The premises2 needed for establishing the existence of the deity, may He be exalted, and for the demonstration that He is neither a body nor a force in a body and that He, may His name be sublime, is one, are twenty-five — all of which are demonstrated without there being a doubt as to any point concerning them. For Aristotle and the Peripatetics after him have come forward with a demonstration for every one of them. There is one premise that we will grant them, for through it the objects of our quest will be demonstrated, as I shall make clear; this premise is the eternity of the world.
1] The first premise: The existence of any infinite magnitude is impossible.
2] The second premise: The existence of magnitudes of which the number is infinite is impossible — that is, if they exist together.3 5] The third premise: The existence of causes and effects of which the number is infinite is impossible, even if they are not endowed with magni¬ tude. For instance, the assumption that one particular intellect, for example, has as its cause a second intellect, and that the cause of this second intellect is a third one, and that of the third a fourth, and so on to infinity, | is likewise clearly impossible.
4] The fourth premise: Change exists in four categories: it exists in the category of substance, the changes occurring in a substance being generation and corruption. It exists in the category of quantity, namely, as growth and decrease. It exists in the category of quality, namely, as alteration. It exists in the category of place, namely, as the motion of translation. It is this change in the category of place that is more especially called motion.
i. Gen. 21:33. Cf. above, Epistle Dedicatory, n. i.
2. No example prior to Maimonides of a list of twenty-five or twenty-six “premises” seems to be known.
3. Or: simultaneously.
2)6 The Guide of the Perplexed II [3a 5] The fifth premise: Every motion is a change and transition from potentiality to actuality.
6] The sixth premise: Of motions, some are essential and some accidental, some are violent and some are motions of a part — this being a species of accidental motion. Now essential motion is, for example, the translation of a body from one place to another. Accidental motion is, for example, when a blackness existing in this particular body is said to be translated from one place to another. Violent motion is, for example, the motion of a stone upwards through the action of something constraining it to that. Motion of a part is, for example, the motion of a nail in a ship; for when the ship is in motion, we say that the nail is likewise in motion. Similarly when any compound is in motion as a whole, its parts are likewise said to be in motion.
7] The seventh premise: Everything changeable is divisible. Hence everything movable is divisible and is necessarily a body. But everything that is indivisible is not movable; hence it will not be a body at all.
8] The eighth premise: Everything that is moved owing to accident must of necessity come to rest, inasmuch as its motion is not in virtue of its essence. Hence it cannnot be moved forever in that accidental motion.
9] | The ninth premise: Every body that moves another body moves the latter only through being itself in motion when moving the other body.
10] The tenth premise: Everything that is said to be in a body is divided into two classes: either it subsists through the body, as do the accidents, or the body subsists through it, as in the case of the natural form. Both classes are to be considered as a force in the body.
11] The eleventh premise: Some of the things that subsist through body are sometimes divided through the division of the body and hence are divisible according to accident, as for instance the colors and the other forces that are distributed through the whole of the body. In a like manner some of the things that constitute a body are not divisible in any way, as for instance the soul and the intellect.
3 b ] The Guide of the Perplexed II 2 ) j 12] The twelfth premise: Every force that is found distributed through a body is finite because the body is finite.
13] The thirteenth premise: It is impossible that one of the species of motion be continuous, except local motion, and of this only that which is circular.
14] The fourteenth premise: Local motion is the primary and the first by nature among all motions; for generation and corruption are preceded by alteration, and alteration is preceded by the approach of that which alters to that which is to be altered; and there is no growth and diminution except when they are preceded by generation and corruption.
15] The fifteenth premise: Time is an accident consequent upon motion and is necessarily attached to it. Neither of them exists without the other. Motion does not exist except in time, and time cannot be conceived by the intellect except together with motion. And all that with regard to which no motion can be found, does not fall under time.
16] The sixteenth premise: In whatsoever is not a body, [ multiplicity cannot be cognized by the intellect, unless the thing in question is a force in a body, for then the multiplicity of the individual forces would subsist in virtue of the multiplicity of the matters or substances in which these forces are to be found.4 Hence no multiplicity at all can be cognized by the intellect in the separate things, which are neither a body nor a force in a body, except when they are causes and effects.
17] The seventeenth premise: Everything that is in motion has of necessity a mover; and the mover either may be outside the moved object, as in the case of a stone moved by a hand, or the mover may be in the body in motion, as in the case of the body of a living being, for the latter is composed of a mover and of that which is moved. It is for this reason that when a living being dies and the mover — namely, the soul — is lacking from it, that which is moved — namely, the organic body — remains at the moment in its former state, except that it is not moved with that motion. However, inasmuch as the mover that exists in that which is moved is hidden and does not appear to the senses, it is thought of living 4. Literally: of their matters and substrata.
2j8 The Guide of the Perplexed -II [4 a beings that they are in motion without having a mover. Everything moved that has a mover within itself is said to be moved by itself— the meaning being that the force moving that which, in the object moved, is moving according to essence, exists in the whole of that object.
1 8] The eighteenth premise: Everything that passes from potentiality to actuality has something other than itself that causes it to pass, and this cause is of necessity outside that thing. For if that cause were that thing and there were no obstacle to prevent this passage, the thing would not have been for a certain time in potentia but would have always been in actu. If, however, the cause of the passage from potentiality to actuality subsisted in the thing, and if there was at the same time an obstacle to it, which was subsequently removed, there is no doubt that the factor that put an end to the obstacle is the one that caused that potentiality to pass into actuality. Understand this.
19] The nineteenth premise: Everything that has a cause for its existence is only possible with regard to existence in respect to its own essence. For it exists if its causes are present. If, however, they are not present, or if they become nonexistent, or if their relation | that entails the existence of the thing in question has changed, that thing does not exist.
20] The twentieth premise: Everything that is necessarily existent in respect to its own essence has no cause for its existence in any way whatever or under any condition.
21] The twenty-first premise: Everything that is composed of two notions has necessarily that composition as the cause of its existence as it really is, and consequently is not necessarily existent in respect to its own essence, for it exists in virtue of the existence of its two parts and of their composition.
22] The twenty-second premise: Every body is necessarily composed of two things and is necessarily accompanied by accidents. The two things constituting it are its matter and its form 5 and the accidents accompanying it are quantity, shape, and position.
25] The twenty-third premise: It is possible for whatsoever is in 4 b] The Guide of the Perplexed II 2)9 potentia and in whose essence there is a certain possibility, not to exist in actu at a certain time.
24] The twenty-fourth premise: Whatsoever is something in potentia is necessarily endowed with matter, for possibility is always in matter.
25] The twenty-fifth premise: The principles of an individual com¬ pound substance are matter and form. And there is no doubt about the necessity of there being an agent, I mean to say a mover that moves the substratum so as to predispose it to receive the form. That is the proximate mover, which predisposes the matter of a certain individual. At this point it is necessary to engage in speculation with regard to motion, the mover, and the moved. However, with regard to all this, everything that it was necessary to explain has already been explained. The text of the words of Aristotle is: Matter does not move itself.5 This therefore is the capital premise calling for an inquiry concerning the existence of the Prime Mover. | Of the twenty-five premises that I have put before you in the form of a preface, some become manifest with very little reflection and are demon¬ strative premises and first intelligibles or notions approaching the latter, as may be seen in the epitome we have made of their orderly exposition. Others require a number of demonstrations and premises leading up to them. However, all of them have been given demonstrations as to which no doubt is possible. With regard to some of them, this has been done in the Book of “Akroasis”6 and its commentaries 5 with regard to others, in the Book of “Metaphysics” and its commentary. I have already made it known to you that the purpose of this Treatise is not to transcribe the books of the philosophers and to explain the most remote of the premises, but to mention the proximate premises that are required for our purpose.
I shall add to the premises mentioned before, one further premise that affirms as necessary the eternity of the world. Aristotle deemed it to be correct and the most fitting to be believed. We shall grant him this premise by way of a hypothesis7 in order that the clarification of that which we intended to make clear should be achieved. This premise, which among them 5. Metaphysics xii.6. 107^29—30. The quotation is accurate.
6. Aristotle’s Physics is meant.
7. I read taqdir instead of the word taqrir found in the Arabic text. Graphically this emendation is very slight. It is in conformity with Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation.
2^0 The Guide of the Perplexed II [5a is the twenty-sixth, [consists in Aristotle’s statement] that time and move¬ ment are eternal, perpetual, existing in actu.8 Hence it follows of necessity, in his opinion, that there is a body, moving with an eternal movement, existing in actu; and this is the fifth body. For this reason, he says that the heaven is not subject to generation and corruption. For according to him, movement is not subject to generation and corruption; for he says that every movement is necessarily preceded by another movement either of the same species as itself or of other species, and that what is thought with regard to living beings — namely, that their local movement is not preceded at all by another movement — is not correct. For the cause of their movement after rest goes back finally to things calling for this local movement; these things being either an alteration | of temperament necessitating a desire to seek what agrees with the living being or to flee from what disagrees with it, or an imagination, or an opinion occurring to it. Accordingly, any one of these three factors sets the living being in motion, and every one of them is necessitated by other movements. Similarly he says that in the case of everything that comes about in time, the possibility of its coming-about precedes in time its coming-about. From this there follow necessarily several points liable to validate his premise.9 According to this premise, a finite moving object moves upon a finite distance an infinite number of times, going back over the same distance in a circle. Now this is impossible except in circular movement, as is demonstrated in the thirteenth of these premises. According to this premise, that which is infinite must necessarily exist as a succession and not simultaneously.10 This is the premise that Aristotle constantly wishes to establish as true. Now to me it seems that he does not affirm categorically that the arguments he puts forward in its favor constitute a demonstration. The premise in question11 is rather, in his opinion, the most fitting and the most probable. However, his followers and the commentators of his books claim that the premise is necessary and not merely possible and that it has already been demonstrated. On the other hand, every Mutakallim desires to establish that it is impossible. They say that there can be no mental representation of the coming-about in succession of an infinite number of things occurring in time. The strength of their argument is that 8. Cf. Physics viii. l.251 bao ff.; Metaphysics xii.6.i07lb5 ff.
9. Concerning the eternity of movement. 10. Or: together.
11. The Arabic pronoun for which the words, “the premise in question,” are substituted in this translation, may alternatively refer to “the arguments” mentioned in the pre¬ ceding sentence. This was Ibn Tibbon’s opinion. However, the sentences that follow appear to prove the correctness of the translation propounded in the text.
5& ] The Guide of the Perplexed II 241 it constitutes, in their opinion, a first intelligible. But to me it seems that the premise in question is possible — that is, neither necessary, as is affirmed by the commentators of the writings of Aristotle, nor impossible, as is claimed by the Mutakallimun. It is not the purpose now to explain the arguments of Aristotle, or to raise our doubts concerning him, or to explain my opinion concerning the creation of the world in time. But the purpose at this point is to circumscribe the premises that we need for our [ three problems 5 after first having set forth these premises and having agreed to take- them as granted, I shall set out explaining what necessarily follows from them.
CHAPTER 1 It follows necessarily from the twenty-fifth premise that there is a mover, which has moved the matter of that which is subject to genera¬ tion and corruption so that it received form. If now it is asked: what moved this proximate mover? — it follows of necessity that there exists for it another mover either of its own species or of a different species; for motion exists in four categories,1 and sometimes these different kinds of change are called motion in a general way, as we have mentioned in the fourth premise. Now this does not go to infinity, as we have mentioned in the third premise. For we have found that every movement goes back, in the last resort, to the movement of the fifth body, and no further. It is from this movement that every mover and predisposer in the whole lower world proceeds and derives. Now the sphere moves with a movement of translation, and this is prior to all other movements, as has been mentioned in the fourteenth premise. Similarly every movement of translation goes back, in the last resort, to the movement of the sphere. It is as if you say: this stone, which was in motion, was moved by a staff; the staff was moved by a hand; the hand by tendons; the tendons by muscles; the muscles by nerves; the nerves by natural heat; and the natural heat by the form that subsists therein, this form being undoubtedly the first mover. What obliges this mover to move could be an opinion, for instance an opinion that the stone should be brought by the blow of the staff | to a hole2 in order to stop it, so that blowing wind should not enter thereby toward the man who had this opinion.3 Now the mover of this wind and the factor causing it to blow is the movement of the sphere. In a similar way you will find that every cause of generation and corruption goes back, in the last resort, to the movement of the sphere. Now when, in the last resort, we have gone back to this sphere, which is in motion, it follows necessarily that it must have a mover, according to what has been set forth before in the seventeenth premise. Now the mover cannot but be either in the moved or outside it, for this is a necessary division. Now if the mover is outside the sphere, it cannot but be either a body or not a body; in "which latter case it should not be said to be outside the sphere, but separate from it, for what is not a i. Literally: in the four categories. I.e., those enumerated in the fourth premise.
2. Or: a window.
3. Literally: to him (or: to it). It is practically certain that the man who moved the stone is referred to in the Arabic pronominal suffix.
244 The Guide of the Perplexed II • l [6 b body is not said to be outside a body except through an extension of the meaning of the expression. If, however, its mover is in it — I mean the mover of the sphere — it cannot but be either that the mover is a force distributed in the whole of the body of the sphere and divisible through the latter’s being divided — as heat in fire — or that it is a force in the sphere that is not divisible — as are the soul and the intellect — just as has been expounded before the tenth premise. There is, accordingly, no doubt as to the mover of the sphere being one of these four: either another body outside it, or separate from it,+ or a force distributed in it, or an indivisible force.
Now the first supposition — namely, that the mover of the sphere is another body outside the sphere — is absurd, as I shall point out. For if it is a body, it must — as has been set forth in the ninth premise — be in motion when moving another body. Now in that case, this sixth body5 likewise must be in motion when moving another body. Accordingly it would necessarily follow that it is moved by a seventh body. This in its turn must be supposed to be in motion. Accordingly it would follow necessarily that an infinite number of bodies must exist and that only in that case is the sphere in motion. Now this is absurd, [ as has been set forth before in the second premise.
The third possibility — namely, that the mover of the sphere is a force distributed in the latter — is likewise absurd, as I shall point out. For the sphere is a body and in consequence necessarily finite, as has been set forth before in the first premise. In consequence its force must be finite, as has been set forth in the twelfth premise. Hence this force must be divisible if the sphere is divided, as has been set forth in the eleventh premise. Hence it cannot move something for an infinite time, as we have supposed that it does in the twenty-sixth premise.
As for the fourth possibility — namely, that the mover of the sphere is an indivisible force subsisting in the sphere, as for example man’s soul does in man — it is likewise absurd that this mover alone should be the cause for this perpetual motion, even if it is indivisible. The explanation of this lies in the fact that if this mover is the first mover of the sphere, it also must be in motion according to accident, as has been mentioned in the sixth premise.
I shall add here the explanation that follows. When, for example, the 4. In this case the mover is supposed to be an immaterial entity.
5. The sphere being considered as the fifth body, Maimonides calls its mover, should that turn out to be a body, the sixth body.
ja ] The Guide of the Perplexed II • l 245 soul of a man, which is his form, moves him to go up from the house to an upper chamber, it is the body that is in motion according to essence, the soul being the first mover according to essence. However, the soul is in motion according to accident, for through the transporting of the body from the house to the upper chamber, the soul, which was in the house, was transported and came to be in the upper chamber. Now if the action of moving exerted by the soul would come to rest, that which was moved by it, namely, the body, also would come to rest. But then through the fact that the body would come to rest, the accidental motion, which had come to the soul, would be abolished. Now, everything that is moved according to accident must of necessity come to rest, as has been mentioned in the eighth premise. When, however, it comes to rest, that which is moved by it like¬ wise comes to rest. It follows accordingly of necessity that the first mover in question | necessarily must have another cause subsisting outside the whole, which is composed of a mover and of a moved. When this cause, which is the beginning of movement, is present, the first mover, which subsists in this whole, moves that in it which may be moved. When, however, it is not present, that which may be moved in the whole is at rest.6 For this reason the bodies of animals are not perpetually in motion, even though there is in every one of them an indivisible first mover. For their mover does not move them perpetually according to essence, for the factors that incite it to cause to move are matters outside it: either quest for what agrees with that particular animal, or flight from what disagrees with it, or again an imagina¬ tion or a representation in the case of those animals that have representa¬ tions.7 When acted upon by these factors, the mover causes movement. When doing this, it itself is moved accidentally. And accordingly there is no doubt about its coming to rest at a certain time, as we have mentioned. If, however, the mover of the sphere were in it in this manner, it would not be able to be in motion eternally.
Accordingly, if the motion in question is perpetual and eternal, as is stated by our adversary — and this is possible, as has been mentioned in the thirteenth premise — it follows necessarily, according to this opinion,8 that the first cause of the movement of the sphere conforms to the second 6. This appears to be the probable meaning of the phrase. However, if one keeps to the letter of the text, it would seem that that which is at rest in the circumstances under discussion is “the mover” rather than “that which may be moved.” There are certain considerations that seem to favor the latter interpretation.
7. In the singular in Arabic. In the context the Arabic word may mean the faculty of representation.
8. Namely, the opinion that regards the movement of the sphere as eternal.
246 The Guide of the Perplexed II • 1 [7 b possibility; I mean to say that it is separate from the sphere according to what is required by the above division.9 It accordingly has been demonstrated that it is necessary that the mover of the first sphere, if the movement of the latter is regarded as eternal and perpetual, should not at all be a body or a force in a body; in this way the mover of this sphere would have no move¬ ment, either according to essence or to accident, and would not be subject to division or to change, as has been mentioned in the seventh and the fifth of the premises. Now this is the deity, may His name be sublime; I am referring to the first cause moving the sphere. And it is absurd that there should be two or more of them because it is absurd that there should be multiplicity in the separate things, which are not bodies, except when | one of them is a cause and the other an effect, as has been mentioned in the sixteenth premise. It has also been made clear that this first cause does not fall under time because it is impossible that there should be movement with regard to it, as has been mentioned in the fifteenth premise. Accord¬ ingly this speculation has led by means of a demonstration to the knowledge that it is impossible that the sphere should move itself in an eternal motion; that the first cause to which its being set in motion is due, is not a body or a force in a body; and that this first cause is one and unchangeable because its existence is not conjoined with time. These are the three problems with regard to which the most excellent among the philosophers gave demonstrations.
A second speculation made by them. Aristotle propounded, by way of introduction, a premise that runs as follows: Supposing that there exists a thing composed of two things and that one of these two things exists separately outside this compound thing, it follows necessarily that the other thing also must exist outside the compound thing.10 For if the existence of these two things had required that they exist only together, as do matter and natural form, one of them would not have existed in any way without the other. Accordingly, the fact that one of them exists separately is a proof for the absence of an obligatory mutual connection. Consequently the second thing, which enters into the compound thing, must necessarily exist separately. The following example for this may be adduced: if oxymel exists and honey likewise exists by itself, it follows necessarily that vinegar must exist by itself. After having explained this premise, he says: We find that many things are composed of a mover and a moved.
9. The one posing four prima facie possible hypotheses regarding the nature of the mover of the sphere.
10. I.e., the second element entering into the makeup of the compound thing.
8a] The Guide of the Perplexed II - l 24 7 He means to say thereby that these things move other things, and, when moving the latter, are themselves moved by other things. This is manifest with regard to all the things that have an intermediate status as far as causing to move is concerned. Now we find that there exists a thing that is moved and does not at all cause to move; this is the last of the moved things. It follows accordingly that there must exist a mover that is not moved at all; this is the first mover.11 And inasmuch as no | motion is possible in it, it is not divisible and not a body, and it does not fall under time, as has become clear in the preceding demonstration.
A third philosophic speculation about this subject is taken over from Aristotle’s argumentation, even though he sets it forth with a view to another purpose. This is how the argument is ordered. There is no doubt that there are existent things. These are the existent things that are apprehended by the senses. Now there are only three possible alternatives,12 this being a necessary division: namely, either no existents are subject to generation and corruption, or all of them are subject to generation and corruption, or some of them are subject to generation and corruption whereas others are not. Now the first alternative is clearly absurd, for we perceive many existents that are subject to generation and corruption. The second alternative is likewise absurd, the explanation of this being as follows: if every existent falls under generation and corruption, then all the existents and every one of them have a possibility of undergoing corruption. Now it is indubitable, as you know, that what is possible with regard to a species must necessarily come about. Thus it follows necessarily that they, I mean all existents, will necessarity undergo corruption. Now if all of them have undergone corruption, it would be impossible that