PAGE 16, line 30, "pliable." "Leibnitz means," says J. H. v. Kirch- mann, Erlauterungen zu Leibniz, d. klein. philos. wichtig. Schrift., Leipzig, 1879, p. 109, " that, although bodies contain no vacuum, yet from the fact that they can become greater or lesser in extent, the other substances which fill out the gaps of the body proper are by pressure removed from it, or conversely with the cessation of the pressure penetrate into its vacuum. An actual extension or cohesion of a definite homogeneous body, which contains no gaps, Leibnitz does not assume, although the Scholastics affirmed it for a long time." On the development of Leibnitz's views from the atomism to which he was at first inclined, but almost immedi ately rejected, to the dynamic idealism of his monad doctrine, cf. D. Selver, Der Entwicklungsgang d. Leibniz. Monadenlehre bis 1695, Leip zig, William Euglemann, 1885; Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 2, 446 sq.
PAGE 17, line 11, " De Seriebus infinitis." Cf. infra, p. 424, note 2.
PAGE 21, line 12, "Fabritius." Cf. infra, p. 102, note 2. The letter of Fabritius to Spinoza here mentioned is found in Spinoza, Opera, ed. Van Vloten and Land, 2, 181-182; Philos. Wks. Elwes' translation, 2, PAGE 26, line 4, " Clerc." Jean Le Clerc, 1657-1736, Professor of Philosophy, Belles-Lettres, and Hebrew in the Remonstrant Seminary at Amsterdam, 1684-1712, and thereafter of Church History, exercised con siderable influence in the direction of scientific Biblical criticism, and wrote several philosophical works; but his greatest literary influence was exercised through the serials or reviews of which he was the editor, among which were the " Bibliotheque universelle et historique," here mentioned; the "Bibliotheque choisie," Amsterdam, 1703-1713; and the "Bibliotheque ancienne et moderne," 1714-1726.
PAGE 28, line 6, "Understanding." Cf., also, infra, p. 41. The term is used in the sense of the Greek poOs, Latin intellectus, to indicate the totality of the human intellectual powers, the Reason in the larger sense of that term, in the language of Kant and his school, Vernunft.
PAGE 42, line 10, "Plato." Schaarschmidt says: "This comparison is to be considered as provisional only, in order to illustrate the opposition between the author's and Locke's point of view by a familiar example. Strictly taken the parallel does not hold good, as may be seen from the ?24 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE addition Leibnitz makes. Aristotle, that is to say, — to call to mind only the chief antitheses of the respective theories of knowledge, — assumes before all things principles which are peculiar to the spirit as such, while Locke denies the same; Plato, again, recognizes experience by means of sense-perception in a wholly different, more real, sense than Leibnitz and affirms in no wise, as Leibnitz, an absolute spontaneity of the presenta- tive power."
PAGE 42, line 13, " Acroamatic." Of. infra, p. 272, note 1.
PAGE 42, line 5 from bottom, " Aristotle." Schaarschmidt says: "Aristotle has certainly compared the mind (or the Reason — in his language vovs), though not the soul in general, with an unwritten tablet." Of. Hepl *i>xi?s, Bk. III., chap. 4, § 11, Berlin Academy ed., 439 b 31; ed. E. Wallace, Cambridge, 1882, p. 159: Set 5' ourws ua-irep tv ypa/j./j.aTet(i> (j fiyOev virap-^eL evTeXe^elq. yeypafj-fjitvov ' Sjrep avfj.f3a.tvei fTrl TOV vov. " This meanwhile is by no means to be understood in the sense that thought is merely something taken up from without, the spirit a merely receptive faculty. According to Aristotle, the thinking spirit is rather partly re ceptive or passive, partly productive or active, as is clear from this same Bk. III. of the Ilepi ^ux^s-" <?/-, also, Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., 3d ed., PAGE 43, line 1, "Schoolmen." The Scholastic philosophy, to which Leibnitz frequently refers in this and other works, "assumed," says Schaarschmidt, " a three-fold source of knowledge: 1. Experientia, ex perience through the senses; 2. Ratio, the logical faculty of drawing conclusions; 3. Intellectus, the faculty of ideas, which is precisely the understanding (or spirit) of Aristotle, active for itself from within, not creative out of sense-experience."
PAGE 43, line 4, "Prolepses." The Stoics derived general ideas or conceptions, — ttoival ewoiai or TrpoXTj^eis, communes notiones, — like all knowledge, from sensuous perception, explaining them by the persistence and combination of the sense-impressions. They are not to be under stood, therefore, in the later sense as innate ideas, independent of ex perience and peculiar to the spirit as such. The Stoic theory was more like Locke's than like Aristotle's; and according to Plutarch, Placita phUosophorum, IV., 11, considered the soul as originally a blank tablet (tabula rasa), upon which the outer world made its impressions. Through Boethius [470-524] the Stoic theory of knowledge became the source of medieval nominalism. On the Stoic doctrine of knowledge, c/. Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., 3d ed., Leipzig, 1880, III., 1 [Vol. 5], 70-80; Benn, Greek Philosophers, 2, 15; Windelband-Tufts, Hist, of Philos., PAGE 43, line 14, "Necessary truths." "Leibnitz," says Schaar schmidt, "here hints at his later more closely grounded division of truths into necessary and factual (contingent). The former are, according to ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS Leibnitz, the ' eternal truths of reason,' partly logical laws, partly general notions which belong to the mind as such, and are developed out of itself in order to come into consciousness. The latter, the factual truths, are formed by us through abstraction from experience, and therefore real. To this antithesis, further developed in the second book, Kant joins on that of the so-called a priori and a posteriori thought, in that he assigned to the former the character of necessity and universality, to the latter that of contingency and actuality (particularity)."
PAGE 44, line 13, "Innate." Leibnitz, in here maintaining that expe rience can never furnish anything absolutely and universally valid, and is therefore incapable of serving as the foundation of the sciences dealing with and requiring absolutely universal fundamental truths, such as Logic, Metaphysics, and Ethics, indicates in the sharpest and clearest manner his opposition to Locke's theory of knowledge.
As regards the nature of these pure truths of reason and the method by which they arise in consciousness, Leibnitz assumes and maintains that they are developed by the mind out of itself, and thus come into conscious ness. Of this self -development, " this transition from potentiality to actuality (a potentia ad actum}," sense-experience furnishes the occasion, but is not the sufficient reason. Leibnitz to this extent, therefore, main tains against Locke the " Innateness of Ideas." But " he oversteps this idealistic principle in so far as he assumes an absolute spontaneity of the understanding, while at the same time that the understanding itself in its development is plainly shown in reciprocal action with experience, which forms the expression of real relation to other beings. In Leibnitz's theory the ' eternal ' and ' necessary ' truths of reason are in substance the principles of all knowledge, and furnish accordingly not only the ground-principles of the formal sciences, like Logic and Mathematics, but also of Metaphysics and Ethics" (Schaarschmidt).
PAGE 44, line 9 from bottom, "The same reasons hold good." Cf. H. S. Reimarus, 1604-1708, Allgemeine Betrachtungen iiber die Kunst- triebe der Tliiere, 1700, 4th ed. 1798, chap. 2, who, says Schaarschmidt, has treated the antithesis between the knowledge of man and brute, the investigation of which in our times has led to interesting contro versies, better than most of the later writers. Leibnitz assumes a specific difference between the souls of brute and man, and does not at all agree with Descartes' view that animals are living but soulless automata. On animal intelligence, c.f. Romanes, Animal Intelligence [International Sci entific Series, Vol. 44, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1st ed. 1883, 2d ed. 188(5]; Mental Evolution in Animals, New York, 1884, D. Appleton & Co.; Win. "Wundt, Lectures on Human and Animal Pxycholor/y, translated from the 2d German edition, by J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener, London and New York, 1894, Lectures 23, 24, pp. 340-360. Wundt's Lectures include some criticism of Romanes, as somewhat wanting in critical attitude and exhibiting too much sympathetic imagination.
726 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE PAGE 45, line 6 from bottom, " Intellectual ideas." Intellectual, i.e. as opposed to "sensuous" (i.e. belonging to, or arising from, the senses). Leibnitz means to say, says Schaarschmidt, either we fasten our attention upon sense-pictures, whose source is sense-perception, or upon intellect ual, verstandesmassigen (formulated, sprachyeformten), ideas, thought- pictures, for whose rise those general ideas, which Kant called Kategories or original notions of the understanding, are requisite; general ideas which do not arise from experience through the senses, but must belong to our understanding as such and therefore be considered as ' ' innate ' ' or " implanted."
PAGE 46, line 18, "Virtual." I.e. Potential, or, as opposed to " actual," the real-possible. " It is here," says Schaarschmidt, " the faculty through which a substance (the soul) out of its own supreme power goes over into a new condition as for it a new realization. Our soul contains an unend ing number of possible ideas, as capacities, seeds or traces left behind and remains of former activity, which upon definite occasion it realizes, i.e. calls into consciousness. This Leibnitzian application of the — originally wider — Aristotelian concept of power to the soul has become for modern philosophy in the highest degree weighty and fruitful."
PAGE 46, line 7 from bottom, " Reminiscence." On the Platonic doc trine of " reminiscence " or " recollection" {ava^vyatf}, an essential part of his doctrine of Ideas, cf. Windelband-Tufts, Hist, of Philos. pp. 118, 119; Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., 4th ed. 1889, II., 1 [Vol. 3], 823, 824, In Plato's philosophy the ideas which are the objects of our rational thought were intuited by the soul in its pre-existent and exalted state when it dwelt in the presence of the archetypal forms (irapadd'yfjLaTa}, which Plato called ideas (eUSt) or Z5&u). The soul in its earthly life is but dimly, if at all, conscious of these archetypal forms, till the percep tion of their imperfect copies in corporeal things arouses the slumbering recollection and stimulates the soul to reproduce them in consciousness and with the aid of dialectic again to attain the knowledge of true and ideal reality. Cf., also, JVe?o Essays, Book I., chap. 1, § 5, Th. (3), infra, PAGE 47, line 8, "Reflection." "Provided," as Schaarschmidt says, "that Reflection, which with Locke has to do only with the activities of the inner nature as such, receives that further content which embraces the ' eternal ' and ' necessary ' ground-truths, and to which we are in fact led if we keep in mind the presuppositions and modalities under which those activities proceed."
PAGE 47, lines 18, 19, "The book of Boyle against absolute rest." Cf. infra, p. 324, note 2. The treatise is also found in Vol. 1 of the Latin version of his works, Opera varia, Geneva, 1680, and later, with the title Dissertatio de intestinis motibus particularum solidorum quiescent ium, in qua absoluta corporum quies in disquisitionem vocatur. On Boyle, cf.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 727 Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 2, 261-203; Lange, Gesch. d. Matcrialis- mus, 2d ed. Iserlohn, 1873. 1, 255; English translation, Boston, 2d ed.
PAGE 47, line 21, "Doing away with atoms." Leibnitz rejects atoms in favor of his own monads, because the monads contain in themselves the principle of motion as active force, while the atoms are assumed in conse quence of a force in movement foreign to them. On Leibnitz's view and its development, cf. Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 2, 470 sq.
PAGE 48, line 7 from bottom, "Confused in the parts." Cf. infra, pp. 120, 317, note 2, 319, 320, 458, 459. Leibnitz's doctrine of " minute perceptions" or, in the philosophical language of to-day, "unconscious mental states," is of the greatest significance in psychology and episte- mology, and never more so than at the present time. For an excellent exposition of it, cf. Windelband-Tufts, Hist, of Philos., pp. 423 sq., 462 sq.
PAGE 48, last line, " Hippocrates." Cf. infra, p. 476, note 2.
PAGE 49, line 15, "Sufficiently distinguished." That is, to reach con sciousness. The perceptions are not sufficiently strong to call forth a conscious activity of the soul.
PAGE 49, line 12 from bottom, "Author of the most excellent of dic tionaries." The reference is to Bayle. Cf. infra, p. 507, note 1.
PAGE 49, note 1. The note should read: Cf. Vergil, Georg. IV., 393. Gerhardt's reading: "que" is evidently a typographical error. Erdmann and Janet read: "quce mox futura," etc.; Jacques, correctly: quce mox ventura trahantur."
PAGE 50, line 20, " Law of Continuity.'1'' Cf. infra, p. 334, note 1; PAGE 50, note 3. Add: The correspondence of Leibnitz and Basnage is found in Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 3, 73 sq.
PAGE 51, line 7, " JVwmero." Cf., also, infra, p. 332, note 1.
PAGE 51, lines 11-13, "Perfect globes of the second element, born of cubes perfect and original." The reference is to Descartes, PrincipUK Philosophies, Pt. III., §§ 48 sq. Cf., also, New Essays, infra, p. 552, note 1. Mahaffy, Descartes, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, Edin burgh, 1881, p. 159, says Descartes' theory of general physics was elabo rated as regards minerals. This fact perhaps accounts for Schaarschmidt's translation: " des sichtbaren Metalls " and his reference to Prin. Philos., Pt. IV., §$ 70, 75, in his note, Erlauterung, 400, p. 101, to the passage, New Essays, Bk. IV., chap. 16, § 12, Th., p. 532 of his German transla tion. Descartes, says Mahaffy, ibid., p. 159, gave special explanation of the growth of the human body, but that of plants and the lower animals was wanting when he died. On Descartes' theory, cf. Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 2, 89.
728 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE PAGE 51, lines 19, 20, "Present considerations." While the process of abstraction allows us, in order to their better apprehension, to concen trate our attention for the time on certain properties or attributes of a subject to the exclusion of others, yet we must remember that in so doing we are departing from reality and only partially representing it in con sciousness.
PAGE 51, line 20. Instead of the rendering: "If it were very well understood," read, after Schaarschmidt, "If we take it as pure and simple gospel," etc.
PAGE 51, line 29, "Some exception." Nature gives us no perfect circles, perfect spheres, etc. Perfect mathematical regularity of form exists only in thought.
PAGE 52, line 7 from bottom, " Strong-minded." That is, the "Free thinkers," as Leibnitz at other times called them, who thought they might deny immortality itself after the pretended proofs for it given by Scholas ticism had been disproved.
PAGE 53, line 8 from bottom, " Averroists and some bad Quietists." Cf. infra, p. 581, note 1. The Mystics and Quietists approached very nearly this Averroistic doctrine of a denial of personal immortality. In Leibnitz's time the Mystics and Quietists were especially the followers of Madame Guy on, who was ready " to burst from an overplus of divine grace," and of Ant. Bourignon, on whom cf. infra, p. 599, note 2; also, according to Schaarschmidt, Leibnitz's letter CXLIV., Feder, Commercii epistolici Leibnitiani, Hanover, 1805, p. 459.
PAGE 54, note 1. Add: Leibnitz was much interested in the Locke- Stillingfleet controversy, as his correspondence with Thomas Burnett shows. Cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 3, 149-329, passim, and especially pp. 205, 216, and the two essays, pp. 223-242; also Foucher de Careil, Lettres et opuscules inedits de Leibniz, Paris, 1854, Introduc tion, pp. Ixii sq., and Leibnitz's Remarques sur le Sentiment de M. de Worcester et de M. Locke, ibid., pp. 1-26. The latter piece is identical witli that published — not therefore for the first time — by Gerhardt, op. cit., 3, 229-242. The controversy, like that of Leibnitz and Arnauld, served to bring Locke to the further explication and limitation of his views.
PAGE 55, lines 16, 17, "French version." That is, by Pierre Coste, with the co-operation of Locke. It appeared in 1700, then in 1729, and again in 1742. Cf. ante, p. 4, note 1. For the correspondence of Leib nitz and Coste, cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift., 3, 377-436. Before Locke published, in 1(>90, his Essay, he published an abstract, translated into French by Le Clerc in Le Clerc's " Bibliotheque universelle," Janu ary, 1688. Cf. ante, p. 4, note 1, and Eraser's Locke's Essay, 1. 15, note 2. The abstract or " Epitome " is found in Lord King's Life and Correspondence of Locke, new ed., London, 1830, 2, 231-293; Bohn's ed., ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 720 PAGE 55, last line, "Intentional species." Cf. infra, p. 381, note 1. PAGE 56, line 8. For the Latin verse, c/. Ovid, Tristia, I., 8, 7.
PAGE 59, line 4 from bottom, " Inexplicable qualities." That is, the qualitates occiiltce of the mediaeval philosophers.
PAGE 60, line 6 from bottom, "Instructive." Leibnitz, as Schaar- schmidt says, "avails himself of Stillingfleet's polemic against Locke, which is of particular interest because it shows Locke's uncertainty in regard to the weighty question of the substantiality of the soul, to add thereto the statement that the soul must be immaterial. Locke himself, so he argues, has admitted that thought is not conceivable as a modifica tion of matter, or that, in other words, a thinking being cannot be a mere mechanism; thus the soul is to be considered as something immaterial, since the thought, that God may through a miracle have bestowed thought upon matter, is an unpermissible subterfuge." For further discussion of the point, cf. New Essays, Bk. IV.
PAGE 62, line 10 from bottom, " Miracle pure and simple." Cf. infra, p. 428. The doctrine of a purifying fire through which souls have to pass after death goes back to the early period of the church, but became more prominent and was more generally adopted from the time of Gregory the Great (c. 540-604). Cf. Hagenbach, Hist, of Doctrines, ed. H. B. Smith, § 141, Vol. 1, p. 373; § 206, Vol. 2, p. 126. Clement of Alexandria, Stro- mateis, vii., 6, says: <f>a/j.tv 5' i]fj.eis dyidfciv rt> irvp, ov rd Kpta, dXXo. rds dfj.apru>\ovs ^vxds ' ^^P °v T^ Trd/jL<payov Kal fidvavtrov, d\\d rt> fypbviiMv \fyovres, rb SuKVoti/tevof did ^ux^s rrjs Siep^o^vij^ rb Trvp, i.e. " We say that fire sanctifies not flesh, but sinful souls, speaking of that fire which is not all-devouring, such as is used by artisans, but of that which is dis criminative, pervading the soul which passes through the fire " (the phrase "discriminative" (fipbvi/j.oi''), or as Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria [Bampton Lectures for 1886], p. 113, translates it, " wise fire," "comes," says Bigg, "from Heraclitus and the Stoics.") Cf. Bigg, op. cit., 295; Hagenbach, op. cit., § 77, 1, 222. And Augustine, De Civit. Dei, Bk. XXL, chap. 10, Benedictine ed., Paris, 1685, Vol. 7, p. 631, says: "Cur enim non dicamus, quamvis miris, tamen veris modis etiam spiritus incorporeos posse poena corporalis ignis affiigi, si spiritus homi- num, etiam ipsi profecto incorporei, et nunc potuerunt includi corporali- bus membris, et tune poterunt corporum suorum vinculis insolubiliter alligari? " i.e. " For why may we not assert that even immaterial spirits may, in some extraordinary way, yet really be pained by the punishment of material fire, if the spirits of men, which also are certainly immaterial, are both now contained in material members of the body, and in the world to come shall be indissolubly united to their own bodies? " ( The City of God, 2, 435, translated by Rev. Marcus Dods, M.A., T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1871). In chapter 7, after having in previous chapters cited many real or supposed facts from the natural world in support of the pos sibility at least of the view, he admits that it is miraculous and beyond our 730 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE knowledge, and maintains the omnipotence of God as the ultimate reason for belief in miracles. Thos. Aquinas, Snmma Theol., Qusest. 70, Art. 3, Concl., says: "Bespondeo: Dicendum quod ignis inferni [i.e. purgato rial fire, according to the context] non sit metaphorice dictus, nee ignis imaginarius, sed verus ignis corporeus," etc. Only those requiring purga tory go there, according to St. Thomas, cf. Qusest. 69, Art. 2. Bellamin, 154:?-! 621, in his De Purgatorio, chaps. 10-12, investigates the method of the purgatorial fire and follows Augustine in teaching that it is mate rial and miraculous in its action upon the soul.
PAGE 63, line 10 from bottom, "Demons or goblins." "Leibnitz is perhaps here thinking," says Schaarschmidt, " of the so-called Spirits of the Elements (Elementargeister), of which the 'philosophers and physi cians of the past,' especially Theoph. Paracelsus [cf. infra, p. 645, note 1], had treated, both in his Philosophia sagax. and in a special book, De nymphis, sylphis, pygmceis et salamandris, or even of the ' spiritus famili- aris ' of others, as of the Italian philosopher and physician Hieronyinus Cardanus [cf. infra, p. 566, note 1], who in his interesting autobiography [De vita propria~\, chap. 47, discusses the subject and at the same time narrates marvellous experiences of his own past life."
PAGE 63, note 3. Add: In the Philos. Mosaica, and also in his Utriusque Cosmi — Metaphysica, physica atque teclmica Historia, Oppen- heimii, 1617 fol., "God appears," says Schaarschmidt, "as the ani mating and moving principle of things, in that all power streams forth in a miraculous way from him into matter, in order afterwards to turn back again from the thereby occurring differentiation to unity." On Fludd, cf. Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 1, 329; Stockl, Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittelalters, III. [Vol. 4], 472-476.
PAGE 64, note 1. Add: Prof. A. C. Fraser, in his edition of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, Oxford, 1894, follows Coste's French version in separating the introductory chapter from the First Book, and making, with Leibnitz here, but three chapters in Bk. I.
PAGE 64, note 2, line 2. After "1674," add: new ed. with notes by Bouillier, Paris, 1880,2 vols.; line 4, after " Bernier," add: On Gassendi, cf. Stockl, Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittelalters, III. [Vol. 4] 316-327; Lange, Gesch. d. Materialismus, 2d ed., Gerlohn, 1873, 1, 223-234, Eng. trans. 2d ed. 1, 253-269; Lasswitz, Gesch. d. Atomistik, 2, 126-188. On Bernier's later divergence from Gassendi, cf. ibid. 2, 504.
PAGE 65, line 13. Instead of "Doctors," read: "scholars."
PAGE 65, note 1. Add: Lady Masham, 1659-1708, was one of Locke's most intimate and truest friends, kept him by her at her country seat at Oates and nursed him in his last illness. Cf. Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift. 3, 365. Lady Masham presented Leibnitz with a copy of her father's Intellectual System, as appears by his letter of March 29, 1704, cf. Gerhardt, 3, 338.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 731 PAGE Go, note 3. Add: The objections referred to in the text are the objectiones quintm against Descartes' Meditationes de prima philosophia, "which indeed," as Schaarschmidt says, "contain a series of very acute objections and gave Descartes much trouble." The Cinquiemes Objec tions of "Gassendy," with the Beponses of Descartes thereto, are found in Cousin, CEuvres de Descartes, 2, 89 sq., 241 sq.
PAGE 66, line 6, " Inclined towards ethics." Leibnitz, who to a certain extent may be considered as giving utterance to his own views in the person of Theophilus, here throws out a hint to be well taken to heart as regards his own course of development. As a natural consequence of his early studies in jurisprudence; Leibnitz was led to a deeper study of ethical conceptions, and in like manner his study of Descartes made him acquainted with the problems of mathematics and physics, which he thoroughly examined only later after his sojourn in Paris.
PAGE 66, lines 13, 14, "No longer a Cartesian." Cf. the entire context, pp. 66-69, also Leibnitz's letter to Remond de Montmort, January 10, 1714, Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift. 3, 606-607, Erdmann, 701-702, in which Leibnitz gives a brief account of his own philosophical studies and development, including, Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics and thence passing to the moderns, rejecting the " substantial forms" for the mechan ism of the Cartesian system, and then developing his own doctrine of Pre- established Harmony. The difficulties and controversies within the Cartesian School and against it led Leibnitz to his own doctrine, and he remarks in his Considerations sur le Principe de Vie, 1705, Gerhardt, 6, 540, Erdmann, 430, as also in the letter here cited, that if Descartes had known that Nature conserves not only the same force, but also the same total direction in the laws of motion, he would himself have come to the system of pre-established harmony. Cf. W. Sigwart, Die Leibniz* sche Lehre v. d. prastabilirten Harmonie. Tubingen, 1822, pp. 110-112, 117, 118, 121, 132, etc. For Leibnitz against Descartes and Cartesianism, cf. Gerhardt, 4, 265-406; also, Stein, Leibniz u. Spinoza, 60 sq.
PAGE 66, line 17, "New System." That is, The System of Pre- established Harmony, in explanation and defence of which Leibnitz published in the journals mentioned many essays, most, if not all, of which are mentioned later in either the text of the Neio Essays or notes thereto. "Leibnitz," as Schaarschmidt well says, "can truly boast that he has turned to account for his own system moments of all the doctrines named in the text," it being "a characteristic feature of Leibnitz's thought to ascribe a relative truth to each philosophic system and accordingly to wish to extract from it a good side in order, by harmonizing these different elements, to bring to pass the possibly best view of the world." Cf. Leibnitz's letter to Remond de Montmort, January 10, 1714, Gerhardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift. 3, 606, Erdmann, 701: " Outre que j'ay eu soin de tout diriger a 1'edification, j'ay tache de de"terrer et de re"unir la ve"rite ensevelie et dissipe"e sous les opinions des differentes Sectes des Philosophes, 732 LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE et je crois y avoir adjoute quelque chose du mien pour faire quelques pas en avant."
PAGE 66, note 1. Add: Geronimo Rorario, 1485-1566, an Italian Iitt6rateur, Nuncio of Clement VII. at the Court of Ferdinand, King of Hungary, maintained, against the Cartesians and the followers of Aristotle, that the beasts have reason and make better use of it than man. His book, Quod animalia bruta scepe ratione utantur melius homine, appeared first in 1648, then 1654 at Amsterdam.
PAGE 67, lines 3, 4, "Life and perception in all things." The doctrine of the universal soulhood (Allbeseeltheit) goes back to the world-soul of Plato, as developed especially by Plotinus (c/. Windelband-Tufts, Hist, of Philos., 245 s<?.), and is connected in part therewith, and partly with the pantheistic tendencies represented, for example, by the Averroists (c/. New Essays, infra, p. 581, note 1). Leibnitz rejects both errors by his Monadology, which conceives the universal soulhood of substances in an individual and not in a pantheistic way. In modern times the doctrine appears in Giordano Bruno, 1548-1600 (cf. Delia Causa, Vol. II., pp. 239- 241, ed. A. Wagner, Leipzig, 1829, new ed. by P. de Lagarde, 2 vols., Gottingen, 1888, German trans, by Lasson, Berlin, 1872, in J. H. v. Kirch- mann's Philos. Bibliothek, Vol. 53), and in Jacob Boehme (cf. infra, p. 298, note 1). On the doctrine as found in Bruno and Boehme, cf. Windelband-Tufts, op. cit., 367 sq., 373 sq. Spinoza, Ethica, Pt. II., Prop. XIII., Scholium, ed. Van Vloten and Land, 1, 86-88; Elwes' trans., 2, 92, also gives expression to the same thought.