Your Serene Highness will have received the let- ter which I sent by the preceding post, to which I joined, in the form of a letter to Your Highness, a communication of which a copy could be sent to. M. A. I have since thought it would be better to change those words toward the end, beginning ‘‘Nevertheless, if the church in which he is be so prompt to censure, such a procedure ought to serve as a nmotice. etc’, as far asthe words, sapove'all, when one has no means of support,”’ lest M. A. may take the opportunity from them to enter into controversial disputes as if the church were being attacked, which is not at all the inten- tion.
In the copy could be put tn their place, “‘least of all in the communion to which M. A. belongs, where the Council of Trent as well as the Popes have been very wisely satisfied with censuring opinions in which there are points manifestly against the faith and against the customs. They have not gone into the philosophic consequences. If it were necessary to listen to these, then in mat- ters of censure Thomists would pass for Calvinists according to the Jesuits, and the Jesuits would be classed as Semipelagians according to the Thomists.
&8 CORRESPONDENCE.
&8 CORRESPONDENCE.
Both would destroy freedom according to Durandus and Father Louys de Dole, and in general every absurdity would pass for atheism because it could be shown to destroy the nature of God.”’
VI Arnauld to Leibniz.
I thought that I ought to address myself to you personally to ask pardon for having given you cause to become angry against me, in that I employed too severe terms when I indicated what I thought of one of your positions. But I protest before God that the fault which I committed was not at all the result of prejudice against you, for I have never had cause to have of you other than a most favorable opin- ion save in the matter of Religion, in which you found yourself fixed through your birth; neither was IT in an ill humor when I wrote the letter which has wounded you, nothing being further from my char- acter than the evil disposition which it pleases many people to attribute to me; neither by a too great attachment to my own opinions was I shocked in see- ing you hold contrary opinions, for I can assure you that I have meditated so little on these kinds of subjects that Iam able to say that my opinions are not at all fully made up.
I beg you, sir, to believe nothing like that about me but to be convinced that what caused my indis- cretion was simply that, having been accustomed to write off-hand to His Highness because he is so good as to readily excuse all my faults, I imagined that I could tell him frankly what I was unable to approve of in one of your opinions because I was LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS, 89 very sure it would not pass muster and if I had misunderstood your meaning you would be able to correct me without its going any further.
But I hope, sir, that the Prince will be willing to make peace for me and I may engage him in this by using the words which Saint Augustine used on a similar occasion. He had written very harshly against those who thought that God could be seen with the physical eyes, and a Bishop in Africa who held this opinion, having seen this letter which was not at all addressed to him, was seriously offended by it. This necessitated Saint Augustine's employ- ing a common friend to appease the Prelate and I beg you to imagine that I am saying to the Prince for your ears what Saint Augustine wrote to this friend, to be said to the Bishop: Dum essem in admonendo sollicitus, in corrifpiendo nimius atque improvidus fur. foc non defendo sed reprehendo: hoc non excuso, sed accuso. Lgnoscatur, peto; recordetur nostram dilectionem pristinem et obliviscatur offensionem novam. Factat certe quod me non fecisse succensuit: habeat lenitatem tin dandi venia, quam non habui in lla epistola conscribenda.
I was in doubt whether I ought not to stop here without going again into the question which was the occasion for our falling out, lest there might again escape me some word which could wound you. But I fear, however, that that would be not to have a sufficiently good opinion of your fairness. I will tell you, therefore, in a few words the diffi- culties which I still have with this proposition: “The individual concept of each person involves, once for all, all that will ever happen to him.”’
It seems to me to follow from this that the indi- 90 CORRESPONDENCE, vidual concept of Adam has involved that he would have so many children and the individual concept of each one of these children involves all that they will do and all the children which they will have and soon. Whence I thought that we could infer that God was free, in so far as the creating or not creating of Adam, but supposing that he had wished to create him, all that has since happened to the human race has come and must come by a fatalistic necessity or I thought at least that there was no more freedom in God regarding all that, supposing that he had wished to create Adam, than there was not to create a being capable of thinking, suppos- ing he had wished to create me.
It does not appear to me, Monsieur, that, in speaking thus, I have confused wmecessitatem ex Aypothest and absolute necessity, for I was all the time speaking only against the necessity ¢# hypothesi; what I find strange is, that all human events should be quite as necessary by a necessity e+ hypothest after this first supposition that God wished to create Adam, as it is necessary by the same necessity for there to be in the world a nature. capable of thinking simply because he has wished to create me.
You say in this connection various things about God which do not seem to me sufficient to solve my difficulty.
1. ‘That a distinction has always been made between what God is free to do absolutely and what he is obliged to do by virtue of certain resolutions already made.’’ This position is valid.
2. ‘‘That it is little consonant with the dignity of God to conceive of him (under the pretext of LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. gi safeguarding his freedom) in the way that the Socinians do, as a man who forms his resolutions according to the circumstances.’” Such an opinion is very foolish, I grant you.
3. ‘‘That the purposes of God, which are all inter- related must not be isolated. Therefore, the purpose of God to create a particular Adam -must not be looked at detached from all the others which he has regarding the children of Adam and of the whole human race.’’ To this also I agree, but I cannot yet see how these can serve to solve my difficulty.
For 1. I confess, in good faith, not to have under- stood that, by the individual concept of each person (for example of Adam), which you say involves, once for all, all that will ever happen to him, you meant this person in so far as he is in the divine understanding instead of simply what he is in himself, For it seems to me that it is not customary to con- sider the specific concept of a sphere in relation to that which is its representation in the divine under- standing but in relation to what it Is in itself. I thought it was thus with the individual concept of each person or of everything.
2. It is enough, however, for me to know what you intend, so that I can conform to it, and inquire if that overcomes all the difficulty which I mentioned above. It does not seem to me that it does.
I agree that the knowledge which God had of Adam when he resolved to create him involved what happened to him and what has happened, or will happen, to his posterity; and therefore if we understand in this sense the individual oe Adam, what you say about it is very true.
I grant also that the purpose which he had in Q2 CORRESPONDENCE.
creating Adam was not detached from that which he had regarding what would happen to him and in regard to all his posterity.
But it seems to me, that after all this there still remains the question (and this is where my difh- culty lies) whether the relationship between those objects (I mean Adam on the one hand and what will happen to him and to his posterity on the other), is such through itself, independently of all the free decrees of God; or, whether it has been dependent. That is to say, whether it is only tn consequence of the free decrees by which God has foreordained all that will happen to Adam and to his posterity that God has known all that will happen to Adam and to his posterity; or whether there ts, independent of these decrees, between Adam on the one hand, and what has happened and will hap- pen to him and his posterity on the other, an intrin- sic and necessary connection. Unless you mean the latter I do not see how it can be true when you say, ‘‘that the individual concept of each person involves once for all, all that which will ever happen to him,’’ even if we understand this concept in its relation to God.
It seems, moreover, that it is this latter whitch you do not accept. For 1 believe you to suppose that, according to our way of conceiving, possible things are possible before any free decree of God, whence it follows that what is involved in the con- cept of possible things is involved independently of all God’s free decrees. Now you say ‘‘that God has found among possible things a possible Adam, accompanied by certain individual circumstances, who, among other predicates, possesses also that of LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. 93 having in time a certain posterity.’’ There is, therefore, according to you a connection intrinsic, so to speak, and independent of all the free decrees of God; a connection between this possible Adam and all the separate persons of his posterity and not the persons alone, but in general all that must happen to them. It is this, Monsieur, I speak plainly, that is incomprehensible to me. For your meaning seems to be that the possible Adam whom God has chosen preferably to other possible Adams, had a connection with the very same posterity as the created Adam. In either case it is, as far as I can judge, the same Adam considered now as possible and now as created. If this is your meaning then here is my difficulty.
How many men there are who have come into the world only through the perfectly free decrees of God, such as Isaac, Samson, Samuel and many others! Now the fact that God has known them conjointly with Adam is not owing to their having been involved independently of the decrees of God in the individual concept of the possible Adam. It is, therefore, not true that all the individual person- ages of the posterity of Adam have been involved in the individual concept of the possible Adam since they would then have been thus involved inde- pendently of God’s decress.
The same can be said of an infinite number of human events which have occurred by the express and particular commands of God, for instance, the Jewish and Christian Religions, and, above all, the Incarnation of the Word of God. Ido not see how it can be said that all these are involved in the individual concept of the possible Adam. What 94 CORRESPONDENCE, ever is considered as possible must have all that is conceived of under this idea.of possibility independ- ently of the Divine decrees.
Moreover, Monsieur, I do not see how, in taking Adam as an example of a unitary nature, several possible Adams can be thought of. It is as though I should conceive of several possible me’s; a thing which is certainly inconceivable. For I am not able to think of myself without considering myself as a unitary nature, a nature so completely distin- guished from every other existent or possible being that I am as little able to conceive of several me’s as to think of acircle all of whose diameters are not equal. The reason is that these various me’s are different, one from the other, else there would not be several of them. There would have to be, there- fore, one of these me’s which would not be me, an evident contradiction.
Permit me, therefore, Monsieur, to transfer to this me what you say concerning Adam and you may judge for yourself if it will hold. Among possible beings God has found in his’ ideas several me’s, of which one has for its predicates, to have several children and to be a physician, and another to live a life of celibacy and to be a Theologian. God, having decided to create the latter, or the present me, includes in its individual concept the living a life of celibacy and the being a Theologian while the former would have involved in its indi- vidual concept being married and being a physician. Is it not clear that there would be no sense in such statements, because, since my present me Is neces- sarily of a certain individual nature, which is the same thing as having a certain individual concept, LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS, 95 it will be as impossible to conceive of contradictory predicates in the individual concept me, as to con- ceive of a me different from me? Therefore we must conclude, it seems to me, that since it is ‘mpossible for me not to always remain myself whether I marry or whether I live a life of celibacy, the individual concept of my me has involved neither the one nor the other of those two states. Just as we might say that this block of marble is the same whether it be in repose or in a state of move- ment and therefore neither movement nor repose are involved in its individual concept. This is why Monsieur, it seems to me, that I ought to regard as involved in my individual concept only what is of such a nature that I would no longer be myself if it were not in me, while, on the other hand, every- thing which is of such a nature that it might either happen to me or not happen to me without my ceasing to be myself, should not be considered as involved in my individual concept; (although, by the ordinance of God’s providence, which never changes the nature of things, it could never happen that that should be in me). This is my thought, which, I believe, conforms wholly to what has always been held by all the philospohers in the world. That which confirms me in this position is the difficulty 1 experience in believing it to be good philosophy, to seek in God’s way of knowing things, what we ought to think out, either from their specific concepts or from their individue! concepts. The divine understanding is the measure of the truth of things, guoad se, (as far as they are concerned,) but it does not appear to me that, inasmuch as we are in this life, it can be the measure for us, guoad nos.
96 CORRESPONDENCE, For what do we know at present of God’s knowl- edge? We know that he knows all things and that he knows them all by a single and very simple act, which is his essence. When I say that we know it I mean that we are sure that this must be so. But do we understand it? And ought we not to recog- nize that however sure we may be that it is so, it Is impossible for us to conceive how it can be? Further, are we able to conceive that, although the knowledge of God is his very essence, wholly neces- sary and immutable, he has, nevertheless, knowledge of an infinity of things which he might not have had because these things might not have been? It ts the same in the case of his will which is also his very essence where there is nothing except what ts necessary; and still he wills and has willed, from all eternity, things which he would have been able not to will. I find therefore a great deal of uncertainty in the manner in which we usually represent to our- selves that God acts. We imagine that before pur- posing to create the world he looked over an infinity of possible things, some of which he chose and rejected the others—many possible Adams, each one with a great sequence of persons and events between whom there was an intrinsic con- nection. And we think that the connection of all these other things with the one of the possible Adams is exactly like that which we know has been between the created Adam and all his posterity. This makes us think that it was that one of all the possible Adams which God chese and that he did not at all wish any of the others. Without however stopping over that which I have already said, namely, that taking Adam for an example of a LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. 97 unitary nature it is as little possible to conceive of several Adams as to conceive of several me’s, I acknowledge in good faith that I have no idea of substances purely possible, that is to say, which God will never create. Iam inclined to think that these are chimeras which we construct and that whatever we call possible substances, pure possi- bilities are nothing else than the omnipotence of God who, being a pure act, does not allow of there being a possibility in him. Possibilities, however, may be conceived of in the natures which he has created, for, not being of the same essence through- out, they are necessarily composites of power and action. I can therefore think of them as possi- bilities. I can also do the same with an infinity of modifications which are within the power of these created natures, such as are the thoughts of intelli- gent beings, and the forms of extended substance. But Iam very much mistaken if there is any one who will venture to say that he has an idea of a possible substance as pure possibility. As for myself, I am convinced that, although there is so much talk of these substances which are pure possi- bilities, they are, nevertheless, always conceived of only under the idea of some one of those which God has actually created. We seem to me, therefore, able to say that outside of the things which God has created, or must create, there is no mere negative possibility but only an active and infinite power.
However that may be, all that I wish to conclude from this obscurity and from the difficulty of know- ing the way that things are in the knowledge of God and of knowing what is the nature of the con- nection which they have among themselves and 98 CORRESPONDENCE.
whether it is intrinsic or, so to speak, extrinsic— all that I wish to conclude, I say, from this, is that it is not through God, who with respect to us, dwells in inaccessible light, that we should try to find the true concepts either specific or individual of the things we know; but it is in the ideas about them which we find in ourselves.
Now I find in myself the concept of an individual nature since I find there the concept me. I have, there- fore, only to consult it in order to know what is involved in this individual concept, just as I have only to consult the specific concept of a sphere to know what is involved there. NowI have no other rule in this respect except to consider whether the properties are of such a character that a sphere would no longer bea sphere if it did not have them; such, for instance, as having all the points of its circum- ference equally distant from the center. Or to con- sider whether the properties do not affect its being a sphere, as for instance, having a diameter of only one foot while another sphere might have ten, another a hundred. I judge by this that the former is involved in the specific concept of a sphere while the latter, which was the having a greater or smaller diameter, is not at all involved in it.
The same principle I apply to the individual con- cept me. I am certain, that, inasmuch as I think, I am. myself; But I am able to think that: I will make a certain journey or that I will not, being perfectly -assured’ that neither) the ‘one “nor -the other will prevent me from being myself. I main- tain very. decidedly that neither the one nor the other is involved in the individual concept me. “God however has foreseen,” it will be. said, LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS, 99 “that you will make this journey.’’ Granted. “It is therefore indubitable that you will make it.”’ I grant that also. But does that alter anything in the certitude which I have that whether I make it or do not make it I shall always be myself? I must, therefore, conclude that neither the one nor the other enters into my me, that is to say, into my individual concept. It is here it seems to me that we must remain without having recourse to God’s knowledge, in order to find out what the individual concept of each thing involves.
This, Monsieur, is what has come into my mind regarding the proposition which troubled me and regarding the explanation which you have given. I do not know if I have wholly grasped you thought but such has been at least my intention. The subject is so abstract that a mistake is very easy. I should, however, be very sorry if you had of me as poor an opinion as those who represent me as a hot-headed writer who refutes others only in calumniating them and in purposely misrepresenting their opinions. This is most assuredly not my character. At times I may express my thoughts too frankly. At times also I may fail to grasp the thoughts of others (for I certainly do not consider myself infallible, and such one would have to be in order never to be mistaken), but even if this should be through self-confidence, never would it be that I misstated them purposely; for I find nothing to be so low as the using of chicanery and artifice in differences which may arise regarding matters of doctrine. This even if it should be with persons whom we have no reason otherwise to love, and still more if the difference is between friends. I 100 CORRESPONDENCE.
100 CORRESPONDENCE.
believe, Monsieur, that you wish indeed that I place you in this latter class. I can not doubt that you do me the honor to love me. You have given me too many marks of it. And, in my behalf, I protest that the very fault for which I beg you once more to pardon me, was only the result of the affection which God has given me for you and of a zeal for your salvation, a zeal which has been by no means moderate. l am, iete:, Vil Arnauld to Count Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels.
I am very sorry, Monseigneur, to have given to Mr. Leibniz cause to become so angry at me. If I had foreseen it, I should have been on my guard against saying so frankly what I thought of one of his metaphysical propositions. But I ought to have foreseen it and I did wrong in employing such severe terms, not against him personally but against his position. Therefore, I have felt myself com- pelled to beg his pardon for it and I have done it very sincerely in the letter which I have written him and am sending open to Your Highness. It is also from my heart that I pray you to make peace for me and to reconcile me with a former friend of whom I should be very sorry to have made an enemy by my imprudence.
I shall be very glad, however,-if the matter rests there and if I shall not be obliged to tell him what I think of his positions, because I am so over- whelmed with so many other occupations that I should have difficulty in convincing him and these LEIBNIZ, ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. IOL abstract subjects require aggreat deal of application which I can not devote to them on account of the time which it consumes.
I do not know but that I have forgotten to send you an addition to the Apology for the Catholics. I fear last I may have, because Your Highness has not mentioned it tome. Iam accordingly sending it to you to-day with two Memoirs. The Bishop of Namur, whom the Internuncio has appointed judge, has had difficulty in deciding to accept this post, so great is the fear of the Jesuits. But if their power is so great that justice can not be obtained against them in this world, they have reason to fear that God will punish them with so much the more severity in the next. It is a terrible history and a long one, that of this Canon, whose wickedness apparently would be unpunished if he had not ren- dered himself odious by his conspiracies and his cabals.
This Lutheran minister of whom Your Highness speaks must have good qualities, but it 1s some- thing incomprehensible and marking an extremely blind prejudice that he can regard Luther as a man destined by God for the Reformation of the Chris- tian religion. He must have a very low idea of true piety to find it in a man like him, imprudent in his speech and so gluttonous in his manner of living. I am not surprised at what this minister has said to you against those who are calted Jansenists, since Luther at first put forward extreme propositions against the co-operation of grace and against the freedom of will so far as to give to one of his books the title De servo arbitrio, Necessttated Will. Melancthon, some time after, mitigated these propo- 102 CORRESPONDENCE, sitions a great deal and since then the Lutherans have gone over to the opposite extreme so that the Arminians have nothing stronger to oppose to the Gummarists than the doctrines of the Lutheran Church. There is no cause then for astonishment that the Lutherans of to-day, who occupy the same positions as the Arminians, are opposed to the dis- ciples of Saint Augustine. For the Arminians are more sincere than are the Jesuits. They grant that Saint Augustine is opposed to them in the opinions which they have in common with the Jesuits but they do not think themselves obliged to follow him.
What Father Jobert is requiring from new con- verts gives grounds for hope that those who are con- verts only in name may return, little by little, previded that instruction is given them, that they are edified by good examples, and that the curacies are filled with good men. But it woud be spoiling everything to take from them the vernacular trans- lations of what is said at Mass. It is only such leniency that can cure them from the aversion that has been given to them regarding it. Yet we have not yet been informed of what has been the outcome of the storm aroused against the Année Chrétienne, about which I wrote to Your Highness some time ago.
A gentleman named Mr. Cicati, who is in charge of the Academy at Brussels and who says he is well- known by Your Highness because he had the honor to teach the Princes, Your sons, to ride on horse- back, is acquainted with a German, a very honest man, who knows French very well and is a good Jawyer, even having had a charge as councillor, and who has already been employed to take charge of LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. 103 young Seigneurs. Mr. Cicati thinks that he would be a very available man for Your grandsons, above all, when they make their journey in France and that meanwhile he could render other services to Your Highness. I thought it couldn’t do any harm to give you this information. It binds you to nothing and may be of service to you if you think it best to have somebody with the young Princes— someone who shall leave them neither day nor night. Not knowing the characteristics of Mr. Leibniz, I beg Your Highness to have the above forwarded along with the letter which I have written him.
Vill Remarks upon Mr. Arnaud's letter in regard to my statement that the individual concept of each per- son tnvolves, once for all, all that will ever hap- pen to him: ‘“‘T thought,’’ says Mr. Arnaud, “‘that we might infer that God was free either to create or not to create Adam, but supposing that he wished to create him, all that has since happened to the human race was, or all which will happen is by a fatalistic necessity, or we might infer at least that there was no more liberty in God, supposing that he once wished to create Adam, than there was of not creating a nature capable of thought in case he wished to-ereate’me: 1 “I repliedhat cimst that qa distinction must be made between absolute and hypothetical necessity. To this Mr. Arnaud replies here that he is speaking only of necessity ex hypothest. After this declaration the argumenta- tion takes a different phase. The words “‘fatal JO4 CORRESPONDENCE, necessity’ which he used and which are ordinarily understood as an absolute necessity obliged me to make this distinction, which, however, is now uncalled for, inasmuch as M. Arnaud does not insist upon the fatalistic necessity. He uses alternative phrases; ‘‘by a fatalistic necessity or at least, etc.”’
It would be useless to dispute in regard to the word. In regard to the matter, however, M. Arnaud still finds it strange for me to maintain ‘“‘that all human events occur by necessity ex hypothesi after this single presupposition that God wished to create Adam.”’ To which I have two replies to give. The one is, that my supposition is not merely that God wished to create an Adam whose concept was vague and incomplete but that God wished to create a par- ticular Adam sufficiently determined as an_ indi- vidual. This complete individual concept, in my opinion, involves the relation to the whole sequence of things—a position which ought to appear so much the more reasonable, because M. Arnaud grants here the inter-connection among the resolutions of God, that is te say, that God, having resolved to create a certain Adam, takes into consideration all the reso- lutions which he will form concerning the whole sequence of the universe; almost in the same way that a wise man who forms a resolution in regard to one part of his plan, has the whole plan in view and will make resolutions better in proportion as he is able to pian for all the parts at the same time.
The other reply is that the sequence, in virtue of which events follow from the hypothesis, is indeed always certain, but that it is not always necessary by a metaphysical necessity, as is that instance which ts found in M. Arnaud’s example: that God, LEYENIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS.,. 105