The third opinion is that of Aristotle, his followers, and the com¬ mentators of his books. He asserts what also is asserted by the people belonging to the sect that has just been mentioned, namely, that something endowed with matter can by no means be brought into existence out of that which has no matter. He goes beyond this by saying that the heaven is in no way subject to generation and passing-away. His opinion on this point may be summed up as follows. He thinks that this being as a whole, such as it is, has never ceased to be and will never do so; | that the permanent thing not subject to generation and passing-away, namely, the heaven, likewise does not cease to be; that time and motion are perpetual and everlasting and not subject to generation and passing-away; and also that the thing subject to generation and passing-away, namely, that which is beneath the sphere of the moon, does not cease to be. I mean to say that its first matter is not subject in its essence to generation and passing-away, but that various forms succeed each other in it in such a way that it divests itself of one form and assumes another. He thinks furthermore that this whole higher and lower order cannot be corrupted and abolished, that no innovation can take place in it that is not according to its nature, and that no occurrence that deviates from what is analogous to it can happen in it in any way. He asserts — though he does not do so textually, but this is what his opinion comes to — that in his opinion it would be an impossibility that will should change in God or a new volition arise in Him; and that all that exists has been brought into existence, in the state in which it is at present, by God through His volition; but that it was not produced after having been in a state of nonexistence. He thinks that just as it is impossible that the deity should become nonexistent or that His essence should undergo a change, it is impossible that a volition should undergo a change in Him or a new will arise in Him. Accordingly it follows necessarily that this being as a whole has never ceased to be as it is at present and will be as it is in the future eternity.8 This is a summary and the truth of these opinions. They are the opin¬ ions of those according to whom the existence of the deity for this world 8. Or: the future time.
has been demonstrated. Those who have no knowledge of the existence of the deity, may He be held sublime and honored, but think that things are subject to generation and passing-away through conjunction and separation due to chance and that there is no one who governs and orders being, are Epicurus, his following, and those like him, as is related by Alexander.9 It is useless for us to mention these sects. | For the existence of the deity has already been demonstrated, and there can be no utility in our mention¬ ing the opinions of groups of people who built their doctrine upon a founda¬ tion the reverse of which has been demonstrated as true. Similarly it is useless for us to wish to prove as true the assertion of the people holding the second opinion, I mean that according to which the heaven is subject to generation and passing-away. For they believe in eternity; and there is, in our opinion, no difference between those who believe that heaven must of necessity be generated from a thing and pass away into a thing or the belief of Aristotle who believed that it is not subject to generation and corruption. For the purpose of every follower of the Law of Moses and Abraham our Father or of those who go the way of these tw o is to believe that there is nothing eternal in any way at all existing simultaneously with God; to believe also that the bringing into existence of a being out of nonexistence is for the deity not an impossibility, but rather an obligation, as is deemed likewise by some10 of the men of speculation.
After we have expounded those opinions, I shall begin to explain and summarize the proofs of Aristotle in favor of his opinion and the motive that incited him to adopt it.
CHAPTER 14 Ido not need to repeat in every chapter that I compiled this Treatise for your benefit only because of my knowledge of your achievements. I do not need to set forth in every passage the text of the discourse of the philosophers, but only their intentions. I shall not write at length, but only draw your attention to the methods that they aim at, as I did for you regarding the opinions of the Mutakallimun. I shall pay no attention to anyone who besides Aristotle has engaged in speculative discourse, for it is his opinions that ought to be considered. And if there are good grounds for refuting him or raising doubt with regard to these opinions as to some point on which 9. On this reference to Alexander of Aphrodisias, cf. Translator’s Introduction. 10. Or: one.
286 The Guide of the Perplexed II • 14 [30a we make a refutation or | raise doubts, these grounds will be even firmer and stronger with respect to all the others who disagreed with the funda¬ mental principles of the Law.
I say then that Aristotle asserts that motion is not subject to generation and passing-away — he means motion in the absolute sense. For he says that if a motion is produced in time, it should be considered that everything that is produced in time is preceded by a certain motion, namely, that con¬ sisting in its passage to actuality and its being produced after it had been nonexistent. Consequently a motion exists, namely, the motion by means of which the latter motion was brought into being. Consequently the first motion must of necessity be eternal or else the series will go on to infinity. Likewise in conformity with this principle, he asserts furthermore that time is not subject to generation and passing-away. For time is consequent upon, and attached to, motion, and there is no motion except in time 5 and again time cannot be intellectually conceived except through motion, as has been demonstrated. This is a method of his by means of which the eternity of the world is necessarily inferred.
A second method of his: He asserts that the first matter, which is common to the four elements, is not subject to generation and passing-away. For if the first matter were subject to generation, it would have to have a matter out of which it would be generated. And it necessarily would follow that the generated matter would have to be endowed with form, for the latter is the true reality of generation. But we have assumed that the matter in question was matter not endowed with form. Now such matter necessarily must not be generated from some thing. It is consequently eternal and not liable to be destroyed. These considerations too render obligatory the eternity of this world.
A third method of his: He asserts that the matter of the heaven as a whole has no contraries, for circular motion has no contrary, as has been made clear; and there are contraries only in rectilinear motion, as has been demonstrated. He asserts further that in everything that passes away, the cause of its passing-away consists in there being contraries in it. Accordingly as there are no contraries in the sphere, it is not subject to passing-away. | Now what is not subject to passing-away is likewise not subject to gen¬ eration. He thus stated several propositions in an absolute manner and explained them. These propositions are: Everything that is subject to generation is subject to passing-away.
Everything that is subject to passing-away is subject to generation.
Everything that has not been generated will not pass away.
Everything that will not pass away has not been generated.
This too is a method that renders obligatory the eternity of the world, which he wishes to establish.
A fourth method: He asserts that with respect to everything that is produced in time, the possibility of its being produced precedes in time the production of the thing itself. And similarly with respect to everything that changes, the possibility of its changing precedes in time the change itself. From this premise he made a necessary inference as to the perpetuity of circular motion, its having no end and no beginning. His later followers in their turn made it clear by means of this premise that the world was eternal. They said: Before the world came into being, its production in time must have been either possible or necessary or impossible. Now if it was necessary, the world could not have been nonexistent. If its production in time was impossible, it could not be true that it ever would exist. And if it was possible, what was the substratum for this possibility? For there indubitably must be an existent thing that is the substratum of this possibility and in virtue of which it is said of the thing that it is possible. This is a very power¬ ful method for establishing the eternity of the world. However, an intelli¬ gent man from among the later Mutakallimun thought that he had solved this difficulty. He said: Possibility resides in the agent and not in the thing that is the object of action. This, however, is no reply, for there are two possibilities. For with respect to everything produced in time, the possibility of its being produced precedes in time the thing itself. And similarly in the agent that produced it, there is the possibility to pro¬ duce that which it has produced before it has done so. These are indubit¬ ably two possibilities: a possibility in the matter to become that particular thing, and a possibility in the agent to produce that particular thing. These are the most important of the methods followed by Aristotle in | establishing the eternity of the world by starting from the world itself.
There also are methods set forth by those who came after him, methods that they derived from his philosophy and by which they established the eternity of the world by starting from the deity, may His name be sublime.
One of them is as follows. They say that if God, may His name be sublime, has produced the world in time after its having been nonexistent, God must have been an agent in potentia before He had created the world; and after He had created it, He became an agent in actu. God had therefore 288 The Guide of the Perplexed II • 14 [ 51 b passed over from potentiality to actuality. Consequently there had been in Him, may He be exalted, a certain possibility and there indubitably must have been in His case something that caused Him to pass over from potenti¬ ality into actuality. This also is a great difficulty. Every intelligent man ought to reflect concerning its solution and the disclosing of its secret.
Another method. They say: An agent acts at one time and does not act at another only because of the impediments or incentives that may supervene upon him or in him. For the impediments may render necessary the nonaccomplishment of a certain action that the agent wishes to accom¬ plish, and on the other hand the incentives may render necessary a certain wish that the agent did not have before. Now as the Creator, may His name be sublime, has no incentives necessitating the alteration of a will, nor hindrances or impediments that supervene and cease to exist, there is no reason in respect of which He should act at one time and not act at another; but on the contrary His action exists, just as His permanence does, per¬ manently in actu.
Another method. They say: His acts, may He be exalted, are most perfect; there is nothing in them that is a defect; there is nothing in them that is without an object or is supererogatory. This is the notion always reiterated by Aristotle,1 who says that nature is wise and does not do anything without an object and that it does everything in the most perfect possible way. They say accordingly: It follows from this that the existent in question 2 is the most perfect existent that is and that it does not serve an end beyond it. | Consequently it is necessary that it should perpetually exist, for His wisdom is perpetual, as is His essence; or rather His essence is His wisdom, which has required the existence of this existent.
All the arguments of the believers in the eternity of the world that you may encounter are ramifications of these 'methods and stem from one of them.
They also say in order to prove that the opposed doctrines are dis¬ graceful: How could the deity, may He be honored and sublime, be idle and not do a thing in any respect whatever or cause a happening to take place in the course of the perdurable pre-eternity, so that whereas He did not do a thing throughout the duration of His existence — which is eternal and unending— He inaugurated that which exists when yesterday came? For if you were to say, for instance, that God created many worlds before this one — their number being that of the mustard seeds required to fill 1. Cf., e.g., De Caelo 1.4.271333; De partibus animalium iv.i3.695bi8.
2. I.e., the world.
32a] The Guide of the Perplexed II • 15 289 the globe of the ultimate sphere — and that each of these worlds has re¬ mained in existence a number of years equal to that of the mustard seeds required to fill it, this, in respect to its status compared to His infinite existence, may He be exalted, would have been as if you were to say that God created the world yesterday. For as soon as we affirm the inauguration of that which exists after nonexistence, there is no difference between one’s positing that this happened hundreds of thousands of years since or at a very recent time. Accordingly this is also a way by means of which those who believe in the eternity of the world prove the incongruity of the opposed doctrines.
They also argue through drawing an inference from what was uni¬ versally admitted in the past among all nations. For this necessitates that this belief is natural and not conventional and that for this reason there was a general consensus regarding it. Thus Aristotle says:3 All men explicitly affirm the perpetuity and permanence of the heavens. And when they became aware that they were not subject to coming-about and passing-away, they asserted that they were the dwelling-place of God, may He be exalted, and of the spiritual beings — he means to say, of the angels. They attributed the heavens to Him in order to indicate their perpetuity. He also sets forth other points of this | kind concerning this subject in order to buttress the opinion, which according to him speculation has shown to be true, by means of universally admitted beliefs.
CHAPTER 15 CHAPTER 15 My purpose in this chapter is to make it clear that Aristotle possesses no demonstration for the world being eternal, as he understands this. Moreover he is not mistaken with regard to this. I mean to say that he him¬ self knows that he possesses no demonstration with regard to this point, and that the arguments and the proofs that he sets forth are merely such as occur to the mind and to which the soul inclines. Alexander1 thinks that they involve a lesser number of doubts. However, Aristotle cannot be 5. Cf. De Caeio i.j.ayobg ff. In Guthrie’s translation, the passage reads as follows: “All men have a conception of gods, and all assign the highest place to the divine, both barbarians and Hellenes, as many as believe in gods, supposing, obviously, that immortal is closely linked with immortal. It could not, they think, be otherwise.”
1. Of Aphrodisias.
2go The Guide of the Perplexed II ■ 15 [ 32 b supposed to have believed that these statements were demonstrations, for it was Aristotle who taught mankind the methods, the rules, and the conditions of demonstration.
What led me to speak of this is the fact that the latter-day followers of Aristotle believe that Aristotle has demonstrated the eternity of the world. Most of the people who believe themselves to philosophize follow Aristotle as an authority in this question and think that everything that he has mentioned constitutes a cogent demonstration as to which there can be no doubt. They regard it as disgraceful to disagree with him or to suppose that some concealed point or some false imagining in one of the issues has remained hidden from him. For this reason I thought that it was indicated to challenge them with regard to their opinion and to explain to them that Aristotle himself did not claim to have a demonstration in this question. Thus he says in the “Akroasis”: All the physicists preceding us believe that motion is not subject to generation and passing-away, except Plato, who believes that motion is subject to generation and passing-away, and | the heaven too according to him is subject to generation and passing-away.2 This is literally what he says. Now it is certain that if there had been cogent demonstrations with regard to this question, Aristotle would not have needed to buttress his opinion by means of the fact that the physicists who preceded him had the same belief as he. Nor would he have needed to make all the assertions he makes in that passage concerning the vilification of those5 who disagree with him and the worthlessness of their4 opinion. For when something has been demonstrated, the correctness of the matter is not increased and certainty regarding it is not strengthened by the consensus of all men of knowledge with regard to it. Nor could its correctness be diminished and certainty regarding it be weakened even if all the people on earth disagreed with it. You will find likewise that Aristotle in “The Heaven and the World,” when embarking upon the explanation that the heavens are not subject to generation and passing-away, states:5 Now after 2. Physics viii.i.25ibi5 ff. The quotation is not exact. 3. Or in the singular.
4. Or in the singular.
5. De Caelo i.i 0.279134 ff. The two passages quoted by Maimonides read as follows in Guthrie’s translation: “Having established so much, let us next decide whether [the world] has been from all time or has had a beginning, and whether it is indestructi¬ ble or destructible. But first let us run over the theories of others, since to expound one theory is to raise the difficulties involved in its contrary. At the same time also the arguments which are to follow will inspire more confidence if the pleas of those who dispute them have been heard first. It will not look so much as if we are procuring judgment by default. And indeed it is arbiters, not litigants who are wanted for the obtaining of an adequate recognition of the truth.” The Arabic translation of De Caelo can be shown to be accountable for the differences between Maimonides’ quotations and the Greek text. Cf. Translator’s Introduction.
33 a] The Guide of the Perplexed II 15 291 this we wish also to investigate the heavens. We shall accordingly say: Do you regard them as generated from some thing, or not 5 are they liable to pass away or can they not at all pass away? After assuming this question to have been posed, he desired to mention the arguments of those who assert the heavens to be generated, and accordingly continues literally as follows. He says: If we do this,6 our words will be more acceptable for, and more worthy of approval by, those who proceed correctly in speculation, and more particularly if they have first heard the arguments of those who disagree with us. For if, without mentioning the arguments of those who disagree with us, we only mention our opinion and our arguments, these7 would appear too weak to be accepted by the listeners. It behooves him who wishes to judge according to the truth not to be hostile to those who disagree with him, but to be friendly to, and equitable toward, them — meting out the same measure in granting that their arguments were correct as he would with regard to his own arguments. This is literally the discourse of the man.
Consequently, 0 community of people who are engaged in speculation, after this introduction, can any blame remain attached to that man, and can anyone think after reading these words | that he had found a demonstration with regard to this question? For can anyone, much less Aristotle, imagine that the readiness to accept a thing that is demonstrated would be feebler if the arguments of those who disagree with it were not heard first? Moreover, there is the fact that he stated8 that this doctrine9 was an opinion and that his proofs10 in favor of it were mere arguments.
Can Aristotle have been ignorant of the difference between mere arguments and demonstrations, as well as between opinions, which when thought about may be accepted to a greater or lesser extent, and things of demonstration? Furthermore, does one need in demonstration that rhetori¬ cal statement, which he has made by way of introduction, that one should be equitable toward the adversary in order to strengthen one’s opinion? No; rather his whole purpose is to make it clear that his opinion is more correct than the opinions of those who disagree with him — that is, those who claim that philosophic speculation leads to the belief that the heavens are subject to generation and passing-away, but that they have never been 6. I.e., set forth the arguments of those who believe in the generation of the heavens.
7. Or: our opinion. 8. In the passage just quoted.
9. That of the eternity of the world.
10. Maimonides refers to the term hujaj used in the Aristotelian passage just quoted. This term does not necessarily imply an absence of cogent demonstration. It only does so if it is opposed, as it is by Maimonides, to the term burhdn (demonstration).
2<)2 The Guide of the Perplexed II • 15 [536 nonexistent, or that they have been generated but will not pass away, and whatever other of these opinions he mentions. Now this is indubitably correct. For his opinion is nearer to correctness than the opinions of those who disagree with him in so far as inferences are made from the nature of what exists. However, we do not think so,11 as I shall make clear. But passions get the better of all sects, even of the philosophers. Consequently the latter wish to establish as a fact that Aristotle produced a demonstration with regard to this question. Perhaps, according to their opinion, Aristotle produced a demonstration with regard to this question without being aware of having done so, so that attention was called to this only after him. As for me, I have no doubt that the opinions mentioned by Aristotle with regard to these subjects — I mean such opinions as that concerning the eternity of the world and that concerning the cause of the difference of the motions of the spheres and the ordered arrangement of the intelligences — are none of them provided with a demonstration. And Aristotle never at any time had the fantasy that what he said in this connection constituted a demonstration. On the contrary, he thought, as he says, that the gates of the ways to inferential reasoning | on these matters are closed before us and that we have at our disposition no principle pertaining to them from which to start to draw inferences. You know the text of his words, which reads as follows:12 As for the matters concerning which we have no argu¬ ment or that are too great in our opinion, it is difficult for us to say: Why is this so? For instance, when we say: Is the world eternal or not? This is literally what he says. However, you know Abu Nasr [al-Farabl’s] interpreta¬ tion of this example,13 what he made clear with regard to it, as well as the fact that he considered disgraceful the notion that Aristotle could have doubted of the eternity of the world. He had an extreme contempt for Galen because of the latter’s saying that this was an obscure question with regard to which no demonstration is known. As Abu Nasr holds, it is clear and manifest, being proved by demonstration, that the heavens are eternal whereas that which is within them is subject to generation and passing- away.
To sum up: Nothing in the methods that we have set forth in this chapter is capable either of establishing an opinion as correct or of proving it false or of arousing doubts with regard to it. And we have advanced the 11. The meaning may be either that Maimonides does not agree with Aristotle’s doctrine regarding the eternity of the world or that he does not think that in this matter “inferences from the nature of what exists” should be used as demonstrative proofs.
12. Topica i.n.io4bi5 ff. The quotation is by and large accurate.
13. The passage of al-Farabl to which reference is made has not yet been identified.
things we have only because we know that the majority of those who consider themselves as perspicacious, even though they have no under¬ standing of anything in the sciences, decide simply that the world is eternal through acceptance of the authority of men celebrated for their science who affirm its eternity, whereas they reject the discourse of all the prophets, because their discourse14 does not use the method of scientific instruction, but that of imparting reports coming from God. Only a few favored by the intellect have been guided aright through this second method. As for what we desire in regard to the subject of the creation of the world according to the opinion of our Law, I shall speak of it in chapters that will follow. | CHAPTER 16 This is a chapter in which I shall explain to you what I believe with regard to this question. After that I shall give proofs for what we desire to maintain. I say then with regard to all that is affirmed by those Mutakal- limun who think that they have demonstrated the newness of the world, that I approve of nothing in those proofs and that I do not deceive myself by designating methods productive of errors as demonstrations. If a man claims that he sets out to demonstrate a certain point by means of sophisti¬ cal arguments, he does not, in my opinion, strengthen assent to the point he intends to prove, but rather weakens it and opens the way for attacks against it. For when it becomes clear that those proofs are not valid, the soul weakens in its assent to what is being proved. It is preferable that a point for which there is no demonstration remain a problem or that one of the two contradictory propositions simply be accepted. I have already set forth for your benefit the methods of the Mutakallimun in establishing the newness of the world, and I have drawn your attention to the points with regard to which they may be attacked. Similarly all that Aristotle and his followers have set forth in the way of proof of the eternity of the world does not constitute in my opinion a cogent demonstration, but rather arguments subject to grave doubts, as you shall hear. What I myself desire to make clear is that the world’s being created in time, according to the opinion of our Law — an opinion that I have already explained — is not