been found which as regards many properties, for example, those of maintaining and multiplying themselves, might pass for vegetables with as good right as for animals, and which wrould reverse the ordi nary rules, based upon the supposition of a perfect and absolute sepa ration of the different orders of simultaneous beings which fill the universe; I should be so little astonished, I say, that I am indeed convinced that there must be such, that Natural History will perhaps some day succeed in knowing them, when it shall have studied more this infinite number of living beings, wyhose minuteness hides them from ordinary observation and which are found concealed in the Psychology, led him to surprising glimpses in his views of animate nature. Nowhere has Leihnitz expressed himself so clearly upon this subject, as in the letter to an unknown person, of Oct. 16, 1707, of which a fragment occasioned the notorious controversy between Maupertuis and Konig, 1752. It stands witli many others in Konig's Appel au Public du jugenient de I'academie royale de Berlin, etc. See p. 45. [Then follows the letter]...This is the same letter which the Berlin Academy, under the inspiration of Maupertuis, declared a forgery, and struck off the list of the Academicians Professor Konig as an impostor. — There are perhaps few pieces of Leibnitz, whose genuineness are so certified to the connoisseur, as this letter (which Dutens and Erdmann have overlooked). Voltaire also (in his letter to Konig) recog nized its genuineness at once, although only from motives which he drew from the style. The Academy was right only in the fact that the letter could not have been addressed to Hermann. Cf. Lribn. opp. [ed. Dutens], 3, 531." — TR. 1 Leibnitz probably refers to Johann Franz Buddeus, 16*57-1729, assistant in the philosophical faculty at Wittenberg, Professor of Greek and Latin at Coburg Gymnasium, of Philosophy at Halle, and of Theology at Jena. He published Elementa philosophise practice instrumentalis et theoreticte, Halae, 714 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE bowels of the earth and the depths of the waters. We remarked only since yesterday what grounds have we for denying to reason what we have not yet had occasion to see? The principle of con tinuity is then beyond doubt with me, and might aid in establishing many important truths in the true philosophy, which, raising itself above the senses and the imagination, seeks the origin of phenomena in the regions of the intellect. I flatter myself that I have some ideas concerning them, but this age is not qualified to receive them.
X THAT THE MOST PEKFECT BEING EXISTS1 [From the Latin] I call every simple quality which is positive and absolute, or expresses whatever it expresses without any limits, a perfection.
But a quality of this sort, because it is simple, is therefore irresolv able or indefinable, for otherwise, either it will not be a simple quality but an aggregate of many, or, if it is one, it will be circum scribed by limits and so be known through negations of further progress 2 contrary to the hypothesis, for a purely positive quality was assumed.
From these considerations it is not difficult to show that all perfec tions are compatible with each other or can exist in the same subject.
For let the proposition be of this kind: A and B are incompatible (for understanding by A and B two simple forms of this kind or perfections, and it is the same if more are assumed like them 3), it is evident that it cannot be demonstrated without the resolution of the terms A and B, of each or both; for otherwise their nature would not enter into the ratiocination and the incompatibility could be demonstrated as well from any others as from themselves. But now (by hypothesis) they are irresolvable. Therefore this proposi tion cannot be demonstrated from these forms.
But it might certainly be demonstrated by these if it were true, because 4 it is not true per se, for all propositions necessarily true are 1 Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 7, 261-202. Cf. Gerhardt's Einlcitunrj, 2 Leibnitz had first written: " atque ita ope negationum," i.e. and thus also by means of negations. — Gerhardt. — TR.
3 The words, " idemque est...," were added later. — Gerhardt. — TR.
4 For the following, up to the words: " aut per se notae," Leibnitz at first wrote: "(esset enim necessaria, neque tamen per se nota)" i.e. for it would be necessary, and yet not known per se. — Gerhardt. — TR.
APPENDIX 715 either demonstrable or known per se. Therefore, this proposition is not necessarily true. Or 1 if it is not necessary that A and B exist in the same subject, they cannot therefore exist in the same subject, and since the reasoning is the same as regards any other assumed qualities of this kind, therefore all perfections are compatible.
It is granted, therefore, that either a subject of all perfections or the most perfect being can be known.
Whence it is evident that it also exists, since existence is contained in the number of the perfections.2 Gerhardt says: " In the foregoing is found what Leibnitz brought before Spinoza. The following he appears later to have added: " [The same can be shown also as regards the forms composed from the absolute forms, provided they are granted.]
I showed this reasoning to D. Spinoza when I was in The Hague,3 who thought it solid; for when at first he opposed it, I put it in writ ing and read this paper before him.
SCIIOL.
SCIIOL.
The reasoning of Descartes concerning the existence of the most perfect being assumed that the most perfect being can be known, or is possible. For this being assumed because a notion of this kind is granted, it immediately follows that that being exists, since we framed the notion in such a way that it immediately contains existence. But the question is asked whether it is within our power to conceive such a being, or whether such a notion exists on the side of the thing, and can be clearly and distinctly known without contradiction. For the opponents will say that such a notion of the most perfect being or of a being existing through his essence is a chimera. Xor is it sufficient for Descartes to appeal to experience and to allege that he perceives the same in such a manner in himself clearly and distinctly, for this is to break off, not to complete the demonstration, unless he shows the method through which others also can attain the same experience; for as often as we bring experiences into the midst of the demonstra tion, we ought to show others also the method of producing the same experience, unless we wish to convince them by our authority alone.
1 This sentence up to "omnes perfectiones," was added later. — Gerhardt.
2 At first: " inter perfectiones." — Gerhardt. — TR.
3 November, 167C; cf. Guhrauer, Leibnitz, Elne Biographic, Pt. I., 184. — -TR.
71G LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE XI WHAT IS IDEA1 [From the Latin] First of all (however), by the term Idea we mean something which is in our mind; marks (vestigia) therefore impressed upon the brain are not ideas, for I assume as certain that the mind is something else than the brain, or a more subtile part of the brain substance.
But there are many things in our mind — for example, thoughts, perceptions, affections — which we know well are not ideas, although without ideas they would not be produced. For idea for us consists not in a certain act of thought, but in a power (facultate), and we say we have an idea of a thing, although we do not think of it, provided we can on a given occasion think of it.
There is nevertheless also in this a certain difficulty, for we have a remote power of thinking about all things, even of those of which we have not perchance ideas, because we have the power of recovering them; idea, therefore, demands a certain power near at hand of thinking about a thing or facility.
But not even this suffices, for he who has a method which if he follows he can attain the thing, does not, therefore, have an idea of it. As, if I should enumerate in order the sections of a cone, it is certain that I would come into the knowledge of opposite hyperbolas, although T have not yet an idea of them. There must necessarily, therefore, be something in me, which not only leads to the thing, but also expresses it.
That is said to express anything in which are contained conditions corresponding to the conditions of the thing to be expressed. But these expressions are varied; for example, the model of the machine expresses the machine itself, a perspective drawing of a thing in a plane expresses a solid, an oration expresses thoughts and truths, letters expi-ess numbers, an algebraic equation expresses a circle or other figure; and because these expressions have something common, from the contemplation of the conditions of the expressing thing, we can come into the knowledge of the corresponding properties of the thing to be expressed. AVhence it is evident that it is not necessary that that which expresses be similar to the thing expressed, provided a certain analogy of conditions is preserved.
It is also evident that some expressions have a basis in nature, but others at least are partly based in will (arbilrio), as are the expressions which are produced by sounds or characters. Those things which 1Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 7, 2G3-2G4. Cf. Gerhardt's Einleitung, APPENDIX 717 are based upon nature demand either some similitude, such as exists between a great circle and a little one, or between a region and a map of the region; or at least a connection such as exists between a circle and an ellipse which represents it in perspective (optice), for any point whatever of an ellipse corresponds, according to a certain fixed law, to some point of a circle. Nay, rather, the circle, by any other similar figure in such a case, would be badly represented. In like manner, every complete effect represents a complete cause; for I can always, from the knowledge of such effect, come to the knowledge of its cause. Thus the deeds of each one represent his mind, and the world itself in a measure represents God. It can also happen that those things which arise from the same cause express themselves by turns; for example, gesture and discourse. So certain deaf persons understand those who speak, not by the sound, but by the motion of the mouth.
And so the idea of things existing in us is nothing else than the fact that God, the author alike of things and the mind, has impressed this power of thought upon the mind, so that out of its own workings it can draw those things which perfectly correspond to those which follow from things. And so, although the idea of a circle is not like the circle, yet from it truths can be drawn which in the true circle experience would no doubt confirm.
XII ON THE METHOD OF DISTINGUISHING REAL FROM IMAGINARY PHENOMENA1 [From the Latin] Being is that the concept of which involves something positive, or that which can by us be conceived, provided that which we conceive is possible, and does not involve a contradiction, which we know, both if the concept is perfectly explained, and involves no confusion; and briefly, if the thing actually exists, for that which exists is cer tainly a being or a possible thing.
But as far as Being is explained by a distinct concept, so is Existence by a distinct perception; and that we may the better understand this, we must see in what ways existence is proved. And in the first place, without proof, I affirm existence, from the simple perception or ex perience of which I am conscious within myself; that is, in the first place, myself, thinking the various things, then the various phenomena 1 Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 1, 319-322; Erdmann, Leibnit. opera 718 LEIBNITZ'S CKITIQUE OF LOCKE themselves, or the appearances which exist in ray mind. For these two, since they are immediately perceived by the mind with the inter vention of no other, can be wholly proved, and it is equally certain that there exists in my mind the species of a mountain of gold or of a centaur, when I dream of these, as it is certain that I exist who dream; for each is contained in this one thing, that it is certain that the centaur appears to me.
Let us now see by what signs we may know what phenomena are real. We determine this now, both from the phenomenon itself, and from the antecedent and consequent phenomena. From the phenomenon itself, whether it be vivid, multiplex, congruous. It will be vivid, if the qualities, as light, color, heat, appear sufficiently intense; it will be multiplex if they are varied, and adapted to many tests and to the institution of new observations; for example, if we experience in the phenomenon not only colors but also sounds, odors, flavors, tactile qualities, and those tilings both in the whole and in its various parts, which again we can discuss in various relations (rarm- causis trac- tare). Which things, indeed, a long series of observations, instituted especially with design and with choice, is wont to meet neither in dreams nor in those images which the memory or the phantasy pre sents, in which the image is very often weak and also disappears (dispareC) in the coiirse of the discussion. The phenomenon will be congruous when it consists of many phenomena, the reason of which can be given from themselves in turn, or from some common hypothesis sufficiently simple; then it will be congruous if it preserves the usage of other phenomena which have frequently presented themselves to us so that the parts of the phenomenon have that position, order, result, which similar phenomena have had. Otherwise, they will be suspected; for if we should see men moved in the air, sitting upon the hippogryphs of Ariosto, we should doubt, I think, whether we were dreaming or awake. But this proof can be referred to another head of con siderations assumed from the preceding phenomena. With which phenomena the present phenomenon must be congruous, if, namely, they preserve the same usage, that is, if the reason of this can be given from the preceding, or all agree with the same hypothesis as a common reason. But, undoubtedly, the strongest proof is the agree ment with the whole course of life, especially if very many others affirm that the same agrees with their own phenomena also; for, that other substances similar to us exist, is not only probable, but indeed, certain, as I shall soon say. But the most powerful proof of the reality of phenomena, which, indeed, alone suffices, is the success in predicting future phenomena from the past and present, whether that prediction is founded in reason, or in the hypothesis thus far succeeding, or in the usage thus far observed. Nay, although this entire life Avere said to be nothing but a dream, and the visible world nothing but a APPENDIX' 719 phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough, if, using reason well, we were never deceived by it; but just as we know from these what phenomena must be regarded as real, so, on the other hand, whatever phenomena conflict with these which we judge real, also those whose fallacy we can explain from their own causes, these only we think apparent.
But it must be confessed that the proofs of real phenomena which thus far have been brought forward, howsoever united, are not demon strative; for, although they have the greatest probability, or, as is commonly said, produce a moral certainty, they, nevertheless, do not create a metaphysical certainty, so that the assertion of the contrary implies a contradiction. And thus, by no argument can it be abso lutely demonstrated that there are bodies, nor anything keep certain well-ordered dreams from being objects to our mind, which are considered by us as true, and on account of the agreement among themselves with respect to use are equivalent to truths. Nor is the argument of great weight, as they commonly allege, that thus God would be a deceiver; certainly, every one sees how far this is from a demonstration of metaphysical certainty, for we are deceived by our own judgment, not by God, when we assert anything without accu rate proof. And although there is present great probability, never theless God is not therefore a deceiver who presents this to us. For what, if our nature were not perchance capable of real phenomena; surely God would be not so much to be blamed as to be thanked, for, by causing these phenomena, since they could not be real, to be at least accordant, he showed 'us that which in the entire usage of life would equal in worth real phenomena; what, indeed, if this whole short life were nothing but a certain long dream, and we should awake only in death? a conception such as the Platonists seemed to have; for since we are destined for eternity, and this whole life, although it should continue many thousands of years, has in respect of eternity the value of a point, how small will be the interposition of such a little dream in the full truth, the ratio of which is much less than that of the dream to life; and yet no sane person will say that God is a deceiver, if by chance he should happen to observe any short but distinct and congruous dream in his mind.
Hitherto I have spoken of those things which appear; now we must see about those which do not appear, which, nevertheless, can be inferred from those which do appear. And indeed it is certain that every phenomenon has some cause. Now if any one says that the cause of the phenomena is in the nature of our mind, in which the phenomena are, he will affirm nothing indeed false, but nevertheless he will not express the whole truth. For, in the first place, there is necessarily a reason why we ourselves exist rather than not exist, and although we should assume that we existed from eternity, yet the 720 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE reason of the eternal existence must be sought, which reason must be found either in the essence of our mind or outside it. And, indeed, there is nothing to prevent the existence of innumerable other minds as well as ours; but all possible minds do not exist, which I prove from this, because all existing things have intercourse with each other. Further, minds can be known of another nature than ours and having intercourse with this of ours. Moreover, that all existing things have intercourse with each other is demonstrated both from this, that otherwise we cannot say whether anything in respect to these things happens now or not, and so the truth or falsity of such a proposition is not given, which is absurd, and because many extrinsic denominations are given; nor does any one become a widower in India by the death of his wife in Europe, without a real change happening in him. For every predicate is truly contained in the nature of the subject. If now some possible minds exist, we ask why not all; then because it is necessary that all existing things have intercourse, it is necessary that there be a cause of this intercourse, nay, it is necessary that all express the same nature, but in a different way; but the Cause through which it happens, that all minds have intercourse or express the same thing and so exist, is that which per fectly expresses the universe, namely God. The same cause has no cause and is unique. Hence it is at once evident that many minds exist besides ours, and since it is easy to think that men who are con versant with us can have just as much reason to doubt concerning us as we concerning them, and no greater reason wages war in our behalf, they also exist and will have mhids. Hence already, sacred and profane history, and whatever things pertain to the state of minds or rational substances, are considered as confirmed.
With respect to bodies, I can demonstrate that not only light, heat, color, and similar qualities are apparent, but also motion and figure and extension. And if anything is real, that alone is the power of acting and enduring, and so in this (as it were matter and form), consists the substance of the body; but those bodies which have no substantial form, those only are phenomena, or at least aggregates of the true.
Substances have metaphysical matter or passive power as far as they express anything confusedly, active, as far as they express it distinctly.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS The following Additions and Corrections are made in the interest of the greater accuracy and completeness of the book. The material incorporated therein has been obtained chiefly since the earlier portion of the book was in type. As it could not be introduced in its proper place, it is deemed best to insert it here rather than to omit it altogether. It will be noticed that it per tains chiefly to the earlier portion of the Neiv Essays, the annotation of which, not a part of the Translator's plan at the outset, began with the print ing and has grown with the progress of the work. — TB.
PAGE 3, note 2, add: Erdmann, 677-678. The letter, after speaking of the nature, processes, and extent of our knowledge of physics, proceeds thus: il You enquire concerning the things of spirits or rather concern ing incorporeal things; and you say that we see the mechanical disposi tion of the parts, but that we do not see the principles of the mechanism. Very well, but when we see motion also, then we know the cause of the motion or force. The source of the mechanism is primitive force (vis primitiva), but the laws of motion, according to which impulses (impetus) or derivative forces arise out of this primitive force, proceed from the perception of good and evil, or from that which is most fitting. Thus it happens that efficient causes depend upon final causes, and spiritual things are by nature prior to material things, as indeed to us they are prior in knowledge, because we perceive more immediately (interius) the mind (nearest — intimam — to us) than the body, as indeed Plato and Descartes have observed. This force, you say, is known by its effects, not as it is in itself. I reply that so it would be if we had no mind, and did not know. The mind has in itself perceptions and appetites, and in these its nature consists. And as in the body we know avTirv-iriav, and form in general, although we do not know what the forms of the insensible bodies are, so in the mind we know perception and appetite, although we do not know distinctly the insensible ingredients of the confused percep tions, by which the insensible things of bodies are expressed. Spiritual things are perceived, you say, just as the air, the wind, the light, yet not on that account sufficiently known; but to me the air, the wind, the light seem to be no more spiritual than running water, nor do they differ from this save in subtility. Spirits, minds, and simple substances or monads in the universe cannot be comprehended by the senses and the imagination, because lacking in parts. Do you ask whether I believe that there are bodies which do not fall within the range of vision? Why may I not LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE believe? nay, rather, concerning them I think I cannot doubt. In micro scopes we see animalcula otherwise imperceptible, and the nerves of these animalcula and other animalcula by chance swimming in their own fluids cannot be seen. The subtility of nature proceeds into infinity. Finally you seek for definitions of matter, body, spirit. Matter is that which con sists in antitypia, or that which resists penetration, and so naked matter is merely passive. Body, moreover, has besides matter also active force. Body, moreover, is either a corporeal substance or a mass collected from corporeal substances. Corporeal substance I call that which consists in a simple substance or monad (i.e. in the mind or somewhat analogous to the mind) and in an organic body united to it. But mass is an aggregate of corporeal substances, as a cheese sometimes consists of a conflux of worms. Then a monad or a substance simple in kind contains perception and appetite, and is either primitive or God, in which is the ultimate reason of things, or derivative, that is a created monad, and this is either endowed with reason, Mind (mens), or endowed with sense, that is Soul (cmzma), or endowed with a certain lower grade of perception and appetite, or analogous with soul (animce analoga), which is content with the naked name of monad, since we do not know its various grades. Every monad, furthermore, is inextinguishable; for simple substances can neither begin nor end, except by creation or annihilation, that is, miraculously. And, moreover, every created monad is endowed with a certain organic body, by means of which it perceives and appetizes, although it is variously (e)volved through births and deaths, involved, transformed, and exists in a perpetual flux. Monads, then, contain in themselves the Entelechy, or the primitive force (vis primitiva}, and without them matter would be passive merely; and any mass whatever contains innumerable monads, for although each organic body of nature has its own corresponding monads, yet it contains in the parts other monads endowed in like manner with their own organic bodies serving the primary body; and all nature is nothing else, for all aggregates must necessarily result from simple substances, as it were from true elements. But atoms or extended bodies, and yet infrangible, are a fiction, which cannot be explained except by a miracle, and are without reason; nor may we from them assign the causes of the forces and motions. And although they might be admitted, they would not be truly simple, for this very reason, because they are extended and endowed with parts. Thus I have replied to your questions, and set forth my views, as far as may be in a few words and by letter."
PAGK 9, line 15. For " 1709," read " 1704," and cf. infra, p. 101, note 1, line 3 from bottom, and infra, p. 531, note 2, 1T1T 2, 3, where this por tion of note 1, p. 101, is corrected.
PAGE 13, note 1. Add: translation also in Duncan, Philos. Wks. of Leibnitz, 94-99; German translation in J. II. v. Kirchmann, Die Klein, philos. wichtig. Schrift. v. Leibniz, 86-92 (Philos. Bibliothck, Bd. 81; Erlauterunyen, Bd. 82), Leipzig, 1879.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. 723 PAGE 15, note 2. After "translation," instead of "Appendix," etc., read " Duncan, Philos. Wks. of Leibnitz, pp. 71-80; German translation in J. II. v. Kirchinann, Die klein. philos. wichtig. Schrift. v. Leibniz, PAGE 16, line 22, " Huygens." Cf. infra, p. 150, note 3. On Huygens' physical views, cf. Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 2, 341-397. New ed. Huygens, (Euvres completes, La Haye, 1888-1893, 5 vols., still in prog ress. These 5 volumes contain correspondence only.