this passage. Cp., for instance, the following sentences in Aphs. 25, 24: ' Axiomata, quae in usu sunt, ex tenui et manipulari experientia, ct paucis particu- laribus, quae ut plurimum occurrunt, fluxere; et sunt fei e admensuram eorum facta et extensa: ut nil mirum sit, si ad nova particularia non ducant.' ' Sed axiomata, a particularibus rite ct ordinc abstracta, nova particularia rursus facile indicant et designant.'
Page 60. suggest hints of enquiry. Or, in more technical lan- guage, may suggest hypotheses or provisional explanations. One or two instances may often put us on the scent, and lead us to some provisional theory, which further enquir}' may either confirm, modify, or disprove. A hypothesis, started on these slender groiuids, should always be held loosely, and we should constantly be on the look-out for further facts bearing upon it, whether favourable or unfavourable. What, however, frequently happens is that, when a hypothesis has been once formed, all the facts which support it are carefully noted, while those which are unfavourable to it are ignored.
as has been already 7-cmarkcd. See Section 13, and cp. Section 20. Locke's meaning in this, sentence is not very clear. The clause be- ginning ' To make such observations' seems to allude to the habit of merely collecting particulars without basing conclusions on them, whereas the clause beginning ' and he that makes everj'thing an ob- servation' seems to allude to the habit of generalising on insufficient data.
SECTION XXVL Page 61. anticipations of their minds. Cp. Bacon's expression * anticipationes mentis.'
SECTION XXVIII.
Page 62. recusent. Horace, Ars Poetica, 11. 39, 40: 'Et versate diu, quid ferrc recusent, Quid valeant humeri.'
126 NOTES, SECTION XXIX.
Page 64. tJiat dignity. Dignitas is one of the synonyms for axiom. This use of the word goes'back as far as the times of Priscian and Boethius, while Latin was still a living language.
zvell bcatcft track. That is, who think it a sufficient excuse for going astray, if the wrong path they take be a well beaten track.
SECTION XXIX.
Page 64. in another place. That is, the Third Book of the Essay, and especially ch. lo.
Page 65. substantial forms and intentional species. The sjih- stantial form was regarded as that occult principle which, actuating, as it were, matter, produced the distinctive manifestations of any particular class of Substances. Chauvin (Lexicon Philosophicum) gives the following account of the Peripatetic doctrine oi substantial fo7-ms: ' Peripatetic! formam definiunt per rationem Substantiae, seu rationem talem, per quam res aliqua certa ac determinata sub- stantiae evadit, atque est. Ex materia prima et forma substantiali compositum substantial fieri vohmt. Alias illam definiunt per substantiam incompletam, quae materiae unita corjDus naturale componit, omniumque hujus operationum primum principium est, certis tamen qualitatibus tanquam instrumentis utitur ad suos effectus producendos. Scilicet in quovis corpore, post materiam illam primam, quam fingunt, praeter extensionem solidam seu impenetrabilem, praeterque omnia accidentia sensibilia. formam aliquam substantialem sensibus occultam, caeterarum dominam, inexistere, cui in omnibus functionibus hae ministrent, indubitanter asserunt.' Thus, the 'rational soul' (anima rationalis) is the 'substantial form' of man.
Intentional Species were supposed to be certain images or simili- tudes intermediate between the outward object and the percipient mind. They represented to the mind, it was thought, the various qualities as they existed in the object. They were called species {(iSrj), that is, forms or appearances, because they were regarded as representative of the external reality; intentional (from intentio animi), that is, notional, in order to distinguish them from material and wholly objective appearances. They were supposed to be neither merely affections of external objects nor merely modifications of the mind, but a something mediating between mind and matter, and thus enabling the former to become acquainted with the latter. On this conception, and on the distinction between sensible and NOTES, SECTIOXS XXX, XX XL 127 intelligible species, species impressae and species exprcssae, see Hamilton's Reid, pp. 952-957. It must be acknowledged that traces of this doctrine arc to be found even in Locke's Essay; for he sometimes seems to speak of 'ideas,' as if they were not merely mental modifications, but a tertium quid, a something intermediate between external objects and the mind. See^ for instance. Essay, Bk. II, ch. I, § 25; Bk. IV, ch. 21, § 4.
insignijicant. That is, non-significant, having no meaning.
efch oul. That is, to complete, to fill in the outline of their systems.
I know not what. Locke constantly speaks in the Essay of the idea of Substance as of a 'something I know not what.' The remark in the Text, it is almost needless to point out, affords a good instance of Locke's felicitous way of stating homely truths.
Page 66. simple ones. See Essay, Bk. II, chs. i, 2.
SECTION XXX.
Page 67. from straggling. Cp. the Sections (123-127) on Sauntering, in the Thoughts concerning Education.
SECTION XXXI.
Page 68. Distinction and division. If Locke uses these terms in their proper sense, they may be distinguished as follows. A distinction is a determination of the various meanings of an equivocal term, such as canis, humanity, post, &c. (and, in practice, it was ex- tended to determining the various meanings of ambiguous sentences). A division, in the strict sense of the word, is a determination of the various species which fall under the same genus, or, to employ less technical language, of the various subject-classes which fall under the same higher class. It is thus an exposition of what logicians call the denotation of a term. Thus, to distinguish the various meanings of a word like humanity, church, house, &c., would be a distinction. To enumerate the various kinds of plane rectilineal figures, namely, triangles, squares, and polygons, would be a division. ' In a distinction the same definition is not predicable of each of the terms distinguished, but in a division the same definition is predicable of each dividing member' (as the subject classes are called). See my Deductive Logic, Part II, ch. 8.
128 NOTES, SECTION XXXI.
Bishop Sanderson (whose Compendium of Logic was in common vise in Locke's time) thus distinguishes between Distinction and Division in Pt. I, ch. i8: ' Divisio est latioris in angustiora deductio. Quae si sit nominis, distinciio, si rei, Divisio magis proprie appellatur. Distinctio est ambiguae vocis in sua significata distributio: ut canis in piscem, domesticum animal, et coeleste sidus. Ambiguum onme prius est distinguendum, quam definiendum; indistinctio enim parit continuas lites: nee aliter constabit, quid aut de quo agatur. Nee tamen semper excutiendae sunt omnes significationum minutiae, sed quae sunt cum subjecto negotio conjunctae, aut in quibus error contingere potest, si non distinguantur. — Divisio rei perfccta est totius alicujus proprie dicti in partes proprie dictas distributio.' He then proceeds to explain what is a whole and what are parts, pro- perly so called; the one being a genus, or logical whole, the other being species, or logical parts. Chauvin (Lexicon Philosophicum) says: ' Distinctio Logica simia est divisionis. In hoc loco divisi, consistit vocabulum homonymum; et loco membrorum dividentium, plures termini, qui isto vocabulo significantur. V.g. sentiens aliud actu, aliud potentia sentit.'
Locke's meaning in this Section is not always very clear, but I cannot doubt that what he intends to commend is Division, 'the perception of a difference that nature has placed in things,' while what he wishes to caution his readers against is over-subtlety in Distinction. The determination of the various subject-classes which are included under any higher class, like the reverse process of grouping lower classes under some higher class ('generalisation '), is a logical process indispensable to any complicated act of reasoning. Any man who can analyse his thoughts will find that he is performing both these processes all day long. Distinction is also a process of the greatest utility, but it is not employed to nearly the same extent as division, and, if words and sentences were properly constructed, it would not be required at all. We must recollect, in reading this Section, that Locke has an eye to the ' Disputations,' which were so common in the Universities in his time, the method of which largely affected the controversial, and especially the theological, writings of his contemporaries. In these disputations, the distinctions were often of the most frivolous and shadowy character, being, in fact, ' distinctions without differences.' It is against the waste of time and 'puzzling of the understanding' involved in such useless and NOTES, SECTION XXXII, 129 over-subtle distinctions that Locke is here mainly protesting, though it cannot escape his notice that the process of division may similarly be over-strained, either by recognising too minute shades of difference in constituting the subject-classes or by needlessly increasing the number of steps in the descending process of sub-division. Hence, a certain amount of confusion is produced in this Section by con- sidering together, and apparently not always carefully distinguishing between, the two faults of over-subtlety in distinction and over- minuteness in division. Both of these faults were more common in Locke's time than in our own, but they are still common enough to render the warnings of this section not altogether superfluous to the modern reader.
Page 69. thereby one from another. That is to say, there would no longer be any need of distinctions, but there would still be need of divisions.
Page 70. too much. ' Distinguo ' is the constantly recurring term of the scholastic disputations.
Page 71. t/tey are right. That is, the verbal distinctions.
Page 72. conceptions of than. On the tendency of the mind to note differences rather than resemblances, or resemblances rather than differences, one of the instances of the idola specus, there is an admirable aphorism in the Novum Organum: ' Maximum et velut radicale discrimen ingeniorum, quoad philosophiam et scientias, illud est: quod alia ingenia sint fortiora et ajDtiora ad notandas rerum differentias; alia, ad notandas rerum similitudines. Ingenia enim constantia et acuta figere contemplationes, et morari, et haerere in omni subtilitate differentiarum possunt: ingenia autem sublimia et discursiva etiam tenuissimas et catholicas rerum simili- tudines et agnoscunt et componunt: utrumque autem ingenium facile labitur in excessum, prensando aut gradus rerum, aut umbras.' — Nov.
SECTION XXXII.
SECTION XXXII.
Page 72. think aright. A simile or meta])hor may often be most appropriately used for the purpose of illustrating or enforcing an argument, but it should never be used in lieu of an argument. * How does this simile apply to the case in point, and what is the argument which it is meant to illustrate,' are questions which should always be asked, when a simile, metaphor, or allegorj' is employed, K 130 lYO TES, SE CTIONS XXXII I-XXX V.
From want of putting these questions, men often deceive, not only others, but themselves.
Page 73. under cotisideratio7i. This sentence is somewhat in- volved. The emphatic word in it is only. 'Which' refers to the ' borrowed representations ' and ' foreign ideas.'
SECTION XXXIII.
Page 74. to give assent. The student should read the chapters on Probability and Degrees of Assent in the Essay. See Bk. IV, all as iincertaifi. Like the two ancient sects of the New Academy and the Ephectici (Pyrrhonists or Sceptics).
SECTION XXXIV.
Page 75. said above. See Section 11, which is on the same subject as this.
Page 77. born to orthodoxy. Orthodoxy, which, according to the original usage of the term, is the dogma of the Catholic Church as opposed to the tenets of heretics, is, practically speaking, at any particular time and in any particular country, the body of opinions then and there most prevalent.
Page 78. best state of the three. The reader will be reminded, though the cases are not strictly parallel, of the answer of the Delphic Oracle to Chaerephon, that there was no man wiser than Socrates, and of Socrates' explanation of the response, that he alone was conscious of his own ignorance. The conceit of knowledge without the reality was a far inferior state of mind to ignorance with the consciousness of it. See Plato's Apology of Socrates, and Crete's Greece, Pt. II, ch. 68.
SECTION XXXV.
SECTION XXXV.
Page 79. or chymists. These were various sects of physicians. The Dogmatists and Empirics were opposed rather in respect of their logical method than their medical doctrine. The former, who trusted mainly to the deductions of reason, falsely claimed for themselves the authority of Hippocrates (the great physician of Cos, born, according to the common account, b.c. 460); the latter, who r professed to ground their conclusions solely on experience* may NOTES, SECTIONS XXXVII, XXXVIir. 131: conveniently be dated from I'hilinus of Cos, who flourished about 250 B.C. The Methodists were a later school, and appear to have meant nothing more by the name which they assumed than that they proposed a new method, distinct from that of either the Dogmatists or Empirics. Their doctrine rested on a philosophical theory of Atomism. Its earliest exponents were Asclepiades of one of the towns named Prusa in Bithynia and Themison of Laodicea, both belonging to the ist century, b.c. By the 'chymists' Locke probably means the followers of Paracelsus (b. 1493, d. I540> though ' chymiatria ' or the art of healing by means of drugs had, of course, existed long before his time. The body, according to Paracelsus, being composed of sulphur, mercury, and salt, all disease arises from the relative increase, diminution, or disarrangement of these elements. For further information on these schools, the reader may consult the History of Medicine of Sprengel, Daremberg, or Bouchut.
SECTION XXXVII.
Page 81. oscitancy. Laziness. The Latin word ' oscitatio,' per- haps from ' os' and ' cito' (moving the mouth), means literally 'gaping' or ' yawning,' and, hence, laziness.
SECTION XXXVIIL Page 82. Fortunatus' purse. ' Fortunatus is the legendary hero of one of the most popular of European chap-books. He was a native, says the story, of Famagosta in Cyprus, and after many strange adventures and vicissitudes fell in with the goddess of Fortune in a wild forest, and received from her a purse which was continually replenished as often as he drew from its stores.'...' The earliest known edition of the German text of Fortunatus appeared at Augsburg in 1509, and the modem German investigators are disposed to regard this as the original fonn. Innumerable rifaci- mentos have been made in French, Italian, Dutch, English, &c., and cheap editions are still common enough on the bookstalls.' Encyclopaedia Britannica.
132 NOTES, SECTIONS XXXIX, XL, SECTION XXXIX Page 83. eundo. Virg. Aen. iv. 175.
vicet-e. I do not know the source of this quotation, but cp. Viig.
'Hos successus alit: possunt, quia posse videntur.'
Page 86. said elscivherc. Cp. Sections 25, 28, and Thoughts concerning Education, Sections 64-66.
2i7ipei-plcxcd proposition. This is another sentence, the construction of which would probably have been altered, had the book been revised. As it stands, it is doubtful whether we should take the words from ' simple, unperplexed proposition ' to the end of the sentence as an independent clause, the construction then being that of the ablative absolute, or regard them as describing the requisites of the 'next adjoining part yet unkno^vn.' Either way, what is meant by ' simple, unperplexed proposition ' is a proposition making one simple statement or asking one simple question, as opposed to a proposition involving a number of statements or asking a plurality of questions, and therefore putting before the mind several issues instead of one.
SECTION XL.
SECTION XL.
Analogy. On the various meanings of the word Analogy, and on the nature of the argument founded on Analogy, in the modern sense of that term, see my Inductive Logic, ch. 4. The peculiarity of the argument is that we do not draw our inference from a number of instances, as in Induction, but from a number of points of re- semblance. ' The argument is based, not on the number of instances in which the two sets of qualities are found united, but on the number of qualities which are found to be common to two or more instances: the argument is not that I have so often observed a, b, c in conjunction with w that I believe these qualities to be conjoined invariably, but that I know X and Y to resemble each other in so many points that I believe them to resemble each other in all.* The argument is never absolutely conclusive, because its very character- istic is to argue from a number of known points of resemblance to the common possession of some other quality which is known to exist in the one instance but not known to exist in the other. Were it known to exist in both, either as a matter of fact or as a certain NOTES, SECTION XLL 1 33 inference from induction, there would be no occasion for the argument from analogy.
may l>c Justified. But, if we know that the good effect is owing wholly to the acidity, the argument is not an analogical but an inductive argument, and, wherever we find acidity, unless there be counteracting circumstances, we may be certain that the good effect will follow. On the other hand, if we know that the good effect is 7iot owing to the acidity, there is an equally certain induction on the negative side, and no ground for analogy whatever. The very essence of the argument from analogy is that there should be some amount of uncertainty as to whether the quality known to belong to the one case or instance [here the power of producing a good effect] also belongs to the other, and, if we actually know that it is due to some other quality which both the cases or instances possess in common, the argument ceases to be analogical and becomes inductive. See my Inductive Logic, 3rd ed., p. 223, &c. It is almost needless to say that the analysis of inductive reasoning, and the discrimination of its various kinds, were little advanced in Locke's time, nor was he, as many passages of the Essay show, at all adequately acquainted even with what had already been done or suggested by Bacon in this department of Logic.
SECTION XLL SECTION XLL Page 87. Human Understanding. See Bk. II, ch. 33. This admirable chapter, which the student should by all means consult, was added in the Fourth Edition of the Essay, published in 1699. It had probably been written some years before.
Page 88. principling. That is, imbuing them, by repeated admonition, with general maxims of conduct or general principles of speculation, the truth of which is taken for granted. On ' Prin- ciples,' see Section 6.
Page 89. ttnited in their heads. That is to say, that ideas come not to be thought to have a necessary or usual connection, when they have no such necessary or usual connection as a matter of fact, and that the extent of any usual connection be not exaggerated.
in another place. He is referring here to the celebrated passage contained in the Essay, Bk. II, ch. 9, §§ 8-10. The reference in § 8 134 I^OTES, SECTIONS XLII, XLIIL to Mr. Mol}'neux was inserted in the Second Edition. It would be out of place here to refer at any length to the manner in which this idea was worked out and extended by Bp. Berkeley in his New Theory of Vision, or to the subsequent developments and modifications of Berkeley's theory by Professor Bain and others. See Berkeley's 'Essay towards a New Theory of Vision,' with Professor Eraser's Preface, and Professor Bain's Mental Science, Bk. II, eh. 7, sections on Theory of Vision. The most familiar and perhaps the best example of ' the change of the ideas of sense into those of judgment ' is to be found in the acquired perceptions of sight. Thus, for instance, our estimates of distance are, in the language of Berkeley, formed by ' an act of judgment grounded on experience rather than by sense.' We do not see distance, but we learn to estimate it, whether it be near or remote, by constantly repeated acts of corriparison between our various visual sensations, on the one hand, and the sensations derived from touch, muscular exertion, and locomotion, on the other.
SECTION XLII.
SECTION XLII.
Page 90. Fallacies. In its widest and commonest sense, a Fallacy may be described as any error either in the premisses or the conclusions of our arguments. Such errors are due sometimes to moral, sometimes to intellectual causes. One chapter, at least, in every work on Logic, and that which is almost invariably the most practically useful, is devoted to the discussion of Fallacies. See, for instance. Mill's Logic, Bk. V, my Deductive Logic, Pt. Ill, Ch. 8, and my Inductive Logic, Ch. 6. Bacon's very fresh and interesting treatment of Fallacies is to be found in his doctrine of the Idola, Novum Organum, Bk. I, Aphs. 38-70.
SECTION XLIII.
Page 94. purely logical enquiries. That, is to say, in mere logical subtleties and technical distinctions. Opposed as Locke was to the logical discipline then prevailing, he would have been one of the last to question the importance of analysing the reasoning process and determining the ultimate grounds on which the various orders of our beliefs rest. To answer these questions was, in fact, one of his main motives for writing the Essay.
NOTES, SECTIONS XLIV, XLV. 135