THE TWELFTH PREMISE This is their saying that the senses do not always procure certain knowledge. For the Mutakallimun have been suspicious with regard to the apprehension of the senses on two counts. One of them arises from the fact that, as they say, the senses miss many of the objects of their sensations either because of the subtlety of the body of the object of apprehension — as they mention with regard to the atoms and what pertains to them, as we have made clear — or because of the distance of the objects of apprehension from the apprehending subject. Thus a man does not see, hear, and smell at a distance extending to several parasangs, and it is impossible to appre¬ hend the motion of the heaven. The second count arises from their saying that the senses can be mistaken with regard to the object of their apprehen¬ sion. Thus a man, when he is far off, sees a big thing as small; a small thing as big, if it is in water; and a crooked thing as straight, if part of it is in water and part of it outside. Similarly someone suffering from jaundice sees things as yellow, and one whose tongue is steeped with yellow bile tastes sweet things as bitter. They enumerate many things of that kind.
They say: for this reason the senses should not be trusted to the extent of adopting them as the principles of demonstration. Do not think that agree¬ ment of the Mutakallimun in affirming this premise is gratuitous. That 214 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-73 [ 1176 would be similar to the belief 35 of the majority of the later Mutakallimun that the wish of their predecessors to establish the existence of the indivisible particle did not correspond to a need. In fact, all their assertions that we have set forth in the foregoing passages are necessary 5 and if one premise were to be destroyed, the whole purpose would be destroyed. Indeed this | last of the premises is most necessary. For whenever we apprehend with our senses things controverting their assumptions, they are able to say: no attention should be paid to the senses as the matter — which, as they think, has been proven by the testimony of the intellect — is demonstrated. This is the case with regard to their claim that continuous motion is interrupted by units of rest, with regard to their other claim that the millstone under¬ goes a division when revolving, and with regard to still another claim of theirs that the whiteness of this garment has become nonexistent at this instant and that this whiteness is another whiteness. These are assertions that run counter to what can be seen. There are furthermore many things necessarily following from the existence of vacuum, all of which are contra¬ dicted by the senses. Consequently the answer to all this is, when this answer is possible, that the particular thing one is concerned with has been missed by the senses. In other cases, the answer is given that it is one of the errors of the senses. You already know that all these are ancient opinions, which had been held by the Sophists. About the latter, Galen, in his book “On the Natural Faculties,”56 states that they taxed the senses with lying and relates everything that you already know.37 After having prefaced these premises, I shall begin to make clear their methods with regard to the four above-mentioned problems.
35. Literally: thinking.
36. The passage referred to occurs in Book I, chap. ii. It reads (in A. J. Brock’s translation): “The Sophists, however, while allowing that bread in turning into blood becomes changed as regards sight, taste, and touch, will not agree that this change occurs in reality. Thus some of them hold that all such phenomena are tricks and illusions of our senses; the senses, they say, are affected now in one way, now in another, whereas the underlying substance does not admit of any of these changes to which the names are given.”
37. Literally: as Galen states in his book “On the Natural Faculties” about them who taxed the senses with lying and relates everything that you already know.
CHAPTER 74 CHAPTER 74 In this chapter I shall include for your benefit a narration of the proofs of the Mutakallimun showing that the world is created in time. Do not demand of me that I set them forth in their terminology and at such length as they do. However I shall inform you of what every one of them intends and of the method he uses in order to adduce proof establishing the creation of the world in time | or refuting its eternity. I shall draw your attention with brevity to the premises used by the author of each method. When you shall read their lengthy books and famous works, you shall not find in them in any respect, in the proofs they adduce with regard to the subject in question, a single notion in addition to what you will understand from my exposition here. However, you shall find a lengthier exposition and resplendent and fine diction. Sometimes they use rhymed prose and symmetrical words and choose eloquent language. Sometimes also, they make their diction obscure intending to astonish the listener and to strike terror into the student. In their works you shall likewise very often find reiteration of notions, formulations of doubts and — as they think — their solution, and polemics against those who disagree with them.
THE FIRST METHOD THE FIRST METHOD Some1 of them think that any single happening occurring in time may be adduced as proof that the world has been created in time. You say, as it were: the individual Zayd has been a drop of sperm and has thereupon passed from one state to another until he has reached his perfection. It is impossible that it was he who changed himself and made himself pass from one state to another. There accordingly must be in his case someone outside him who changes him. Thus it has been made clear that he requires an artificer who has constructed his frame and has made him pass from one state to another. The same inference applies to a palm tree and other things. The same inference, he says, applies to the world as a whole. Thus you see that he believes that whatever rule may be found with regard to one particular body must necessarily be applied to every body.
THE SECOND METHOD They say likewise that the fact that a procreative individual is created in time | demonstrates that the whole world has been created in time. The l. Or: one.
216 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-74 [119a explanation of this is as follows. Once upon a time this Zayd was not here $ then he is. Accordingly if he is, it is impossible in every respect that he should not derive from his father Umar. Now his father Umar is likewise produced in time. Accordingly if his father is, it is impossible that he, Umar, should not be generated from Zayd’s grandfather Khalid. But Zayd’s grandfather Khalid is also produced in time. Thus this goes on to infinity. However, they have assumed, as we have made clear in the eleventh of their premises, that the existence of an infinity of this kind is impossible. Similarly if I should ultimately come to a first individual having no father — that is, Adam — there would necessarily arise the question: from what was this Adam generated? Accordingly you would say, to take an example: from dust. Thereupon it would necessarily be asked: from what was that dust generated? To take an example, the answer would be given: from water. Thereupon it would be asked: from what was this water generated? They say that this series of questions and answers might undoubtedly either go on to infinity, which is absurd, or would ultimately stop at the existence of one thing — an existence that would come to pass after pure nothingness — and that this latter solution is the true one and that question¬ ing ceases when it has arrived at this ultimate term. Accordingly this constitutes, as they say, a demonstration of the world’s having come into existence after pure and absolute nothingness.
THE THIRD METHOD They say that the substances2 of the world cannot in any respect be anything but aggregated or separated. And sometimes certain substances are aggregated, whereas others are separated. It is accordingly clear and manifest that in respect of the essence of the atoms, neither aggregation nor separation was necessarily in them to the exclusion of the other possi¬ bility. For if their essence and nature would only require their being separated, they would never aggregate. Similarly if their essence and true reality would | only require their being aggregated, they would never be separated. And therefore separation is not more fit for them than aggrega¬ tion, nor is aggregation more appropriate to them than separation. Thus the fact that some of them are aggregated, while others are separated, and still others undergo modifications of their state, being sometimes aggregated and sometimes separated, is a proof that they, I mean the substances, require someone who aggregates those that are aggregated and separates those that are separated. Thus this is, as they say, as proof of the world’s being created 2. Cf. n. 1 1 of the preceding chapter.
ngb] The Guide of the Perplexed 1-74 21 7 in time. It is already clear to you that the author of this method has used the first of their premises and all that necessarily follows from it.
THE FOURTH METHOD They say: the world in its entirety is composed of substances and accidents. Now no substance can be exempt from one or several accidents. And all accidents are produced in time. Accordingly it follows necessarily that the substance that serves as a substratum for them is also produced in time. For everything that is conjoined with accidents and cannot be exempt from them is produced in time. Accordingly the world in its entirety is produced in time. If, however, someone says: perhaps substance is not produced in time, whereas accidents are conjoined successively — one following the other to infinity — with the atoms; they say: it would necessarily follow that there is an infinite number of things produced in time. Now this they have assumed to be absurd. This is, according to them, the most intelligent and the best of the methods in question, so that many think it is a demonstra¬ tion. Now in this method three premises are assumed, which are required for an object that cannot be hidden from those engaged in speculation. One of these premises is that anything that is infinite through succession is impossible. The second | is that all accidents come into being in time. Now our adversary who maintains the eternity of the world contradicts us with regard to one accident — namely, circular movement. For Aristotle considers that circular movement is not subject to generation and corruption. Because of this, the thing that is endowed with this motion is, in his opinion, not subject to generation and corruption. It is accordingly useless for us to establish the coming-into-being in time of the other accidents with regard to whose coming-into-being in time our adversary does not contradict us, maintaining that they succeed one another in rotation supervening on something that is not produced in time. Similarly he maintains with respect to the above-mentioned accident alone, that is, the circular movement — I mean the movement of the heavenly sphere — that it is not produced in time and that it does not belong to any of the species of the accidents produced in time. Accordingly this accident is the only one that has to be investigated and the production of which in time has to be made clear. The third of the premises assumed by the author of this method is that there is no sensible being except substances and accidents, I mean to say the atoms and such of their accidents as he believes in. But if the body is composed of matter and form, as our adversary has demonstrated, it ought to be demon¬ strated that the first matter and the first form are subject to generation 12 218 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-74 [ 120a and corruption. If this is done, the demonstration of the coming-into-being of the world in time will be true.
THE FIFTH METHOD This is the method of particularization. And it is a method to which they accord very great preference. Its principle refers back to what I have made clear to you in regard to the tenth of their premises. For [the Mutakallim] directs his thought to the world as a whole or to any part of it he likes and says: it is admissible that this should be endowed with | the shape, size, and accidents it has and that it should be in the time and place in which it exists 5 and it is also admissible that it should be bigger or smaller, endowed with another shape or with those other accidents, or that it should exist prior to or after the time in which it exists or in another place than that in which it is found. Accordingly its particularization in respect of a certain shape or a certain size or place or accident and a particular time and there¬ withal the admissibility of all this being different, is a proof of the existence of someone who particularizes, who has freedom of choice, and who has willed one of two admissible possibilities. Now the fact that the world as a whole or any part of it requires someone who particularizes is a proof of its being created in time. For there is no difference between your saying some¬ one who particularizes or who makes or who creates or who brings into existence or who creates in time or who purposes the universe — all these terms being intended to signify one single notion. They ramify this method into very many subdivisions of a general or a particular nature. Thus they say: the earth’s being under the water is not more appropriate than its being above the water. Who therefore has particularized that place for it? And the sun’s being circular is not more appropriate than its being square or triangular, as all shapes bear the same relation to the bodies endowed with shapes. Who therefore has particularized the sun in respect of the shape it has? They consider in a similar way all the particulars 3 of the world as a whole, so that when they see flowers of different colors they marvel, and this proof becomes even firmer for them. They say: this is the same earth and the same water 5 wherefore is this flower yellow and that one red?
Can this be except through the agency of someone who particularizes? And this someone who particularizes is the deity. Thus the world as a whole requires someone to particularize it as a whole and each of its parts by means 5. The Arabic word juz’iyyat used here derives from another root than the word translated as “particularization,” 120 i] The Guide of the Perplexed 1-74 219 of one of the various admissible possibilities.4 All this follows necessarily if the tenth premise is assumed as true. | Moreover some who believe in the eternity of the world do not contradict us with regard to particularization, as we shall make clear. To sum up: this is to my mind a most excellent method. I have, with regard to it, an opinion which you shall hear.
THE SIXTH METHOD One of the later ones thought that he had come upon a most excellent method superior to all the methods known before. This method is concerned with the preponderance given to existence over nonexistence. He said: according to everyone, the world is possible in respect of existence 5 for if its existence were necessary, it would be the deity. Now we only engage in discussion with those who, on the one hand, affirm the existence of the deity and, on the other, maintain the eternity of the world. Now that which is possible is that of which it is possible that it should exist and it is equally possible that it should not exist, existence not being more appropriate to it than nonexistence. Now the fact that this thing, which is possible in respect of existence, exists in spite of the equal validity of its status as an existent5 and of its status as a nonexistent6 proves that there is someone who gives preponderance to its existence over its nonexistence. This is a very persuasive method and is a ramification of the method of particularization of which we have just now spoken. The author of this method has merely replaced the expression “someone who particularizes” by the expression “someone who gives preponderance,” and replaced the states of an existent by the very existence of an existent.7 He has led us into error or made an error himself with regard to the meaning of the statement: the world is possible in respect of its existence. For our adversary who believes in the eternity of the world, when he says that the world is possible in respect of existence, uses the term “possible,” as we shall make clear, in another sense than that in which it is used by the Mutakallim. Furthermore, the assertion of the author of this method that the world requires someone who should give preponderance to its existence over its nonexistence is a subject of very pronounced vain fantasy. For there can be giving of preponderance and 4. In accord with some MSS, I read jaHzat and not juzHyyat, the latter being the reading adopted by Munk, who follows certain other MSS. This second reading agrees with the Hebrew translations of Ibn Tibbon and Alharizi. juzHyyat means “particulars.”
5. Literally: of existence. 6. Literally: of nonexistence.
7. Whereas according to the Fifth Method, someone who particularizes determines the states of the existents, the Sixth Method maintains that their existence or nonexistence requires someone who gives preponderance.
220 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-74 [121a particularization only with respect to a particular existent that is equally receptive of two contraries or of two different things. Accordingly it can be said of it that inasmuch as | we have found it in a certain state and not in another, there is proof of the existence of an artificer possessing purpose. It is as if you said that this copper is not more suitable for the reception of the form of a pitcher than of the form of a lamp. In consequence, when we find it as a lamp or a pitcher, we know with necessity that someone who particularizes and who has a purpose purposed one of those two admissible things. Con¬ sequently it is clear that the copper exists and that two admissible things brought in relation with it are nonexistent in it before he who gives preponderance has given it. On the other hand, this notion cannot be represented in any respect of an existent thing as to which there is disagree¬ ment whether its existence, as it is, has had no limit in the past and will have no limit in the future or whether it has come to existence after non¬ existence. The question — who has given the preponderance to its existence over its nonexistence? — can be asked only after it has been recognized that this existent has come to existence after nonexistence. For this is the subject concerning which there is disagreement. Now if we consider its existence and nonexistence only from the mental point of view, we come back to the identical tenth premise. For it is concerned with the consideration of imaginations and vain fantasies, not with that of existents and intellec¬ tually cognized things. For the adversary who believes in the eternity of the world is of the opinion that our imagining its nonexistence is similar to our imagining any impossible thing whatever that occurs to the imagination. The purpose is not to demolish their assertions. I have merely made it clear to you that this method — which was thought to be different from the preceding one — is not correct, for its status is identical with that of what preceded as far as the assumption of the well-known admissibility is con¬ cerned.
THE SEVENTH METHOD One8 of the creationists maintains that the creation of the world in time is established by what the philosophers say regarding the permanent existence of the souls. He says: if | the world is eternal, the number of the men who died in the limitless past is infinite. There would therefore be an infinite number of souls existing simultaneously. Now this is a thing of which it has been indubitably demonstrated that it is false — I mean the simultaneous existence of an infinite number of numerable things. Now 8. Or: some.
122a] The Guide of the Perplexed I ■ 74 221 this is a wondrous method, for it makes clear a hidden matter by something even more hidden. To this, the proverb well known among the Syrians may truthfully be applied: Your guarantee needs another guarantee. It is as if he already possessed a demonstration of the permanence of the souls and as if he knew in what form they last and what thing it is that lasts, so that he could make use thereof for drawing inferences. Now if his intention was to force doubt upon the adversary who believes in the eternity of the world and at the same time in the permanence of the souls, this consequence would follow necessarily if the adversary would concede to him who tried to arouse the doubt that the imaginings that that individual entertains about his9 [to wit, the adversary’s] speech concerning the continued existence of the souls were well-founded. Now some of the later philosophers have resolved this doubt by saying that the souls endowed with continued existence were not bodies so that they would have place and position; and that in regard to their existence, infinity in number would be impossible for them. Now you know that regarding the things separate from matter — I mean those that are neither bodies nor forces in bodies, but intellects — there can be no thought of multiplicity of any mode whatever, except that some of them are the causes of the existence of others and that thus there is a difference among them since one is the cause and the other the effect. However, what remains of Zayd is neither the cause nor the effect of what remains of Umar. Consequently all are one in number, as Abu Bakr Ibn al- Sahgh10 and others who were drawn into speaking of these obscure matters have made clear.11 To sum up: | premises by which other points are to be explained should not be taken over from such hidden matters, which the mind is incapable of representing to itself.
Know that whoever wishes to establish as true the coming-into-being of the world in time or to prove false its eternity by means of these methods of the kalam must necessarily use one of these two premises or both of them: these premises being the tenth, whereby I mean the doctrine of mental admissibility with a view to establishing someone who particularizes; or the eleventh premise, according to which the infinite by succession is impossible. They establish the correctness of this latter premise in various ways. One 9. Or: in his.
10. Abu Bakr Ibn al-Sa'igh Ibn Bajja (the Avempace of the Latins; d. 1138), was the founder of the Peripatetic philosophic school of Moslem Spain. His works, one of which is entitled the Regimen of the Solitary ( Tadbir al-Mutawahhid), seem to have been well known to Maimonides.
11. Ibn Bajja’s doctrine of the Unity of the Intellect accordingly seems to be accepted by Maimonides. Cf. Translator’s Introduction.