2$4 The Guide of the Perplexed II • 17 [546 impossible and that all those philosophic proofs from which it seems that the matter is different from what we have stated, all those arguments have a certain point through which they may be invalidated and the inference drawn from them against us shown to be incorrect. Now inasmuch as this is true in my opinion and inasmuch as this | question — I mean to say that of the eternity of the world or its creation in time — becomes an open ques¬ tion, it should in my opinion be accepted without proof because of prophecy, which explains things to which it is not in the power of speculation to accede. For as we shall make clear, prophecy is not set at nought even in the opinion of those1 who believe in the eternity of the world.
After I have made it clear that what we maintain is possible, I shall be¬ gin to make it prevail2 likewise, by means of speculative proof, over any other affirmations 3 I refer to my making prevail the assertion of creation in time over the assertion of eternity. I shall make it clear that just as a cer¬ tain disgrace attaches to us because of the belief in the creation in time, an even greater disgrace attaches to the belief in eternity. I shall now start to bring into being a method that shall render void the proofs of all those who prove by inference the eternity of the world.
CHAPTER 17 CHAPTER 17 In the case of everything produced in time, which is generated after not having existed — even in those cases in which the matter of the thing was already existent and in the course of the production of the thing had merely put off one and put on another form — the nature of that particular thing after it has been produced in time, has attained its final state, and achieved stability, is different from its nature when it is being generated and is beginning to pass from potentiality to actuality. It is also different from the nature the thing had before it had moved so as to pass from poten¬ tiality to actuality. For example, the nature of the feminine seed, which is the blood in the blood vessels, is different from the nature of this seed as it exists in the state of pregnancy after it has encountered the masculine sperm and has begun to move toward the transition from potentiality to actuality. And even at the latter period, its nature is different from the nature of an animal that, after having been born, achieves perfection.
1. Or: of him. i. Literally: that it outweighs.
356] The Guide of the Perplexed II • 17 295 No inference can be drawn in any respect from the nature of a thing after it has been generated, has attained its final state, and has achieved stability | in its most perfect state, to the state of that thing while it moved toward being generated. Nor can an inference be drawn from the state of the thing when it moves toward being generated to its state before it begins to move thus. Whenever you err in this and draw an inference from the nature of a thing that has achieved actuality to its nature when it was only in potentia, grave doubts are aroused in you. Moreover, things that must exist become impossible in your opinion, and on the other hand things that are impossible become necessary in your opinion. Assume, according to an example we have made, that a man of a most perfect natural disposition was born and that his mother died after she had suckled him for several months. And the man,1 alone in an isolated island, took upon himself the entire upbringing of him who was born, until he grew up, became intelligent, and acquired knowledge. Now this child had never seen a woman or a female of one of the species of the other animals. Accordingly he puts a question, saying to a man who is with him: How did we come to exist, and in what way were we generated? Thereupon the man to whom the question was put replied: Every individual among us was generated in the belly of an individual belonging like us to our species, an individual who is female and has such and such a form. Every individual among us was — being small in body — within the belly, was moved and fed there, and grew up little by little — being alive — until it reached such and such limit in size. Thereupon an opening was opened up for him in the lower part of the body, from which he issued and came forth. Thereupon he does not cease growing until he becomes such as you see that we are. Now the orphaned child must of necessity put the question: Did every individual among us — when he was little, contained within a belly, but alive and moving and growing— did he eat, drink, breathe through the mouth and nose, produce excrements? He is answered: No. Thereupon he indubitably will hasten to set this down as a lie and will produce a demonstration that all these true statements are impossible, drawing inferences from | perfect beings that have achieved stability. He will say: If any individual among us were deprived of breath for the fraction of an hour, he would die and his movements would cease. How then can one conceive that an individual among us could be for months within a thick vessel surrounding him, which is within a body, and yet be alive and in motion? If one of us were to swallow a sparrow, 1. According to Ibn Tibbon, the father is meant. However, several Arabic manuscripts have “men,” in the plural. This reading is adopted by Ibn Falquera and by Alharizi.
2^6 The Guide of the Perplexed II ■ 17 [36c that sparrow would die immediately upon entering the stomach, and all the more the underbelly. Every individual among us would undoubtedly perish within a few days if he did not eat food with his mouth and drink water; how then can an individual remain alive for months without eating and drinking? Every individual among us, if he had taken food and had not given off excrements, would die in very great pain within a few days; how then could the individual in question remain for months without giving off excrements? If the belly of one of us were perforated, he would die after some days; how then can it be supposed that the navel of the fetus in question was open? How is it that he does not open his eyes, put out his palms, stretch his feet, while all the parts of his body are whole and have no defect as you thought? Similarly all the analogies 2 will be carried on in order to show that it is in no respect possible that man should be generated in that manner.
Consider this example and reflect upon it, you who are engaged in speculation, and you shall find that this is exactly our position with regard to Aristotle. For we, the community of the followers of Moses our Master and Abraham our Father, may peace be on them, believe that the world was generated in such and such manner and came to be in a certain state from another state and was created in a certain state, which came after another state. Aristotle, on the other hand, begins to contradict us and to bring forward against us proofs based on the nature of what exists, a nature that has attained stability, is perfect, and has achieved actuality. As for us, we declare against him that this nature, after it has achieved stability and perfection, does not resemble in anything the state it was in while in the state of being generated, and that it | was brought into existence from absolute nonexistence.3 Now what argument from among all that he ad* vances holds good against us? For these arguments necessarily concern only those4 who claim that the stable nature of that which exists, gives an indication of its having been created in time. I have already made it known to you that I do not claim this.
Now I shall go back and set forth for your benefit the principles of his methods and shall show you that nothing in them of necessity concerns us in any respect, since we contend that God brought the world as a whole into existence after nonexistence 5 and formed it until it has achieved perfection as you see it. He said that the first matter is subject to neither 2. In the singular in Arabic. Or: the syllogism.
5. Other possible translations are “privation” and “nothingness.”
4. Or in the singular. 5. Cf. n. 3, this chap.
36^ ] The Guide of the Perplexed II • 17 297 generation nor passing-away and began to draw inferences in favor of this thesis from the things subject to generation and passing-away and to make clear that it was impossible that the first matter was generated. And this is correct. For we do not maintain that the first matter is generated as man is generated from the seed or that it passes away as man passes away into dust. But we maintain that God has brought it into existence from nothing and that after being brought into existence, it was as it is now — I mean every¬ thing is generated from it, and everything generated from it passes away into it; it does not exist devoid of form; generation and corruption termin¬ ate in it; it is not subject to generation as are the things generated from it, nor to passing-away as are the things that pass away into it, but is created from nothing.6 And its Creator may, if He wishes to do so, render it entirely and absolutely nonexistent. We likewise say the same thing of motion. For he has inferred from the nature of motion that motion is not subject to generation and passing-away. And this is correct. For we maintain that after motion has come into existence with the nature characteristic of it when it has become stable, one cannot imagine that it should come into being as a whole and perish as a whole, as partial motions come into being and perish. This analogy7 holds good with regard to everything that is attached | to the nature of motion. Similarly the assertion that circular motion has no beginning is correct. For after the spherical body endowed with circular motion has been brought into being, one cannot conceive that its motion should have a beginning. We shall make a simi lar assertion with regard to the possibility that must of necessity precede everything that is generated. For this is only necessary in regard to this being that is stabilized — in this being everything that is generated, is generated from some being. But in the case of a thing created from nothing, neither the senses nor the intellect point to something that must be preceded by its possibility. We make a similar assertion with regard to the thesis that there are no contraries in heaven. That thesis is correct. However, we have not claimed that the heavens have been generated as the horse and palm tree are. Nor have we claimed that their being composite renders necessary their passing-away as is the case with plants and animals because of the contraries that subsist in them.
The essential point is, as we have mentioned, that a being’s state of perfection and completion furnishes no indication of the state of that being 6. The verb abdaca (to create), of which Maimonides uses a participle, often connotes creation from nothing.
7. Or: “syllogism,” and by extension “reasoning.”
298 The Guide of the Perplexed II • 17 [ 37a preceding its perfection. It involves no disgracefulness for us if someone says that the heavens were generated before the earth or the earth before the heavens or that the heavens have existed without stars or that a particular species of animals has existed without another species being in existence. For all this applies to the state of this universe when it was being generated. Similarly in the case of animals when they are being generated, the heart exists before the testicles — a circumstance that may be ocularly perceived — and the veins before the bones 5 and this is so in spite of the fact that after the animal has achieved perfection, no part of its body can exist in it if any part of all the others, without which the individual cannot possibly endure, does not exist.
All these assertions are needed if the text of Scripture is taken in its external sense, even though it must not be so taken, as shall be explained8 when we shall speak of it at length. | You ought to memorize this notion. For it is a great wall that I have built around the Law, a wall that surrounds it warding off the stones of all those who project these missiles against it.
However, should Aristotle, I mean to say he who adopts his opinion, argue against us by saying: If this existent9 provides no indication for us, how do you know that it is generated and that there has existed another nature that has generated it — we should say: This is not obligatory for us in view of what we wish to maintain. For at present we do not wish to establish as true that the world is created in time. But what we wish to establish is the possibility of its being created in time. Now this contention cannot be proved to be impossible by inferences drawn from the nature of what exists, which we do not set at nought. When the possibility of this contention has been established, as we have made clear, we shall go back and we shall make prevail the opinion asserting creation in time.
In this question10 no way remains open to him except to show the impossibility for the world having been created in time, not by starting from the nature of being, but by starting from the judgments of the intellect with regard to the deity: these being the three methods that I have men¬ tioned to you before.11 By means of these methods they12 wish to prove the eternity of the world, taking the deity as their starting point. I shall accord¬ ingly show you, in a following chapter, how doubts can be cast on these methods so that no proof whatever can be established as correct by means of them.
11. Cf. II 14, methods 5, 6, and 7. 12. I.e., the Aristotelian philosophers.
CHAPTER 18 The first method they mention is the one through which, in their opinion, we are obliged to admit that the deity passed from potentiality to actuality inasmuch as He acted at a certain time and did not act at another time.
The way to destroy this doubt is most clear. For this conclusion neces¬ sarily follows only with regard to everything composed | of matter, which is endowed with possibility, and of form. When such a body acts in virtue of its form after not having acted, there was indubitably in it a thing that was in potentia and afterwards made the transition into actuality. Accordingly it undoubtedly must have undergone the action of something causing it to make this transition. For this premise has been demonstrated only with regard to things endowed with matter. On the other hand, that which is not a body and is not endowed with matter, has in its essence no possibility in any respect whatever. Thus all that it has is always in actu. Accordingly with regard to it, their contention does not necessarily follow 5 and it is not impossible with regard to it that it acts at a certain time and does not act at another time. For in a being separate from matter, this does not imply change or a passage from potentiality to actuality.
A proof of this is provided by the Active Intellect as it is conceived by Aristotle and his followers. For the Active Intellect, on the one hand, is separate from matter; and, on the other, it acts at a certain time and does not act at another time, as Abu Nasr [al-Farabl] has explained in his treatise “On the Intellect.” For there he has set down a statement that runs literally as follows. He says:1 It is clear that the Active Intellect does not always act; rather it acts at a certain time and does not act at another time. This is literally what he says, and it is clearly true. But even if this is so, it cannot be said that the Active Intellect undergoes change or that it was acting potentially and became actual, because it did at a certain time what it did not do before. For there is no relation between bodies and that which is not body and no resemblance in any respect either at the time of their acting or at the time of their abstention from acting. In fact the acts of forms endowed with matter and the acts of a separate being are both called “act” only by equivocation. Hence it does not follow that if a separate being does not accomplish at a certain time the 1. This quotation, which is accurate (or nearly so), occurs in Bouyges’ edition at p. 32, 11. 9-10. See above, I 73, n. 23.
joo The Guide of the Perplexed II • 18 [58a act that it accomplishes later on, it has passed from potentiality to actuality, as we find it to follow in the case of forms endowed with matter. Perhaps, however, someone may think that this speech contains something mis¬ leading. For if the | Active Intellect necessarily acts at a certain time and does not act at another time, this does not result from a certain cause sub¬ sisting in its essence, but from the disposition of the portions of matter. For its action is perpetual with regard to all things properly disposed. Hence if there is an obstacle to this action, this results from a material disposition 2 and not from the Intellect in itself. He who thinks thus should know that our purpose is not to give information as to the cause for which God, may He be exalted, has acted at a certain time and has not acted at another time. We did not pursue this example to a conclusion; we did not say that just as the Active Intellect acts at a certain time and does not act at another time, though it be separate from matter, so God, may He be exalted, can do the same. We have not said this nor drawn this conclusion. If we had done this, it would indeed have been misleading. But the conclusion that we have drawn — and this conclusion is correct — is that though the Active Intellect, which is not a body or a force in a body, acts at one time but does not perform “the same action” at another time — whatever the cause of this may be — it is not said of it that it has passed from potentiality to actuality nor that there subsists possibility in its essence nor that it needs something causing it to make the transition from potentiality to actuality. Thus we are relieved from this great doubt that has been raised against us by him who affirms the eternity of the world. For as for us, we believe that He, may He be exalted, is neither a body nor a force in a body; and hence it does not follow that He changes if He acts after not having acted.
The second method is the one in which eternity is shown to be neces¬ sary because there do not subsist for Him, may He be exalted, any incentives, supervening accidents, and impediments. It is difficult to resolve this doubt, and the solution is subtle. Hear it.
Know that every agent endowed with will, who performs his acts for the sake of something, must of necessity act at a certain time | and not act at another time because of impediments or supervening accidents. To take an example: a man, for instance, may wish to have a house but does not build it because of impediments — if the building materials are not at hand or if they, though being at hand, have not been prepared for receiving the form because of the absence of tools. Sometimes, too, both the materials and the tools are at hand, but the man does not build because he does not 2. The disposition of the body upon which the Active Intellect exerts an action.
39a ] The Guide of the Perplexed II • 18 yoi wish to build since he can dispense with a shelter. If, however, accidents like heat or cold supervene, he is compelled to seek a shelter, whereupon he will wish to build. It has thus become clear that supervening accidents may change the will and that impediments may oppose the will in such a way that it is not executed. All this, however, only occurs when acts are in the service of something that is external to the essence of the will. If, however, the act has no purpose whatever except to be consequent upon will, that will has no need of incentives. And the one who wills is not obliged, even if there are no impediments, to act always. For there is no external end for the sake of which he acts and that wrould render it necessary to act whenever there are no impediments preventing the attainment of the end. For in the case envisaged, the act is consequent upon the will alone.
Somebody might object: All this is correct, but does not the supposition that one5 wishes at one time and does not wish at another time imply in itself a change? We shall reply to him: No, for the true reality and the quiddity of will means: to will and not to will. If the will in question belongs to a material being, so that some external end is sought thereby, then the will is subject to change because of impediments and supervening accidents. But as for a being separate from matter, its will, which does not exist in any respect for the sake of some other thing, is not subject to change. The fact that it may wish one thing now and another thing tomorrow does not constitute a change in its essence | and does not call for another cause; just as the fact that it acts at one time and does not act at another does not constitute a change, as we have explained. It shall be explained later on that it is only by equivocation that our will and that of a being separate from matter are both designated as “will,” for there is no likeness between the two wills. Thus this objection has likewise been invalidated and it has been made clear that no incongruity necessarily follows for us in consequence of this method. As you knowr this was what we desired to achieve.
The third method: It is the one in which they argue the eternity of the world to be necessary because everything, with regard to which Wisdom decides that it should come forth, comes forth at the very moment of the decision. For His wisdom is eternal as is His essence, and in consequence that which necessarily proceeds from it is likewise eternal. This is a very feeble way of going on to an obligatory conclusion. For in the same way as we do not know what was His wisdom in making it necessary that the spheres should be nine — neither more nor less — and the number of the stars equal to what it is — neither more nor less — and that they should be neither 3. Or: God.
3 02 The Guide of the Perplexed II ■ 19 [39& bigger nor smaller than they are, we do not know what was His wisdom in bringing into existence the universe at a recent period after its not having existed. The universe is consequent upon His perpetual and immutable wisdom. But we are completely ignorant of the rule of that wisdom and of the decision made by it. For, in our opinion, volition too is consequent upon wisdom; all these being one and the same thing — I mean His essence and His wisdom — for we do not believe in attributes. You shall hear much about this notion, when we shall speak of providence.4 By looking at the matter in this way, this disgracefulness is thus abolished.
As for Aristotle’s remark that the nations were agreed in past time that the angels dwell in heaven and that the deity is in heaven — something similar occurs in the external meaning of the scriptural texts — this does not serve as an indication of the eternity of the heavens, as he wishes to consider it. But this has been said because it serves as an indication that [ the heaven proves to us the existence of the separate intellects, who are the spiritual beings and the angels, and the heaven proves to us the existence of the deity, who is its mover and its governor, as we shall explain. We shall make it clear that there is no proof indicating to us the existence of the Maker, according to our opinion, like the indication deriving from the heaven.5 The latter also proves, as we have mentioned, according to the opinion of the philosophers, the existence of the Mover of the heaven and His not being either a body or a force subsisting in a body.
After having explained to you that our contention is possible and not — as is thought by him who affirms the eternity of the world — an impossi¬ bility, I shall return in the chapters that will follow, to explaining that our opinion can be shown, by means of speculation, to outweigh the other in the scales and to making manifest the disgraceful consequences necessarily deriving from his opinion.6 CHAPTER 19 It is clear to you from the doctrine of Aristotle, as well as from that of everyone who affirms the eternity of the world, that in his view that which exists has proceeded from the Creator in virtue of a necessity; that He, 4. Cf. Translator’s Introduction.
5. The meaning seems to be that the proof in question is the most convincing of all.
6. The opinion of those who believe in the eternity a parte ante of the world is meant.
40 a ] The Guide of the Perplexed II -19 yoy may He be exalted, is a cause and this world an effect and it was necessary that this should be so. Just as one does not ask with regard to Him, may He be exalted, why He exists or how He exists thus — I mean to say as One and incorporeal — so it may not be asked with regard to the world as a whole why it exists or how it exists thus. For all this, both the cause and the effect, exist thus necessarily, and nonexistence is not possible with regard to them in any respect nor their changing from the way they exist. Hence it follows necessarily from this opinion that of necessity everything must remain permanently as it is according to its nature and that nothing can change as far as its nature is concerned. For according to this opinion, it is impossible that a thing from among the existents should change as far as its nature is concerned. | Accordingly no thing has come into being in virtue of the purpose of One possessing purpose who chose freely and willed that all things should be as they are. For if they had come into being in virtue of the purpose of One possessing purpose, they would not have existed thus before they were purposed.
Now as for us, the matter is clear in our opinion: namely, that all things exist in virtue of a purpose and not of necessity, and that He who purposed them may change them and conceive another purpose, though not absolutely any purpose whatever. For the nature of impossibility is stable and cannot be abolished, as we shall make clear.