essence and existence; that the affections are either primi tive, viz.: unity, truth, the good, or derivative, viz.: iden tity, diversity, simplicity, complexity, etc., and, in speaking of each of these terms, to give only vague notions and verbal distinctions is indeed to abuse the name of science. But we must render this justice to the more profound Scholastics, like Suarez x (whom Grotius valued so highly) and admit that there is sometimes in them discussions of value, as upon the continuum, the infinite, the contingent, the reality of abstracts, the principles of individuation, the origo et vacuum formarum, the soul and its faculties, the concurrence of God with his creatures, etc., and even in ethics, upon the nature of the will and the principles of justice; in a word, we must admit that there is still some gold in these scoriae, but it is only enlightened persons who can profit from it; and to load the youth with the rubbish of inutilities, because there is some thing of value here and there, would be badly to dispose of the most precious of all things, time. For the rest, we are" not wholly destitute of general propositions regarding sub stances which are certain, and deserve to be known; there are grand and beautiful truths concerning God and the soul which 1 Francisco Suarez, 1548-1617, a famous Jesuit and a distinguished philoso pher, theologian, and philosophical jurist, was "the last great Scholastic." In philosophy he was a moderate Thomist. As a theologian, he advocated the system known as " congruism." In his Tractatus de leylbus ac Deo h'rjislatore, reprinted, London, 1679, wherein he was to a certain extent the forerunner of Grotius and Pufendorf, he maintained che theory of conditional obedience to authority. For an account of his views on natural law and sovereignty, cf. Larousse, Grande Diet. Univ. de XIXe Siecle, Vol. 14, pp. 1164:0-1165 a; for his "congruism," ibid., Vol. 4, p. 934 a. His Opera omnia, 23 vols., fol., ap peared at Mainz and Lyons, 1630 sq., Venice, 1640, new revised ed., 26 vols., 8vo, Besancon and Paris, 1856-62. The most important of his works are, per haps, the Disputationes metaphysics^, 1605, and the Tract, de leg., cited above. For an account of his philosophy, cf. Stockl, Gesch. de Philos. d. Mittelalters, III. [Vol. 4], 634 sq., and K. Werner, Suarez u. d. Scholastik d. Ictzten Jahr- hunderte, Regensburg, 1861.
Huig van Groot — Latin, Hugo Grotius — cf. ante, p. 285, note 1, one of the founders of the philosophy of law, in his theological writings occasionally cites Suarez as an authority; cf., for example, Opera omnia theoloc/ica, Amsterdam, 1679, Vol. 4, pp. 206, a, 50, 621, a, 54; and in his Epistolse ad Gallon, epist. 154 ad Joa. Cordesium, p. 335, ed. Leipzig, 1674, and new ed. 1684, also Epistolie quotquot reperiri potucrunt, epist. 329, p. 118, Amsterdam, 1687, praises him thus: " Quorsum tantus Suarezii contemtus? hominis, si quid recte judico, in philosophia cui hoc tempore eonuexa est scholastica, tantse subtilitatis, ut vix queinquam habeat parem? " — TR.
CH. vin] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 495 our clever author has taught either in his own right or in part after others. We have perhaps added something also thereto. And as for general knowledge concerning bodies, considerable additions are being made to what Aristotle left, and it should be said that physics, even general physics, has become much more real than it was heretofore. As for real metaphysics, we are beginning, as it were, to establish it, and we find important truths grounded in reason and confirmed by experience, which belong to substances in general. I hope, also, that I have advanced a little the general knowledge of the soul and of spirits. Such a metaphysic was the demand of Aristotle, it is the science which he called Z^rov/xei/^, the~ desired (la desir&e) or that which he sought, which must be as regards the other theoretic sciences what the.science of_happi- ness is to the arts which it needs^and what the architect is to the workmen. This is why Aristotle said that the other sciences depend upon metaphysics as the most general science ' and must derive from it their principles, demonstrated by it.1 You must know also that true ethics is to metaphysics what practice is to theory, because upon the doctrine of substances in common depends the knowledge of spirits and particularly of God and the soul which gives a proper meaning to justice and virtue. For as I have elsewhere 2 remarked, if there were neither providence nor a future life, the wise man would be more limited in the practice of virtue, for lie would refer everything merely to his present satisfaction, and even this satisfaction, which appears already in Socrates, in the em peror Marcus Aurelius, in Epictetus and other ancients,3 1 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphys., A, 2, 98'2a-983a, the object of which is to prove the dependence of the other sciences upon metaphysics, and in which the term fijTeiy frequently occurs in this specific sense; cf. especially 982 b, 7, 8: ef a-ndv- Tiav oiiv Tuiv etpTj/u.evioi' fir'i rr)i> avrrfv eTTKTTrjju.r)!' iriTTTei TO ^rov^fvov ovofia. For the 2 Leibnitz refers perhaps to what he said in New Essays, Bk. I., chap. 2, § 2, Th. (2), ante, pp. 86-87; or in the Preface to his Codex juris gentium diplomaticus, § 13 (Dutens, 4, Pt. III., 2!X>): " Ut vero universal! demonstra- tione conficiatur, omne honestum esse utile, et omne turpe damnosum, assu- menda est immortalitas auiinre, et rector universi Deus," etc. — TR.
3 Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, 121-180, the noblest of the Roman Emperors, whose Meditations or Thoughts exhibit the Stoic philosophy at its best on the moral and religious side, and present a morality nearer to that of the New Testament than that of any other pagan writer. Eds. of the Greek Text ra eis aii-rov by J. M. Schultz, Leipzig, 1802, reprinted by Tuuclmitz, 1821, and n 496 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv would not be so well grounded always without these beautiful and grand views which the order and harmony of the universe open for us even in a future without limits; otherwise the tranquillity of the soul would be only what is called a forced patience, so that we may say that natural theology, comprising two parts, theoretical and practical, contains altogether real metaphysics and the most perfect ethics.1 § 12. Ph. There is doubtless knowledge which is far reby J. Stich, Leipzig, 1882. Eng. trans., The Thoughts of the Emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus, by Geo. Long, revised ed. in Bohn's Class. Library; also Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1804. On his life and philosophy, cf. Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., III., 1 [Vol. 5], 754-763, 3d ed., 1880; Capes, Stoicism (in series of " Chief Anct. Philosophies," pub. by the Soc. for promoting Chris tian Knowledge), chap. 13, pp. 200-239, London, 1880; F. W. Farrar, Seekers after God, pp. 257-317, London, Macmillan & Co., 1877.
Epictetus, the date of whose birth and death is unknown, lived in Rome under Nero, 54-08, and his successors, and, when Domitian in Ut banished all philosophers from the Imperial City, went to Nicopolis in Epirus, and there taught till his death, which appears to have occurred in the reign of Trajan, 1)8-117, or shortly after. At first a slave, but afterwards a freedman, he repre sented Stoicism in the cottage, while in Aurelius we see it on the throne. He left no writings, but his discourses, AiarpijSai, were carefully taken down as far as possible in his own words as he uttered them, by his pupil and admirer Arrian. The best ed. is that by Schweighauser, 0 vols., 8vo, Leipzig, 1799- 1800. Eng. trans., The Discourses of Epictetus, with the JEncheiridion and Fragments, by Geo. Long, in Bohn's Class. Library; also byT. W. Higginson, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1805. On his life and philosophy, cf. Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., III., 1 [Vol. 5], 738-754, 3ded., 1880; Capes, Stoicism, chap. 12, pp. 180-199; Farrar, Seekers after God, pp. 18G-25G, London, 1877. — TK.
1 The old scholasticism made natural theology a part of metaphysics, which included besides natural theology, ontology, cosmology, and psychology. Cf. Thos. Aquinas, Summa Theol., Pt. I., Quest. 1, Art. 1, ad fin.: " Unde theo- logia, qupe ad sacram doctrinam pertiuet, differt secuudum genus ab ilia theo- logia quse pars philosophise ponitur." Leibnitz, in a writing without place or date, which Gerhardt (Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 4, 208, note **) thinks was undoubtedly addressed to the Duchess Sophie, says (G. op. cit., 4, 292, and Foucher de Careil, Nouvelles lettres et opuscules de Leibniz inedits, Paris') 1857, p. 25): "En effect la metaphysique est la theologie naturelle, et le meme Dieu qui est la source de tous les biens, est aussi le principe de toutes les con- iioissances." Cf. also Discours dc metaphys., § 28, G. 4, 453. * Leibnitz finds the source of ethical truths in natural theology, because God, the idea of whom is the subject of natural theology, is also the object of man's highest moral aspiration and effort, so far as he seeks lovingly to comprehend him, a point of view from which Leibnitz sought to develop the ethical con ceptions published under the title of Deftnitiones ethicse, G. 7, 73 sq., Erdmann, 070, trans. Duncan, Philos. Wks. of Leibnitz, 130, and which controls the thought-development in the Preface to the Codex juris f/entium diplomaticus, cf. § 13, Dutens, 4, Pt. III., 290, in the Theodicee, Preface, G. 0, 20-28, E.409, Jacques, 2, 3—4, Janet, 2, 3-4, and in the Discours de metaphys., §§ 2—4, 35-37, CH. ix] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 497 moved from being trifling or purely verbal. But this last seems to be that in. which two abstracts are affirmed the one of the other; for example, that parsimony is frugality, that gratitude is justice; and however specious these and other propositions sometimes appear at first sight, yet when we press their force, we find that it all amounts to nothing else than the signification of the terms.
Th. But the significations of terms, i.e. definitions united with identical axioms, express the principles of all demonstra tions: and as these definitions can make known at the same time the ideas and their possibility, it is plain that what depends on them is not always purely verbal. As for the example that gratitude is justice, or rather a part of justice, it is not to be despised, for it shows that what is called actio' ingrati,1 or the complaint which can be made against the ungrateful, should be less neglected in the tribunals. The Eomans received this action against the Liberti,2 or freedmen, and still to-day it should have place as regards the revocation of gifts. For the rest, I have already said elsewhere 8 that abstract ideas also may be attributed to one another, the genus to the species, as in the statements: duration is a continuity, virtue is a habit; but universal justice is not only a virtue, but it is indeed the complete ethical virtue. j CHAPTER IX OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OUR EXISTENCE4 § 1. Ph. We have hitherto considered only the essences of things, and as our mind knows them only by abstraction, by detaching them from every particular existence, "ol;TleT"i;han that which is in our understanding, they give us absolutely no knowledge of any real existence. And the universal prop- 2 Gerhardt, Erdmaun, and Janet read "les lihertes "; Jacques reads "les lib«res." — TR.
8 Cf. Bk. III., chap. 3, § 10, Th., ante, p. 313. — TR.
4 Locke's title is, "Of our knowledge of existence," Philos. Works, Vol. 2, 498 LEIBNITZ'S CK1TIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv ositioiis of wliicli we may have a certain knowledge, do not relate to existence. Further, every time we attribute anything to an individual of a genus or a species by a proposition, which would not be certain if the same were attributed to the genus or species in general, the proposition belongs only to the exist ence and makes known only an accidental union in the things existing in particular, as when we say, such a man is learned.
Th. Very well, and it is in this sense that the philosophers also, distinguishing so often between what is essence and what existence, refer to existence everything which is accidental or contingent. Very often we do not even know whether the uni versal propositions, which we know only by experience, are not perhaps accidental also, because our experience is limited; as in the countries where water is not frozen, this proposition which will be formed about it, that water is always in a fluid state, is not essential, and we know it by coming into colder countries. But we may take the accidental in a more limited sense, so that there will be, as it were, a mean between it and the essential; and this mean is the natural (le naturel), i.e. that which does not belong to the thing necessarily, but which, nevertheless, agrees with it of itself if nothing prevents. Thus, some one might maintain that it is not indeed essen tial, but that it is at least natural, for water to remain fluid. We might maintain this, I say, but it is not, however, a demonstrated fact, and perhaps the inhabitants of the moon, if there are any, would have reason to believe the statement no less grounded that it is natural for water to be frozen.
There are other cases, however, where the natural is less doubtful; for example, a ray of light always continues straight in the same medium unless it accidentally meets some surface which reflects it. For the rest, Aristotle was accustomed to refer to matter the source of accidental things; l but then we must understand thereby secondary matter, i.e. the heap or mass of bodies.
§ 2. Ph. I have already 2 remarked, following the excellent English author who wrote the Essay concerning Understand ing, that we know our existence by intuition, that of God by 2 Cf. Bk. IV., chap. 3, § 21, ante, p. 439.— TR.
CH. x] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 499 demonstration, and that of other things by sensation. § 3. Now this intuition which makes known our existence to our selves, makes it known to us with an evidence complete, incapable of being proved and having no need of proof; so that even when I attempt to doubt all things, this doubt itself does not allow me to doubt my own existence. In fine, we have on this point the highest degree of certainty that can be imagined.
Th. I am entirely agreed as to all this. And I add that the immediate apperception of our existence and of our thoughts furnishes us the first truths a posteriori, or of fact, i.e. the first experiences, as the identical propositions contain the first truths a priori, or of reason, i.e. the first lights (les premieres lumieres).1 Both are incapable of proof, and may be called immediate; the former, because they are immediate between the understanding and its object; the latter, because they are intermediate between the subject and the predicate.
CHAPTEE X OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD § 1. Ph. God having given to our soul the faculties with which it is adorned, has not left himself without a witness; for the senses, perception, and the reason furnish us manifest proofs of his existence.
Th. God has not only given the soul faculties suitable for knowing him, but he has also impressed upon it characters which indicate him, although the soul needs faculties to per ceive these characters. But I do not wish to repeat the discus sions we have already had upon ideas and innate truths, among which I reckon the idea of God and the truth of his existence. Let us come rather to the fact.
Ph. Now, although the existence of God is the truth most easily proved by the reason, and its evidence equals, if I am not mistaken, that of mathematical demonstrations, it yet demands attention. It needs at once only reflection upon 1 Schaarschnridt translates: "die ersten Erlcuchtungen aus dem Inuern," i.e. the first illuminations from within. — TR.
600 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [UK. iv ourselves and our own indubitable existence. § 2. Thus I sup pose that every one knows that something actually exists, and that thus there is a real being. If there is any one who can doubt his own existence, I declare that I do not speak to him. § 3. We know also by an intuitive knowledge that bare nothing can not produce a real being. Whence it follows, with mathemat ical evidence, that something has existed from all eternity, since everything which has a beginning must have been produced by something else. § 4. Now every being which draws its existence from another, draws also from it all it has, and all its faculties. The eternal source of all beings is then also the principle of all their powers, so that this eternal being must be also all-powerful, § o. Further, man finds in himself knowledge. There is, then, an intelligent being. Now it is im possible for a thing absolutely destitute of knowledge and per ception to produce an intelligent being, and it is contrary to the idea of matter, deprived of thought, to produce it of itself. The source of things is then intelligent, and there has been an intelligent being from all eternity. § 6. An eternal, very power ful, and very intelligent being is what we call God. If, how ever, any one were found so unreasonable as to suppose that man is the only being having knowledge and wisdom, but that, nevertheless, he has been formed by pure chance, and that it is this same principle, blind and without knowledge, which carries on all the rest of the universe, I shall advise him to examine at his leisure the wholly solid and emphatic censure of Cicero ("De Legibus," lib. 2). Certainly, he says, no one could be so foolishly arrogant as to think that he has within himself an understanding and reason, and yet that there is no intelligence governing the heavens and all this vast universe.1 From what I have just said it clearly follows that we have a more certain knowledge of God than of anything else outside us. Th. I assure you, sir, with perfect sincerity, that I am ex tremely sorry to be obliged to say something against this demonstration; but I do it solely in order to give you an op portunity to fill up the void. It is principally in the part 1 Cicero, De Leg., Bk. II., chap. 7: " Quid est enim verius, quam nominem esse oportere tarn stulte arrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem pntet iuesse, in ccelo mundoque non pntet? Ant ut ea qnse vix summa ingenii ratione com- prekendat, nulla ratione raoveri putet?" — TR.
en. x] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 501 where you conclude (§ 3) that something has existed from all eternity. 1 find therein some ambiguity, if that means that there never has been any time in which nothing existed. I admit it, and it follows truly from the preceding propositions by an inference wholly mathematical. For if there had always been nothing, there would always have been nothing, nothing being unable to produce a being; then we ourselves should not be, which is contrary to the first truth of experience. But the consequence appears at once, that by the statement that some thing has existed from all eternity, you mean an eternal thing. But it does not at all follow in virtue of what you have hitherto advanced, that if there has always been some thing, there has always been a certain thing, i.e. an eternal being. For certain opponents will say that I have been pro duced by other things, and these things by others. Further, if some admit eternal beings (as the Epicureans their atoms) they will not think themselves compelled for that reason to admit an eternal being who is the only source of all the others. For if they should admit that this which gives exist ence, gives also the other qualities and powers of the thing, they will deny that a single thing gives existence to the others, and they Avill say also that in each thing many others must concur. Thus we shall not reach by this alone a source of all the powers. Yet it is very reasonable to judge that there is one, and also that the universe is governed with wis dom. But when we believe matter susceptible of thought, we may be disposed to believe that it is not impossible that it may produce something. At least it will be difficult to bring forward a proof which does not show at the same time that it is wholly incapable of it; and, assuming that our thought comes from a thinking being, may we take it as admitted, without prejudice to the demonstration, that this must be God?
§ 7. Ph. I do not doubt that the excellent man from whom I have borrowed this demonstration is capable of perfecting it; and I shall try to influence him to do so, since he could scarcely render a greater service to the public. You also de sire it. This makes me think that you do not consider it necessary, in order to shut the mouths of atheists, to make everything revolve upon the existence of the idea of God in 502 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv us, as some do, who attach themselves too strongly to this favorite discovery even to rejecting all other demonstrations of the existence of God,1 or at least attempting to weaken them and forbidding to employ them as if they were weak or false; although at bottom they are proofs which show us so clearly and in a manner so convincing the existence of this sovereign being by the consideration of our own existence, and of the sensible parts of the universe, that I think no wise man ought to resist them.
Th. Although I am for innate ideas, and in particular for that of God, I do not think that the demonstrations of the Cartesians drawn from the idea of God are perfect. ' I have shown fully elsewhere 2 (in the "Actes de Leipsic," and in the "Memoires de Trevoux") that what Descartes has bor rowed from Anselm,8 Archbishop of Canterbury, is very beau- 1 Descartes relied mainly, and Spinoza exclusively, on the ontological or a priori argument for the proof of God's existence. Spinoza's system, in fact, did not admit the possibility of any other argument, since God is the only sub stance and all other things are merely modes, accidents, or expressions of that substance. Cf. Descartes, Meditations, III. and V., Veitch's trans., pp. 115 sq., 143 sq., Princip. Philos., Pt. I., §§ 13 sq., Veitch, pp. 198 sq., Discours de la Methode, Pt. IV., Veitch, pp. 34 sq.; Spinoza, Ethica, Pt. I., ed. Van Vloten and Land, Vol. 1, pp. 39 sq., trans. Elwes, Vol.2, pp. 45 sq.; letter to De Vries, V.V. &L..2, 34, trans. E. 2, 315. Also on Descartes, Windelband, Hist, of Philos., trans, by Tufts, 392-3, 405; on Spinoza, ibid., 401, 407-10. Leibnitz, while seek ing to correct and complete the ontological argument, makes the teleological form of the a posteriori argument, in his doctrine of monads and their pre- established harmony, one of the constituent principles of his system. Cf. Con- fessio natursB contra atheistas, 1668, Gerhardt, 4, 105-109, Erdmann, 45-47, Dutens, 1, 5-8; Principes de la nature et de la f/rdce, §§ 11 sq., G. 6, 603, E. 716, trans. Duncan, 214, Monadologic, §§.'58 sq., G. 6, 613, E. 708, trans. D., 223.
Leibnitz's doctrine of monads demands the existence of God as its necessary ground and complement. Cf. ante, p. 363, note 1. He regarded all the argu ments for God's existence as valuable and urged men to perfect them. Cf. infra, p. 505, note 2. On his doctrine, cf. Windelband, op. cit., 420-425. — Tit.
2 Leibnitz means the Med. de Cor/., Ve.r. et Id., published in the " Acta Enid. Lips.," Nov., 1684, and found in Gerhardt, 4, 422, Erdmann, 79, Dutens, 2, Pt. I., 14, Janet, 2, 514 (in French), trans. Duncan, 27;.and the De la demon stration Cartesienne, etc., published in the " Memoires de Trevoux," 1701, G. 4, 405, E. 177, Dntens, 2, Pt, I., 254, Janet, 2, 568, trans. Duncan, 136.— TR.
3 Anselm, 1033-1109, archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 till his death, and the real founder of the Christian Scholasticism of the Middle Age, was a dis tinguished philosopher and theologian, whose fame rests chiefly upon his onto logical or a priori argument for the existence of God, and his theory of the incarnation and atonement. His Opera are found in Migne, Patrol. Cw. Compl., Vol. 155. The most important for philosophy are the Ctir Detts Homo?, the Monoloyium, and the Prosloyium. The two latter, with Gaunilo's en. x] ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 503 tiful and really very ingenious, but that there is still a gap therein to be filled. This celebrated archbishop, who was without doubt one of the most able men of his time, congratu lates himself, not without reason, for having discovered a means of proving the existence of God a priori, by means of its own notion, without recurring to its effects. And this is very nearly the force of his argument: God is the greatest, or (as Descartes says) the most perfect of beings, or rather a being of supreme grandeur and perfection, including all de grees thereof. That is the notion of God. See now how existence follows from this notion. To exist is something more than not to exist, or rather, existence adds a degree to grandeur arid perfection, and as Descartes states it, existence is itself a perfection. Therefore this degree of grandeur and perfection, or rather this perfection which consists in exist ence, is in this supreme all-great, all-perfect being: for otherwise some degree would be wanting to it, contrary to its definition. Consequently this supreme being exists. The Scholastics, not excepting even their Doctor Angelicus,1 have misunderrefntation of the Proslor/ium, entitled Liber pro insipiente, and Anselm's reply, Liber apolor/eticus, were edited by C. Haas, Tiibingen, 1863. There is a French trans., with notes, of the Monolor/ium and Proslor/ium by Bouchitte, Le Rationalisme Chretien, Paris, 1842; and an English trans, of the Pros lor/ium and Lib. apoloyet, in the "Bibliotheca Sacra," Vol. 8 [1851], pp. 529 sq., 704 sq., and of the Cur Deus Homo?, ibid., Vol. 11 [1854], pp. 729 sq., 12 [1855], 52 sq. His ontological argument is found in the Proslor/ium and the Liber apolor/eticus. An excellent account of it is given in Ueberweg-Heinze, Gesch. d. Philos., 7th ed., Berlin, 1888, Vol. 2, p. 152 sq., Eng. trans, from 4th German ed., New York, 1871, Vol. 1, pp. 383-86. Of. also Windelband, Hist, of Philos., trans, by Tufts, pp. 291-294; Mulford, The Republic of God, pp. 4, 5, 4th ed., Boston, 1882. For further account of Anselm's life and philosophy, cf. Hasse, Anselm von Canterbury, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1843, 1852 (ontolog. argt. in Vol. 2, pp. 233-280); Stockl, Gesch. d. Philos^ d. Mitldaltcrs, 1, 151-208; Haureau, Histoire de la Philos. Scholastique, Paris, 1872-80, 1, 2(!T>-cS7.
For expositions and criticisms of the ontological argument, cf. Kant, Krit. d. r. Vernunft., ed. Rosenkranz and Schubert, 2, 402-470, cd. Harteustein, 1838, 2, 450-4*J4, 18G7, 3, 405-411, ed. Kirchman, Leipzig, 1877, 1, 470-483, trans. Miiller, 1 vol. ed., 509-518; E. Caird, The, Philos. of Kant, Glasgow, 1877, 030, (>42, The Grit. Philos. of Kant, New York, 1889, 2, 110, 120; Hegel, Vorlcsunr/en ii. d. Beweise vom Dasein Gottes, in his Philos. d. Ri'lif/., Anhang, 2, 357 sq., 2d ed., Berlin, 1840; Dorner, Christ. Glaubenslehre, 1, 201 sq., Eng. trans., 1, 214 sq.; Pfleiderer, Philos. d. Relir/., 2, 271 sq., 2d ed., Berlin, 1S84, Eng. trans., 3, 271 sq. — Tit.
1 I.e. Thomas Aquinas, 1225 or 1227-1274. For his critique of the ontologi cal argument, cf. Numma thcolor/iie, Pt. I., Quest. 2, Article 1; Contra gen tiles, Bk. I., chap. 11; and Stock!, Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittelalters, II., 1 [Vol.
504 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE [BK. iv