FOREWORD THE author, Rabbi Moses (may God preserve him!) said:1 We have already explained in the introduction to this work (i. e. the Commentary on the Mishnati) the reason the author of the JMishnah had for putting this treatise (Abot) in this Order (Nezikin)2. "We have also mentioned the great benefit that is to be derived from this treatise, and have promised many times in preceding passages to discuss certain important points at some length in commenting upon it. For, although the contents of the treatise seem clear and easy to under- stand, yet to carry out all that it contains is not a simple matter for everybody. Moreover, not all of its contents is in- telligible without ample comment, withal that it leads to great perfection and true happiness. For these reasons, I have deemed it advisable here to go into a more lengthy discussion. Besides, our Rabbis of blessed memory have said, "He who wishes to be saintly, let him practise the teachings of Abot"3. Now, there is nothing that ranks so high with us as saintliness, unless it be prophecy, and it is saintliness that paves the way to prophecy; as our Rabbis of blessed memory said, "Saintliness leads to holy inspiration." * Thus, their words make it clear 1 See Hebrew text p. 5, n. 2. The introductory words are by ibn Tibbon.
2 See Goldschmidt, Der Bdbylonische Talmud, I, Berlin, 1897, Einleitung in die MiSnah von Moses Maimonides, p. XXX; and Hebrew Review, vol. I, p. 191.
« 'Abodah Zarah, 20 b: K»n TNT T^ rwna m» riijjf *\*b rwaa nrron TV nto3» KBH rwv FOREWORD 35 that the putting into practice of the teachings of this tractate leads one to prophecy. I shall later expound the truth of this assertion, because upon it depends a number of ethical prin- ciples.
Further, I deem it fit to preface the commentary on the re- spective Haldkot1 proper by some useful chapters, from which the reader may learn certain basic principles which may later serve as a key to what I am going to say in the commentary. Know, however, that the ideas presented in these chapters and in the following commentary are not of my own invention; neither did I think out the explanations contained therein,2 but I have gleaned them from the words of the wise occurring in the Midrashim, in the Talmud, and in other of their works, as well as from the words of the philosophers, ancient and recent, and also from the works of various authors,3 as one 1 I. e., the verses of Abot.
2 See H. Malter, Shem Tob Joseph Palquera, in JQ R (new series), vol. I, p. 163, n. 21.
3 The "ancient" philosophers upon whom M. drew, although not always from the sources (see Munk, Guide, I, p. 345, n. 4; Rosin, Ethik, p. 5, n. 4), are Socrates, Plato, the Stoics, especially Aristotle (see Introduction, p. 5, n. 2), Alexander of Aphrodisias (Moreh, I, 31; II, 3), and Themistius (Ibid., I, 71). By the "recent" philosophers M. means Abu Nasr al-Farabi (Ibid., I, 73, 74; II, 15, 18, 19; III, 18), Ibn Sina, al-Gazzali, Abu Bekr Ibn al-Zaig (Ibid., I, 74; II, 24 twice; III, 29), but hardly Ibn Roshd (Averroes). The "works of various authors" refers to the ethical writings of M.'s Jewish predecessors, among whom were Saadia, Ibn Gabirol, Bahya, Bar Hiya, Ibn Zaddik, Yehudah ha-Levi, Abraham Ibn Ezra, and Ibn Daud. See M.'s Letter to Ibn Tibbon, in Kobe? Teshubot ha-Rambam, II, 28b; Munk, Ibid., I, p. 107, n. 1; p. 345, n.' 4; p. 433, n. 2; 434, n. 4; III, p. 417, n. 2, and p. 438, n. 4; Beer, Rabbi Moses ben Maimon pp. 47-50; Geiger, Nachgelassene Schriften, III, Moses ben Maimon, p. 41; Kaufmann, Attri- butenlehre, p. 324, n. 186; Rosin, Ibid., pp. 5-25, 96, n. 3; Wolff, Acht Capitel, Introduction, XII-XIII; Cohen, Charakteristik, in Moses ben Maimon, I p. 79; in JE, articles on the Greek, Arabic, and Jewish philosophers mentioned in this note, and article by I. Broyde, Arabic Philosophy— Its Influence on Judaism, II, p. 58. On M.'s relation to Ibn Roshd, see Munk, Notice sur Joseph ben-Jehouda, p. 31, and n. 1; Steinschneider, Catal. Bodl., Moses Maimonides.
c* 36 should accept the truth from whatever source it proceeds.1 Sometimes, I may give a statement in full, word for word in the author's own language, but there is no harm in this, and it is not done with the intention of glorifying myself by pre- senting as my own something that was said by others before me, since I have just confessed (my indebtedness to others), even though I do not say "so and so said", which would ne- cessitate useless prolixity. Sometimes, too, the mentioning of the name of the authority drawn upon might lead one who lacks insight to believe that the statement quoted is faulty, and wrong in itself, because he does not understand it. Therefore, I prefer not to mention the authority, for my intention is only to be of service to the reader, and to elucidate for him the thoughts hidden in this tractate. I shall now begin the chapters, which, in accordance with my intention, are to serve here as an introduction, which is to consist of eight chapters.
1 See Jaraczewski, Die Ethik des Maimonides, etc., in ZPhKr., XL VI, p. 9; and H. Malter, Ibid., p. 169, n. 31.
CHAPTER I CONCERNING THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES* KNOW that the human soul is one,2 but that it has many diversified activities. Some of these activities have, indeed, been called souls, which has given rise to the opinion that man has many souls, as was the belief of the physicians, with the result that the most distinguished of them3 states in the introduction of his book that there are three souls, the physical, the vital, and the psychical.4 These activities are called faculties and * For a discussion of the contents of this chapter, see Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., c. I; Jaraczewski, ZPhKr., XL VI, pp. 9 — 10; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 45 ff. A summary of the Perakim is found in Speier, The Three- fold Cord (London, 1891), Appendix.
2 In Moreh, I, 41, M. explains the term soul (B>D3) as being " the vital- ity which is common to all sentient beings." Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, c. 1 (ed. Hicks, pp. 50 and 51), "Hence soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of life." On the homonymous use of the word WBi, see Moreh, loc. cit.
* Hippocrates, the creator of medical science. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 45; Wolff, Acht Oapitel, p. 1, n. 2; M. Schloessinger, in JE., VI, p. 403.
* M. opposes the belief in the existence of three souls, but uses this classification to designate a threefold division of the soul's faculties, al- though, later in this chapter (see infra, pp. 38 — 39), he divides the faculties into five classes. In Moreh, III, 12, he points to the threefold division of the faculties, where he says, "all physical, psychical, and vital forces and organs that are possessed by one individual are found also in the other individuals." See, also, ibid., Ill, 46 (end), where the appetitive (mttnn), the vital (JViVnn), and the psychic (rfH&BJn) faculties are enumerated. Bahya, Ibn Gabirol, and Ibn Zaddik seem to have believed in the existence of three souls in man. See I. Broyde in JE., vol. xi, art. Soul. Abraham ibn Daud, in Emunah Ramah, I, 6 (ed. Weil, 1842), also, opposed the belief of the physicians, supporting the Aristotelian view of the unity of the soul, as did M. Consult Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., p. 11, n. 3; Munk, Guide, I, p. 355, n. 1; idem, Melanges, p. 38, n. 1; p. 40, n. 3; p. 54, n. 2; Rosin, Ethik, p. 45, n. 1; Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, p. 398, n. 60.
38 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES parts, so that the phrase "parts of the soul," frequently employed by philosophers, is commonly used. By the word "parts", how- ever, they do not intend to imply that the soul is divided into parts as are bodies, but they merely enumerate the different activities of the soul as being parts of a whole, the union of which makes up the soul.
Thou knowest that the improvement of the moral qualities is brought about by the healing of the soul and its activities.1 Therefore, just as the physician, who endeavors to cure the human body, must have a perfect knowledge of it in its entirety and its individual parts, just as he must know what causes sickness that it may be avoided, and must also be acquainted with the means by which a patient may be cured, so, likewise, he who tries to cure the soul, wishing to improve the moral qualities, must have a knowledge of the soul in its totality and its parts, must know how to prevent it from becoming diseased, and how to maintain its health.2 So, I say that the soul has five faculties; the nutritive [also known as the "growing" faculty], the sensitive, the imaginative, 1 The phrase, the improvement of the moral qualities (nvran Jipfi, Ar. p«!?5«^« riN^SK), is one which M. probably borrowed from Ibn Gabirol, author of Tikkun Middot ha-Nefesh (The Improvement of the Moral Qualities) to designate the practical task of ethics. Cf. Rosin, Ethik, pp. 12, 37, n. 5. M. is not concerned with a theoretical discussion of ethics, but with the problem as to how one's moral qualities are to be improved, which is a practical question. Therefore, the science of curing the soul is to him as practical as is that of healing the body. What Aristotle says in Eth. Nic., II, 2 may well apply here. "Since, then, the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation, as it is of some others (for we are inquiring not merely that we may know what virtue is, but that we may become virtuous, else it would be useless), we must consider as to the particular actions how we are to do them, because, as we have just said, the character of the habits that shall be formed depends on these."
2 Philo, too, speaks of a physician of the soul (Quod Omnis Probus Liber, I, 2). Cf. Eth. Nic., I, 12, where Aristotle states that it is necessary for the Politician (moralist) to have a certain knowledge of the nature of the soul, just as it is for the oculist to have a knowledge of the whole body, and in fact more so, as Politics (ethics) is more important than the healing art.
the appetitive, and the rational.1 We have already stated in this chapter that our words concern themselves only with the human soul; for the nutritive faculty by which man is nourished is not the same, for instance, as that of the ass or the horse. Man is sustained by the nutritive faculty of the human soul, the ass thrives by means of the nutritive faculty of its soul, and the palm-tree2 flourishes by the nutritive faculty peculiar to its soul. Although we apply the same term nutrition to all of them indiscriminately, nevertheless, its signification is by no means the same. In the same way, the term sensation is used homonymously 3 for man and beast; not with the idea, however, 1 M. agrees with Aristotle as to the number of the divisions of the faculties of the soul, but instead of the latter's faculty of motion, has that of imagination. 5wd/j.ea 8' etiropev ^pfirTixbv (}in), 6peicnK6t> (TWriOn), ai<r§r)ruc6i> (B^iltan), KivT)riKbv KO.T& rbmov, 5iavoriTu<6i> (^5tWl). De Anima, II, 3, ed. Hicks, pp. 58 and 59. M.'s division is preferable to that of Aristotle, motion being subservient to the appetitive and the rational faculties, as Aristotle himself states (De Motu Animalium, chaps. 6 and 8). M. considers motion, espe- cially that of the limbs of the body, to be dependent upon the appetitive faculty (see infra, p. 43), and to be "an accident pertaining to living things" (Moreh, I, 26). Of., also, ibid. I, 46 (n pn mptt ^3K Tin Dxutt ny« jmnnff); and Aristotle, Physics, V, 2. See Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., p. 11, n. 3; p. 14, n. 4. Al-Farabi (niKSwn m!?nnn, in epDHH IBD, Leipzig, 1849, p. 2) divides the faculties as follows: nonon nsni rumen rDm(^3»n of M.)rnnon ran BPjnion nsni. In making his division, M. seems to have had in mind the divi- sions of Aristotle and al-Farabi. By adding the nutritive faculty (jtn), which Aristotle includes in his list, to the list of al-Farabi we have M.'s list. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 47, n. 4.
3 n»n *|in»a; Ar. DDN^K -jN-intPfcO, homonymously, i. e. the participation of two things in the same name. In Millot ha-Higgayon, c. XII, M. defines this term as follows. "If a noun has a number of significations it is a homonym The word ^y, which is used to designate the eye which sees, and a fountain, is a homonym. The common or appelative noun (see Munk, Guide, I, Introd., p. 6, n. 2) designates something common to two or more things, and by such a word we recognize, as regards each of these things, the class to which it belongs on account of the conception of the thing which each shares in common, as, for instance, the word living (Tl) which is applied to a man, a horse, a scorpion, and a fish; for life, which consists of nutrition and sensation, is a common possession of each one of these species." In this sense, the words nutrition (]NJ) and 40 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES that the sensation of one species is the same as that of another, for each species has its own characteristic soul distinct from every other, with the result that there necessarily arises from each soul activities peculiar to itself. It is possible, however, that an activity of one soul may seem to be similar to that of another, in consequence of which one might think that both belong to the same class, and thus consider them to be alike; but such is not the case.
By way of elucidation, let us imagine that three dark places are illumined, one lit up by the sun shining upon it, the second by the moon, and the third by a flame. Now, in each of these places there is light, but the efficient cause in the one case is the sun, in the other the moon, and in the third the fire. So it is with sensation and its causes. In man it is the human soul, in the ass it is the soul of the ass, and in the eagle, the soul of the eagle. These sensations have, moreover, nothing in common, except the homonymous term which is applied to them. Mark well this point, for it is very important, as many so-called philosophers have fallen into error regarding it, in consequence of which they have been driven to absurdities and fallacies.
Returning to our subject of the faculties of the soul, let me say that the nutritive faculty consists of (1) the power of at- tracting nourishment to the body, (2) the retention of the same, (3) its digestion (assimilation), (4) the repulsion of superfluities, (5) growth, (6) procreation, and (7) the differentiation of the nutritive juices that are necessary for sustenance from those which are to be expelled.1 The detailed discussion of these seven faculties — the means by which and how they perform their functions, in which members of the body their operations are most visible and perceptible, which of them are always present, and which disappear within a given time — belongs to the science of medicine, and need not be taken up here.
The faculty of sensation consists of the five well-known senses 1 The first four of these powers are discussed with more detail in Moreh, I, 72. See Munk, Guide, I, p. 367, n. 6.
of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling, the last of which is found over the whole surface of the body, not being confined to any special member, as are the other four faculties. The imagination is that faculty which retains impressions of things perceptible to the mind, after they have ceased to affect directly, the senses which conceived them. This faculty, com- bining some of these impressions and separating others from one another, thus constructs out of originally perceived ideas some of which it has never received any impression, and which it could not possibly have perceived. For instance, one may imagine an iron ship floating in the air, or a man whose head reaches the heaven and whose feet rest on the earth, or an animal with a thousand eyes, and many other similar impossi- bilties which the imagination may construct and endow with an existence that is fanciful.1 In this regard, the Mutakallimun11 1 M. defines imagination in Moreh, I, 73, Tenth Proposition, Note. It is the opposite of the intellect which "analyzes and divides the component parts of things, it forms abstract ideas of them, represents them in their true form as well as in their causal relations, derives from one object a great many facts, which — for the intellect — totally differ from each other, just as two human individuals appear different to the imagination; it distinguishes that which is the property of the genus from that which is peculiar to the individual, — and no proof is correct unless founded on the former; the intellect further determines whether certain qualities of a thing are essential or non-essential. Imagination has none of these functions. It only perceives the individual, the compound in that aggregate condition in which it presents itself to the senses; or it combines things which exist separately, joins some of them together, and represents them all as one body or as a force of the body. Hence it is that some imagine a man with a horse's head, or with wings, etc. This is called a fiction, a phantasm; it is a thing to which nothing in the actual world corresponds. Nor can imagination in any way obtain a purely immaterial image of an object, however abstract the form of the image may be. Imagination yields, therefore, no test for the reality of a thing." Further (ibid. II, 36) it is stated that part of the functions of the imagination is to retain im- pressions by the senses, to combine them, and chiefly to form images. The most perfect developement of the imaginative faculty results in prophecy. See infra, p. 47, and n. 3.
a The Mutakallimun were a sect of dogmatic or religious philosophers who tried to harmonize Mohammedan theology with Aristotelian philosophy. Starting with the "word of God" (kaJdm, A6-yos), as contained in the Koran, 42 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES have fallen into grievous and pernicious error, as a result of which their false theories form the corner-stone of a sophistical system which divides things into the necessary, the possible, and the impossible; so that they believe, and have led others to believe, that all creations of the imagination are possible, not having in mind, as we have stated, that this faculty may at- tribute existence to that which cannot* possibly exist.1 The appetitive is that faculty by which a man desires, or loathes a thing, and from which there arise the following they endeavored to reconcile revelation with philosophy. I. T., in his Glossary of Strange Words, harshly criticizes them as "a sect of pseudo- scientists without wisdom." T. J. De Boer says of their system of philo- sophy, "An assertion, expressed in logical or dialectic fashion, whether verbal or written, was called by the Arabs, — generally, but more particularly in religious teaching— Kalam (A6yoj), and those who advanced such assertions were called Mutakallimun. The name was transferred from the individual assertion to the entire system, and it covered also the intro- ductory, elementary observations on Method, — and so on. Our best de- signation for the science of the Kalam is 'Theological Dialectics' or simply 'Dialectics', and in what follows we may translate Mutakallimun by 'Dialecticians'," Geschichte der Philosophic im Islam, Stuttgart, 1901, p. 43 ff.; Eng. ed., London, 1903, pp. 42-43. To M. we are indebted for a knowledge of the details of the system of the Mutakallimun, which he describes in a masterly way in his famous attack on the Kalam (Moreh, I, 71 — 76). He is vehemently opposed to them, not because of the views they held in regard to the universe and God, many of which coincided with his own, but on account of the method they pursued in arriving at their conclusions. On the Mutakallimun, and the Kalam, see Yehudah ha-Levi, Cuzari, c. V; Munk, Melanges, pp. 311-312, 318 if.; idem, article Arabes, in Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques; idem, Notice sur R. Saadia Gaon, p. 156 ff.; idem, Guide, I, p. 335, n. 2; Steinschneider, Heb. Lit., p. 117; idem, HUb., p. 415; Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, see index; M. Gut- mann, Das Religionsphil. Syst. d. Mutakallimun nach der Berichte des Mai- mun, Leipzig, 1885; Ludwig Stein, in AGPh., vol.' XI, pp. 330-334; Schreiner, Der Kalam in der judischen Literatur, Berlin, 1895; S. Horo- vitz, in ZDMG, 57, p. 177 ff.; I. Goldziher, Vorlesungen uber den Islam, (Heidelberg, 1910), p. 100 f.; 127 f.; 129; 172 f.; 177 f.; etc.
1 Cf. Moreh, I, 73, Tenth Proposition, in which M. describes the theory of admissibility of the Mutakallimun, which forms the principal support of their doctrine (n&Dn lies inn irror IPX rra»nn n«» NTI rrw»n nonpnn D^aion). Everything conceived by the imagination, they maintain, is ad- mitted as possible. Cf., also, ibid., I, 49; III, 15. See Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., pp. 12-13; Munk, Guide, I, p. 400, n. 2.
activities: the pursuit of an object or flight from it, inclination and avoidance, anger and affection, fear and courage, cruelty and compassion, love and hate, and many other similar psychic qualities.1 All parts of the hody are subservient to these ac- tivities, as the ability of the hand to grasp, that of the foot to walk, that of the eye to see, and that of the heart to make one bold or timid. Similarily, the other members of the body, whether external or internal, are instruments of the appetitive faculty.* Reason, that faculty peculiar to man, enables him to under- stand, reflect, acquire knowledge of the sciences, and to discriminate between proper and improper actions.3 Its functions are partly practical and partly speculative (theoretical), the practical being, in turn, either mechanical or intellectual. By means of the spe- culative power, man knows things as they really are, and which, by their nature, are not subject to change. These are called the sciences4 in general. The mechanical power is that by onp&n, psychic accidents. Cf. Moreh, I, 51. "It is a self- evident fact that the attribute is not inherent in the object to which it is ascribed, but it is superadded to its essence, and is consequently an ac- cident." See, also, ibid., I, 73. Fourth Proposition. With M.'s description of the appetitive faculty compare that of al-Farabi, in niNSDJn JY6nrn, p. 2: i«,UDD man? 1« lain ppanso rvaruMn rmwnnn,T.T na w« ton m-njnsm nsnvn,na'«m wnm,nan«m n«:»n IT.T iai,inp'riT» i«,inDK&n» IN irn«rv» .»Bjn npa n«Bn nw&mm nmoNm,pvn warn,]inttani 2 Cf. Moreh,I,46 •. tfsan m^»s^ D^D D^ID "o-'isni nno nmjn nnx no«n 0^12 o^an 'D1 niB^nnDn. All the organs of the body are employed in the various actions of the soul. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III, 10, ed. Hicks, pp. 152 and 153.
3 Cf. Millot ha-Higgayon, c. XIV (beg.): "The word dibbur as used by former philosophers of cultured nations, is a homonym having three significations. In the first place, it is used to designate that power peculiar to man by which he forms conceptions, acquires a knowledge of the sciences, and differentiates between the proper and the improper. This is called the reasoning faculty or soul." Cf. Ibn Daud, Emunah Ramah, I, 6.
4 CLEth.Nic., VI, 3: "What science is is plain from the following con- siderations, if one is to speak accurately, instead of being led away by resemblances. For we all conceive that what we scientifically know cannot be otherwise than it is So, then, whatever comes within the 44 THE ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES which the arts, such as architecture, agriculture, medicine, and navigation are acquired.1 The intellectual power is that by which one, when he intends to do an act, reflects upon what he has premeditated, considers the possibility of performing it, and, if he thinks it possible, decides how it should be done.2 This is all we have deemed it necessary to say in this regard concerning the soul. Know, however, that the soul, whose facul- ties and parts we have described above, and which is a unit, may be compared to matter in that it likewise has a form, which is reason. If the form (reason) does not communicate its impression to the soul, then the disposition existing in the soul to receive that form is of no avail, and exists to no purpose, as Solomon says, "Also in the want of knowledge in the soul there is nothing good".3 This means that if a soul has not range of science is by necessity, and therefore eternal — because all things are so which exist necessarily — and all eternal things are without be- ginning, and indestructible."
neon to i«tp"i,DTOs6Dn nwem to to p Di ini^S'i mvp neon to to ,-DNbei ]nb nfivw n»i rvasnm nniano nnx to ixip^i,mv9 naxbc K'-BiDi^sn. Of., also, Eth. Nic. VI, 4, on "Art."
2 With M.'s definition of the rational faculty compare that of al-Farabi (niNSDin nibnnn, p. 2): Dos^oni nmann mxn \w n n»« «in inon nani. See Rosin, Ethik, p. 47, n. 4; Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, p. 398, and note 60. On this faculty and its functions, see Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., pp. 14-29; Rosin, Ethik, pp. 49-51, and Wolff, Acht Capitel, p. 7, n. 1.
The following scheme will elucidate the divisions of the functions of the rational faculty, according to M.
Reason Ctopn nan,nmn nsn,rn:non ts>Bjn; Ar.
Practical ("WD; Ar."^ey) Theoretical Oil"? ^n-'iv Mechanical (ni2»no nDS^a Intellectual ("atyntt; Sciences (nitsDn; Ar. Dito); ^"IWD rott'jO; Ar.
Ar. "3,10) Architecture, etc. Prov. XIX, 2.
attained a form but remains without intelligence, its existence is not a good one.1 However, this is not the place for us to discuss such problems as that of form, matter, and the number of different kinds of intelligence, and their means of acquisition;2 nor is it necessary for what we have to say concerning the subject of ethics, but is more appropriately to be discussed in the Book on Prophecy, which we mention (elsewhere).3 Now I conclude this chapter, and begin the next.
1 M. considers matter and form in the Aristotelian sense. The prin- cipia of all existing, transient things are matter, form, and the absence of a particular form (Moreh, I, 17). Matter (ittin,fnNB, ^ 6X17) consists of the underlying, basic substance of a thing, which has a potential but not a real existence, its true nature consisting in the property of never being without a disposition to receive a form (ibid., Ill, 8). Every sub- stance is endowed with a form (mis, finis, TO etSos), or incoporeal being (ibid., II, 12), by means of which that substance is what it is. That is, through form that which is potentially in existence comes into real exi- stence (Aristotle, Physics, II, 3; Metaphysics, I, 3), and upon it the reality and essence of a thing depend. When the form is destroyed, the thing's existence is terminated (Moreh, III, 69). As soon as a substance has received a certain form, the absence or privation (Twnn, ms^N) of that form which it has just received has ceased, and it is replaced by the privation of another form, and so on with all possible forms (ibid., I, 17). Of. Aristotle, Physics, I, 5-7; also )n nil, c. IX. Matter is constantly seeking