I think now, M., that I have omitted none of all the difficulties which you spoke of, or at least indi- cated, and also of those which I have thought you might still have. It is true that this has increased the size of this letter but it would have been more difficult to put my meaning in less words, and had I attempted it, obscurity might have been involved. I think that you will now find my positions as we'!l articulated among themselves as with the accepted opinions. I do not at.all overthrow established opinions, but I explain them and I carry them out further. If you might have the leisure some day to look over again what we finally established regard- ing the concept of an individual substance, you will perhaps find, that in granting me this premise it will be necessary to grant all the rest. I have attempted, however, to write this letter in such a way that it shall explain and defend itself. It is quite possible, indeed, to separate the questions. Those who are unwilling to recognize souls in ani- mals and substantial forms elsewhere, may, neverthe- LEIBNIZ, ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS, 235 less, approve of the way in which I have explained the union of the mind and the body, and all that I have said regarding true substance.. It will be for them to save as they can, without such forms and without a true unity, whether by points or by atoms, as seems best to them, the reality of matter and of corporeal substances, or else to leave this undecided; since investigation can be cut off. wherever one thinks best. We must not, however, stop half way when we desire to have true ideas of the universe and of the perfection of God’s works, which are able to furnish us most weighty arguments with respect to God and with respect to our souls.
_ It is very remarkable how Catelan has so entirely missed my meaning, as you suspected he had; -he advances three propositions and says that I find con- tradictions in them, while, in fact, I find none there, and employ these very propositions to prove the absurdity of the Cartesian principle. This is the result of dealing with men who take up things only superficially. If it can happen in a question of mathematics what should we not expect in meta- physics and in ethics. It is for this reason that:I consider myself fortunate in having found in you a critic as exact.as he is fair. I wish you long life, as well for the interests of the public as for my own.
I am, etc.
Part of a letter sent at the same time to Arnauld.
Here is the reply to your last objection, it has: become a little long because I wish to explain myself. explicitly and to leave none of your doubts untouched.. Several times I inserted your. own words which contributed toward increasing its size.
236 CORRESPONDENCE, As I took all those positions along time ago and have foreseen, if I might dare to say, most of the objections, they cost me hardly any meditation, and all I needed to do was to pour out my thoughts upon paper and to re-read them afterwards. I say this, M., so that you may not think me too deeply engrossed in such matters at the expense of other necessary business; you drew me on to go so far, when you made objections and questions which I wished to satisfy, as much in order to profit by your enlightenment as to make you recognize my wish to disguise nothing.
At the present time I am very busy with a history of the noble house of Brunswick. I have looked over several archives this summer and I am to make a journey in Southern Germany to seek certain docu- ments; this does not prevent my desiring to learn your opinion regarding my explanations when your leisure will permit it and also regarding my reply to Catelan which I send herewith; I do this because it is short and, in my opinion, demon- strative, provided that it is read with the least attention. If Catelan does not do better than hitherto, I cannot expect any enlightenment from him on this subject. I wish you might be able to give a moment of serious attention to it, and you would, perhaps, be surprised to see that something which is so easy to overthrow has been accepted as an incontrovertible principle because it is clear that the velocities which bodies acquire in descending are as the square roots of the heights from which they have fallen: now, if we leave out of question external resistances a body can return exactly to the height from which it has descended, therefore LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. 237 Another draft of the above.
] herewith send you my reply to Catelan which will, perhaps, be inserted in The News of the Republic of Letters; we are at the beginning again, and ] made a mistake in replying to his first answer. I should simply have said that he did not touch my objection, and should have indicated these points to which a reply was necessary, as I have now done— I have added in my reply a mechanical problem, which can be solved by geometry, but a good deal of skill must be used and I will see if M. Catelan will dare tackle it. It seems to me that he is not very able, and I am surprised to see that among so many Cartesians there are so few who imitate Descartes in trying to advance further.
XXIV Letbniz to Count Ernst von Hessen-Rhetnfels.
I beg your Highness to ask M Arnauld as well as yourself if there is really so great an evil in saying that everything (whether a species or whether an individual or person), has a certain perfect concept which involves all that can be truly said regarding it, and, according to this concept, God, who con- ceives of everything perfectly, conceives of the said thing? And to ask further if M. A. thinks in good faith that a man who holds such a position could not be accepted into the Catholic church, even when he sincerely rejects the supposed fatalistic consequence; and Your Highness may ask how that agrees with what M. A. formerly wrote, namely, that no trouble was made for a man in the Church oa 238 CORRESPONDENCE.
account of these kinds of opinions, and if it is not to repulse men by a useless and untimely strictness, to condemn so easily all kinds of opinions which have nothing to do with the faith?
Can it be denied that everything, whether genus, species or individual has a complete concept accord- ing to which God conceives of it (he who conceives of everything perfectly), a concept which involves or embraces all that can be said of the thing? And can it be denied that God ts able to have such an individual conception of Adam or of Alexander that it shall. embrace all the attributes, affections, acci- dents and, in general, all the predicates of this sub- ject? And finally since St. Thomas could maintain that every separate intelligence differed in kind from every other, what evil will there be in saying the same of every person and in conceiving indi- viduals as final species, provided that the species shall not be understood physically but metaphys- ically or mathematically; for, in physics when a thing engenders something similar to it, they are said to be of the same kind, but in metaphysics or in geometry we say that things differ in kind when they have any difference in the concept which suffices to describe them, so that two ellipses in one of which the major and minor axes are in the ratio of two to one and in the other in the ratio of three to one, differ in kind. Two ellipses which differ only in magnitude or proportionately, and where, in their description, there is no differenoe of ratio in the axes, have no specific difference or difference in kind, for it must be remembered that complete beings cannot differ merely because - differences in size.: LEIBNIZ, ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. 239 XXV Leibniz to Arnauld.
Monsieur: Perhaps you will have seen in The News. af the Republic of Letters for the month of September what I replied to M. l’Abbé C. It is a remarkable thing to see how many people reply, not to what has been said, but to what they have imagined. This is what M. l’Abbé has done up to the pres- ent. For this reason it was necessary to break off abruptly, and bring him back to the first objection. I have only taken the opportunity of this argumen- tation to put forward a very curious geometrico- mechanical problem which I have just solved. It is to find what I call an isochronous curve, in which a body shall descend uniformly and approach equal distances to the horizon in equal times, notwith- standing the acceleration it undergoes. This latter I offset by continually changing the inclination. I did this in order to bring out something useful and to show M. l’Abbé that the ordinary analysis of the Cartesians is too limited for difficult problems. I succeeded partly in this, for M. Hugens* gave a solu- tion of the problem in the News for October. I knew well enough that-M. Hugens could do it, and therefore I didn’t expect that he would take the trouble, or, at least, that he would publish his solu- tion and set M. |l’Abbé free: since, however, M. Hugens’ solution is in part enigmatical, apparently to see if I can do it-also, I have sent him the rest of it. Now we will see what M. | Abbé sat *So spelled by Leibniz.—Z£a 240 CORRESPONDENCE.
say about it. It is true that if the nature of the line which M. Hugens has published is known, the rest can be obtained by ordinary analysis, but without that the thing is difficult, for the converse of the rule of tangents, to find the line, having given the property of the tangents, to which this proposed problem reduces itself, is a problem which M. Descartes him- self has confessed in one of his letters not to have mastered. For, usually, what I call transcendentals result, which have no degree; and when the problem reduces itself to curves of a certain degree, as it happens in this case, an ordinary analyst will have difficulty in recognizing it.
I wish, with all my heart, that you might have leisure to think over for half an hour my objection to the Cartesians, which M. l’Abbé tries to meet. Your enlightenment and your sincerity assure me that we should come to the point and that you would recognize in good faith what was the real dis- cussion. The discussion is not long, and the matter is of importance, not only for mechanics, but also in the realm of metaphysics, because movement in itself separated from force is something merely relative and its subject cannot be determined; force, however, being something real and absolute, and its calculations, as I clearly show, different from that of motion, we must not be surprised if nature preserves the same quantity of force but not the same quantity of motion. It follows that there is in nature some- thing besides extension and motion, unless all force or energy be denied to things, which would be to change them from substances into modes, as Spinoza does, who holds that God alone is a sub- stance and that al! other things are modifications of LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS., 241 him, Spinoza is full of confused reveries and his pretended demonstrations de Deo have only an apparent truth. However, I hold that one created substance, in metaphysical strictness, does not act upon another, that is to say, with a real influence; furthermore, it is impossible to explain distinctly in what this influence consists unless we refer it to God, whose operation is a continual creation, and the source of this influence is the essential depend- ence of created things. If we wish to speak as ordinary men do, who say that one substance acts upon another, we must give some other conception to what is called action. It would take too long to develop this point and I refer to my last letter, which is prolix enough.
I do not know whether the Rev. Father Male- branche has replied to my answer given in one of the summer months of last year, where I advanced another general principle useful in mechanics as in geometry, which clearly overthrew all the laws of motion that Descartes put forward as well as those of Malebranche himself, together with what he said in The News to defend them.
Some day, if I find leisure I hope to write out my meditations upon the general characteristic or method of universal calculus, which should be of service in the other sciences as well as in mathe- matics. I have already made some _ successful attempts. I have definitions, axioms, and very remarkable theorems and problems in regard to coincidence, determination (or de unico), similitude, relation in general, power or cause, and substance, and everywhere I advance with symbols in a precise and strict manner as in algebra, I have made some applications of it in jurisprudence, and it can: be truly said that there are no authors whose style approaches nearer that of the geometers than the style of the jurists in the Digests. But you will ask how is calculation to be applied to conjectural mat- ters...},liireply that,at., 1s:.1n,,the way thatsPascal: Hugens, and others, have given demonstrations of possible chances. Because the most probable and the most certain can always be determined in so far as it is possible to know anything ex dats.
I do not however wish to take more of your time, and perhaps I have already taken too much. I should not dare to do it so frequently, if the matters upon which I desire to have your criticisms were not important. I pray God to prolong your life a long time, so that we may always profit by your enlighten- ment. Iam, with zeal, etc.
XXVI Lethntz to Arnauld. Venice, March 23, 1690.
I am now on the point of returning home after a long journey, undertaken under the orders of my Prince for the purpose of historical investigations. And I have found diplomas, certificates and indubi- table proofs sufficient to establish the common origin of the noble Houses of Brunswick and Este, which Justel, du Cange and others had strong grounds for calling tn question, because there were contradic- tions and errors on the part of the historians of Este in this respect, together with a complete confusion in dates and personages.
At present I am thinking of returning to my old LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. 243 life and of taking up my former occupations again. I wrote to you two years ago, a little before my departure, and I take the same liberty again, for the purpose of asking after your health and to let you know how constantly the thought of your well- known merits are in my mind. When I was at Rome, I saw the denunciation of a new letter which is attributed to you or to your friends. Since then I have seen a letter of the Rev. Father Mabillon’s to one of my friends in which he says that the Rev. Father Tellier’s apology for the missionaries against the practical morality of the Jesuits had given to many persons favorable impressions of these Fathers, but he had heard that you had replied to it, and that it was said you had with geometrical logic com- pletely overthrown the reasoning of this Father. All this has led me to think that you are still ina condition to render service to the public, and I pray God that it may be so for a long time yet. It is true that I havea personal interest in this, but itis a praiseworthy interest since I am given a means of being instructed, whether in common with all the others, who will read your works, or in particular when your criticisms shall instruct me, provided the little leisure which you have may still permit me to hope for this advantage at times.
As this journey has served in part to release my mind from routine business, I have had the satisfac- tion of conversing with several able men on matters of learning and science, and I have communicated to some of them my own views, which you are acquainted with, in order to profit by the doubts and difficulties which they raised, and there were some of these men who, not satisfied with the current doctrines, found an unusual satisfaction in certain of my positions. This has led me to put them down in writing so that they may be communicated more easily, and some day, perhaps, I will have a few copies printed without my name, merely to circulate them among my friends in order to obtain their criticisms, I should like you to be able to examine them first and therefore I have made the following abstract: A body is an aggregation of substances, and is not a substance, properly speaking. Consequently, in all bodies must be found indivisible substances which cannot be generated and are not corruptible, having something which corresponds te souls.
All these substances have been always and will always be united to organic bodies diversely trans- formable.
Each of these substances contains in its nature the law of the continuous progression of its own work- ings and al] that has happened to it and all that will happen to it.
Excepting the dependence upon God, all these activities come from its own nature.
Each substance expresses the whole isiireien some substances, however, more distinctly than others, each one especially distinctly with regard to certain things and according to its own point ue view.
The union ot the soul with the body and even fhe action of one substance upon another consists only in the perfect mutual accord, expressly established by the ordinance of the first creation, by virtue of which each substance following its own laws falls in with what the others require, and thus the activities LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. 245 of the one follow or accompany the activities or changes of the other.
Intellects, or souls which are capable of reflection and of knowing the eternal truths and God, have many privileges that exempt them from the trans- formations of bodies.
In regard to them moral laws must be added to physical laws.
It is for them principally that every thing has been made., They, taken together, constitute the Republic of the Universe, with God as the monarch.
There is perfect justice and order observed in this city of God, and there is no evil action without its chastisement, nor any good action without its proportionate reward..
The better things are understood, the more are they found beautiful and conformable to the desires which a wise man might form.
We must always be content with the ordering of the past because it has absolutely conformed to the will of God, which can be known by the events, but we must try to make the future, in so far as it depends upon us, conform to the presumptive will of God or to his commandments, to beautify our Sparta and to labor in well-doing, without, however, being cast down when unsuccessful, in the firm belief that God will know. how to find the most fit- ting times for changes to the better.
Those who are not content with the ordering of ae cannot boast of loving God properly.
_ Justice its noeee else aos love felt by the wise.
Charity is ben benevolence whose fulfillment 246! CORRESPONDENCE.
the wise carry out conformably to the dictates of reason so as to obtain the greatest good.
Wisdom is the science of happiness or of the means of attaining the lasting contentment which consists in the continual achievement of a greater perfection or at least in variations of the same degree of perfection.
In regard to the subject of physics: the nature of force must be understood as wholly different from motion, which is something more relative. Force must be measured by the quantity of effect: there is an absolute force, a directive force and a respective force.
Each of these forces is conserved in the same quantity in the universe, or in each machine which has no communication with others, and the two lat- ter forces taken together compose the former or the absolute force. The same amount of motion, how- ever, is not conserved, for I can show that if it were, perpetual motion would be possible, and that an effect would be greater than its cause.
Some. time ago 1. published!. in; the ‘Acts of Lewpsic an essay in the domain of physics for the purpose of finding the physical causes of the astral motions. I assume as basal that every motion of a solid in a fluid, where the motion is in a curved line or the velocity is constantly changing, is derived from the motion of the fluid itself. Whence I draw the conclusion that the heavenly bodies have deferent but fluid orbs, which we may call with Descartes and with the ancients, vortexes. I think there are neither vacuums nor atoms, for these are things far removed from the perfection of God’s works, and that every motion is propagated from one body to LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS, 247 all other bodies, although more feebly as the dis- tances are greater. Supposing that all the great globes in the universe have something analogous to magnetism, I think that in addition to a certain tend- ency which causes them to maintain the parallel- ism of their axes, they have a kind of attraction whence arises something comparable to gravity. We can picture this by imagining rays of some material substance which is trying to move away from a center and consequently pushes others which have not this tendency toward the center. We may compare these rays of attraction with those of light, and by the same law which holds in illumination we shall find that the attraction is inversely as the square of the distance.
These things agree wonderfully with the phe- nomena. Kepler found that in general the areas of the orbits of the planets described by radii drawn from the sun to the orbits are in proportion to the times of the revolutions around the sun, and I have demenstrated an important general proposition, namely, that all those bodies which revolve in harmonic motion (that is to say, so move that their distances from the center are in arithmetical pro- gression, while their velocities are in harmonic progression or inversely as the distances), and moreover, if these bodies have a _ paracentric motion (that is to say, are heavy or light as regards the same center, whatever law this attrac- tion or repulsion may obey)—all such _ bodies describe areas which vary necessarily as the times, just as Kepler observed in the case of the planets. I conclude that the deferent fluid orbs of the planets revolve harmonically, and I give an a 248 CORRESPONDENCE.
priort season for this. Now, empirically observing that in fact this motion is elliptical, I find that the law of paracentric motions, which when combined with the harmonic revolutions describe ellipses, ought to be such that the attraction is inversely as the squares of the distances, that is, exactly the same as what we found above to be true @ priort by the laws of radiation. From this I then deduce special characteristics and the whole was broached in my publication in the Acts of Letpsic some time ago.
-] will say nothing of my calculus of increments or differences, by which I determine the tangents with- out eliminating irrationals and fractions even when unknown quantities are involved in them and by which I subject quadratics and transcendental prob- lems to analysis. Neither will I speak of an entirely new analysis confined to Geometry and differing entirely from Algebra, and even less of certain other subjects which I have not yet had the time to develop.. I should have liked to be able to explain them all to you in a few words, so as to have upon them your opinion, which would be of infinite serv- ice to me, had you as much leisure as I have defer- ence for your criticism. Your time, however, is too precious, and. my letter is already quite long. Therefore I bring it to an end here, and am sincerely, ‘etc:: THE MONADOLOGY phantom te lia pan eels: aelths veh PEs eth ig, 1 Oe fb SA Sulina? OE Vie, TEL eh, SA ee a SOR aR Wee dit Polit. phys Moh Ce a a ie tee an ras it ee Lr Song pie BORIC se Ae te Ra ee ie) ad pet eca ited nn tase Lene wins iad | eta ite: she Ue ey eee 6 Sea 7 at au cat PY aneenl: ae WO Ag . aos areal ele Soe eat, hy aeaee nas aes eu ee MBO AARON, Mire Nagi ae tl te AY ghee Bie # ieee eg aay ade Mi Metete aS wi y aed! al: ane Sy ere aubenoer a Tar ie Waa Oak ahh ee wt see eg a ane aa YN vin Cant ee ae Cie teny ieee ek peteeate ot Rie vee «si Bi chan & Voy?
Die ‘diel nie teen to shee a cout ote THE MONADOLOGY.
1. The Monad, of which we will speak here, is nothing else than a simple substance, which goes to make up composites; by simple, we mean without parts.
2. There must be simple substances because there are composites; for a composite is nothing else than a collection or aggregatum of simple substances.
3. Now, where there are no constituent parts there is possible neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility. These Monads are the true Atoms of nature, and, in fact, the Elements of things.
4. Their dissolution, therefore, is not to be feared and there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance can perish through natural means.
5. For the same reason there Is no way conceiv- able by which a simple substance might, through natural means, come into existence, since it can not be formed by composition.
6. We may say then, that the existence of Monads can begin or end only all at once, that 1s to say, the Monad can begin only through creation and end only through annihilation. Composites, however, begin or end gradually 7. There is also no way of explaining how a Monad can be altered or changed in its inner being by any other created thing, since there is no possibility of transposition within it, nor can we conceive 252 LEIBNIZ.
of any internal movement which can be produced, directed, increased or diminished there within the substance, such as can take place in the case of composites where a change can occur among the parts. The Monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out. The Attributes are not liable to detach themselves and make an excursion outside the substance, as could sensible species of the Schoolmen. In the same way neither substance nor attribute can enter from without into a Monad.
8. Still Monads must needs have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be existences. And if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no means of perceiving any change in things. Whatever is in a composite can come into it only through its simple elements and the Monads, if they were without qualities, since they do not differ at all in quantity, would be indistinguishable one from another. For instance, if we imagine @ plenum or completely filled space, where each part receives only the equivalent of its own previous motion, one state of things would not be distinguishable from another. | g. Each Monad, indeed, must be different from every other. For there are never in nature two beings which are exactly alike, and in which it ts not possible to find a difference either internal or based on an intrinsic property.
10. I assume it as admitted that every created being, and consequently the created Monad, is sub- ject to change, and indeed that this change is continuous in each. 11. It follows from what has just been said, that MON ADOLOGY. 253 the natural changes of the Monad come from an internal principle, because an external cause can have no influence upon its inner being.
12.. Now besides this principle of change there must also be in the Monad a manifoldness which changes. This manifoldness constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances.
13. This manifoldness must involve a multiplicity in the unity or in that which is simple. For since every natural change takes place by degrees, there must be something which changes and something which remains unchanged, and consequently there must be in the simple substance a plurality of con- ditions and relations, even though it has no parts.
14. The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called Perception. This should be carefully distinguished from Apperception or Consciousness, as. will appear in what follows. In this matter the Cartesians have fallen into a serious error, in that they treat as non- existent those perceptions of which we are not con- scious. It is this also which has led them to believe that spirits alone are Monads and that there are no souls of animals or other Entelechies, and it has led them to make the common confusion between a protracted period of unconsciousness and actual death. They have thus adopted the Scholastic error that souls can exist entirely separated from bodies, and have even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the belief that souls are mortal.
15. The action of the internal principle which brings about the change or the passing from oné 254 LEIBNIZ.
perception to another may be called Appetition. It is true that the desire (/’apfetit) is not always able to attain to the whole of the perception which it strives for, but it always attains a portion of it and reaches new perceptions.
16. We, ourselves, experience a multiplicity in a simple substance, when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are conscious involves a variety in the object. Therefore all those who acknowl- edge that the soul is a simple substance ought to grant this multiplicity in the Monad, and Monsieur Bayle should have found no difficulty in it, as he has done in his Dictionary, article ‘‘Rorarius.”’
17. It must be confessed, however, that Percep- tion, and that which depends upon it, are inex- plicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensa- tion, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain Perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the composite nor in a machine that the Perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substance can consist.
18. All simple substances or created Monads may be called Entelechies, because they have in them- selves a certain perfection (€xovar 75 évredés). There MONADOLOGY. 255 is in them a sufficiency (atrdpxea) which makes them the source of their internal activities, and renders them, so to speak, incorporeal Automatons.
I9. If we wish to designate as soul everything which has perceptions and desires in the general sense that I have just explained, all simple sub- stances or created Monads could be called souls. But since feeling is something more than a mere perception I think that the general name of Monad or Entelechy should suffice for simple sub- stances which have only perception, while we may reserve the term Soul for those whose perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory.
20. We experience in ourselves a state where we remember nothing and where we have no distinct perception, as in periods of fainting, or when we are overcome by a profound, dreamless sleep. In such a state the soul does not sensibly differ at all froma simple Monad. As this state, however, 1s not per- manent and the soul can recover from it, the soul ts something more.
21. Nevertheless it does not follow at all that the simple substance is in such a state without percep- tion. This is so because of the reasons given above; for it cannot perish, nor on the other hand would it exist without some affection and the affection is nothing else than its perception. When, however, there are a great number of weak perceptions where nothing stands out distinctively, we are stunned; as when one turns around and around in the same direc- tion, a dizziness comes on, which makes him swoon and makes him able to distinguish nothing. Among animals, death can occasion this state for quite a period.
256 LEIBNIZ.
_ 22. Every present state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future.
23. Therefore, since on awakening after a man of unconsciousness we become conscious of our per- ceptions, we must, without having been conscious of them, have had perceptions immediately before; for one perception can come in a natural way only from another perception, just as a motion can come ina natural way only from a motion.
24. It is evident from this that if we were to have nothing distinctive, or so to speak prominent, and of a higher flavor in our perceptions, we should be in acontinual state of stupor. This is the eendeny of Monads which are wholly bare.
25. We see that nature has given to animals heightened perceptions, having provided them with organs which collect numerous rays of light or numer- ous waves of air and thus make them more effective in their combination. Something similar to this takes place in the case of smell, in that of taste and of touch, and perhaps in many other senses which are unknown to us. I shall have occasion very soon to explain how that which occurs in the soul represents that which goes on in the sense-organs.
26. The memory furnishes a sort of consecutive- ness which imitates reason but is to be distinguished from it. We see that animals when they have the perception of something which they notice and of which they have had a similar previous perception, are led by the representation of their memory to expect that which was associated in the preceding perception, and they come to have feelings like those which they had before. For instance, if a stick be MONADOLOGY. 257 shown to a dog, he remembers the pain which it has caused him and he whines or runs away.