of them consists in that he who adduces the proof directs his attention to one of the species whose individuals are subject to generation and corrup¬ tion. Furthermore, he directs his attention in his mind to a time in the past. Now from the belief that the world is eternal, it follows necessarily that all the individuals of that particular species going back from a given time in the past to the preceding time are infinite in number. And similarly, all the individuals of that same species from a date posterior by one thousand years, for example, to the preceding time are likewise infinite in number. Now the latter group of individuals is greater than the former by the number of those who were born during the thousand years. Accordingly they con¬ clude from this consideration — necessarily, as they believe — that an infinite may be greater in number than another infinite. They do the same thing also with regard to the revolutions of the heavenly sphere, from which they conclude — necessarily, as they believe — that an infinite number of revolu¬ tions may be greater than another infinite number of revolutions. They also compare the number of revolutions of one heavenly sphere with that of another and slower one, both of which numbers are infinite. They do the same also with regard to all accidents produced in time. For they count their nonexistent individuals12 and act in imagination as if they were existent and as if they had some beginning, and thereupon they add to | the objects of fantasy or subtract from them. All these are matters of fantasy, not of existence. Abu Nasr al-Farabl has demolished13 the premise in question and has laid bare what belongs to fantasy in all its various details. You will find a clear limpid exposition of his argument if you study without partisanship in his well-known book, “The Changing Beings.”14 The foregoing are the principal methods of the Mutakallimun in establishing the coming-into-being of the world in time. Now when, by means of these proofs, it was established to their mind that the world was produced in time, it followed of necessity that it has an artificer who has produced it in time with a purpose and by the use of will and freedom of choice. Thereupon they made clear that He is one by means of methods that we shall explain to you in the next chapter.
12. Apparently the individuals of the accidents. 13. Literally: has brained the premise. 14. This treatise has not been found. On al-Farabl, cf. Translator’s Introduction.
CHAPTER 75 I shall explain to you likewise in this chapter the proofs of the belief in unity according to the opinion of the Mutakallimun. They say that that which is indicated by what exists as being its maker and its bringer into existence is one. Their principal methods in establishing oneness are two: the method referring to reciprocal hindering, and the method of differing from one another.
THE FIRST METHOD Namely, the method referring to reciprocal hindering is the one pre¬ ferred by the multitude [of Mutakallimun]. Its meaning is this: he says that if the world had two gods, it would necessarily follow that a substance, which cannot be exempt from one of two contraries, could either be deprived of both contraries — which is impossible — or that two contraries could be conjoined in it at | the same time and in the same substratum — which is likewise impossible. For instance, one god wishes at present to warm one or more substances, whereas the other wishes to cool them. This would have one of two consequences: [1] They would be neither warm nor cold because the two actions hinder each other 5 and that is impossible, for every body must receive one of these two contraries. Or [2] the body in question would be at the same time both warm and cold. Similarly if one of the two gods would wish to move a particular body, it would be admissible that the other would wish to set it at rest. Accordingly it would necessarily follow that it would be neither in motion nor at rest, or that it would be at the same time both in motion and at rest. This kind of argumentation meant to lead to a proof is founded on the doctrine of the atoms, which is the first of their premises, and on the premise concerning the creation of accidents and on the premise according to which the privations of habitus are existent things requiring an agent to bring them into existence. For if someone should maintain that the lower matter, in which there is — according to the opinion of the philosophers — a succession of generation and corruption, is not the higher matter (I mean the substrata of the heavenly spheres), which assumption has been demonstrated; and if, furthermore, someone should affirm — according to the belief of the dualists — that there exist two gods, one of whom governs the lower matter, there being no connection between his activity and the heavenly spheres, while the other governs the spheres, there being no connection between his activity and hyle: this opinion would in no way necessitate reciprocal hindering. If, however, someone would maintain that this view implies a deficiency in each of the two gods, as either of them would not be able to act freely upon the things upon which the other acts freely, he could be given the answer: this is not a deficiency in either of them if it is impossible for him to exert an action upon the thing with which his activity has no connection. Nor is it a deficiency for an artificer to have no power over what is impossible for him, just as in our opinion — that of the community of believers in unity — it is no deficiency | in the One that He does not conjoin contraries in one substratum, and His power is not affected by this and by other similar impossibilities. As [the Mutakallimun] became aware of the weakness of this method, in spite of their having some incentive to choose it, they adopted another method.
THE SECOND METHOD THE SECOND METHOD They say: if there were two gods it would be necessary that one notion apply to both, while another notion would apply only to one and not to the other; this second notion would account for the difference between the two gods. Now this is a philosophic and demonstrative method, if it is followed step by step and if its premises are made clear. I shall make them clear when speaking of the opinions of the philosophers regarding this subject. However, this method too may not be applied in the doctrines of any of those who believe in the divine attributes. For according to him, the Eternal, may He be exalted, has several different notions subsisting in Him. The notion of knowledge is, in his opinion, different from that of power, and that of power is, in his opinion, different from that of will. And withal it would not be impossible1 that either of the two gods should possess several notions, some of which he would have in common with the other god, while differing from the latter through possession of others.
THE THIRD METHOD THE THIRD METHOD There is a further method that is in need of one of the premises of the partisans of this method. For some of them, namely, the ancients among them, believe that God wills by a will that is not something superadded to the essence of the creator, but is a will that does not subsist in a substratum. And in accordance with | this premise, which we have made clear, or rather in accordance with the conception of it, which you shall see, they main¬ tained that there is one will that does not subsist in a substratum and cannot 1. Ibn Tibbon adds: according to that opinion.
belong to two beings. For as they say, there cannot be a single cause that necessarily effects two statuses for two different essences. As I have let you know, this amounts to the explanation of something hidden by something even more hidden. For the will they refer to cannot be represented to oneself. According to some of them it is an impossibility. As for the others who hold to this opinion, doubts in unlimited numbers arise regarding it. And yet they have recourse to it as being a proof of unity.
THE FOURTH METHOD They say: the existence of an act necessarily indicates an agent and does not indicate to us a number of agents. Again there is no difference between the affirmations that the deity is two or three or twenty or any other number that might occur. This is clear and manifest. If, however, you say that this proof does not prove the impossibility of multiplicity in the deity, but merely proves an ignorance of the number of the deities — it being possible that there is only one and it being possible that there are many — he would complete his demonstration by saying: there is no possibility in respect of the being of God, for it is necessary. Accordingly, the possibility of a multiplicity of gods is shown to be false. This is the way in which this prover fashioned his proof. The error in this is most clear. For in the being of Him, may He be exalted, there resides no possibility, whereas possibility resides in our knowledge of it. For what is possible in respect of knowledge is not yet possible in respect of being. Perhaps just as the Christians think that He is three, and it is not so, we think that He is one, and the matter is not so. This is clear to whoever has trained himself in the knowledge of the necessary proceeding of conclusions from their premises, j THE FIFTH METHOD One of the later ones thought that he had found a demonstrative method for the belief in unity, namely, the method starting from need. The explanation of it is as follows. He says: if one is sufficient for making the beings, a second one is superfluous and not required. If, however, being cannot be perfected and brought into orderly arrangement except by the two of them in conjunction, then incapacity is attached to each of them, as each of them needs the other and is in consequence not self-sufficient. Now this is merely a ramification of the method concerning reciprocal hindering. This way of arguing with a view to a proof may be criticized by means of the statement that not everyone who does not do that which it is not 226 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-75 [ 125a within his substance to do is called incapable. For we do not call a human individual weak because he cannot move one thousand hundred-weights, and we do not attribute to God, may He be exalted, incapacity because He is unable to corporify His essence or to create someone like Him or to create a square whose diagonal is equal to its side. And similarly we should not say that he is incapable because he does not create alone, for it is a necessity of their being that they should be two. This is not need but a necessity, anything different from which is an impossibility. For just as we do not say that God, may He be cherished and magnified, is incapable because He is not able — according to their opinion — to bring a body into existence other¬ wise than through creating atoms and aggregating them by means of accidents that He creates in them; and just as we do not call this need and incapacity because anything different from it is impossible: so the associa¬ tion^, for his part, maintains that it is impossible the one should act alone; this is not an incapacity in either of the two, for it belongs to their necessary being that they should be two.
One of [the Mutakallimun] was so wearied by those tricks that he affirmed that the belief in unity was accepted in virtue of the Law. The Mutakallimun considered this statement as very disgraceful | and despised him who made it. As for me, I am of the opinion that he among them who had made this statement was a man of a most rightly directed mind, averse to the acceptance of sophistries. Accordingly, as he did not hear in their speeches anything that was in truth a demonstration and found that his soul was not at peace with what they considered a demonstration, he said that the belief in unity was a thing accepted from the Law. For these groups of people did not leave being with any permanent nature so that arguments could be adduced from it with a view to correct proof, nor did they leave the intellect with a sound, inborn disposition by means of which correct conclusions could be drawn. All this was done on purpose so that we could assume that there is an existent of such a kind that by means of it we could demonstrate what cannot be demonstrated. Accordingly the necessary consequence was that we failed to demonstrate what can be demonstrated. No complaint can be made except to God and to the equitable among the men of intellect.
CHAPTER 76 CHAPTER 76 Concerning the refutation of the doctrine of corporeality according to the doctrine of the Mutakallimun. The methods and the argumentations of the Mutakallimun purporting to refute the doctrine of corporeality are very feeble, even feebler than their proofs in favor of the belief in unity. For the refutation of the corporeality [of God] is, in their opinion, as it were a ramification necessarily deriving from the root of the belief in unity. They say: the body is not one. Now whoever refutes the doctrine of cor¬ poreality because a body is necessarily composed of matter and form and thus is compound — while, on the other hand, it is clear that there can be no composition in the essence of the deity — is, in my opinion, no Mutakal- lim. | For this proof is not founded on the roots of the Mutakallimun, but is a correct demonstration founded on the belief in matter and form and on the representation of their notion. And this is a philosophic doctrine, which I shall mention and make clear when speaking of the demonstrations of the philosophers regarding this. In this chapter our purpose is only to mention the proofs, according to their premises and argumentations, of the Mutakallimun concerning the refutation of corporeality.
THE FIRST METHOD THE FIRST METHOD They say: if the deity is a body, there are only two possibilities with regard to the notion and true reality of divinity. Either it is constituted by all the substances1 of that body, I mean to say every atom of them, or else it is constituted by only one substance from among the substances of that body. Now if it were constituted by one atom, what would be the utility of the rest of these particles? The existence of that body would have no meaning. If, however, every single particle2 of that body were required for its constitution, there would be many deities and not one deity. But they have already made clear that he is one. If you consider this proof, you will find that it is built on the first and fifth of their premises. — [But what] if they were told that the body of the deity is not composed of indivisible particles? I mean to say that it is not composed of substances resembling those that, as all of you say, He creates, but is one continuous body not admitting division except in fantasy 5 and fantasies should not be considered. For you imagine in a similar way that the body of heaven admits of being divided 1. Cf. n. 11, chap. 73 above. a. I.e., atom.
228 The Guide of the Perplexed 1-76 [ 126a and split up, whereas the philosopher | maintains that this possibility of division is only due to the action of imagination and of an inference from what is manifest — that is, the bodies existing in our world — to what is hidden.
THE SECOND METHOD Which is grand in their opinion, refers to the impossibility of resemblance. For He does not resemble any of His creatures. Now if He were a body, He would resemble bodies. They expatiate at great length on this theme and say: if we were to say that He is a body that is not like bodies, you would thereby contradict yourself. For every body is like every other body in respect of corporeality. For bodies only differ from one another in other respects; they mean by the accidents. According to them, it would moreover follow [from the corporeality of God] that He has created something like Him. This proof may be invalidated in two ways. One of them consists in someone’s saying: I do not concede the denial of resemblance. What demonstration have you that it is not admissible that God should in any way resemble a thing He has created — by God! — unless you rely in this point, I mean in the denial of God’s in any way resembling a created thing, upon the text of a prophetic book? In that case the denial of corporeality would be a doctrine accepted on the authority of a tradition, and not an intellectually cognized doctrine. If you say that if He resembles a thing created by Him, He has created a thing like Him, the disputant says: that thing would not be like Him in all aspects. I do not deny that there are in the deity a multiplicity of notions, so that He offers several aspects. For a believer in corporeality does not shrink from this conclusion. Another way of objecting, which is more arduous, is as follows. It is established and considered correct, among those who have philosophized and have plunged into the doctrines of philosophers, that it is | in a purely equivocal sense that the term “body” is applied both to the heavenly spheres and to the hylic bodies here.3 For matter here4 is not identical with matter there,5 and the forms here6 are not identical with the form there;7 but the terms “matter” and “form” are likewise applied equivocally to what is here as well as to the heavenly spheres. And although the heavenly sphere un¬ doubtedly possesses dimensions, the dimensions in themselves are not a body; but a body is a thing composed of matter and form. Now if this is said with regard to the heavenly spheres, the partisan of the doctrine of 3. Literally: these material bodies. 4. Literally: this matter.
g. Literally: that matter. 6. Literally: these forms. 7. Literally: those forms.
127 a] The Guide of the Perplexed 1-76 229 corporeality can all the more say it of the deity. Accordingly he would say: the deity is a body possessing dimensions; but His essence, true reality, and substance do not resemble anything that is in the bodies of the created things; and the term “body” is applied to Him and to these bodies in an equivocal sense, just as in the opinion of those who have reached true knowl¬ edge of reality, the term “being” is applied to Him and to them in an equivocal sense. The proclaimer of the doctrine of corporeality does not concede that all bodies are composed of particles8 resembling each other. On the contrary, he says that God is the creator of all these bodies and that they differ in respect of their substance and true reality. And just as he holds that the body of dung is not identical with the body of the sphere of the sun, so he says that the body of created light — I mean the Indwelling— is not identical with the body of the heavenly spheres and of the stars; and that the body of the Indwelling or the created Pillar of Cloud is not identical with the body of the deity, may it be exalted, in his opinion. On the contrary, he says that this body is the perfect and noble essence, which was never composed or changed and which cannot possibly be changed. In this way the being of this body becomes permanently necessary. And by its act9 it makes everything that is other than itself in accordance with its will and volition. Would that I knew how this feeble opinion can be controverted by means of these wondrous methods of theirs, which I have already let you know. [ THE THIRD METHOD is this. They say: if the deity were a body, it would be finite, which is correct. If, however, it were finite, it would have a certain magnitude and a certain permanent shape, which is likewise a correct necessary consequence. Then they say: it is admissible that the deity qua body could have been of a bigger or a smaller size or of a different shape than any life or shape what¬ ever. Accordingly its being particularized to a certain size and shape requires something that particularized it. I have heard them greatly praise this proof. It is, however, feebler than all the foregoing proofs, for it is built upon the tenth premise, with regard to which we have already made clear to what extent it is subject to doubts when applied as to the other beings, if it is assumed that they might exist in a way different from their nature. All the more do these doubts arise with regard to the deity. There is no difference between this proof and their assertion concerning the pre¬ ponderance given to the existence of the world over its nonexistence; 8. I.e., atoms. 9. Literally: acts.
according to that assertion, the existence of the world proves the existence of an agent who has given preponderance to its existence over its nonexist¬ ence since it is equally possible that the world should, and that it should not, exist. If now the question should be posed to them why this does not apply to the deity, may it be exalted — and it should be said that inasmuch as it is an existent it follows necessarily that it must have a factor giving preponderance to its existence over its nonexistence — then he undoubtedly would answer by saying that this would lead to an infinite series and hence that the series must doubtlessly end with the necessarily existent in which there is no possibility 10 and who therefore does not require something that would bring him into existence. Now the selfsame answer would necessarily follow in respect of shape and size. For it may be said of all the shapes and sizes whose existence is possible11 — in the sense that a particular shape or size has not existed and has then come into existence — | that any particular size could have been bigger or smaller than it is in fact, and a shape could have been different $ hence there is necessarily a need for something that particularizes. However, the shape and size of the deity, may it be exalted above all deficiency and likening, have not been — so the partisan of the doctrine of corporeality says — nonexistent, and thereafter at a certain time have come into existence so that they would need a factor that particularizes. On the contrary, its essence with its size and shape is necessarily existent. Thus it does not need a factor that particularizes, [nor one that gives pre¬ ponderance]12 to existence over nonexistence, as there is no possibility of nonexistence in it. Similarly it will not need a factor that particularizes its shape and size since their existence as they are is necessary.
Consider, therefore, you who are engaged in speculation, if you give the preference to the quest for the truth and cast aside passion, blind following of authority, and obeisance to what you are accustomed to hold great. Your soul should not be led into error by the circumstances of these men engaged in speculation, neither by what has happened to them nor by what has come from them. For they are like one who flees from torrid heat into fire. For they have abolished the nature of being and have altered the original disposition of the heavens and the earth by thinking that by means of those premises, it would be demonstrated that the world was created in time. In consequence whereof, they have not demonstrated the creation of the world in time and have destroyed for us the demonstrations of the 10. Or: contingency. 11. Or: contingent.
12. The words in brackets are missing in all but one of the MSS collated in Joel’s edition of the Arabic text.
128a] The Guide of the Perplexed 1-76 23 1 existence and oneness of the deity and of the negation of His corporeality. For the demonstrations, by means of which all this can be made clear, can only be taken from the permanent nature of what exists, a nature that can be seen and apprehended by the senses and the intellect.
Now as we have finished setting forth the end at which their discourse arrives, we shall start upon a presentation of the philosophic premises and of their demonstrations proving the existence and the oneness of the deity and the impossibility of its being a body 5 whereby we shall grant them for their benefit that the world is eternal, though we do not believe in it. After that I shall show you our own method, that to which correct speculation has conducted us in respect of the perfecting of the demonstration | regarding the three problems in question. After that I shall return and plunge together with the philosophers into the consideration of their assertion concerning the eternity of the world with the help of the Almighty [ Shaddai ].
* This First Part OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED HAS BEEN COMPLETED JUDAISM THE. GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED Volume One Moses Maimonides Translated and with an Introduction and Notes by Shlomo Pines Introductory Essay by Ivco Strauss “ This work by Pities and Strauss must be recognized as one of the most important contributions to the study of Maimonides in the present cen¬ tury. The translation is of a quality unequalled in a modern language." — Journal of the History of Philosophy This monument of rabbinical exegesis, written at the end of the twelfth century, has exerted an immense and continuing influence upon Jewish thought. It has also been a formative element in the think¬ ing of leading Christian writers and philosophers down through the seventeenth century. The Guide is not a philosophical treatise. Rather, its aim is to liberate men from the tormenting perplexities arising from their understanding of the Bible according only to its literal meaning. This celebrated translation is now available in a two-volume Phoenix paperback edition.
Professor Pines’s work far excels any previous rendering of the Guide into a Western language. Maimonides claimed that every word he used was chosen with infinite care. To translate the original Arabic with its frequent Hebrew words and phrases therefore requires consummate skill. Professor Pines has preserved the linguistic flavor, the ambiguities and implications, and at the same time achieved verbal accuracy. This edition has the additional merit of providing extensive introductions by Professor Pines and the late Ixro Strauss, a leading authority on Maimonides.
“Leo Strauss’s penetrating essay alone would give high value to this volume...On the other hand, without this essay the new translation would make this an important volume which is unlikely to be surpassed for a long time.” — Times Literary Supplement “Competent reviewers have without exception praised this transla¬ tion...As a whole, the book is simply indispensable.” — The Modern Schoolman SHLOMO Pines (1908-1990) was professor of general and Jewish philosophy at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and a member of the Israel Academy of Science and the Humanities.
Leo Strauss was the Scott Buchanan Distinguished Scholar-in- Residence at St. John’s College at the time of his death. His many books include The Argument and Action of Plato's Laws, Tbe City and the Man, Socrates and Aristophanes, and Studies in Platonic /‘olitical Philosophy, all published by the University of Chicago Press.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 9 780226 502304 MOSES MAIMONIDES VOLUME TWO Translated and with an Introduction and Notes by SHLOMO PINES Introductory Essay by LEO STRAUSS THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED Volume II THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED Moses Maimonides Translated with an Introduction and Notes by SHLOMO PINES With an Introductory Essay by LEO STRAUSS Volume II THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS Chicago and London The University- of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 1963 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Published 1963.
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CONTENTS * Volume I How To Begin To Study The Guide of the Perplexed by LEO strauss xi Translator’ s Introduction Ivii THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED PART i: 1 Volume II part ii: 233 part in: 413 Glossary 639 Indexes 643 BIBLICAL PASSAGES APPEARING IN THE TEXT 645 RABBINIC PASSAGES APPEARING IN THE TEXT 655 SECTS, COMMUNITIES, AND NONBIBLICAL WRITERS AND WRITINGS 657 THE SECOND PART of The Guide of the Perplexed In the name of the Lord, God of the World 1 [INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND PART]