resolving to create me, could not avoid creating a nature capable of thought. The sequence is often only physical and presupposes certain free decrees of God, as, for instance, do consequences which depend on the laws of motion or which depend upon the following principle of morality—namely, that every mind will pursue that which appears to it the best. It is true that when the supposition of the decrees which produce the consequence ts added to the first supposition which constituted the antece- dent, namely, God’s resolution to create Adam—it is true, ] say, that if all these suppositions or reso- lutions are regarded as a single antecedent, then the consequence follows.
As I have already touched upon these two replies somewhat in my letter sent to the Count, M. Arnaud brings forward answers to them here which must be considered. He acknowledges in good faith that he understood my opinion as if all the events happen- ing to an individual were deducible from his indi- vidual concept in the same manner and with the same necessity as the properties of the sphere may be deduced from its specific concept or definition, and as though I had considered the concept of the individual in itself, without regard to the manner in which it is present in the understanding or will of God. ‘‘For,’’ he says, “it seems to me that it Is not customary to consider the specific concept of a sphere in relation to its representation in the divine understanding but in relation to what it is in itself, and I thought that it was thus with the individual concept of each person.”’
But, he adds, that now, since he knows what my thought is, it is enough for him to conform to it in 106 CORRESPONDENCE.
inquiring if it overcomes all the difficulties. Of this, he is still doubtful.
I see that M. Arnaud has not remembered, or at least, has not adhered, to’the position of the Cartesians who maintain that God, by his will, estab- lishes the eternal truths such as are those regarding the properties of the sphere. But, as I share their opinion no more than does M. Arnaud, I will simply say why I believe that we must philosophize differ- ently in the case of an individual substance from our way of philosophizing in the case of a specific con- cept of the sphere. It is because the concept of space relations involves only eternal or necessary truths but the concept of an individual involves sz ratione possibilitatis that which is in fact or which has relation to the existence of things and to time, and consequently it depends upon certain free decrees of God considered as possible. Because the truths of fact or of existence depend upon the decrees of God. Furthermore, the concept of the sphere in general is incomplete or abstract, that is to say we consider only the essence of the sphere in general or theoretically without regard to the par- ticular circumstances, and consequently the concept does not involve that which is required for the existence of acertain sphere. The concept of the sphere which Archimedes had put upon his tomb ts complete and should involve all that pertains to the subject of this thing. That is why in individual or practical considerations, where singulars are dealt with, in addition to the form of the sphere there enters the material of which it is made, the time, the place, and the other circumstances which, by a continual network, would finally involve the whole LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HUESSEN-RHEINFELS. 107 sequence of the universe, provided we were able to follow out all that these concepts involve. For the concept of this bit of matter out of which this sphere is made, involves all the changes which it has undergone and which it will some day undergo.
In my opinion each individual substance always contains the traces of what has ever happened to it and marks of that which will ever happen to it. What I have just said, however, may suffice to justify my line of thought.
Now, M. Arnaud declares that in taking the indi- vidual concept of a person in relation to the knowl- edge which God had of it when he resolved to create it, what I have said regarding this concept is very true, and he grants also that the will to create Adam was not at all detached from God’s will in regard to whatever has happened both to him and to his pos- terity. He now asks if the connection between Adam and the events occurring to his posterity is dependent or independent of the free decrees of God. ‘“‘That is to say,’’ as he explains, “‘whether it is only in consequence of the free decrees by which God has ordained all that will happen to Adam and to his posterity that God has known what will hap- pen to them, or whether, independently of these decrees there is between Adam and the events aforesaid, an intrinsic and necessary connection.”’
He does not doubt that I would take the second alternative and, in fact, I am unable to take the first in the manner in which he has just explained it. But there seems to me to be a mean position. He proves that I ought to choose the latter because I consider the individual concept of Adam as possible when I maintain that among an infinity of possible 108 CORRESPONDENCE.
concepts God has selected a certain Adam, while the possible concepts in themselves do not at all depend upon the free decrees of God.
But here I must needs explain myself a little better. I say, therefore, that the connection between Adam and human events is not indepen- dent of all the free decrees of God, but also, that it does not depend upon them in such a way that each event could happen or be foreseen only because of a particular primitive decree made about it. I think that there are only a few primitive free decrees regulating the sequence of things which could be called the laws of the universe and which, being joined to the free decree to create Adam, bring about the consequences. In very much the same way as but few hypotheses are called for to explain phenomenon. I will make this clearer in what follows.
As regards the objection that possibles are inde- pendent of the decrees of God 1 grant it of actual decrees (although the Cartesians do not at all agree to this), but I maintain that the possible individual concepts involve certain possible free decrees; for example, if this world was only possible, the indi- vidual concept of a particular body in this world would involve certain movements as possible, it would also involve the laws of motion, which are the free decrees of God; but these, also, only as possi- bilities. Because, as there are an infinity of pos- sible worlds, there are also an infinity of laws, certain ones appropriate to one; others, to another, and each possible individual of any world involves in its concept the laws of its world.
The same can be said of miracles, or of the LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. 109g extraordinary operations of God. These are a part of the general order and conform to the principal purposes of God and consequently, are involved in the concept of this universe, which is a result of these designs. Just as the idea of a building results from the purposes or plans of him who undertakes it, so the idea or concept of this world is a result of the designs of God considered as possible. For everything should be explained by its cause and of the universe the cause is found in the purposes of God. Now, each individual substance, in my opin- ion, expresses the whole universe, according to a certain aspect and consequently it also expresses the so-called miracles. All this ought to be under- stood in regard to the general order, in regard to the plans of God, in regard to the sequences of this uni- verse, in regard to the individual substance and in regard to miracles, whether they are taken in the actual condition or whether they are considered sud vatione posstbilitatis. For another possible world would have all such orderings, according to its own manner, although the plans of ours were preferred. It can be seen also from what I have just said con- cerning the plans of God and concerning the prim- itive laws, that this universe has a certain primary or primitive concept, from which the particular events are only the consequences—with the excep- tion of liberty and contingencies, whose certitude, however, is not affected, because the certitude of events is based in part upon free acts. Now every individual substance of this universe expresses in its concept the universe into which it has entered. Not only the supposition that God has resolved to create this Adam but also any other individual substance 110 CORRESPONDENCE.
that may be, involves the resolves for all the rest, because this is the nature of an individual sub- stance, namely, to have so complete a concept that from it may be deduced all that can be attributed to it, and even the whole universe, because of the inter-connection between things; nevertheless, to speak more strictly, it must be said that it 1s not so much because God has resolved to create this Adam that he made all his other resolutions, but because the resolution which he made in regard to Adam, as also that which he made in regard to other par- ticular things, are consequences of the resolve which he made in regard to the whole universe and to the principal designs which determine its primary con- cept; these resolves have established this general and unchangeable order to which everything con- forms without even excepting the miracles which are doubtless conformable to the principal designs of God, although the particular regulations which are called the laws of Nature are not always observed.
I have said that the supposition from which all human events can be deduced is not simply that of the creation of an undetermined Adam but the crea- tion of a particular Adam, determined to all the cir- cumstances, chosen out of an infinity of possible Adams. This has given M. Arnaud opportunity to object, not without reason, that it is as little pos- sible to conceive several Adams, understanding Adam as a particular nature, as to conceive of several me’s. I agree, but yet, in speaking of several Adams, I do not take Adam for a deter- mined individual. I must, therefore, explain. This is what I meant. When we consider in Adam a part of his predicates, for example, that he was the LEIENIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. IIE first man, put into a garden of enjoyment, and that, from his side, God took a woman, and, if we con- sider similar things, conceived sub ratione gencralt- fatis (that is to say, without mentioning Eve or Paradise, or the other circumstances which consti- tute his individuality), and if we call the person to whom these predicates are attributed Adam, all this does not suffice to determine the individual, for there might be an infinity of Adams, that is to say, of possible persons to whom these would apply who would, nevertheless, differ among themselves. Far from disagreeing with M. Arnaud, in what he says against the plurality of the same individual, I would myself, employ the idea to make it clearer that the nature of an individual should be complete and determined. Jam quite convinced in regard to what St. Thomas has taught about intelligences, and what I hold to be a general truth, namely, that it is not possible for two individuals to exist wholly alike, that is, differing solo numero. We must, therefore, not conceive of a vague Adam or of a person to whom certain attributes of Adam appertain when we try to determine him, if we would hold that all human events foliow from the one presupposition, but we must attribute to him a concept so complete that all which can be attributed to him may be derived from his. Now, there is no. ground for doubting that God can form such a con- cept or, rather, that he finds it already formed in the region of possibilities, that is to say, in his understanding.
It follows, also, that if he had had other circum- stances, this would not have been our Adam, but another, because nothing prevents us from saying 112 CORRESPONDENCE.
that this would be another. He is, therefore, another. It indeed appears to us that this block of marble brought from Genoa would be wholly the same if it had been left there, because our senses cause us to judge only superficially, but in reality, because of the inter-connection of things, the uni- verse, with all its parts, would be wholly different and would have been wholly different from the very commencement if the least thing in it happened otherwise than it has. It is not because of their inter-connection that events are necessary, but it Is because they are certain after the choice which God made of this possible universe whose concept con- tains this sequence of things. I hope that what I am about say will enable M. Arnaud himself to agree to this.
Let a certain straight line, A BC, represent a certain time, and let there be a certain individual substance, for example, myself, which lasts or exists during this period. Let us take then, first, the me which exists during the time A B, and again the me which exists during the time B C. Now, since people suppose that it is the same indi- vidual substance which perdures, or that it is the me which exists in the time A B while at Paris and which continues to exist in the time B C while in Germany, it must needs be that there should be some reason why we can veritably say that I perdure, or, to say, that the me which was at Paris is now in Germany, for, if there were no reason, it would be quite right to say that it was another. To be sure, my inner experience convinces me a fosteriort of this identity but there must be also some reason @ prirt. It is not pos- LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. I1l3 sible to find any other reason, excepting that my attributes of the preceding time and state, as well as the attributes of the succeeding time and state are predicates of the same subject; iusunt eidem subjecto. Now, what ts it to say that the predicate is in the subject 1f not that the concept of the predicate is found tn some sort involved in the con- cept of the subject? Since from the very time that 1 began to exist it could be said of me truly that this or that would happen to me, we must grant that these predicates were principles involved in the sub- ject or in my complete concept, which constitutes the so-called me, and which ts the basis of the inter- cennection of all my different states. These, God has known perfectly from all eternity. After this I think that all doubts ought to disappear, for when I say that the individual concept of Adam involves all that will ever happen to him I mean nothing else than what the philosophers understand when they say that the predicate is contained in the subject of true propositions. It ts true that the consequences of so clear a teaching are paradoxical, but it is the fault of the philosophers who have not sufficiently followed out perfectly clear notions.
Now I think that M. Arnaud, discerning and fair as he is, will not find my proposition so strange and, although he may not be able to approve of it entirely, yet I almost flatter myself with having his approbation. J agree with what he judiciously has added, in regard to the care that must be employed in having recourse to knowledge of divine things for the determination of what we should decide con- cerning the concepts ef mundane things. But if properly understood, what I have just said must be 114 CORRESPON DENCE, said even when we speak of God only as much as is necessary. For, even if we should not say that God, in considering Adam, whom he resolved to create, saw all the events which will happen to him, it is enough that we can always prove that he had a complete concept of this Adam which involved these events. Because all the predicates of Adam, either depend upon the other predicates of the same Adam, or they do not. Putting one side those which depend upon others, we have only to gather together all the primitive predicates in order to form a concept of Adam sufficiently complete to deduce whatever will happen to him in so far as a reason Is needed. It is evident that God can discover, and indeed effectively conceive such a concept sufficient to assign a reason to all the phenomena pertaining to Adam; but not less clear is it, however, that this concept is possible in itself. Truly, we must not submerge ourselves more than necessary, when we investigate, in divine knowledge and will, because of, the: great. difficulties;>which there sare. there: Nevertheless, we may explain what we have derived for our question from such a source without enter- ing into those difficulties which M. Arnaud men- tions; for instance, the difficulty of understanding how the simplicity of God is reconcilable with cer- tain things which we are obliged to distinguish from it. It is also very difficult to explain perfectly how God has knowledge which he was able not to have, that is, the knowledge of prevision, for, if future contingencies did not exist, God would have no vision of them. It is true that he might have sim- ple knowledge of future contingencies which would become prevision when joined to his will so that the difficulty above would 5¢ reduced to the difficulties present in conceiving of the will of God. That ts to say, the question how Cod ts free to will. This, without doubt, passes our ken, bre ‘t is not essen- tial to understand it in order ty solve cur question.
In regard to the manner #1 which we conceive that God acts when he chooses the best anioang several possibilities, Ml. /yrnaud has reason to find some obscurity. He seeras, neverthciess, to recog’: nice that I] am inciined to think that there are an infinity of possible firs: men, each one with a reat sequence of personages and events, anc that God chose among them the one which pleased him, together with his sequence. This is not, therefore, so strange as it appears at first. It is true, M. Arnaud says he ts inclined to think that substances which are purely possible are only chimeras. In regard to this, I do not wish to dispute, but I hope that, nevertheless, he will grant me as much as I have need of. I agree that there is no other reality in pure possibilities than what they have in the divine understanding, and we see, therefore, that M. Arnaud will be obliged himself to have recourse to the divine knowledge in order to explain them, while he seems above to have wished that they might be sought in themselves. When I grant further what M. Arnaud is convinced of and what I do not deny, that we conceive nothing as possible excepting through the ideas which are actually found in the things which God has created, this does not at all injure my position, for, in speaking of possibilities, I am content if true propositions may be formed concerning them. For example, if there were no perfect square in the world, we should, 1316 CORRESPONDENCE.
nevertheless, see that no contradiction was implied in the idea. If we wish to reject absolutely the pure possibles, contingencies will be destroyed, because if nothing is possible except what God has actually created then what God has actually created would be necessary in case he resolved to create anything.
Finally, I agree that in order to determine the concept of an individual substance it is good to con- sult the concept which I have of myself, just as the specific concept of the sphere must be consulted in order to determine its properties. Nevertheless, there is a great difference in the two cases for the concept of myself and of any other individual sub- stance, is infinitely more extended and more diff- cult to understand than ts a specific concept like that of a sphere which is only incomplete. It is not sufficient that I feel myself as a substance which thinks; ] must also distinctly conceive whatever dis- tinguishes me from all other spirits. But of this I have only a confused experience.
Therefore, although it is easy to determine that the number of feet in the diameter is not involved in the concept of the sphere in general, it is not so easy to decide if the journey which I intend to make is involved in my concept; otherwise, it would be as easy for us to become prophets as to be Geometers. I am uncertain whether I will make the journey but Iam not uncertatn that, whether I make it or no, I will always be myself. Such human previsions are not the same as distinct notions or distinct knowl- edge. They appear to us undetermined because the evidences of marks which are found in our sub- stance are not recognizable by us. Very much as LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. II7 those who regard sensations merely, ridicule one who says that the slightest movement is communi- cated as far as matter extends, because experience alone could not demonstrate this to them. When, however, they consider the nature of motion and matter they are convinced of it. It isthe same here when the confused experience, which one has of his individual concept in particular, is consulted. He does not take care to notice this inter-connection of events, but, when he considers general and distinct notions which enter into them, he finds the connec- tion. In fact, when I consult the conception which I have of all true propositions, I find that every necessary or contingent predicate, every past, pres- ent, or future, predicate, is involved in the concept of the subject, and I ask no more.
J think, indeed, that this will open to us a means of reconciliation. For, I think, that M. Arnaud disliked to grant this proposition, only because he understood the connection which I held to, both as intrinsic and necessary at the same time, while I fold it indeed as intrinsic but not at all as neces- sary. I have now sufficiently explained that it is founded upon free decrees and free acts. I mean no other connection between the subject and the predicate than that which there is in the most con- tingent of true propositions. That is to say, I mean that there is always something to be conceived of in the subject which serves to give the reason why this predicate or event pertains to it or why a certain thing kas happened to it rather than not.
These reasons of contingent truths, however, bring about results without necessitation. It is therefore true that I am able not to make this 118 CORRESPONDENCE.
journey, but it is certain that I will make it. This predicate or event is not connected certainly with my other predicates conceived of incompletely or sub rvatione generalitatis; but it is certainly con- nected with a complete individual concept because I presuppose that this concept is constructed expressly in such a way that from it may be deduced all that happens to me. This concept is found doubt- less @ parte ret and is properly a concept of myself which I find under different conditions, since it Is this concept alone that can include them all.
I have so much deference for M. Arnaud and such a good opinion of his judgment, that I easily give up my opinions or at least my expressions as soon as I see that he finds something objectionable in them. It is for this reason that I have carefully fol- lowed the difficulties which he put forward and now, after I have attempted to meet them in good faith, it seems to me that I am still not far from those very positions.
The proposition which we are discussing is of great importance and should be firmly established, since from it follows that every soul is a world by itself, independent of everything excepting God; that it is not only immortal, and, so to speak, permanent, but that it bears in its substance traces of everything that happens to it. From it can be deduced also in what the inter-activities of substances consist and particularly the union of soul and body. This inter-activity is not brought about according to the usual hypothesis of the physical influence of one substance upon another because every present state of a substance comes to it spontaneously and is only a sequence of its preceding state. No more ts the LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. 11g inter-activity accounted for by the hypothesis of occasional causes as though God intervened differ- ently for ordinary events than when he preserved every substance in its course; and as though God whenever something happened in the body aroused thoughts in the soul which would thus change the course that the soul would itself have taken with- out this intervention. The inter-activity is in accordance with the hypothesis of concomitants which, to me, appears demonstrative. That is to say, each substance expresses the whole sequence of the universe according to the view or relation that is appropriate to it. Whence it follows that sub- stances agree perfectly and when we say that one acts upon another, we mean that the distinct expres- sion of the one which is acted upon diminishes, but of the one which acts, augments, conformably to the sequence of thoughts which its concept involves. For, although each substance expresses everything, we are justified in attributing to it ordinarily only the expressions which are most evident in its partic- ular relation.
Finally, I think after this, that the propositions contained in the abstract sent to M. Arnaud will appear not only more intelligible but, perhaps, bet- ter founded and more important than might have been thought at first.
PX Letbniz to Arnauld.
Hanover, July 14, 1686. Monsieur: As I have great deference for your judgment, I was glad to see that you moderated your censure 120 CORRESPONDENCE.
after having seen my explanation of that proposi- tion which I thought important and which appeared strange to you: ‘“‘That the individual concept of each person involves once for all, all that will ever happen to him.’”’ From this at first you drew this consequence, namely, that from the single suppost- tion that God resolved to create Adam, all the rest of the human events which happened to Adam and to his posterity would have followed by a fatalistic necessity, without God’s having the freedom to make a change any more than he would have been able not to create a creature capable of thought after having resolved to create me.
To which I replied, that the designs of God re- garding all this universe being inter-related conform- ably to his sovereign wisdom, he made no resolve in respect to Adam without taking into considera- tion everything which had any connection with him. It was therefore not because of the resolve made in respect to Adam but because of the resolution made at the same time in regard to all the rest (to which the former involves a perfect relationship), that God formed the determination in regard to alk human events. In this it seems to me that there was no fatalistic necessity and nothing contrary to the liberty of God any more than there is in this gener- ally accepted hypothetical necessity which God ts under of carrying out what he has resolved upon.
You accept, M., in your reply, this inter-relation of the divine resolves which I put forward and you even have the sincerity to acknowledge that at first you understood my proposition wholly in a differ- ent sense, “Because it is not customary for exam- ple” (these are your words), “to consider the specific LEIBNIZ. ARNAULD. HESSEN-RHEINFELS. be D concept of a sphere in relation to its representation in the Divine understanding but in relation to that which it is itself.’”’ And you thought ‘‘that it was thus also with respect to the individual concept of each person.”
On my part, I thought that complete and com- prehensible concepts are represented in the divine understanding as they are in themselves but now that you know what my thought is, you say it ts sufficient to conform to it and to inquire if it removes the difficulty. It seems then that you realize that my position as explained in this way, to mean complete and comprehensive concepts such as they are in the divine understanding, is not only innocent but is, indeed, right, for here are your words, ‘‘I agree that the knowledge which God had of Adam when he resolved to create him involved everything that has happened to him and all that has happened and will happen to his posterity, and therefore, taking the individual concept of Adam in this sense, what you say is very certain.’’ We will go on to see very soon in what the difficulty which you still find consists. Yet 1 will say one word in regard to the cause forthe difference which there is here between concepts of space and those of indi- vidual substances, rather in relation to the divine will than in relation to the simple understand- ing. This difference is because the most abstract specific concepts embrace only necessary or eter- nal truths which do not depend upon the decrees of God (whatever the Cartesians may say about this whom it seems you have not followed at this point), but the concepts of individual substances which are complete, and sufficient to identify entirely their 122 CORRESPONDENCE.